


Essays in the
**POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
AUSTRALIAN CAPITALISM**
Volume three



Edited by
E.L. Wheelwright & Ken Buckley

H. J. Rade

ESSAYS IN
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'History', said one of the men who founded the modern teaching of the subject at our universities, 'is past politics'. He might have gone further and said that much academic history is present politics dressed up in period costume. Whether he likes it or not, the work of the academic historian reflects the attitudes and views of his class.

E.J. Hobsbawm, 'Where are British Historians Going?' *The Marxist Quarterly*, Two, I (January 1955).

INTRODUCTION

KEN BUCKLEY

IN VOLUME TWO of this series, the main common theme running through the essays was the role of the state, together with an analysis of development and contradictions within the ruling and middle classes in Australia. In the present Volume Three, emphasis is focused upon the working class, especially its separate elements and culture. Also, there is consideration of imperialism here—not only the historical relationship between Australia and Britain, but Australia's own role as a colonial power in Papua New Guinea, as well as the exercise of 'internal colonialism' towards Aborigines within Australia itself.

Class-struggle is a vital concept, but what is class? It is all too easy—and dangerous in political practice—simply to divide society into the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, with an ill-defined and shifting middle class between these two poles. On examination, the poles themselves are found to be unstable at some levels. Bettina Cass, the first contributor to this volume, finds it useful to adopt a schema of three main classes in advanced industrial capitalist society; two of these classes are derived in orthodox Marxist terms from the ownership or non-ownership of property in the means of production, while the third is related to the possession of educational or technical qualifications which confer relative power in the labour market. Further, it is necessary to take account of circumstances in which members of a class may have little awareness of their common interests. Bettina Cass quotes a perceptive passage on the creation of class-consciousness, from E.P. Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class*:

class happens when some men, as a result of common experiences (inherited or shared), feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves, and as against other men whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs. The class experience is largely determined by the productive relations into which men are born—or enter involuntarily.

Of course, Marxist scholars have always differentiated between and within classes. Thirty years ago, Maurice Dobb in his classic *Studies in the Development of Capitalism* pointed out (pp.265-6) that in Britain the survival into the second half of the nineteenth century of the conditions of domestic industry . . . meant that not until the last quarter of the century did the working class begin to assume the homogeneous character of a factory proletariat. Prior to this, the majority of the workers retained the marks of the earlier period of capitalism, alike in their habits and

interests, the nature of the employment relation and the circumstances of their exploitation. Capacity for enduring organization or long-sighted policies remained undeveloped; the horizon of interest was apt to be the trade and even the locality, rather than the class; and the survival of the individualist traditions of the . . . craftsman, with the ambition to become himself a small employer, was for long an obstacle to any firm and widespread growth of trade unionism, let alone of class consciousness . . . By this heterogeneity of a still primitive labour force the dominion of Capital over Labour was augmented.

Dobb's work is in a class of its own. There is no comparable, incisive analysis of the development of Australian capitalism. Nevertheless, the writers in the present volume who examine the fragmentation of Australian society, particularly the cruel divisions in the working class, are clearly operating within a great tradition. The fruits of their work are badly needed, as political commentators about class generally eschew analysis and tend to become ever more hazy (or dogmatic) in their pronouncements the closer they approach to the present day.

John Collins, in his essay, 'Fragmentation of the Working Class', provides a comprehensive framework for study of differentiation within the working class. He begins with a critique of orthodox labour market theory, which itself was refined in the USA in the 1960s to take account of persistently higher levels of unemployment evident among blacks and ethnic groups. These refinements were in terms of (a) the 'human capital theory', which relates differences in income to variations in skills and training; and (b) an orthodox theory of discrimination which attempts, by reference to the employer's discrimination on the basis of race, sex, etc., to explain why two employees with identical skills can nevertheless receive different wages. Also in the 1960s, a number of American economists, observing what actually happened, developed the theory of a dual labour market: a primary sector, where jobs offer good wages and conditions, opportunity for advancement and stability of employment; and a secondary market where the reverse applies. The secondary market is where women and minority groups are much more likely to find employment.

The dual labour market theory, with its emphasis upon job structures, is a substantial advance over previous orthodox theory, and Marxists have adopted the concept of primary and secondary labour markets. However, Collins argues that the concept, like orthodox labour market theory in general, is inadequate in some crucial respects. In particular, it needs to be related specifically to class and to the Marxist notion of the industrial reserve army. Critical to this notion is not only the existence of additional sources of labour which capitalists can readily draw upon at need, but a difference in quality or nature between these fresh sources and the existing workforce in industry. In fact, the sources of the industrial reserve army have changed in the course of time.

During the Industrial Revolution, capitalists in such countries as Britain recruited part of their workforce from the countryside, from the ranks of a disintegrating peasantry. Besides this, there was a spreading

pool of labour which developed from the great increase in population which was a feature of industrial capitalism. In 'new' countries of white settlement outside Europe, there was heavy reliance upon a swollen flood of immigrants. And in the case of the USA there was another big labour source in the black population, 'freed' from slavery in the 1860s. These disparate elements of the labour force, whether recruited from the countryside or from immigrant ethnic groups or blacks, all tended to be bewildered, submissive and divided from each other in the work places. Employers were able to play upon the various differences so as to hinder the growth of working class movements.

In the twentieth century, especially since World War Two, the nature of the industrial reserve army has changed in important respects. The biggest change is the enormous increase in the use of female labour in the workforce. Secondly, there are variations concerning migrant labour. On the one hand, the USA no longer accepts large numbers of immigrants (although Mexicans are allowed in on a temporary basis as a source of cheap labour for Californian agriculture). On the other hand, countries in Western Europe have attracted millions of labourers from Southern and Eastern Europe and North Africa—no longer as prospective permanent immigrants, but as 'guest workers' to be sent back by the host capitalists when no longer needed. Whatever the new source of labour (female or migrant), and irrespective of whether the addition to the workforce is permanent or temporary, the role of segmentation of the labour market remains unchanged in essentials: it is to enhance profit through greater exploitation, to divide the working class and inhibit class consciousness, and to encourage the wider spread of bourgeois ideology, especially in terms of racism and sexism.

In Australia, the problem of distance and cost of travel from Europe militated against adoption of the concept of 'guest workers'; and the old phobias—of 'populate or perish' and the yellow-red-peril—encouraged preservation of patterns of permanent immigration from Europe. Even so, there have been big changes in the sources from which Australian immigrants have been drawn since 1945. The old preponderance of migrants from the United Kingdom gave way to growing numbers from the European continent, especially Italians and Greeks, and then the hunt for migrant labour was extended into fresh areas—even into countries such as Turkey and the Lebanon, where the racial mixture was rather doubtful from the 'White Australia' point of view.*

In analysing the Australian labour market as it exists today, Collins considers a number of different segments characterised not only as primary and secondary but also differentiated in terms of sex and racial or ethnic origin. In the primary labour market itself, where wages, conditions, and opportunities are relatively good and employment is stable, a distinction may be drawn between 'independent' jobs (which

*See also Collins' essay, 'The Political Economy of Post-War Immigration', in Volume One of this series.

often require professional standards) and 'subordinate' jobs of a routine nature in factories and offices. There is a high concentration, in the primary labour workforce, of men who were born in Australia, the United Kingdom, other English-speaking countries and Northern Europe. This is equally true of the 'subordinate' range of jobs in this market, so that the native male white Australians and their social peers constitute an aristocracy of labour with a strong grip on comfortable and secure (though not necessarily skilled or highly paid) jobs, as well as the most attractive jobs. On the other hand, workers born in Southern Europe, Turkey, etc. are heavily concentrated in manual jobs, especially in manufacturing industry, i.e. the secondary labour market, where incomes are permanently lower, conditions generally poor and work discipline harsher.

These broad generalisations need to be qualified by taking account of the position of female workers. Approximately one-third of the total Australian workforce consists of women. They are to be found mainly in commercial and service occupations which generally have the characteristics of the secondary labour market. Relatively few women secure jobs in the primary labour market, except at the level of the 'subordinate' category. However, if women are usually at a disadvantage compared with men, there are degrees of disadvantage among women in the labour market. Whereas women born in Australia or the U.K. figure prominently in 'clean' clerical jobs, migrant women from Southern Europe are much more evident in menial jobs in textile and clothing factories. Finally, as segments in the labour market it is possible to discern Aborigines at the bottom of the heap, with Aboriginal women probably in a worse position than their menfolk—in so far as either sex is able to obtain jobs at all, for according to official estimates in 1977, between one-third and one-half of the entire Aboriginal labour force is unemployed.

The various differences in the labour market are reflected in internal differences within the labour movement, as well as in politics and ideology. Collins urges the necessity to study the divisions, so as to understand them and be in a position to overcome them. One important aspect for examination in the current situation is the high level of unemployment which threatens to be no mere passing phase. *Prima facie*, one would expect workers in the secondary labour market, notably women and migrants, to be worst affected by unemployment, and there are some signs of this. For example, thousands of jobs have disappeared in the clothing and textile industries since 1974 and this must have affected migrant women in particular. Also, many women have simply dropped out of the workforce due to unemployment: married women receive no unemployment benefit pay if their husbands are working, so there is little incentive to register as unemployed. Yet whilst the official figures of registered unemployment do not tell the full story on that side, there are some contradictory trends. Thus it seems that female employment continues to grow, while male employment falls. Perhaps this is

due to greater use of women as part-time employees, but it may instead be due to greater recognition by employers of the advantages of female labour, especially by comparison with less-qualified male school-leavers coming into the secondary labour market at relatively high award rates of wages.

Another factor could be less readiness by young male Australian-born workers to accept every kind of job which may be offered to them than was the case in the depression of the 1930s. Young people today may be affected both by the philosophy of the counter culture and the attitudes of their parents and friends along the lines of assuming that they are members of privileged groups who should not have to do the lowest-grade labouring work.

Whatever the validity of such speculation, there can be no question of the importance of 'Women's Place in the Class Structure'—the title of Bettina Cass's essay. Women are still lagging far behind men in active participation in politics and unions, but the efforts of the various women's liberation groups of the past decade are to be seen not only in an upsurge of activity but also in a sharp analysis of the sources of sexual inequality. Cass herself is able to use and bring into perspective the work of such Australian writers as Anne Summers and Margaret Power.

Historically in Australia, the rightful function and duty of women has been regarded as two-fold: the reproduction of the population, and unpaid domestic labour. As Cass puts it, 'Women's unpaid domestic labour supports, like an infrastructure, the wage-structures and profits of the industrial-capitalist economy'. To the extent that women are also wage-workers in the labour force, sex discrimination in the form of the concept of a 'family wage', embodied in the Harvester judgment of 1907, has ensured that they were paid less than men. The extension of the principle of equal pay in the 1970s has narrowed but not eliminated the difference.

Cass's main concern is with the sex-class position of women. Married women are closely identified with the class position of their husbands: the woman's life-style and social rank are derived from the husband's income and class status. Yet the sex position cuts across class lines. Women are very often proletarian workers in their own households, 'even if their husband's market capacity provides them with the resources to employ household help and serve pizza and scotch to their guests for lunch'. In other words, married women who are not in the paid workforce are economically dependent upon their husbands; and the foundation for women's association with unpaid domestic labour is their assumption of prime responsibility for care of the children. This assumption, together with other aspects of sex stereotypes, is formed and nurtured within the family, at school and in society generally. Women entering the paid workforce generally expect relatively poor jobs in the secondary labour market, although aspirations are changing as a result of the work of the various women's movements. The changes in consciousness are appreciably more evident among middle class than working

class women.

This bald summary does not do justice to Cass's nicely balanced discussion of sex-class. She does not fall into the temptation of categorising women as a class *per se*, but she argues cogently that class analysis alone is not enough. The key to economic differentiation between the sexes lies in the unequal obligation of women towards child-care, which associates the woman with unpaid domestic labour in the home. Cass concludes with the sobering comment that although socialists claim that a change in the relations of production will of itself produce changes in family relationships, in fact women continue to be responsible for child-care in state socialist societies.

Fragmentation of the workforce into male and female workers, skilled and unskilled, native-born and migrant etc. facilitates control by the bourgeoisie. For example, employers can set off one ethnic group of workers against another. It is important for the labour movement to counter such processes but in fact Australians give very little attention to ethnic communities, except fleetingly at election times. Gianfranco Cresciani's essay on 'Italian Anti-Fascism in Australia, 1922-45' provides a fascinating picture of politics in a migrant community. Here, in a fast-moving account, is an authentic flavour of action and excitement, occasionally flaring into episodes of violence as at Ingham in 1928, when anti-Fascists gathered outside a building where Father Salza, an agent of Fascist propaganda, was lecturing; stones were thrown on the tin roof, causing panic in the audience. In the 1920s, Anarchists provided the driving force among Italian anti-Fascists in Australia. In the following decade, leadership passed to Communists who were aided if not guided by the Communist Party of Australia.

