

THE STATISTICAL ALCHEMY OF WOMEN'S AND YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT

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The Australian Labor Party's accession to office in March 1983, on the basis of reassuring Keynesian rhetoric, signalled a shift of public priority - 'fight inflation first' gave way to 'jobs, jobs, jobs'. Unemployment has emerged as the public policy challenge of the moment.

Unemployment is a dual problem - both the distribution and rate of unemployment are matters for concern. The distribution of unemployment may be influenced by use of various measures of incentive and disincentive. The rate of unemployment may be reduced by stimulating labour demand within a given labour force; this is the approach of traditional Keynesian expansionary policy. Conversely, the rate of unemployment may be lowered by discouraging labour force participation - segments of the labour force which had been classified 'unemployed' might be encouraged to pursue alternative courses of action leading to their reclassification as 'not in labour force'.¹ This is, in effect, a process of alchemistic statistical redefinition.

Employment policy under successive Fraser governments was largely directed toward readjusting the power relativities of labour and capital. High levels of inflation and unemployment, it was argued, were the result of excessive wage demands; this provided the rationale behind a highly restrictive wages policy, and tolerance of high unemployment as a necessary pressure for movement toward 'economic equilibrium'. In this sense, a high rate of unemployment was an essential component of the general economic strategy.

The Fraser Government's redistributive efforts with respect to unemployment constituted an equally significant component of its employment policy. Two of the several groups in the community suffering a disproportionately high rate of unemployment were singled out for special treatment - youth and women. The major programs affecting youth employment were:

- i) the Commonwealth Rebate for Apprentice Full-time Training (CRAFT), involving the payment of rebates to employers for costs related to the release of apprentices for full-time trade training;
- ii) the Special Youth Employment and Training Program (SYETP), providing direct employer subsidies as an incentive for the hiring of long-term unemployed youth; and
- iii) the Employment Program for Unemployed Youth (EPUY) and School to Work Transition Program, providing income support for youth participating in short-term TAFE training designed to enhance 'employability'.

While EPUY and School to Work Transition had an 'employability' enhancing role, the CRAFT and SYETP schemes were designed to provide direct financial incentives for the hiring of apprentices and young workers. The discriminatory effect of these programs on particular labour market segments has been a matter of considerable debate—for example, a high degree of substitutability between youth and adult female labour has been suggested by the Bureau of Labour Market Research (BLMR)² which has asserted that "... adult females would be the main group to suffer from any increase in the youth employment pool".³ Extreme sex segregation in the labour market, however, suggests that this is not the case, and the BLMR has not convincingly demonstrated its assertion. There is an enormous sex bias evident in labour market programs, in particular in the youth programs themselves. Hoy and Lampe have found that the programs have benefitted young men overwhelmingly relative to young women, despite higher unemployment rates among the latter.⁴ Disaggregated figures on participation in the various youth programs and programs such as CRAFT, where participants are almost exclusively youth, evidence the bias dramatically. CRAFT commands the lion's share of training program expenditure and has the largest number of participants. The BLMR has acknowledged that as "... there are very few female apprentices the benefits of CRAFT would accrue almost entirely to young males."⁵

In contrast to the attempted stimulation of demand for youth labour, the alchemistic approach has been employed in response to the disproportionately high rate of unemployment among women - their participation in the labour force was discouraged. Sawyer has commented that during the Fraser years an ideological shift occurred within the Liberal Party which "... brought to the fore 'market men' who believed strongly in 'traditional' roles for



"I don't like 9% unemployment either, but I can live with it."

women."⁶ There emerged a renewed emphasis on the family with respect to welfare service provision and, in particular the value of full-time maternal care of children. This is predictable during economic recession where the State seeks to contract its own role in welfare provision and shift it increasingly to other social institutions. The family-centred caring and support frequently alluded to in the rhetoric of the Liberal and National

parties depended on the availability of women to provide unpaid labour.⁷ The rapidly rising real value of the Dependent Spouse Rebate during the life of the Fraser Government⁸ is but one concrete expression of its preference with regard to women and employment.

