Chad Satterlee, 'The Institutional Design of Collectivist Political-Economic Systems: Some Open Questions and Working Answers'
The political economy of modern models of collectivist political-economic systems has focused on the mitigation of negative externalities generated through the disproportionate influence that small classes of profit-appropriating individuals exercise over the political mechanisms in some societies. Other interesting problems, such as (a) the informational problems that could be expected to arise if the democratic mechanism were extended into major and complex areas of economic life, (b) what form those democratic decisions might take, and (c) how the process of institutional reorganisation in these models might proceed, have not received sufficient attention.
This presentation begins to systematically address these problems through the proposed design of a planning mechanism consistent with, and that complements, the basic features of these models. The enterprise as a whole—always posing the question ‘relative to what?’—is framed by an atypical yet interesting normative yardstick.
Venue: Merewether, Seminar Room 498
Date: Tuesday, 7 August, 4:00-5:30pm