Anti-Fascists, a minority in the Italian community in these years, needed all the support they could get from Australians. Instead, conservative governments, taking heed of representations from Italian diplomats, banned anti-Fascist newspapers printed for distribution in the Italian community and discriminated against anti-Fascists in such matters as naturalisation. After all, were not the Fascists the upholders of law and order? As for the Australian Labor Party, some links were established during World War Two between H.V. Evatt and the Movimento Italia Libera, but the movement's influence was undercut by the Roman Catholic Church. Cresciani quotes Archbishop Mannix as saying, at a 1943 rally of Italians in Melbourne: 'Mussolini is the greatest man living today . . .'. And at the same meeting, Arthur Calwell came in on cue to express his opposition to Italia Libera, which was branded as a left wing movement.

Workers, women, migrants, Aborigines: there are degrees of exploitation of oppressed groups but by any rational criteria the Aborigines come out worst. Mervyn Hartwig examines the applicability of the theory of internal colonialism to the case of the Australian Aborigine. The basic problem here is to differentiate racial exploitation from class exploitation in a capitalist society. Hartwig looks at structural-functional

theory and the theory of plural society, and finds them quite inadequate as explanations of the relationship of classes within racial or ethnic groups to the class structure of the society as a whole. On the other hand, the theory of internal colonialism as developed by H. Wolpe is useful as a framework for analysis of the intersection of class with race.

Capitalism, in its relations with colonial societies, often destroys non-capitalist modes of production in those societies. Sometimes, however, it is found more useful to conserve a traditional non-capitalist social structure while exploiting it; and in these cases, Wolpe argues, political and ideological domination by the capitalist state tends to be expressed in racial, ethnic or cultural terms. In effect, exploitation is masked by emphasis upon race in the process of conserving a traditional society, and this can occur within the boundaries of a single state (internal colonialism) as well as in relations between an imperial power and a colony. The clearest example of internal colonialism is South Africa where, in the context of economic exploitation, the ideological focus is on racial or tribal elements—and this is precisely because the capitalist state aims at preserving and controlling ‘tribes’ for its own purposes.

Wolpe’s views were developed without specific reference to situations such as that of the Australian Aborigine, who suffers racial discrimination in a capitalist society which tolerates parallel non-capitalist modes of production only to a very marginal degree. However, Hartwig considers that Wolpe’s theory, with some modifications, can be applied to the case of Aborigines; and in the latter part of the essay, Hartwig gives a sketch of the history of relations between whites and native blacks in Australia, together with the associated supporting ideology. There have been changes in the ideology. Notably, the modern assimilationist model reflects the aim of completely dissolving a primitive mode of production in northern Australia.

Peter Fitzpatrick’s essay on Papua New Guinea is a case study of the way in which an imperial power, while establishing capitalist relations of production in a colony, can find it very useful to preserve elements of a traditional society. Village organisation in PNG not only supplied a certain amount of labour for capitalist plantations but customarily performed functions of social security such as supporting a member of the community in illness, old age or unemployment. This situation, which still obtains, relieves the state of considerable costs which are borne by governments in advanced capitalist countries. Thus it was in the interest of Australian imperialism to preserve native society, provided that this did not unduly limit the supply of labour for capitalist production.

In this context, Fitzpatrick examines colonial regulation of wage labour in PNG. The indenture system, with its compulsion to work and its penal sanctions, was ‘really rather like slavery’, as Lieutenant-Governor Murray put it. Nevertheless, it was hedged around with ‘protective’ restrictions which helped to conserve traditional society. For example, indentured workers must be repatriated to their home villages after periods of not more than 3 or 4 years. The explanation is not to be

found in terms of Australia being a relatively humane coloniser; rather, it was 'a late and little imperialist', to quote Fitzpatrick. As imperial powers went, Australia was relatively weak, and the ruling European caste in PNG was prone to hysterical fear at any sign of organisation or disrespectfulness on the part of the blacks. The attitude that the natives must be kept in their place is well illustrated by Amirah Inglis' study of sexual anxiety and politics in Port Moresby in the 1920s. Consequently, Fitzpatrick argues, the indenture system should be viewed as more than simply a means of maintaining a cheap labour supply by conserving traditional society; it was also aimed at preventing the development of New Guinean organisation outside the traditional framework. With Fitzpatrick's comment that 'migratory labour systems make the class organisation of workers difficult if not impossible', we are back in the mainstream of class analysis.

Fitzpatrick's essay is the first approach to the study of Australian imperialism which has appeared so far in this series. It is a neglected area, and the editors hope to present more such studies in Volume Four. From another angle, David Clark's essay looks at the exploitation of less-developed countries by the more highly developed, through the mechanism of trade rather than investment and the repatriation of profit. Clark, in examining the views expounded by the French writer A. Emmanuel in *Unequal Exchange*, relates those views to the orthodox theory of international trade. Emmanuel's work is a critique of Ricardo's theory—as modified by later neo-classical economists—concerning comparative advantages in international trade which certain countries possess in particular commodities. Emmanuel argues that the orthodox theory does not conform to reality, that whereas it could be expected in terms of the law of comparative advantage that the terms of trade for primary products would improve in course of time, in actual fact this is not so, and there is a category of countries which always exchange a larger amount of their national labour for a smaller amount of foreign labour. In an attempt to explain this situation, Emmanuel applies Marx's value theory to international trade and enunciates a maxim: 'One is not poor because one sells cheaply, one sells cheaply because one is poor'.

As Clark ruefully acknowledges, Emmanuel's argument is intricate. Broadly, it emphasises the growing mobility of capital, which tends to equalise the rate of profit throughout the world; whereas the strength of trade unionism in developed countries acts as a barrier to downward pressure on wages in those countries. Thus disparities in wage levels between various countries are maintained; and because of the international equalisation of the rate of profit, the extra surplus value based upon low wages in peripheral countries goes not so much into higher profits in those countries, as into benefits for consumers in the more highly developed 'centre' countries, expressed in the terms of trade. Implicit in this theory is the view that workers in the centre countries exploit workers in the peripheral countries, and on this score Emmanuel's

work has been attacked by other Marxist scholars.

Clark notes some other points on which Emmanuel is open to criticism but he finds Emmanuel's ideas stimulating and a useful challenge to orthodox theory. At least, this is so in relation to the surplus transfer process between rich and poor countries—the classic imperialist pattern. When Clark explores the applicability of Emmanuel's model to a different type of relationship—Australian development as a British colony highly dependent upon overseas trade—he finds some points of interest. For example, there is a reflection of Emmanuel's views on the equalisation of interest rates, in the fact that the return on Australian colonial government loans in Britain was almost as low as on British government consols in the 1880s (although this was not so at other times). However, Clark concludes that on the whole Emmanuel's work has only limited validity for study of the Australian case. In particular, it is difficult to account in such terms for the fact that real wages in Australia were higher than in Britain in the second half of the nineteenth century. According to Emmanuel's theory, this would suggest that Australian workers, through 'unequal exchange', were exploiting workers in Britain—and that would be an absurd proposition.

The last two essays in this volume are concerned with questions of education and culture in a class society. Ian Turner traverses with some broad sweeps the fields of high culture and the popular arts. He discusses the social bases of the two cultures and examines the separate value-judgments involved in cultural criticism. Modern industrial society—with its changed class relations, new technology and markets—has transformed the pre-industrial patterns of culture. Thus the works of the high arts are still produced by specialists for an élite, but the private patron of the arts has been replaced by a broader, less defined market. And the mass media have taken over popular culture. The two cultures are no longer so sharply distinguishable from each other, yet there remains the assumption (which reinforces class distinction) that only the élite can appreciate high culture. Critics discuss high culture in philosophical or aesthetic terms, whereas popular culture is considered in relation to its political or sociological significance.

Of course, there is much more to popular culture than escapist literature or the 'tops of the pops'. In Australia, the genre includes bush ballads, theatrical entertainment, children's rhymes and spectator sports such as football, where Turner himself is a penetrating observer. He suggests that it is more useful to consider culture than the process of production, when attempting to define the character of a nation or class. Turner argues for a liberatarian Marxist position: cultural creation, the work of the imagination, should not be concerned only with enlightenment or production. For this reason Turner is hopeful about the counter culture, which is against the work ethic and for the right to play—and which aims to subvert existing value systems rather than confront power structures.

On that last point, Helen Palmer would have misgivings. In the course

of her essay on élitism in education she grants the validity of the fundamental critique of schooling expressed by Illyich, yet in her view the young radical who votes against the system with his feet comes from a social group with initial advantages which enable him easily to opt out (and opt in again). Most Australian youngsters are not in this position.

This is merely one example of the way in which Palmer firmly places developments in education in their class context. Since the beginnings of state school systems in nineteenth century Australia, there have been private schools for children of the rulers, and other schools for the offspring of the ruled. The latter schools initially taught only the rudiments of the three Rs. Then came secondary school development and, after World War Two, strong influences tending to raise the level of education and aspirations towards education. These changes were broadly in line with demands for different skills in the economy, but the ruling class faced a growing problem in attempting to justify the poorness of the grade of school training still provided for future labourers. The answer was IQ testing, which purported to select on educational grounds; it appeared to be a scientific means of measuring innate, culture-free qualities, when it was really a device for selecting a small minority of children to fit into the 'better' type of state school.

After tracing the development of IQ testing (the critique of which has not been well known in Australia), Palmer looks at other aspects of élitism in education. As she observes, 'Equality of opportunity, offered to competitors who have unequal starts, merely perpetuates inequalities that already exist'. She takes account of the work of progressive educationists like Montessori, but considers that the fundamental cleft in educational thinking is not between progressive and traditional viewpoints but between those who believe in different forms of education for the rulers and the ruled, and those who want a more egalitarian approach.

The editors of this volume now look forward to preparing Volume Four in the series. Contributions of essays are invited and may be sent to either editor. The essential elements are that the essays be related to Australia, and the approach of the authors should be left-wing, preferably Marxist—using that term in its widest sense. Jargon should be eschewed as far as possible.

Sydney
July 1977

1

WOMEN'S PLACE IN THE CLASS STRUCTURE

BETTINA CASS

In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests, and their culture from those of other classes, and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class.

Karl Marx
18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte
(1852)

The family then, and to this very day, is engaged in a process of production: of babies, of educated and growing children, of adults who will both produce more children and as adult workers produce not only commodities but also surplus value. Seen from this point of view, the family is a factory or a cottage industry for the production and reproduction of labour power. Capitalism cannot manage without it—it is not an accident of history—and very economical it is too, as even socialist countries who have tried to produce its services elsewhere have perhaps discovered ... Women are often involved as proletarian workers in both micro and macro production systems, whereas it is often if not always the case that man is master in one while slave in the other.

Ronald Frankenberg,
'In the Production of their lives',
in Diana Barker & Sheila Allen
*Sexual Divisions and Society:
Process and Change*
(1976), pp.27-8

Sex Class is so deep as to be invisible.

Shulamith Firestone, *The Dialectic of Sex*, p.11.

MEN AND WOMEN in Australian society, as in other advanced industrial societies, are differentiated in their access to economic, political and social power: the bases of this differentiation are class, sex and race. This essay is concerned with the inter-connections between class position and sex position in the generation of inequalities which women experience. Race will not be considered in this account, not because its importance is underestimated, but because the particular manifestations of deprivation, super-ordination and subordination associated with race relations in Australian society require a separate analysis.

In this essay, economic-class position is held to be based upon ownership or non-ownership of property in the means of production, with the further addition of the concept of 'market capacity', or the forms of relative power which individuals bring to their bargaining encounters in the labour market. This leads to the recognition of differentiation in the ranks of the propertyless, based on the possession of marketable skills, usually acquired by education or training. Such qualifications provide the possessor with greater power in labour market relationships: the 'market capacity' to secure higher income, greater security of employment, prospects of career advancement, superannuation rights, in comparison with the relatively less powerful market capacity of those who have only their labour-power to sell. Thus, following Giddens, I adopt a scheme of three possible bases for class structuration in an advanced industrial capitalist society: 'ownership of property in the means of production, possession of educational or technical qualifications, and possession of manual labour-power'.¹ These forms of market capacity, tied to relatively closed patterns of inter- and intra-generational mobility, yield a three class system: an upper, middle and working class within which access to valued material and symbolic goods is unequally distributed. This scheme represents a departure from a Marxian class analysis of ownership/non-ownership of property in the means of production: a departure which provides useful distinctions in a study of women's relationships to the means of production and exchange.

Sex position refers to membership of a sex-class, and the life chances associated with this membership: men and women are differentiated by the division of labour in procreation, which is biological in origin; and by the division of labour in child-rearing, which is social in origin. In all human societies, women give birth to children, and are by custom or law or religious injunction (or by all three) expected to take prime responsibility for their care, while men are empowered to legitimise the wife's children, to provide them with an acknowledged place in the social structure.² Women as the basic commodity of exchange between men,³ women as mothers or potential mothers,⁴ are disadvantaged, because bearing and rearing small children renders them dependent (except in very exceptional circumstances) on the goodwill, protection and resources of men (husbands, brothers, fathers, the quasi-male organisation of the State) for a greater or lesser period of their young

adult lives. In all societies (even in matrilineal societies where group-membership and inheritance are transmitted through the mother), authority, leadership and control of households, lineages and local groups remain with the men.⁵ In complex, differentiated societies, where the apparatuses of the State centralise and delegate the 'legitimate' exercise of force in society, control by men is systematically co-ordinated in government, public administration, the legal system, the military, and in the organisation of the means of production.