The employment strategy adopted by the current Labor government has important continuities and discontinuities with the Fraser government policy. A case could well be made that it is merely the Coalition's quasi-monetarist rhetoric which has been replaced. It appears that the Keynesian platitudes so abundant during the Labor Party's 1983 election campaign have not been matched by commensurately liberal macroeconomic policy measures. Continuities are also evidenced in the labour market programs currently operating. The

Hawke Government's labour market programs are essentially those of the Fraser Government. While there has been some titular transformation - the Wage Pause Program into the Community Employment Program, for example, SYETP and others into the mooted Private Sector Assistance Program,⁹ and the School to Work Transition Program into the Participation and Equity Program - the approach has been essentially 'more of the same'. CRAFT, perhaps the most regressive program from women's viewpoint, is little changed.

With the establishment of the Committee of Inquiry into Labour Market Programs, there is hope that the Government may embark on the restructuring and reorientation of employment and training programs. However the "... need for continuing restraint in the growth of public expenditure",¹⁰ cited in the Inquiry's terms of reference, seems to preclude any major expansion of the Commonwealth effort in this area. Expenditure on employment and training programs for 1982-83, 1983-84 and 1984-85 (estimated) is shown in Table 1. The significant rise in labour market program expenditure in the Government's first budget has levelled off in its second. Total funds for job creation actually shrink from \$434.1m in 1983-84 to \$411.7m in the 1984-85 Budget with the expiry of the Wage Pause Program.

Table 1: Expenditure on Employment & Training Programs
1982-83 to 1984-85

	1982-83 Actual \$m	1983-84 Actual \$m	1984-85 Estimated \$m
Trade Training	95.4	106.7	122.2
Skills Training	14.8	25.8	36.0
Youth Training	14.3	18.9	23.7
Special Training	31.7	52.8	63.7
Adult Wage Subsidy Scheme	0.4	23.2	40.9
Special Youth Employment Training Program	63.6	120.2	108.9
Wage Pause Program*	152.4	147.5	-
Community Employment Program	-	286.6	411.7
	372.6	781.7	807.1

* Program terminates at end of 1983-84 financial year.

Source: 1984-85 Budget Paper No. 1 - constructed from information pp. 213-218.

However, there is a major apparent discontinuity between Coalition and Labor Government strategy on the distribution of unemployment. The Labor Government's stance on the employment of women, in rhetoric at least, stands in marked contrast to that of the Coalition Government: The Coalition's discouragement of labour force participation among women is not something which could be consciously perpetuated by the Labor Government. In the 1984-85 Budget, however, the

Government extended the Dependent Spouse Rebate to de facto couples thus further reinforcing women's dependence, and benefiting only those families sufficiently affluent to afford a dependent spouse. Through this decision the Government offended conservatives who disapprove of state support for non-legally sanctioned living arrangements, but it also defied feminist opinion and its own rhetoric on women as well.

Further, unless the Government takes positive action to redistribute employment and training program benefits:


- i) inequities within the spread of benefits accruing to program participants, particularly in trade programs, will continue to disadvantage women;
- ii) the 'hidden' unemployed including adult women wishing to re-enter the workforce, a group identified by the Office of Status of Women as receiving least help from existing programs,¹¹ may remain unassisted; and
- iii) job creation schemes which have provided greater opportunity for men than women¹², despite theoretically sound guidelines, will perpetuate existing inequities.

This is well amplified in the BLMR's interim report on the Wage Pause Program.¹³ Program guidelines contained specific measures to ameliorate structural unemployment including amongst the longer-term unemployed, disabled, migrants and Aborigines; projects were expected to give equal employment opportunities to unemployed women and each State was to aim to place equal numbers of males and females in the Program overall.¹⁴ In practice, 29% of placements had been unemployed for less than eight months and possessed no apparent disadvantage.¹⁵ Further, it commented that:

... the available placement data indicates it is highly unlikely that the objective that females should gain an equal number of the jobs created will be met on an Australia-wide basis. Some States may not even place women in proportion to their share of Commonwealth Employment Service (CES) registrants, which is much less than their proportion of the unemployed as measured by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. If this initial situation is sustained it will mean that the Program, instead of assisting women to overcome that comparatively higher ratio of unemployment, will, in fact, exacerbate their relative disadvantage. Of particular concern is the inability of the Program to date to provide more jobs for adult women.¹⁶