It is not sufficient, or analytically fruitful, however, to remain at the level of a-historical, universal, dualistic categories of a sexual division of labour and a sexual division of control. The notion of sex-class is used to denote structured relations of inequality and superordination/subordination between men and women. The general notion of class, however, also implies a process of 'historical formation'—the development of a particular set of material and political conditions within which people who share a common relationship to the means of production, a common relationship to the structure of property-rights and the structure of authority, come to feel an identity of interests grounded in their common experience of deprivation and subordination.⁶ In other words, for sexual differentiation to become the basis for the formation of sex-classes, requires the existence of certain historical conditions, within which women's experience of deprivation and subordination becomes the focus of a shared consciousness, and of political mobilisation to change the relations of dominance and dependence.

The sexual differentiation based on the division of labour in childcare, and on the organisation of productive work within the household, which existed in pre-industrial Europe and European-colonised societies, acquired a particular dimension of *intensification* when married women's life-situation became closely identified with the duty to perform unpaid domestic labour.⁷ 'With the advent of industrial capitalism, the general labour process was split into two discrete units; a domestic, and an industrial unit.'⁸ In pre-industrial European societies, agriculture, commerce, the manufacture of cloth, clothing, foodstuffs, the artisan's workshop, were controlled by the kin group, within the spatial and social boundaries of family relationships within the household. Women—daughters, wives and domestic servants—were full participants in the processes of production, though still subject to the authority of their fathers, husbands and masters.⁹ The gradual removal of the processes of manufacture from the location of the household and from the control of the kin group is commonly attributed to 'industrialization'—to that process whereby manufacture was centralised in factory organisation; controlled by men with accumulated capital, harnessing a mechanised technology to the processes of production, and recruiting 'free' wage-labourers to produce goods for the commodity market.¹⁰

However, before the advent of mechanised, large-scale industrial manufacture, the growth of capitalist commercial enterprise was responsible for a critical change in the organisation of the business 'house'

and the domestic household: the separation of the *budgets* of these productive units—the separation of the book-keeping. It was the organisation of finance and accounting in the households of successful merchants and tradesmen where the separation of household and *enterprise* first emerged.¹¹ With this development, business and commercial activity were finally cut loose from other goals of family life, allowing the systematic accumulation of capital. Such expansion of the enterprise is not possible without the use of rational accounting, which in turn must use an all-purpose medium of exchange—money. Only then can any true calculation of input and output, of profit and loss be made.¹²

Thus, with the separation of the bourgeois household from the commercial enterprise (a gradual process through the seventeenth to the nineteenth century in England and Western Europe) emerged the prototype of the gender differentiation of spheres of life-activities. Men became the guardians of finance and commerce; women became the guardians of the household, where they engaged in the reproduction of children, the management of consumption and household production; the safeguarding of emotion and moral tradition from the incursion of market forces. The process of industrialization was a later stage in the separation of household and production; a stage which crucially affected working-class households, initially drawing not only husbands, but wives and children as well, as family units, into the processes of industrial production.¹³

In a study of domestic labour in Australia, it is essential to recognise the stages in the 'domestication' of women. The various Australian colonies began to industrialize in the 1860s and '70s, but a capitalist mode of production had been flourishing since the first decades of the colony of New South Wales, as a result of successful mercantile enterprise, the accumulation of land-holdings, and the importation of British capital.¹⁴ In the Australian colonies, as in England and Europe, it was the households of the bourgeoisie, and of urban middle class artisans and professional men (with the growth of free immigration after 1830) which provided the prototype of the division between domestic enterprise and business enterprise. In these households, wives, managing the 'domestic economy' with their servants and producing the heirs who would benefit from their parents' successful industriousness, safeguarded and augmented the prestige and social power won by their husbands in the market place. Many of these women were not only engaged in conspicuous consumption and a round of social events, they were also engaged in voluntary charitable work 'of a religious and humanitarian kind', organising committees to establish and administer hospitals, orphanages, schools, kindergartens, homes for unmarried mothers and destitute women, Church auxiliaries, the Women's Christian Temperance Union.¹⁵

These activities, as Beverly Kingston and Ann Summers emphasise, crystallised the role of women as the bearers and guardians of morality, charity and concern.¹⁶ Within the households of the bourgeoisie and

the urban middle-class, protected from the physical and moral taint of the market economy with its ethos of ruthless competition, wives were entrusted with the mission of safeguarding religious life and moral rectitude and the orderly, efficient habits of domestic economy. The objects of their civilising mission were not only those unfortunates who had contravened the message of thrift, hard work, temperance and abstinence by becoming drunk, destitute or pregnant without being married, but also their own husbands.

DOMESTIC ECONOMY

- (1) *How may a good wife render her home attractive to her husband?*
- (2) *What causes induce husbands to frequent taverns?*

Questions such as those illustrated, set in an examination for trainee women teachers in New South Wales in 1868, highlight colonial attitudes to the training of girls for their future moral responsibilities as wives.¹⁷

The notion of married women as 'God's Police' has acquired a characteristically Australian connotation: its impetus derives from the urban middle-class, free migrant response to the taint of convictism and the presence of a foot-loose band of single male pastoral workers, forced by their propertylessness and the scarcity of women to forgo the security and services of marriage.¹⁸ But it was not only in Australia that middle-class women shouldered moral responsibility for the community. In nineteenth century England, middle-class wives maintained the boundaries of respectability, morality, purity and cleanliness, their domestic management geared to the maintenance of class position; demarcating the boundaries between the respectable, clean middle-classes and the poor, the 'great unwashed'. Wives were the guardians of order—housework safeguarded the husband and his family from physical and moral pollution. In the spheres of industrial production and the market economy, men might gear rationality and calculability to the end of the accumulation of profit, but in the sphere of domestic production, the ends were not material but symbolic; the production of a privatized moral order.¹⁹

In England, only a small group of wealthy and powerful men could command the attendance of numerous domestic servants. 'Below this group, *men*, middle class and to a certain extent, the best paid, most regularly employed of the working class were provided with an intensely personal form of ego-protection and enhancement by their wives (or daughters, nieces and unmarried sisters) aided by female general servants.'²⁰ This observation of English social structure is also valid for Australian society in the latter half of the nineteenth century, before the attractions of greater freedom, reduced isolation, better pay and shorter working hours enticed unmarried women out of domestic service and into factory work.²¹ With the scarcity of domestic servants

in the early decades of the twentieth century, the wives and daughters of the middle class, impelled by love, duty and dependence, became the sole providers of domestic labour within their own households, producing goods and services for their husbands, fathers and brothers. 'The domestic worker is divorced not only from the means of production, but also from the means of exchange. She is therefore materially dependant upon the redistribution of the wage to be conducted in private between her and her husband without the benefit of a contract other than the general contract of marriage in civil law.'²² But it is not only in wives that the duty to perform domestic labour has come to inhere, but in the feminine gender itself: unmarried daughters and sisters may also perform unpaid domestic duties, dependent upon remuneration from father or brother, without even the contract of marriage as an emotional bargaining position.²³

Working-class husbands and wives aspired to the gender differentiation in marriage characteristic of middle-class households, but they had fewer material resources to achieve this end. In the early years of settlement, before the growth of urbanization after the 1850s, working-class wives in rural districts were essentially involved in the process of production: 'White women performed domestic labour, ran the dairies and the barnyards, frequently worked as shepherds and supplied pastoral labour when the white male labour went to the goldfields'.²⁴

Ann Curthoys, discussing Eve Pownall's *Mary of Maranoa: Tales of Australian Pioneer Women*, emphasises that women were used in rural districts as a reserve labour force, working in non-domestic tasks when labour was scarce, returning to domestic tasks when the labour shortage was eased by the use of aboriginal labour.²⁵ However, where hardship continued, such as on the sheep and cattle runs of poor selectors, women continued to be part of the family's productive enterprise, as they still are on small and middle-range landholdings in contemporary rural Australia.²⁶

In the urban areas, women's capacity to augment the family diet or income by primary production was severely limited by the shortage of space and the introduction of sanitary regulations controlling the ownership of domestic animals (poultry, pigs, a cow) in city housing.²⁷ Urbanization and industrialization after the 1850s were accompanied by the formation of an urban proletariat dependent only upon labour power for family survival. However, the working class was differentiated by skill. Artisans in the boom conditions prior to the 1890s, supported by strong and confident craft unions, won the right to wages and hours of work which enabled them to purchase a home, with a building-society loan, to aspire to self-improvement through evening reading and adult education, and to maintain their wives as dependent housewives. 'In her kitchen, the working class wife was expected to provide an ample diet at low cost to enable the husband to continue the large amount of heavy manual labour still necessary in most trades.'²⁸ In other words, it was the wife's task to reproduce the labour-power of her husband.

It was also her task to bear visible testimony to their shared, successful struggle to live respectably on £3 per week—a struggle towards which she made considerable contributions. Not only did she bring, as a bride into the marital home, her 'box' of personal clothing and household linen, accumulated during her single days by careful saving and patient stitching, but she also contributed her domestic labour as seamstress, cook, nurse and cleaner, a contribution whose value is hidden if considered only within the wage-form.

In the sections of the working class in less secure circumstances, where men had fewer skills, or were invalid or unemployed, or where women were widowed or otherwise without a male breadwinner, wives and mothers were not only engaged in unpaid domestic labour, but were also employed as wage-labourers. They worked in factories, in textile, clothing, boot, food and drink manufacture, or, if commitments to small children precluded their 'going out to work', they took in washing, or became out-workers for the clothing and boot trades, outside even the rudimentary protection of factory regulations and inspection.²⁹ 'A Mrs. Adams and her two daughters, who sewed moleskin trousers at Messrs McIvor and Lincoln's Factory, worked from 8 a.m. until 11 p.m. each day, being assisted at home by "a little one who takes out tackings when she comes home from school"'. Between them, these four females some-times manage to earn £3 a week.'³⁰

It was widely believed in Australia from the 1880s to 1910s that factory-work was damaging to the physical health, moral well-being and reproductive capacities of women and girls, who therefore required protective legislation, restricting their entry into certain areas of the workforce, and their hours of work.³¹ On the one hand, all employees' interests were eventually served by the introduction of regulative factory legislation; but the final outcome was also the creation of sex-demarcated spheres of industrial labour and sex-demarcated wage differentials. Underlying industrial legislation and the opinions of medical practitioners, the legal profession, most male trade unionists, businessmen and clergymen, was the strong conviction that women's rightful function and duty was the reproduction and rearing of a vigorous and healthy population—and that employment which (allegedly) impaired their reproductive capacities should be regarded with suspicion. Forms of birth control, contraception and abortion, which enabled women to take charge of their own fertility, must also be rigidly controlled, so as to save women from falling into a sad dereliction of their duty.³² However, the hard domestic labour of the servantless, unmechanised household, often in very poor housing conditions, was not regarded with disapproval and did not become the object of regulation or inspection.

Such beliefs, about women's 'natural' place as dependent wives and mothers, and husbands' duty to support them, were incorporated into the concept of the 'family-wage', handed down by Mr Justice Higgins in the Harvester Judgement in the Commonwealth Arbitration Court

in 1907, which became the basis of subsequent wage-fixation decisions. 'I have based it, in the first instance, on the normal needs of the average employee regarded as a human being living in a civilized community ... if he had a wife and children, he is under an obligation, even a legal obligation, to maintain them.'³³ The Harvester Judgement and later judgements set the principles of wage-differentiation for males and females: the minimum wage for an adult male to be sufficient to keep himself, his wife and about three children 'in reasonable comfort', the minimum wage for an adult woman to be sufficient to keep a single woman in reasonable comfort.³⁴ These judgements enshrined and reinforced dominant Australian beliefs about the place of married women in the family, economically dependent on their husband's wage, their own work of child-care and household labour regarded as outside the sphere of production and hence outside the sphere of remuneration. The introduction of a 'living wage', designed to protect the poorer, male unskilled worker, seriously disadvantaged the considerable minority of women who continued to support themselves, and frequently dependent children, invalids and relatives in a sex-differentiated labour market within a sex-differentiated reward structure.

The implications of domestic labour for women

At a certain point in the development of industrial capitalism in Australia, married women were placed in the material conditions of economic dependence, engaged in domestic labour with a strong element of personal service, producing goods and services for their husbands and children. This life-situation, this sex-class position, cut across economic class lines: the wives of the bourgeoisie, of middle-class professionals, and of working-class husbands were placed under the ideological obligation to perform personal service in return for their maintenance.

Those women who are most likely to be involved in full-time domestic labour and therefore to be economically dependent on their husbands or on a state social services benefit, are usually responsible for the care of children. In other words, it is men's and women's unequal participation in child-care, women's major responsibility for the care of their children, which is the base of their full-time involvement in domestic labour, and their material dependence. In contemporary industrial societies, both capitalist and state socialist, women's child-bearing role is technologically capable of control, but in no society, even in those ideologically committed to sexual equality, have women failed to assume the major responsibility for child care.³⁵

Most married women with children (the typical life-situation for Australian women after World War II)³⁶ occupy a particular relationship to the means of domestic production: they carry out the tasks of domestic labour, labour which has no apparent exchange-value, within material conditions provided by the wage (or salary, or profit, or income from property) of other family members, usually their husbands, who are involved in industrial production or in investment in property *outside*

the domestic sphere of production. In other words, women as full-time domestic labourers, typically *do not control* their access to resources, but are dependent on their husbands to supply the money required for the purchase of commodities which are the raw materials of their domestic production. This dependence ties women closely to the class position of their husbands³⁷ and enables them to fulfil the life-style of a working-class, middle-class or upper-class housewife, according to their husband's relationship to the means of production and his market capacity.³⁸ To be more conceptually precise, the *status* affiliations of women as domestic labourers, and their patterns of consumption as encapsulated in the term 'life-style' are a derivative of their husband's class position in the processes of production: his ownership and control of productive property, or his possession of educational and technical qualifications, or his possession of manual labour-power.

The marked discrepancy between the economic power and command of resources derived from property ownership and control, and that derived from the other two forms of market capacity, must of course be emphasised. Control over productive property is of a different order from greater or lesser market capacity in the labour market, derived from the acquisition of 'scarce' skills.³⁹ The implications for women, of their husband's differential access to resources, will be discussed later.

Wives carry out their domestic labour within the material conditions generated by their husband's market capacity. Women supervise and bring to fruition the family's processes of consumption—converting raw materials into meals; soap-powder and hot water into cleansing agents; fabric into curtains; flour, icing-sugar, and paper streamers into children's birthday parties. Women's processes and relations of *production* take place within the sphere of consumption, from the point of view of a market economy; and the 'distributive-groupings' and relationships established in consumption are aspects of *status*, secondary to the relationships of class.⁴⁰ This is the basis of an essential contradiction in women's potential group affiliations: they are immersed in the shared conditions of housewifery and child-care which may generate a sense of sex-class identity; they carry out these tasks within material conditions conducive to the generation of status consciousness.

So, for men, and for male-oriented class theory: economic class is grounded in the relations of production outside the household, and status is grounded in the consumption-patterns and group-affiliations associated with the household. For women, and for feminist-inspired class theory: sex-class is grounded in the relations of domestic production and the rearing of children; and the material conditions within which domestic production takes place are derived from the resources of consumption generated by the market power of men (when the woman is not gainfully employed in her own right). Therefore, as pungently highlighted by the quotation from Frankenberg at the beginning of this paper, women are very often 'proletarian workers' in the micro-production of their household. And they are proletarian workers even

if they enjoy excellent relations with their husband, even if he hands over all his wage packet and is handed back his spending-money. They are proletarian workers because they do not have control over the generation of the material resources on which their own productive labour is based. And they are proletarian domestic labourers even if their husband's market capacity provides them with the resources to employ household help and serve pizza and scotch to their guests for lunch—their life-style, their status, within which they 'manage' their household production (as white-collar workers rather than manual labourers) is still dependent on the good-will and finance of their husbands—*which can be withdrawn*. Their own market capacity, on which they may have to depend in the event of separation, divorce, death of their husband, may be, and typically is, of much lower economic power and usually commands greatly reduced economic rewards.

Women, like men, may be involved in the paid labour force, producing commodities and services for the market economy. In 1973, the estimated labour force participation rate of women in Australia over the age of fifteen was 40.5 per cent and of married women was 37.2 per cent. Between the ages of twenty-five and fifty-nine the greatest proportion of women in the workforce were married women in 1971 (reflecting the almost universal rates of marriage in Australian society). For those women not involved in the paid labour force, the most likely major activity in 1972 was 'keeping house': 97.6 per cent of married women not in the labour force were keeping house in 1972; in contrast to 52.3 per cent of women who were never married, widowed or divorced; and in contrast to 1.4 per cent of men not in the labour force who were keeping house. The high involvement of never-married, widowed and divorced women in unpaid domestic labour suggests that they may have had child-care responsibilities which kept them from wage-earning employment even though they are heads of households. The relative absence of men from full-time domestic labour is clearly demonstrated. (In 1972, the ratio of men to women involved in full-time domestic labour was 1:200.)⁴¹

It is important to note that 60 per cent of all Australian women in 1972 were not labour force participants and the greatest majority of these women (84 per cent) were designated as 'keeping house'. In other words, the dominant life-activity of half of all Australian women, at any one time, is full-time domestic labour, while a further 40 per cent combine full-time or part-time employment with their domestic labour. The women most likely to be outside the labour force are those responsible for the care of young children. Women, as paid workers, are part of the economic class-structure by virtue of their relationship to the means of production and exchange. Their position in this class-structure is closely determined by the life-chances which they inherit from the material conditions of their family of origin (father's and mother's access to property and income) and by their sex-class. Sex-class is experienced initially in day-to-day relationships with the mother, whose

on-going activities of child-care and domestic labour provide her daughters with their first potent enactment of female gender identity, while, in the interplay of power and dependence between the parents, daughters experience the range of influence and authority connected with gender identity.

There are considerable Australian data which attest to the relative sense of powerlessness and incompetence which girls experience, in comparison with boys in similar class situations.⁴² In their journey through childhood, schooling and the sexual market of adolescence, girls typically internalise a sense of relative powerlessness which is a realistic assessment of the position of other women in their social environment. They translate their attitudes into the actions of earlier school-leaving compared with boys in their own social class, entry into sex-differentiated fields of job-training and post-secondary education, and entry into a sex-segregated labour market.⁴³ Margaret Power has shown, using census data on occupations from 1911 to 1971, that women's place in the family in Australia has been reproduced in economic institutions, particularly in the segmented labour market, where women typically are employed in a narrow range of disproportionately female occupations, whose status, conditions, rewards, and promotion possibilities compare unfavourably with conditions which pertain in the male sector of the workforce:⁴⁴ 'Female occupations are those in which work relationships require men to be in authority over women and where the nature of work is often derivative of housework, for instance, work associated with food, clothing and cleaning, and work which involves caring for the young and the sick'.⁴⁵ In other words, there are held to be 'natural' economic roles for women which parallel women's natural family roles. This is reinforced by a further internal segregation of occupations, by means of which the positions of control in the occupation are usually held by men, and the subordinate positions by women. Evidence of this has been documented for the academic workforce, the library profession, and the Australian Public Service.⁴⁶

Women, as paid workers in the labour market, typically occupy positions as wage-labourers in the clerical, sales, service and factory production sectors of the workforce. Only a small minority have the market capacity (educational and technical skills) to be employed in the professional and administrative sectors of the workforce (usually as nurses and teachers), while an even smaller minority are employers or self-employed (see Tables I and II). A part of this latter minority are likely to be members of the *petit-bourgeoisie*, owning shops and small businesses (e.g. dressmaking establishments) which they control in their own right. Another proportion of this group may be property-owners, partners and directors in business enterprises in nominal terms only, as *names* used as part of the financial arrangements of their husbands and kinship group, not uncommonly utilised for the purposes of taxation avoidance. These women may have little actual control of the means of production and little *independent* access to profits, although they

may well benefit substantially from their close family connection with property and wealth.

The typical and dominant pattern is for women workers to have no job qualification (80 per cent of the female workforce in 1971; see Table III); to be a wage-earner (88.4 per cent of the female workforce; see Table I); and to be employed in clerical, sales, production process and service occupational categories (76.4 per cent of the female workforce in 1976; see Table II). By the criteria of market capacity, these workers possess only their labour power, they are members of the working class. It has been mistakenly suggested that because women cluster in the white-collar sectors of the workforce (in sales, clerical work and service industries rather than in industrial manufacture) they occupy 'middle class jobs' in relation to men who are more predominantly involved in trades, heavy industry and labouring jobs. This is a false and misleading use of the concept of class—a term transferred from status-theories of occupational prestige. The majority of employed women are involved in working-class occupations because they have no access to ownership and control of the means of production; they enjoy no monopoly of scarce educational and technical skills and have only their labour-power to sell in the market place. The jobs which they enter are subject to the mechanisms of fragmentation, supervision and hierarchical control described by C. Wright Mills, in *White Collar*, and by Studs Terkel's informants, in *Working*.

There is also a small middle-class (in the Giddens' sense) of workers with tertiary qualifications who are in professional, technical and administrative jobs (17 per cent of the female workforce). But these women usually occupy the subordinate positions in their professional and administrative hierarchies—hierarchies which reproduce, in microcosm, women's general position in the structure of the workforce.

TABLE I: OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF THE LABOUR FORCE AGED 15 YEARS AND OVER, 1971

Occupational Status	Males	%	Females	%
	No.		No.	
Employer	217,792	6.0	59,646	3.5
Self-Employed	300,422	8.3	77,636	4.6
Wage Earner	3,058,672	84.0	1,494,298	88.4
Unpaid Helper	9,640	0.3	22,321	1.3
Unemployed	44,876	1.2	29,123	1.7
Looking for First Job	8,237	0.2	7,824	0.5
Total in Labour Force	3,639,639	100.0	1,690,849	100.0

Source: CBCS 1971 Census.

NOTE: The majority of persons in the labour force are 'wage-earners'. Women are less likely to be 'employers' and 'self-employed' than are men.

TABLE II: LABOUR FORCE BY OCCUPATION GROUP (PER CENT)

<i>Occupation group</i>	<i>February 1964</i>				<i>February 1976</i>			
	<i>Males</i>	<i>Married women</i>	<i>All females</i>	<i>Persons</i>	<i>Males</i>	<i>Married women</i>	<i>All females</i>	<i>Persons</i>
Professional and technical	8.1	9.5	13.6	9.7	10.9	13.6	15.2	12.4
Administrative, executive and managerial	8.1	5.8	3.6	6.8	8.3	2.1	1.9	6.0
Clerical	8.0	20.3	28.1	13.8	8.3	31.3	33.7	17.2
Sales	6.3	14.0	12.9	8.2	6.1	12.0	12.5	8.3
Farmers, fishermen, timber-getters, etc.	13.3	6.7	4.4	10.8	9.0	4.2	3.3	7.0
Transport and communication	7.3	1.9	2.6	6.0	7.7	2.2	2.2	5.8
Tradesmen, production process workers and labourers, n.e.c.	44.3	20.5	16.5	36.4	43.9	15.8	13.0	33.1
Service, sport and recreation	4.2	21.0	17.3	7.9	5.2	18.8	17.2	9.4
Looking for first job	0.2		1.1	0.5	0.5		1.1	0.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: *Social Indicators*: no. 1 (1976). Australian Bureau of Statistics (Canberra), p.45.

TABLE III: DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYED POPULATION 15 YEARS AND OVER BY HIGHEST LEVEL OF QUALIFICATION OBTAINED, JUNE 1971

<i>Level of Qualification Obtained</i>	<i>EMPLOYED POPULATION</i>					
	<i>Males</i>		<i>Females</i>		<i>Persons</i>	
	<i>No.</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>%</i>
No qualification	2,422,548	67.6	1,334,757	80.7	3,757,305	71.7
Trade	727,165	20.3	31,833	1.9	758,998	14.5
Technician	141,837	4.0	84,423	5.1	226,260	4.3
Other tertiary	135,824	3.8	85,289	5.2	221,113	4.2
First degree	100,462	2.8	27,749	1.7	128,211	2.5
Higher degree	16,865	0.5	2,681	0.2	19,546	0.4
Not classifiable	41,815	1.2	87,166	5.3	128,981	2.5
Total	3,586,516	100.0	1,653,898	100.0	5,240,414	100.0

Source: CBCS 1971 Census.

Note: Almost three-quarters of employed persons have no vocational qualifications beyond formal schooling. Relatively more employed females than employed males have not obtained any qualifications. An overwhelmingly higher proportion of employed males than females have obtained trade level qualifications. The most common qualifications obtained by females are at technician or 'other tertiary' level. Completion of short specialised courses ('not classifiable' group) are also common qualifications obtained by women.

Source: *Facts and Figures: Women and Work* no. 11, Women's Bureau, Department of Labour (Melbourne 1973), p.9.