Efforts to include a larger number of women in the Wage Pause Program were successful in some States when specific projects were linked to their employment. While a successful strategy in the immediate sense, it was underpinned by explicit acceptance of the prevailing sexual division of labour.¹⁷ The "... sex-segregated labour market cannot be changed merely by administrative requests to individual sponsors".¹⁸

In light of this, extensive revision of the Community Employment Program guidelines,¹⁹ virtually identical to the Wage Pause Program guidelines, is needed. The 'Jobs on Local Roads' segment of the Program, on which \$50m of the \$285m budget for 1983-84 was spent, is expressly exempted from the equal opportunity provisions. The 'Country Towns Water Supply Improvement' segment and repairs and maintenance to Commonwealth property, which were allocated a total of \$40m for 1983-84, are unlikely to create many jobs for women given prevailing occupational segregation.²⁰ Thus the structural bias evident with nearly one-third of Community Employment Program expenditure 'pre-allocated' to labouring/construction activities in 1983-84 perpetuates the classical bias favouring able men in job creation schemes. Labouring/construction projects proposed by local councils must be added to this sum. Unless attempts are made to challenge occupational segregation within CEP, and all other labour market programs, they continue to reinforce women's disadvantage in the labour market.



There is still hope that the Hawke government will redress the lot of women workers and that it will, amongst other initiatives, restructure the Commonwealth's labour market programs and redistribute the benefits accruing therein. With the final report of the Committee of Inquiry into Labour Market Programs due by the end of 1984, fundamental change is expected in 1985. While women are thus less likely to bear the brunt of obvious and overt negative participation strategies, more subtle techniques of discouraging their labour force participation have not been abandoned - inaction is, in this case, a powerful tool.

A New Target: Youth Unemployment and Education

The disadvantage of youth in the labour market is widely recognised and attracts a great deal of media and academic attention relative to other disadvantaged segments of the labour force. Of course, the rate of youth unemployment correlates positively with the rate of labour force participation and negatively with the rate of participation in continued education.²¹ This raises the question: is more schooling and higher education a solution for youth unemployment, either in terms of statistical alchemy (concealing the unemployed) or in terms of a more genuine long-run improvement in labour market opportunities?


Encouraging education participation has often been advocated as an ameliorative strategy for youth unemployment. The Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission (CTEC), the Government's primary source of advice on TAFE and higher education policy, has cast it in the following light:

It is in the interest of the longer term economic and social health of Australia that its most gifted young people undertake higher education. There is also a more immediate advantage. In the short term an increase in education participation by this group would leave employment openings for other young people for whom direct entry to employment, or training in conjunction with employment may well be the best post-school destination. (...) For these reasons policies which encourage young people to lengthen, rather than shorten, their periods of full-time education are in the national interest.²²

The BLMR, in its advocacy, goes so far as to speculate on the relationship between education and productivity:

Actions to increase school participation merit consideration as they meet several objectives. First, although little research has been done in Australia on the relationship between the amount of schooling received and productivity in the workplace, it is reasonable to expect that significant increases in schooling would increase the productivity of young people and thereby offset to a greater or lesser extent the effect of increased relative wages. Such policies also have the benefit of simultaneously reducing the supply of youth labour and thereby alleviating the competition for available jobs.²³

The factors which influence participation have been discussed extensively in CTEC's Learning and Earning, Beswick et. al., Studies of Tertiary Student Finances, and Dept. of Education and Youth Affairs, Youth Policies, Programs and Issues: an Australian Background Paper.²⁴



They work in a complex, interactive manner and may have perverse effects. General uncertainty regarding prospects for employment, for example, will be the major factor in the retention of one student within the education system (shelter effect) and the spur for another to leave and seek work before economic conditions perhaps worsen; other factors will affect the predisposition of the student to pursue one course of action rather than another. Similarly, one young person unable to find work may return to

the education system (discouraged worker effect) while another, for many reasons, may prefer to remain simply unemployed.

The detailed delineation of factors influencing education participation in the CTEC and Beswick reports in particular has a useful descriptive role but the central issues tend to be lost from sight in a sea of elegant multivariate analysis. Three factors stand out as prime considerations in such decisions:

- i) do the education/training options available contain perceived incentives for participation? If little of value or interest is perceived in the options offered, participation will be either unlikely or shortlived;
- ii) do income support benefits and conditions attaching to certain choices enable/induce pursuit of certain courses of action and not others? Anomalous benefit levels and/or conditions will obviously create anomalous incentives;
- iii) does the education system as currently composed have the capacity to absorb large numbers of extra students? That is, what are the structural 'capacity' limitations to participation in post-compulsory education.