What is the relationship between women's sex-class and the positions which they characteristically occupy as members of the working class in the processes of production? Women in Australia usually pursue marriage and motherhood as their major source of identity, and equip themselves for the workforce as a secondary consideration; they are, in a majority of instances, outside the paid workforce in their most vigorous adult years whilst they are occupied with full time child-rearing and domestic labour. For these reasons, when they return to the workforce (typically at ages thirty to thirty-five when their youngest child is of school age), they lack the necessary skills, work-experience and confidence to take up skilled occupations and professions. If they had initial professional training, they usually remain in the lower echelons of the professional workforce. The initial period of women's responsibility for the care of children, and their continuing responsibility for child-care and domestic labour even while they are employed in the workforce, usually constitutes a set of conditions which militate against the acquisition of a powerful market capacity, and militate against promotion in work hierarchies. At the same time, in the male networks of the controlling elites in the board-rooms of corporate capitalism, in government bureaucracies, in universities, in large businesses, in formal and informal professional associations, decisions are made which maintain strategies of recruitment and exclusion; strategies which discriminate against women. No matter how well qualified, women, because of their membership of a sex-class, represent a discordance with dominant

definitions of the appropriate qualities for suitable colleagues.⁴⁷

Women constitute, and are used as, a 'reserve army' of labour in industrial societies, both capitalist and state socialist. In the Australian post-war economy, married women, and Southern European migrant women in particular, have gained jobs when labour is scarce or when jobs are particularly poorly paid and unattractive (and when male workers are refusing to do them) and they are the first laid off in times of unemployment.⁴⁸ In February 1976, a greater proportion of women than of men in the labour force stated that they were unemployed and looking for work (see Table IV). This discrepancy is also highly likely to be understated because of women's traditional reluctance to see themselves as having a right to work, and therefore their reluctance to see themselves as unemployed when they have lost their job and are having difficulty finding another.

TABLE IV: UNEMPLOYED PERSONS; PERCENTAGE OF LABOUR FORCE IN EACH AGE-GROUP: FEBRUARY 1976

	<i>Age 15-19</i>	<i>Age 20 & over</i>	<i>Original total</i>	<i>Seasonally adjusted</i>
Males	12.8%	2.9%	3.9%	3.3%
Females	15.0%	4.3%	6.0%	4.8%

Source: *Unemployment and Employment*. (Australian Bureau of Statistics, June 1976), p.12.

From the perspective of the political economy of Australian post-war production, married women, as an industrial 'reserve army', have made a considerable contribution to capital accumulation and growth. The sex-segmented labour market in the Australian economy is *one* of the divisions in what Herb Gintis has called the general process of workforce 'fragmentation' in the social relations of production.⁴⁹ Fragmentation of the labour force into male and female workers, white-collar and blue-collar workers, native-born and migrant workers, white and black workers, functions as a process of control and legitimation. The workforce is controlled because it is divided by status differentiations, and these are legitimated by unequal income and unequal access to positions of authority on the basis of job skills. In this hierarchy of domination, women as a category usually occupy subordinate positions. Gintis claims that the criteria upon which workforce fragments form may not be generated at the point of production, but may be brought into the relations of production from an outside source. Clearly, the sexual cleavage, as one such form of workforce fragmentation, is derived from pre-capitalist social relations and has its structural source outside the work place.

In their analysis of sexual differentiation in the British labour market, Barron and Norris utilise a particular model of labour market segmen-

tation—the dual labour market model. They define a dual labour market as one in which:

1. There is a more or less pronounced division into higher-paying and lower-paying sectors.
2. Mobility across the boundary of these sectors is restricted.
3. Higher-paying jobs are tied into promotional or career ladders while lower-paid jobs offer few opportunities for vertical movements.
4. Higher-paying jobs are relatively stable, while lower-paid jobs are unstable.⁵⁰

The development of dualism in the labour market is seen to be the result of the increasing separation of the primary sector from a basically secondary labour market, a separation which takes place because of the employers' need to attract and retain skilled workers in jobs which require considerable manpower investment. The development of a primary sector also coincides with the increasing popularity of secondary schooling and post-secondary training in post-war industrial societies—in effect, with the production of specialist skilled workers and technologists, whose expectations are geared to better wages and conditions and who have been in a position to have their demands met. The promotional structure, increased rewards and better conditions of the primary sector are maintained against the instability and lower earnings of the secondary sector, which is dependent upon the availability of a supply of workers willing to accept poor pay and poor conditions. This duality militates against employee solidarity, since the interests of workers in different sectors of the labour market are unlikely to converge.

Barron and Norris isolate five main conditions which make a particular social category a likely source of secondary workers: their labour is seen as legitimately dispensable; they exhibit clearly visible social differences; they appear to have little interest in acquiring training (or little opportunity to do so); they do not energetically pursue high monetary rewards; and they lack solidarity as workers.⁵¹ Women, clearly, are prime candidates for the secondary labour market, because their major life-project is seen by employers, by most trade union leaders and by many women themselves, to lie outside the reward structure of the labour market. It is commonly accepted that for most single women, the job is a stop-gap before marriage, while for married women, the job is a means for augmenting family income, but because of these same family commitments, their job mobility, their movement into and out of the workforce, may be high. For single women, women without a male bread-winner, and women with high job-commitment, these considerations are not applicable, but the conditions of the stereotype are applied to them also, and they labour under its disadvantages.

The probability that a worker will enter and remain in the secondary labour market is a result of the work opportunities available, the conditions of that work, and qualities shaped elsewhere in the social structure

and brought to the labour market. What appears to be a high level of voluntary job mobility on the part of women may actually be created by the conditions of poor pay and work which lacks intrinsic interest, and offers little prospect for job-security, promotion, or autonomous control—a set of conditions which offers little incentive for job stability.

Clearly, however, sex-segmentation of the labour force gains its ideological impetus and its human recruits from men and women inducted into sex-role relationships in their families, where unequal power relations between the sexes are reproduced and maintained. The family, where women carry out domestic labour, produces not only goods and services for family consumption, it reproduces the sexual division of labour. Women's dependence in child-care, and men's control in bread-winning, produces not only a conjugal relationship of control and dependence, but also children inculcated with the ideology of the sexual division of labour. The family, with the conjugal division of labour *which now pertains*, is the structural base in which the sexual segmentation of the industrial workforce is maintained. However, sexual segmentation gains another dimension, and a structure of support, in the relations of control between the sexes in the workplace, in the processes of production.

Some additional considerations of domestic labour in Australian society

There is a considerable debate being waged about the relationship between domestic labour and the industrial processes of production. There is general agreement that the household is a unit of production, where labour is performed which is outside the sphere of the market economy, and therefore outside the sphere of exchange-value; but that the housewife's job is to reproduce (refresh, replenish, sustain, both materially and psychologically), the labour-power of her husband.⁵² Secombe claims that the wage which a husband is paid contains a component which is due to the wife for her unpaid labours.⁵³ Although he endorses Marx's point that the wage paid to the male is not equivalent to the value of his labour (surplus value having been extracted) he does not make the same observation about the component of the wage due to the wife—apparently this represents the true value of her labour. Again, he suggests that the marriage contract is sufficient basis to ensure that women will be maintained (i.e. will be adequately reimbursed for their domestic labour) through the good agencies of their husband.

Gardiner makes two important criticisms of Secombe's analysis which add substantially to the exercise of placing housework within the labour theory of value.⁵⁴ She demonstrates that women's unpaid domestic labour *contributes* to the value of her husband's wage extending, stretching its exchange value. In other words, the overall standard of living of workers is not determined just by the wage bargain between capital and labour, as it appears to be in Marx's analysis, but also by the contribution of domestic labour. At the same time however, the family is an unequal

power distribution, in which women's dependence is ensured by their lack of resources.

Taking up Gardiner's point that domestic labour contributes to the value of the husband's wage by extending its exchange value, it is essential to move from the theoretical level to an actual, empirical situation. In Australian society, there has been a tradition of the 'good housewife and mother' who 'managed', 'struggled', 'made ends meet'; cut down her husband's trousers for her sons; kept a stock pot on the stove so as not to waste the cooking water of vegetables and meat; turned the faded curtains; made her daughters' dresses; baked all her own cakes; preserved her own jams and fruit—in short, supplied the domestic labour which enabled the family wage 'to support a man, his wife and three children, according to the normal needs of the average employee regarded as a human being living in a civilized community'.

Women's unpaid domestic labour supports, like an infrastructure, the wage structures and profits of the industrial-capitalist economy. The goods and services which women produce and provide in domestic labour (even when they also have paid employment) if purchased in the market place, would add substantially to the cost of maintaining a household. This means that the wage paid to the male breadwinner is actually subsidised by the unpaid domestic labour of his wife. Domestic labourers are not only major agents of consumption in a market economy, but also provide a pool of labour which may be recruited into the secondary labour market.

In her most recent article, Jean Gardiner contends that women do not constitute a class on the basis of their gender, but there is a case for arguing that 'those engaged in unpaid domestic labour share a common class position'.⁵⁵ There is an even stronger case for equating unpaid domestic labour with responsibility for child-care and with the maintenance of low market capacity in the dual labour market. It is not domestic labour alone which needs to be considered in assessing women's position in the class structure, but the cluster of conditions which accompany it.

The political economy of housework debate is essentially concerned with the relationship between domestic labour and the economic organisation of industrial capitalism. The consequences of domestic labour for women are even more pertinent for this discussion. When men are paid a 'family-wage' in order to support and maintain a sex-based division of labour in the family (and this was rightly seen as a gain of considerable significance by the Australian labour movement), then women are rendered economically dependent—a dependence legitimated by law, religion and community morality. They are then subject to the processes of power and authority which are incumbent upon people who are economically dependent, as Fallding's study of some Australian-born families, and as Bottomley's study of some Greek families in Sydney, demonstrate.⁵⁶

One of the crucial issues *not* adequately confronted in the pages of

the political economy of housework debate is that the association of women with unpaid domestic labour is a consequence of their relationship to child-care. To recognise this sexual cleavage would mean confronting the possibility that men and women may not have an identity of interests, either in the family or in the labour force. The industrial interests of women workers may sometimes appear to be in opposition to those of their male co-workers, particularly when women perceive their trade unions to be male-dominated, suspicious of the movement of women into previously male occupations, and especially suspicious of the movement of women into trade union activities. Women's interest in part-time work is a particular instance, which highlights the potential differences which can arise between male and female employees: the claim of some women with dependent children for part-time work has, in some cases, been seen by male trade unionists as undermining the existence, conditions and status of their own jobs.

A particular case in point was the appeal by the Australian Bank Officers' Association, in 1975, to a full bench of the Arbitration Commission, against a decision made by a member of the Commission in favour of the employment of part-time labour as tellers in peak banking hours. It was women with dependents who were likely to benefit from the availability of part-time work. The officials of the A.B.O.A. claimed that the use of part-time labour would be a denial of the career opportunities and expectations of bank officers in all recruitment grades, but the appeal was dismissed. The arguments in this particular case highlight a special instance of a dual labour market within an industry—and highlight the general relationship between women's responsibility for child-care and domestic labour and their availability for recruitment into the secondary labour market. The changes sought and won by management were to facilitate the entry of women into the non-career, non-promotion, secondary sector of the bank labour force; however, here they would be employed in jobs which men, with aspirations to the career rankings of the primary labour force, saw as their career entry-point. But many women who have responsibility for the care of children see themselves having no choice but to take part-time work in the non-career ranks of the labour force. Frequently, their late re-entry into the workforce precludes their recruitment into career-rankings, and their continuing responsibility for the care of children (after school, in school-holidays, when children are sick) militates against their involvement in full time work. Women's identification with motherhood is not the only source of their continuing close alliance with child-care—there is a scarcity of substitute child-care facilities provided on a community basis—and, even more pertinently, most organised groups of men in society, including unions, management, and political parties, show little interest in challenging women's monopoly of child-care responsibilities. 'For all the talk of the joys of parenthood, men do not find childcare sufficiently enjoyable to seize it for themselves'.⁵⁷

Despite their continuing responsibility for children and domestic

labour, married women's workforce participation rate has increased markedly in the post-war period (6.5 per cent of married women were in the labour force in 1947, 37 per cent in 1973, according to the O.E.C.D. study, *The Role of Women in the Economy*). It was against this background of women's contribution to the economy, and the vocal advocacy of women's groups, that women were granted 'equal pay for work of equal value' in December 1972 by the Commonwealth Arbitration Commission, and the male minimum wage was extended to women in 1974.⁵⁸ However, these changes have not been sufficient to eradicate a long history of sex differentials in pay structures, especially when women continue to be employed in a sex-segmented secondary sector of the labour market. In 1975, the gross weekly earnings of full-time male and female workers, twenty years of age and over, showed a bimodal distribution—further evidence of the existence of a dual labour market. Women cluster in the lower levels of the income range: 80 per cent of women earned less than \$140 per week, in comparison with 45 per cent of men. Earnings at the upper levels do not include the value of non-monetary rewards such as the use of a car, expense accounts, which workers in the primary sector are likely to enjoy (see Table V).

Under the employment conditions and reward structure of the secondary labour market, employed married women may gain a measure of economic independence, but their obligation to perform domestic labour and to remain responsible for child care is unlikely to be altered. Similarly, the authority structure within the family may not be changed merely because the wife is an income earner. There is a psycho-sexual dimension in the relations of authority and deference in marriage, which reinforces economic dependence.⁵⁹ The wife's inclination towards deference may not be affected by her work experience, particularly if she is involved in a relationship of authority and deference in the work place. However, paid employment and the gaining of some economic power may, for some women, constitute a base for confidence and moral independence, as elaborated in the concluding section of this essay.

The *conditional* nature of women's alliance with a dependable source of income is illustrated with particular clarity when that alliance ends. *The First Main Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Poverty*, April 1975, contains evidence of the position of women in female-headed households, created by separation, divorce or the death of the husband.⁶⁰ The poverty of these women and their children is exacerbated (or caused), by the sudden drop in income attendant upon the withdrawal of the husband's wage. Their poverty is due to the conjunction of the disadvantages of their economic class position and the disadvantages of their sex-class position. As women, responsible for the care of children, employed in the secondary labour market, or struggling to perform domestic labour within the material conditions provided by a social security benefit, they are placed in a position of low social and economic power.

Until the introduction of the Commonwealth Family Law Act 1975-

TABLE V: ALL EMPLOYEES—WEEKLY EARNINGS, AGE AND
FULL-TIME OR PART-TIME STATUS, PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION BY SIZE, AUGUST 1975 (PER CENT)

	<i>Males</i>			<i>Females</i>			<i>Persons</i>		
	<i>Aged 15-19 years</i>	<i>Aged 20 years and over</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Aged 15-19 years</i>	<i>Aged 20 years and over</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Aged 15-19 years</i>	<i>Aged 20 years and over</i>	<i>Total</i>
FULL-TIME WORKERS									
Weekly earnings (\$)—									
Under 60	22.2	0.8	2.7	23.6	1.8	6.0	22.9	1.1	3.7
60 and under 80	26.6	0.7	3.0	35.0	3.2	9.2	30.5	1.3	4.8
80 " " 100	23.9	3.8	5.6	26.6	16.6	18.5	25.1	7.2	9.3
100 " " 120	16.7	17.5	17.4	9.7	34.3	29.6	13.4	22.0	20.9
120 " " 140	5.6	22.9	21.4	3.3	23.4	19.6	4.6	23.0	20.9
140 " " 160	2.7	18.3	16.9	1.1	10.0	8.3	1.9	16.1	14.4
160 " " 180	0.9	10.5	9.6	0.4	4.3	3.6	0.7	8.8	7.9
180 " " 200	0.7	7.1	6.6	0.2	2.9	2.3	0.5	6.1	5.3
200 " " 220	0.2	5.8	5.3		1.2	1.1	0.1	4.6	4.1
220 " " 240	0.2	3.1	2.9		1.0	0.7	0.1	2.5	2.2
240 " " 260	0.2	3.2	2.8		0.4	0.4	0.1	2.4	2.2
260 " " 300		2.7	2.5	0.1	0.5	0.4		2.1	1.8
300 " " 340	0.1	1.6	1.5		0.3	0.2	0.1	1.3	1.2
340 and over		2.0	1.8		0.1	0.1		1.5	1.3
<i>Total</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>

Source: *Social Indicators* no. 1 (1976). Australian Bureau of Statistics (Canberra), p.49.

76, husbands were legally obliged to support their wives, an obligation which they were usually ordered to maintain on separation or divorce. However, 'not all husbands are conscientious in keeping up regular maintenance payments and it is notoriously difficult to enforce a maintenance order'.⁶¹

Under the maintenance provisions of the Family Law Act, the liability of one party to a marriage... to maintain the other party is not worded in gender terms: the key concept in deciding maintenance is the inability of a spouse to support herself or himself adequately, for a variety of reasons, such as:

- (a) the age and state of health of each of the parties;
- (b) the income, property and financial resources of each of the parties and the physical and mental capacity of each of them for appropriate gainful employment;
- (c) whether either party has the care or control of a child of the marriage who has not attained the age of 18 years;
- (j) the extent to which the party whose maintenance is under consideration has contributed to the income, earning capacity, property and financial resources of the other party;
- (k) the duration of the marriage and the extent to which it has affected the earning capacity of the party whose maintenance is under consideration; and
- (l) the need to protect the position of a woman who wishes only to continue her role as a wife and mother.⁶²

The last of these items fits awkwardly into the general spirit of the Act as it is the only place where sex differentiation is expressed. However, in effect, because of the husband's usually greater market capacity and income-earning potential, and particularly if the wife has responsibility for children and has been out of the workforce for a considerable number of years, the wife is more likely to be awarded maintenance. The emphasis is shifted from the rights and duties entailed in gender, to the relative economic strengths of the spouses, and responsibility for the care of children.

The provisions of the Act in respect of the distribution of marital property draw the attention of the court to the contributions made by the *homemaker* and *parent* to the 'acquisition, conservation or improvement of the property'.⁶³ In the past, the distribution of marital property at divorce traditionally favoured the husband, because his earnings usually provided the principal source of funds for the purchase of family assets. Most women, having spent a considerable proportion of their married lives outside the workforce, were prejudiced by rules that emphasized material contributions to the acquisition of assets.⁶⁴ The Family Law Act, in drawing attention to the contribution of domestic labour to the accumulation of assets, and therefore establishing for the homemaker an entitlement to property rights, is highlighting the economic relationships of domestic labour, economic relationships long shrouded in mystical veils of obligation and duty. The extent to which, and the

manner in which, the Family Court will take the home-maker role into account in property settlements remains to be studied.⁶⁵

It is important to emphasize that property ownership, on a large scale, is applicable to only a small portion of the Australian population. The family home is the only major item of property which most married couples accumulate, and the property problem at separation may be mainly concerned with the payment of debts, including mortgage repayments. The Poverty Commission Report notes that women in single-parent families, particularly those who have been deserted or widowed, are often faced with high debt commitments.⁶⁶ On the one hand, recent legal provisions applying to maintenance and the distribution of marital property point towards a re-evaluation of men's and women's work. But, in taking relative earning power into account, the Act shows that the base of economic inequality between husbands and wives is to be found in their unequal duty to perform domestic labour and child care, and in their subsequent unequal opportunity to acquire a secure position in the labour market. Women whose husbands were in the secondary labour market themselves, are extremely disadvantaged if they are separated, divorced or widowed, because they have usually been unable to accumulate savings or assets.⁶⁷

In making a systematic case for establishing the interconnections between sex-class and economic class, as women experience them, it is not suggested here that domestic labour and child care have no intrinsic reward and provide no emotional gratification. Clearly, these activities may provide women with a source of great satisfaction. Child-care, particularly, is a human activity whose importance cannot be over-estimated, both from the point of view of the child, and of those who are doing the caring. This essay is concerned with the economic, social and political implications which flow from men's and women's unequal participation in child-care and domestic labour, from women's enforced monopoly of what is intrinsically a human activity, capable of providing both sexes with gratification.

The Potential for Sex-Class Consciousness

Do women—or can they—constitute a class, in the sense of consciousness of their common situation, and mobilisation for political action to change their situation? E.P. Thompson, in the introduction to his monumental study of the *making* of the English working-class, stresses that:

class happens when some men, as a result of common experiences (inherited or shared), feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves, and as against other men whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs. The class experience is largely determined by the productive relations into which men are born—or enter involuntarily.⁶⁸

Thompson sees class-consciousness as a historical formation, occurring in a particular place at a particular time because, for a variety of reasons, people who share a common relationship to the structure of property-rights and the structure of authority, come to feel an identity of interests

as between themselves, and as against their rulers and employers, an identity of interests grounded in their common experience of deprivation and oppression. Is such a class-awareness occurring, or likely to occur, amongst women in Australia, who, as suggested in this essay, constitute a sex-class in the objective sense of their relationship to the means of child-care and domestic labour?

Firstly, some of the structural processes militating against the formation of sex-class consciousness should be examined. Women may be viewed as a subordinate class in relation to men, but they take on the status of their husbands, they carry out domestic labour and child-care, and enter the workforce within the material conditions provided by their husband's command of income and property. Their life-style, their consumption patterns, are commensurate with their husband's labour-power, or his control of the means of production, and hence we have the commonly perceived and accepted scheme of working-class women, middle-class women, and upper-class women. As demonstrated, these are actually status categories based on consumption, but these categorisations act as cleavages between women, allying their interests with the status position of their husbands. Working class women do not see themselves having much identity of interests with middle-class women; working-class women *must* work, middle-class women may choose to; working-class women usually perform all of the domestic labour, middle-class women may employ household help. Women of the upper class enjoy the privileges connected with their husband's access to wealth and property, and may have property in their own right, through their own kinship connections. Thus status divisions between women (and in some cases, real class divisions) are highly likely to obscure those life-conditions which women share, child-bearing, responsibility for child-care and responsibility for (and usually the actual carrying out of) domestic labour. Such divisions militate strongly against the formation of a feminist consciousness which goes beyond the individual experience of discontent or discrimination. There is an analogy here with the way in which status divisions between workers at the point of production militate against class consciousness.⁶⁹

It must also be emphasised that women's potential awareness of the shared, or class, nature of their situation is even more likely to be minimised by the privatised nature of their every-day labour (immersion in the family, close connection with housewife identity), than it is by their social class identifications. In their isolated domestic labour, women are likely to form neither economic nor sex-class awareness because they do not have the opportunity to share and accumulate common experiences with other workers and with other women. In this situation, any awareness of grievance or sense of deprivation which they experience can be attributed by themselves, by close family members and by the 'helping professions' to their personal 'failure to cope'. In economic class relations, there is a hegemony of beliefs arising from the interests of the dominant class; that through hard work, men may aspire to social

mobility; that there are classes in society, but their structures are open. In sex-class relations, the hegemony of beliefs is that there is no sex class, because women's interests are the same as those of their men: men and women live in such close emotional interdependence that their interests cannot be separated, therefore women of different classes have little in common.

Conservative thought encourages women (usually successfully) to continue their life project of refreshing and refurbishing the male workforce, reproducing the future workforce and consuming the products of the market economy. Marxian and other varieties of socialist thought make a similar analysis of the family in its current form, but turn the moral content on its head, advocating concerted working class action to change the relations of production in which the family is embedded, because this change will, of itself, produce changes in family relationships. This is a highly doubtful proposition, given the pre-capitalist existence of sexual differentiation and male authority, and the persistence of women's involvement in domestic labour and their continuing responsibility for child-care in state socialist societies.

The liberal position is even more pertinent because it probably comes closest to that held by men and women sympathetic to women's issues. In the liberal analysis, it is held that women do tend to occupy sex-stereotyped positions in domestic labour and in the lower ranks of the workforce, but sex-class mobility is possible. Within the unequal structures of opportunities open to men and women, a small minority of women control their fertility, choose not to marry, or if they marry and have children, they utilise substitute child-care and reject most of the chores of domestic labour as ritualistic and unnecessary. They work hard at school, are not afraid of success or competition with their male peers, enter careers and professions, and through persistence and struggle move into the upper ranks of their occupational hierarchy. The ideology of sex-class mobility operates like the ideology of social class mobility; the movement of a minority through the structures of inequality appears to show that there is room for the expression of talent and merit. This ethic of success through individual action justifies the subordination of those without such energy and drive. Alice Rossi calls this model of equal opportunity an 'assimilationist model', in which women are encouraged to pursue the life-projects usually monopolised by men, without any corresponding change in the life-projects of men and without any change in the hierarchical values of the structures which talented women are striving to enter.⁷⁰

Are there any structural processes conducive to the 'making' of sex-class consciousness at this point in history in western industrial societies? The formation of various women's liberation groups with diverse political beliefs, forms of organisation, analyses of the sources of sexual inequality and strategies for change, which began to develop in the second half of the 1960s in the U.S.A. and in the early 1970s in Australia, is but the most public and visible manifestation of women's potential consciousness.

This wave of feminism of the last decade, which emerged in many western industrial societies, particularly Britain, U.S.A., Canada, New Zealand, France, Italy, Scandinavia and Australia requires a more detailed careful analysis than is feasible here. It is important to note however, that women's organisations, voluntary associations which may not, and very likely do not, see themselves as specifically 'feminist' but which have organised around the particular life-conditions of women, have long been a feature of Australian social life.⁷¹ They have acted as a source of support for women and as political lobby groups—very often, like the women's suffragist and temperance groups in the nineteenth century, emphasising women's specific 'civilising' role and urging political and legal change to protect the interests of women and children. This wave of feminism was not born in a social vacuum, despite the two generations which separated it from the first wave of feminism whose impetus was defused by the massive social disturbances of two wars and a depression. In the experience of two wars and an intervening period of economic hardship and struggle, women were mobilised for the war effort and demobilised again into energetic family formation in the post World War II period.

In tracing the roots of the formation of the women's movement in the U.S.A., Jo Freeman stresses the immediate origins of the two major groupings; the 'reform' grouping stressing women's rights and the 'radical' grouping stressing 'women's liberation' which emerged in the late 1960s.⁷² She analyses the need for a pre-existing communications network of like-minded people who can be co-opted to the ideas of a new movement because their background, experiences or location in the social structure give them a common basis for awareness and action, and who are galvanised into action by a crisis situation. The roots of the reform groupings were in the various women's lobbyist groups, and women's professional and occupational organisations, which had been attempting to promote legal and political changes in the status of women, equal rights to employment, equal pay and equal work conditions—groups set in motion by the President's Commission on the Status of Women, 1961. She traces the roots of the younger groupings, with a more 'radical' style of organisation and a more 'total' utopian vision, to the women 'under 30, who had received their political education as participants or concerned observers of the social action projects' of the 1960s, particularly 'new left' and civil rights organisations. Their political education had included not only a heightened consciousness of social inequalities, but also experience of men's attitudes towards the place of women in the movement, and their dismissal of women's rights as of lesser consequence than other causes.