Perception of further education as an attractive and worthwhile endeavour is significantly shaped by past experience. CTEC comments that ".... there is ample research evidence that many young people so actively dislike the educational experience which they have had that they are resistant to further study";²⁵ and the Beswick report agrees that ".... at both tertiary and secondary level, the negative incentive value of much educational experience cannot be neglected as a point of concern if participation is to be improved."²⁶ Such points were already being made strongly by, amongst others, the Australian Government Commission of Inquiry into Poverty in the mid 1970s:

A disturbing finding that emerged from our commissioned research reports was that the school experiences of early leavers were generally unfavourable ... many of these young people stated that they had left school with 'strong negative emotion about schooling, sometimes reaching the point of explosion in frustration'. (...) Though such deep alienation from school was largely confined to those in the sample who left school early, we found that the sample as a whole viewed their schooling as 'an essentially ambiguous experience'.²⁷

The need for major qualitative change in the services delivered by educational institutions - in particular, schools - is implied. This need has been obvious for some time. The Government's Participation and Equity Program (PEP) partly addresses this need, being designed to achieve " ... wide ranging changes in schools which will enable them to give all students a rewarding, useful education through to the end of schooling";²⁸ \$45m was allocated to schools under PEP for 1984.²⁹ While it is a start, one might reasonably doubt whether such a small allocation can bring about sufficient change to positively transform the average Australian student's

experience of school. In the short term the 'dissatisfaction disincentive' may be discounted as increasing numbers of young people choose to remain at school rather than venture into an inhospitable labour market; however its significance in the longer term should not be underestimated.

The need for revision of the current structure of income support for youth has also been long recognised. The lower levels of benefits and disparate definitions of dependence for those pursuing post-compulsory education compared to those unemployed and seeking work creates obvious anomalies. Quite apart from the perverse relativities evident, the adequacy of even the highest benefit - that covering the unemployed over 17 years of age - must be questioned. Designed during a period of economic buoyancy when periods without work were typically short and job openings abundant, it is now expected to be adequate for lengthy periods of unemployment with a high jobless to vacancy ratio. Students, meanwhile, are expected to subsist on lesser amounts for several years, if they are fortunate enough to qualify for income support at all.

Several proposals for restructuring income support for youth have been canvassed in Income Support for Young People,³⁰ a discussion paper prepared by the Office of Youth Affairs and the Social Welfare Policy Secretariat. It is in this area in particular that many expected action from the Government in the 1984-85 Budget. With TEAS declining in real terms, and both TEAS and ASEAS declining as a proportion of unemployment benefit in 1984, students looked for adoption by the Government of one of the more generous reform packages proposed in Income Support for Young People. Slight increases in student allowances were announced in the 1984 Budget, but the Government has further delayed consideration of the discussion paper's options until 1985.



Finally, there are the structural limits to participation. An additional \$10m was allocated for 1984 to finance additional university and CAE places;³¹ CTEC has been directed to give particular weight to proposals which might "... increase the participation of Australians from disadvantaged groups (including Aboriginals, migrants, low income groups, women and the handicapped), especially those who live in outer metropolitan areas."³² CTEC has responded with the comment that:

... the initial step taken by the Government in relation to higher education - the provision of an additional \$10 million in recurrent funds in 1984 for 3,000 new places - will, on its own, be insufficient to provide the base needed for sound future development. (...) Nor is there firm commitment to meeting the longer term costs of the levels of participation that the Government's announced policies imply.³³

Moreover:

... the Government's objective of increased participation by disadvantaged groups can only be achieved successfully if opportunities for all Australians are increased. We should seek to avoid the need for a policy which would increase participation by disadvantaged groups by reducing opportunities for those who now have them.³⁴

CTEC has thus responded sceptically regarding the extent to which marginal increases in funding can achieve increased participation; higher education lobby groups have reacted similarly and have charged the Government with tokenism. They further point out that higher education institutions have admitted more students than their funded quotas allow in response to high demand for places, with a consequential decline in per student funding.³⁵