The 'immediate' roots of the various women's movements and the particular events and personalities which contributed to their mobilisation, objectives and strategies require a similar analysis in Australian society. But in a more long range perspective there are certain highly significant structural changes which have altered the life-conditions of

women in the twentieth century and which, in the post second-world war period in particular, provide the bases within which women have the potential to form a sex-class consciousness. These are:

1. The widespread dissemination and use of contraception (and abortion) which has enabled women to control their fertility and reduce their family size from an average issue of six children in 1901 to three children in 1942, with a continuing reduction in family size since then.⁷³
2. The increased longevity of women, as well as men, and the decrease in child mortality. Not only do women bear fewer children in order to have a living issue of two or three, but they have a long span of life ahead when their child-bearing and early child-rearing years are complete. Early marriage, a concentrated period of child-bearing, and return to the work-force at ages thirty to thirty-five has become a typical pattern.
3. The dissemination of education, of longer years of schooling, to more groups in the community, particularly to women, whose retention rate in secondary schools has increased substantially in the post war period. In 1954, 6.8 per cent of girls age seventeen were still at school, in 1970, 23.7 per cent.⁷⁴ In addition, women in their late twenties and thirties are returning to secondary and tertiary education in the 1970s, taking up opportunities not available to them in their adolescence.
4. The increased opportunities for women's employment which were opened up with the post-war expansion of the tertiary sectors of the economy. Women's workforce experience is a factor in their release from isolated, housebound activities which requires particular emphasis in the study of the formation of sex-class consciousness. It is not only an independent source of income, but an independent set of group-affiliations outside the concentric circles of domesticity—group-affiliations which are the precursors of women's individualistic action (in one sense) and collectivist action in relation to women's needs.
5. Women with higher levels of education, with careers or professional occupations, are the group most likely to postpone marriage, to choose not to marry at all or when married, to have fewer children.⁷⁵ In other words, the conditions exist for more women to move out of the set of material conditions within which most women have been immersed, and still are immersed.

This analysis suggests that women's movements will be largely composed of educated women with middle-class occupations, which is certainly the profile of many women in the 'reformist' and 'radical' groupings of the various women's movements in Australia.⁷⁶ However, trade-union and working-women's groups also exist, and have been organising support, fighting for women's conditions inside industry,

inside the unions and inside the labour movement. There is a variety of visions of a feminist utopia, fore-shadowing different combinations of social, sexual, economic, political and racial equality, according to the political beliefs and interests of the various feminist groups. The following formula abstracts out a common core of aspirations only in the dimension of sexual equality: equal expectation and opportunity for men and women to participate in child-care, domestic labour, education, the work-force, leisure, politics, public administration, public decision-making. It has been suggested that such a vision does not represent the aspirations of working class women, but more closely expresses the interests of middle class women.

Juliet Mitchell claims that middle-class women are placed in the position of experiencing the contradictions between the privileges connected with their class position (derived from their connection with father and husband) and the deprivations and subordination connected with their situation as women.⁷⁷ Middle-class women experience a contradiction between their economic class position and their sex-class position. In this contradiction lie the seeds of their potential feminist consciousness, their potential awareness of the situation of *all* women in relation to child care, housework, schooling, paid work, politics, the law, health. The middle class composition of the women's movement cannot be dismissed as an 'unhappy fact', but must be recognised as an intrinsic part of the making of sex-class consciousness, just as the skilled artisans were the first groups to organise in the making of the English (and the Australian) working class.

Women share with men the social and economic privileges and deprivations determined by their class position. Working-class men, who have not had the opportunity to acquire job skills, may be employed (or unemployed) in the secondary labour market; women from middle-class families may acquire professional skills and a position in the primary labour market. But men and women are differentiated by their unequal obligation to take care of children and perform domestic labour—a set of obligations intrinsically connected with women's position in the labour market and their economic and social power. Class analysis alone will not elucidate the ramifications of economic and sexual inequalities; we require an analysis which explores the nature of domestic labour and of the sex-segmented dual labour market, and their implications for the position of women in the Australian economy.

NOTES

- 1 A. Giddens, *The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies* (London, 1973), p.107.
- 2 B. Malinowski, 'The Principle of Legitimacy', in J. Goody, *Kinship* (Harmondsworth, 1971); L. Mair, *Marriage* (Harmondsworth, 1971).
- 3 J. Mitchell, *Psychoanalysis and Feminism* (Harmondsworth, 1975), drawing upon the theory of C. Levi-Strauss, *The Elementary Structures of Kinship* (1969).
- 4 S. Firestone, *The Dialectic of Sex* (London, 1971).
- 5 K. Gough, 'The Origin of the Family', in D. Spain (ed.), *The Human Experience: Readings in Socio-cultural Anthropology* (Illinois, 1975).
- 6 E.P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (London, 1963).

- 7 A. Oakley, *Housewife* (London, 1974).
- 8 W. Secombe, 'The Housewife and her Labour under Capitalism', *New Left Review* 83 (February 1973), pp.3-24, 6.
- 9 P. Laslett, *The World we have Lost* (London, 1965).
- 10 Oakley attributes the domestication of women to the process of 'industrialization', using mechanisation of production as the prime mover in the eventual placement of women outside the sphere of industrial production. However, there is a historically prior phase in the development of capitalism which she has not considered, the split between the organisation of business enterprise and the organisation of family-life, in the households of the bourgeoisie. M. Weber, *General Economic History* (New York, 1961), is most useful on this point.
- 11 L. Davidoff, 'The Rationalization of Housework', D.L. Barker & S. Allen (edd.), *Dependence and Exploitation in Work and Marriage* (London, 1976). Davidoff extends Weber's ideas and their implications for the organisation of domestic life in bourgeois households in England in the nineteenth century.
- 12 *ibid.*, p.131.
- 13 A. Oakley, *op. cit.*
- 14 K. Buckley, 'Primary Accumulation: the Genesis of Australian Capitalism', in E.L. Wheelwright & K. Buckley (edd.), *Essays in the Political Economy of Australian Capitalism* (Sydney, 1975), vol. 1.
- 15 B. Kingston, *My Wife, My Daughter and Poor Mary Ann* (Melbourne, 1975).
- 16 *ibid.*, and A. Summers, *Damned Whores and God's Police* (Ringwood, 1975).
- 17 F.H. Christie, 'Woman in School Texts', *Education News* 15, 4 and 5 (1975).
- 18 A. Summers, *op. cit.*
- 19 L. Davidoff, *loc. cit.*
- 20 *ibid.*, p.130.
- 21 B. Kingston, *op. cit.*
- 22 W. Secombe, *loc. cit.*, p.6.
- 23 B. Kingston, *op. cit.*
- 24 A. Curthoys, 'Towards a Feminist Labour History', A. Curthoys, S. Eade & P. Spearritt (edd.), *Women at Work* (Canberra, 1975).
- 25 *ibid.*
- 26 F. Williamson, *Towards a Geography of the Human Condition: A Study of Farmers' Behaviour within Agricultural Change* (Ph.D. thesis, University of Sydney, March 1975), shows the position of women on dairy farms in northern New South Wales.
- 27 M. Cannon, *Life in the Cities* (Melbourne, 1975).
- 28 *ibid.*, pp.261-262.
- 29 B. Kingston, *op. cit.*
- 30 M. Cannon, *op. cit.*, p.276.
- 31 B. Kingston, *op. cit.*
- 32 R. Pringle, 'Octavius Beale and the Ideology of the Birth-Rate', *Refractory Girl*, no. 3 (Winter 1973), pp.19-27.
- 33 E. Ryan & A. Conlon, *Gentle Invaders: 1788-1974. Australian Women at Work* (Sydney, 1975), p.92.
- 34 P. Ryan & T. Rowse, 'Woman, Arbitration and the Family', in Curthoys, Eade & Spearritt, *op. cit.*
- 35 E. Sullerot, *Woman, Society and Change* (London, 1971), and 'China Symposium', *A.N.Z. Journal of Sociology* 12, 1 (February 1976).
- 36 L. Ruzicka & L. Day, 'Australian Patterns of Family Formation', M. Dawson (ed.), *Searchlight—Families* (Sydney, 1974).
- 37 F. Parkin, *Class Inequality and Political Order* (London, 1971); M. Benston, 'The Political Economy of Women's Liberation', *Monthly Review* 83 (January-February 1973); W. Secombe, *loc. cit.*
- 38 A. Giddens, *op. cit.*
- 39 The 'scarcity value' of certain occupational skills which provide their possessors with a strong market capacity (e.g. in the professions of medicine, law, engineering) is artificially created and maintained over time by processes of recruitment and exclusion: stiff entrance qualifications, long and expensive periods of training. F. Parkin, *op. cit.*, discusses this point. There may also be an overlap between strong market capacity and property ownership, because of the opportunity of those who command high rewards to invest surplus income. The implications of Giddens' class scheme would require a separate paper. For the purposes of this analysis, I adopt it because it provides an analytical tool for assessing the impact of the major differentiating factor in women's position in the labour market—their possession, or lack, of marketable

- skills.
- 40 A. Giddens, *op. cit.* Here Giddens is following Marx and Weber.
 - 41 Data from *The Role of Women in the Economy; Background Information Australia*, O.E.C.D. Study, Women and Work no. 12, Women's Bureau, Department of Labour (Canberra, 1974).
 - 42 W.F. Connell, R.E. Stroobant, K.E. Sinclair, R.W. Connell & K.W. Rogers, *12 to 20: Studies of City Youth* (Sydney, 1975); D.E. Edgar, 'Adolescent Competence and Sexual Disadvantage', *La Trobe Sociology Papers*, no. 10 (June 1974).
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 - 44 M. Power, 'A Woman's work is never done—by men: a socio-economic model of sex-typing in occupations', *Journal of Industrial Relations* 17, 3 (September 1975).
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 - 46 B. Cass, 'Women in Academic Institutions', in *The Changing Role of Women in Society*, Australian Frontier Consultation Report (Sydney, 1975); F.M.B. Cass, 'W(h)ither a female profession', *Australian Library Journal*, 22 (March 1973); J. Bielski, 'Women in the Public Service', in *The Changing Role of Women in Society*. For extensive evidence of dual labour markets in the Australian Public Service, with men predominantly employed in the Third Division and above, women in the Fourth Division, see *The Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration*, Appendix Volume three (Canberra, 1976). See especially, 'The Career Service Survey', pp.1-183. Readily identifiable is the existence of a more highly educated well paid third division heavily male career elite in the A.C.T. serviced by a much younger lowly paid female support staff where job opportunities in terms of number of jobs available are increasing but whose career prospects are minimal in contrast to the group they serve. (p.96)
 - 47 C. Fuchs Epstein, 'Encountering the Male Establishment: sex status limits on women's careers in the professions', *American Journal of Sociology* 75, 6 (1970).
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 - 49 H. Gintis, Work and Alienation (paper delivered at First Australian Political Economy Conference, Sydney, June 1976).
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 - 51 *ibid.*
 - 52 M. Dalla Costa, 'Women and the Subversion of the Community', in Dalla Costa & S. James, *The Power of Women and the Subversion of the Community* (Bristol, 1972); M. Benston, *loc. cit.*; W. Secombe, *loc. cit.*; Gardiner, J., 'Women's Domestic Labour', *New Left Review* 89 (January-February 1975); Gardiner, J., 'The Political economy of domestic labour in capitalist society', in D.L. Barker & S. Allen, *op. cit.*
 - 53 Secombe, *loc. cit.*
 - 54 J. Gardiner, 'Women's Domestic Labour', *loc. cit.*
 - 55 J. Gardiner, 'Political Economy of domestic labour in Capitalist Society', in Barker & Allen, *op. cit.* p.119.
 - 56 H. Fallding, 'Inside the Australian Family' in A.P. Elkin, *Marriage and the Family in Australia*, (Sydney, 1957); and G. Bottomley, 'Some Greek sex roles: ideals, expectations and action in Australia and Greece', *A.N.Z. Journal of Sociology* 10, 1 (February, 1974).
 - 57 A. Curthoys, 'Men and Childcare in the Feminist Utopia', *Refractory Girl*, no. 10 (March 1976) p.4.
 - 58 E. Ryan & A. Conlon, *op. cit.*
 - 59 C. Bell & H. Newby, 'Husbands and wives: the dynamics of the deferential dialectic', D.L. Barker & S. Allen, *op. cit.*; J. Mitchell, *Psychoanalysis and Feminism*.
 - 60 *Poverty in Australia*, First Main Report of the Australian Government Commission of Inquiry into Poverty (April 1975).
 - 61 R. Sackville, 'Family Law', in S. Ross & M. Weinberg, *Law for the People* (Ringwood, 1976), p.69.
 - 62 A selection of 'matters to be taken into consideration in proceedings with respect to maintenance' in Family Law Act 1975, Part VIII—'Maintenance and Property', Section 75, p.32.
 - 63 *ibid.* Section 79, 'Alteration of property interests', p.34.
 - 64 Sackville, *loc. cit.*
 - 65 I wish to thank Richard Chisholm for his comments on the implications of the Family Law Act.