Demand for tertiary places is persistent and, with increasing school retention rates, is likely to increase further. Excess demand for 1984 enrolment in the TAFE and higher education sectors has been estimated at well over 110,000 places,³⁶ and even allowing for those who did not meet prevailing entry standards and/or applied knowing they would accept employment in preference to a tertiary place, the number turned away is substantial. Yet while the Government continues to churn out participation rhetoric, the Minister for Education, Senator Ryan, has warned tertiary institutions not to expect large funding increases: "... economic circumstances will not permit lavish spending. Nor is it desirable"³⁷ It appears that the 'crisis of capacity' being experienced by the tertiary system with the Government pushing the 'participation' barrow without constructing policy to facilitate it, will not be resolved in the near future.

It must be borne in mind that the Labor Government's objective of increased education participation is:

... being pursued in the context of the overall review of youth policies being undertaken by the Government with the assistance of the OECD, aimed at providing young people with a range of options in education, training, employment and community activities...³⁸

In a sense the Government's entire youth policy might be said to be in the pending tray until this review is executed. But if one extrapolates from measures taken and challenges avoided to date, there is cause for alarm. While the Government is willing to depart from its own platform and increase the recurrent funding of private schools in order to hose down the politically damaging State Aid debate, it is unwilling to take far-reaching action on fundamental issues of educational equity and institutional capacity.

Braverman has commented that the postponement of school leaving to an average age of eighteen became indispensable for keeping unemployment in the U.S. within reasonable bounds.³⁹ Kumar points out that this is not a new phenomenon - during the Depression, for example, many American states legislated to restrict the labour force participation of youth, forcing many of them back into the education system.⁴⁰ The impingement of economic imperatives on the education system has not been confined to management of

aggregate labour supply and demand - Galbraith has argued that:


Modern higher education is... extensively accommodated to the needs of the industrial system. The schools and colleges of business administration ... are preparatory academies for the technostructure. The great prestige of the pure and applied sciences and mathematics in modern times, and the support accorded them, reflect the needs of the technostructure. The ample sums available for research and related graduate training in these areas reflect specific adaptation to such need, whereas the less prestige and lesser support for the arts and humanities suggest their inferior role (...). Such is the influence of the industrial system.⁴¹

The thought that educational institutions may be spontaneously responsive, or even manipulated, for other than entirely educationally-motivated reasons should come as no surprise. Indeed, the idea that the education system could be used as a macro-sponge to soak up certain segments of superfluous labour, and then be wrung dry in times of excess labour demand, could well be supported by sound social argument - so much the better that idle time is constructively used, for example in enhancing self-development through further education and/or occupational training.

Concluding Comments

A broader consideration involves the Fraser Government's discouragement of the labour force participation of women in conjunction with the current Labor Government's similar strategy with youth. It can be argued plausibly that these strategies have been pursued essentially because of slack labour demand. The current level of unemployment is not

wholly due to cyclical economic downturn - a substantial (but undetermined) proportion is attributable to profound labour-shedding structural change. Will specific segments of the labour force be progressively and permanently sloughed off as a strategy to cope with such structural change?




The equity considerations involved are significant. Depending on the ultimate evolution of the distribution of income, those sectors 'excluded' temporarily or permanently from the labour force could become either an adequately-fed and housed leisured class or a socially and economically marginalised mass. It seems that it is the latter which is the likely social prognosis. Whatever the case, it is inequitable to require particular segments of society to bear a disproportionate share of the long term decline in labour market opportunity. It is important that these long-run problems should not be concealed with politically expedient short-term policy.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Unemployed persons are those aged 15 and over who were not employed during the survey week, and (a) had actively looked for full-time or part-time work at any time in four weeks up to the end of the survey week and: (i) were available for work in the survey week, or would have been available except for temporary illness (i.e. lasting for less than four weeks to the end of the survey week); or (ii) were waiting to start a new job within four weeks from the end of the survey week and would have started in the survey week if the job had been available then; or (b) were waiting to be called back to a full-time or part-time job from which they had been stood down without pay for less than four weeks up to the end of the survey week (including the whole of the survey week) for reasons other than bad weather or plant breakdown."
"Persons not in the labour force are those who, during the survey week, were not in the categories employed or unemployed as defined... They include persons who were keeping house (unpaid), attending an educational institution (school, university, etc.) retired, voluntarily inactive, permanently unable to work, inmates of institutions (hospitals, gaols, sanatoria, etc.), trainee teachers, members of contemplative religious orders, and persons whose only activity during the survey week was jury service or unpaid voluntary work for a charitable organisation."
Australian Bureau of Statistics, The Labour Force, Australia, May 1983, Explanatory Notes, pp. 1-2.
2. Bureau of Labour Market Research, Youth Wages, Employment and the Labour Force, (AGPS: Canberra, 1983) pp. 85-91.
3. Ibid., p. 104.
4. M.A. Hoy & G.L. Lampe, "Women in National Training and Employment Programs", cited in ibid., p. 25.
5. Ibid., p.25
6. M. Sawyer, "From the Ethical State to the Minimal State: State Ideology in Australia" in Politics, v.18(1), 1983, p.29.
7. Ibid., pp. 28-29
8. P. Saunders, Equity and the Impact on Families of the Australian Tax-Transfer System, (Institute of Family Studies: Melbourne, 1982), p.27.
9. National Economic Summit Conference, Documents and Proceedings, (AGPS: Canberra, 1983), vol. 1, pp. 175-179.
10. Department of Employment & Industrial Relations, "Terms of Reference for the Review of Labour Market Programs", Canberra, 20 December, 1983, p.1.
11. Office of the Status of Women, "Women's Contribution to Economic Recovery" in ibid., p.239.
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13. BLMR, Public Sector Job Creation: Interim Report on the Wage Pause Program, Interim Report Series No. 1, (AGPS: Canberra, 1984).
14. Ibid., pp. 57-58.
15. Ibid., pp. 147.
16. Ibid., pp. 147-148.
17. Ibid., pp. 150
18. Ibid., p. 148.
19. DEIR, Community Employment Program: Guidelines for Project Sponsors, (Canberra, 1983).
20. Ibid., Section 1 and Attachment B.
21. Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission, Learning and Earning: A Study of Education and Employment Opportunities for Young People, (AGPS: Canberra, 1982), *passim*.
22. Ibid., p.66.
23. BLMR, Youth Wages, *op. cit.*, p. 106.
24. CTEC, *op. cit.*
D. Beswick, M. Hayden & H. Schofield, Studies of Tertiary Student Finances: An Investigation and Review of Policy on Student Financial Assistance in Australia, (AGPS: Canberra, 1983).
Department of Education & Youth Affairs, Youth Policies, Programs and Issues: An Australian Background Paper, (AGPS: Canberra, 1983)
25. CTEC, *op. cit.*, p. 56
26. Beswick et. al., *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13.

27. Australian Government Commission of Inquiry into Poverty, Poverty and Education in Australia, (AGPS: Canberra, 1976), pp. 71-72.
28. Commonwealth Schools Commission Guidelines for 1984 issued by the Minister for Education & Youth Affairs, Senator Hon. Susan Ryan, 28 July, 1983; Appendix A in CSC, Report for 1984, (Canberra, 1983), p.34.
29. CSC, Participation & Equity in Australian Schools: The Goal of Full Secondary Education, (Canberra, 1983), p.32.
30. Office of Youth Affairs and Social Welfare Policy Secretariat, Income Support for Young People, (AGPS: Canberra, 1983).
31. CTEC Guidelines for 1984 issued by the Minister for Education & Youth Affairs, Senator Hon. Susan Ryan, 28 July 1983; Appendix A in CTEC, Report for 1982-84 Triennium: Recommendations for 1984, (AGPS: Canberra, 1983). p.177.
32. Ibid., p. 166.
33. CTEC, Recommendations for 1984, op. cit., p.4
34. Ibid., p.5
35. "Extra Places Won't Improve Access", The Australian, Higher Education Supplement, 30 November, 1983.
36. "60,000 miss TAFE courses", Canberra Times, 28 February 1984, p. 8; and "More than 50,000 fail to get place", Future Age No. 3, 1984, p.9.
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39. H. Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century, (Monthly Review Press: N.Y., 1974), p.439.
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