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- 74 Encel, MacKenzie & Tebbutt, *op. cit.*
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2

FRAGMENTATION OF THE WORKING CLASS

JOHN COLLINS

Neither changes in productive processes throughout this century of capitalism and monopoly capitalism, nor the changes in the occupational and industrial structure of the working population have been subjected to any comprehensive Marxist analysis since Marx's death ... There is simply no continuing body of work in the Marxist tradition dealing with the capitalist mode of production in the manner in which Marx treated it in the first volume of Capital.

Harry Braverman,
*Labor and Monopoly Capital:
The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century*
(New York and London:
Monthly Review Press, 1974)

1. Introduction

STUDY AND ANALYSIS of the 'labour process'—the relationship to the means of production—is central to the development of a class analysis of contemporary, and past, Australian capitalism. Such a study looks at the exchange of labour-power for wages in the labour market; and at the actual employment of labour in the production process. This requires attention to be given to the historical developments of the enterprise on the one hand, the nature and composition of the working class on the other, and their combination, seen in the social relations of production within the enterprise itself. In other words, a class analysis of Australian capitalism starts from an investigation of the *forces of production* (the level of technology and the organisation of the labour process) and the *relations of production* (the social relations that govern the production and reproduction of the capitalist mode of production [C.M.P.]). As Dos Santos notes, 'social classes are the fundamental expression of the antagonistic relations' of the mode of production.¹

There has been a tendency within Australian capitalism, consistent with Marx's prediction, that, as capitalism develops, it becomes more and more divided into two great classes, bourgeoisie and proletariat. And yet this progressive simplification of the class structure of Australian capitalism is accompanied by a simultaneous and contradictory movement towards complexity and differentiation within the ranks of the two major classes. This is seen, among the bourgeoisie, in differentiation into national and international sectors, small and large capital; financial, industrial and commercial capital, etc. Within the working class, there is a *horizontal* differentiation into different economic sectors, and a *vertical* differentiation between various levels of the occupational hierarchy. These two differentiation processes combine and intersect with sex, race, ethnic and other characteristics of the working class to produce 'fractions' or 'segments' within the proletariat.²

This essay is a first attempt to come to grips with some aspects of the class structure of Australian capitalism. The framework sees the objective requirements of the C.M.P. as the production and reproduction of labour-power (and hence capital accumulation) and of the social relations of production (class relations). It concentrates primarily on the *vertical* differentiation within the working class, and focuses on the aspects of the labour process that give rise to the emergence of 'segments' or 'fractions' within the Australian working class. This necessitates a study of the Australian labour market within the above methodological framework. As argued above, this task has been grossly overlooked by Marxists in Australia.

This is not to say that the study of various characteristics of the Australian labour market has not received any attention. Indeed, Marxist and bourgeois scholars alike have looked at wage determination, general characteristics of the labour-force such as industrial and occupational distribution, unemployment, workforce participation and the like.³ The emergence of the women's movement in the late 'sixties in Australia and elsewhere, coincident with the significant increase of females in the Australian labour market, has given birth to a number of studies that focus on the nature and characteristics of the female workforce.⁴ As well, there has been belated recognition and study of the impact of Australia's three million post-war migrants and their children on the labour market.⁵

However, by and large, these have been disparate and sporadic empirical studies. No one has attempted to pull all these together in an overall study of the Australian labour market. Where there have been attempts to interpret some of this labour market information, it has been within a bourgeois theoretical framework that, implicitly or explicitly, treats the Australian labour market as more or less approximating to a homogeneous whole.⁶

This essay argues that the dynamics of the Australian C.M.P. lead to the generation of distinct segments within the labour market and within the proletariat. Each of these segments in the labour market corresponds

to significantly different conditions concerning the exchange of labour-power and the employment of labour in the production process. The differences between segments in the labour market are manifested by differences in terms of: the industrial and occupational distribution of labour, representing the sections of capital to which this labour is distributed; the returns to the sale of labour-power (wages); the position within the internal job hierarchy within the enterprise itself; the nature of the job itself (i.e. skilled/unskilled, clean/dirty, interesting/boring, etc.); and the state of working conditions and the intensity of exploitation of labour.

These differences at the economic level are mirrored at the political and ideological level. This is of crucial importance at both the level of Marxist political and economic theory, and at the level of political practice which these theories inform. All too often the working-class has been seen as a homogeneous whole, leading to grave oversights in theory and practice. It is precisely the nature and extent of the differences within the Australian working class, rooted in the segments of the labour market—and the underlying segmentation *processes* that generate these differences—that is crucial to an understanding of the dynamics of the Australian class structure. Moreover, only by centering on these ‘fractions’ or ‘segments’ within the working class can we fully understand the nature of capital accumulation, class struggle, and the social relations of production within the Australian C.M.P. itself. Notions of a homogeneous labour market ignore these segmentation processes and therefore obscure any real understanding of the dynamics of the Australian labour market.

The aim of this essay is to develop a Marxist theoretical framework in which to locate the study of the Australian labour market. Such a theory is to be found in the theory of labour market segmentation. Section 2 outlines alternative theoretical approaches to the study of the labour market. Specifically, the central aspects of orthodox labour market theory and dual labour market theory will be outlined and criticised from a Marxist perspective. In Section 3 this theory of labour market segmentation is developed and elaborated as the only adequate explanation of the generation and impact of labour market segmentation within the capitalist mode of production.

Section 4 assesses the post- World War II experience in the light of this theory of labour market segmentation. On the basis of the fairly scant and fragmentary evidence available to date, it attempts to empirically establish the broad labour-market segments that exist within the Australian labour market. This section elaborates as fully as possible the characteristics of each of these labour market segments, and attempts to identify and explain the processes that generate segmentation in the Australian C.M.P. Finally, an attempt is made to assess the significance and impact of this on capital accumulation and class-struggle in the post-war period.

2. Theories of The Labour Market: Orthodox, Dual-Labour Market and Marxist Perspectives

There are three contending theories that purport to provide a theory of the labour market relevant for our consideration of labour-market segmentation. They are most commonly known as orthodox labour market theory, dual-labour market theory and radical labour market theory.⁷ As they now stand, these theories have developed in the U.S.A. in the 'sixties. In particular, they attempted to provide an explanation for the persistent labour market discontinuities that were highlighted by the phenomenon of U.S. urban poverty and underemployment, particularly in the black ghettos.⁸

(a) *Orthodox Labour Market Theory*

Before then, orthodox theory held supreme; it was based on the premise that individual differences amongst workers would decline over time, leading to an approximate homogeneous labour market, where the only differences were in the marginal productivity of workers. Income and employment differences were explained in terms of different marginal productivities of workers. However, empirical research noted that there was a tendency for labour market differences, in terms of employment characteristics and incomes, between certain 'groups' to persist over time. Particularly noticeable was the seemingly different labour market conditions of blacks and women. Separate but related developments within orthodox economic theory attempted to reconcile it with the strong empirical affirmation of labour market 'discontinuities'. These developments were, on the one hand, 'human capital theory', and on the other the 'orthodox theory of racial discrimination'.

Human capital theory, pioneered by Becker [1964], [1967], provided a hitherto absent unified theory of the distribution of income. Although human capital theory arose from a concern with different problems, it provided the basis for explaining the differences in incomes noted for the various 'groups' in the labour market. According to this reformulation of orthodox theory, a worker's wage can be viewed as a return on the amount of money invested in his or her training. As the theory puts it, wages are a return to investment in 'human capital'. This analysis emphasises that education investments are analytically comparable to a firm's investment in on-the-job training, each representing a capital investment designed to increase a worker's productivity. The return to individuals, then, corresponds to the stock of human capital embodied in the individual. The differences in individual capacities are seen as the result of unequal distribution of native ability, formal education, vocational education, and on-the-job training and experience. These general and specific skills affect worker productivity and hence the return to labour. If some workers have low productivities, the human capital theory assumes that either they or society thinks that returns to investments in their productivities would be too low to warrant expenditure.

As a consequence of the small amount of human capital embodied in these workers, they receive low incomes. Human capital theory, then, is an attempt to explain the distribution of income in terms of the distribution of skills. In many ways it is an improvement on the former crude 'marginal productivity' theory of income distribution, for it rejects the simplistic assumption of a homogeneous labour market and centres attention on the differentiation within the labour force. Moreover, it introduces social institutions (e.g. the educational system) into orthodox economic analysis rather than holding institutions to be exogenous and fixed.⁹

Human capital theory attempts to provide a compatibility between empirical observations of discontinuities in the labour market (and resulting discontinuities in the distribution of income) and the whole corpus of bourgeois neoclassical theory, based as it is on the rational profit maximisation decisions of individual economic units in the economy. Hence the empirical documentation of differences in the wages of white and black workers, for example, is to be explained in terms of the low productivities of black workers arising out of their low stock of human capital. As Thurow succinctly puts it:

Human capital (the skills and knowledge of the individual) is one of the key determinants of the distribution of income. Individuals with little education, training and skills have low marginal productivities and earn low incomes. With very little human capital, they earn poverty incomes. Blacks who have less capital than whites earn less. (Thurow [1971:85])

While human capital theory is an attempt to explain differential income distribution in terms of *different* skill levels of individuals, 'discrimination theory' attempts to explain why two people with the *same* skills or 'human capital' get *different* wages. The orthodox theory of discrimination was also pioneered by Becker [1957] and has been developed into its most sophisticated form by Arrow [1972], [1974].¹⁰ The theory has been developed most fully for the case of racial discrimination, but can be extended as an explanation for discrimination on the basis of sex, within education, within trade unions, between workers, and so on.¹¹ Discrimination theory centres around the introduction of a coefficient of discrimination into the orthodox theory of the determination of wage rates. Hence, if an employer is prejudiced and discriminates against a particular group of potential employees (e.g. blacks), Becker's theory argues that the costs to that employer of hiring black workers would be $w(1+di)$, where w is the wage rate for black employees and di is the employer's discrimination coefficient against blacks. In general, if $di > 0$, the employer is prejudiced against this type of worker, and if $di < 0$, the employer shows favouritism towards this type of worker. If the employer discriminates more against B workers than W workers, then $d_B < d_W$. As a result, B workers are not employed to the point where the value of their marginal products equals their wage rate; W workers are employed beyond the point where the value of their marginal

products equals their wage rates. Hence Becker concludes that discriminatory behaviour by the employer will alter both the relative and absolute levels of resource utilisation and the amounts of final products which are produced.¹² It is an easy step for Becker to explain, consistent with neoclassical economic theory and individual maximising behaviour, the economic discrimination against blacks in the U.S. as a result of the 'prejudice' of employers, exogenously given. As he argues, '...tastes for discrimination would produce, via the workings of a competitive economic system—effective discrimination against Negroes'. (Becker [1957: 19-20]).

As Cohen and Cyert argue, the orthodox theory of discrimination suggests that:

There is no need to assume that political discrimination, monopolies or other forms of market imperfections or social class warfare are the causes of discrimination in this country. Although these may be secondary determinants of market discrimination, Becker concludes that the primary determinant is a result of individual tastes for discrimination within a competitive economy. (Cohen and Cyert [1965: 279])

Overall, then, orthodox theory has responded to the empirical studies of labour market discontinuities noticeable amongst ghetto blacks, women and ethnic groups in a twofold manner—human capital theory and discrimination theory—which is consistent with individual maximising behaviour in a competitive economy.

(b) *Dual Labour Market Theory*

Responding to the same empirical observations of poverty and under-employment in the U.S. in the 1960s, a body of economists began to argue that a dual labour market theory, which postulated a dichotomization of the American labour market over time, was the best means of explaining this phenomenon. The dual labour market theory grew largely out of more detailed empirical inquiry into the nature of labour market conditions of blacks and women *vis à vis* other labour market groups. Based on these studies, the dual labour market theory was developed by Piore [1969] [1970], [1971] [1973], who first worked with an explicit dual labour market model, Bluestone [1970], and Gordon [1972]. They were increasingly dissatisfied with the orthodox theory which placed prime emphasis on the individual characteristics of the workers themselves in explaining labour market discontinuities. Rather, the dual labour market theorists argued that the characteristics of workers which were associated with productivity (schooling, vocational training etc.) and which were central to human capital theory, had almost no influence on employment prospects. Instead they focused attention on the characteristics of the jobs themselves. In the words of Piore:

The basic hypothesis of the dual labour market was that the labour market is divided into two essentially different sectors, termed the *primary* and the *secondary* sectors. The former offers jobs with relatively high wages,

good working conditions, chances of advancement, equity and due process in administration of work rules, and, above all, employment stability. Jobs in the secondary sector, by contrast, tend to be low paying, with poorer working conditions, little chance of advancement; a highly personalised relationship between workers and supervisors which leaves wide latitude for favouritism and is conducive to harsh and capricious work discipline; and with considerable instability in jobs and a high turnover among the labour force. (Piore as cited in Gordon [1972: 46])

The theory argues that minority groups and women are much more likely to begin their careers in, and stay in, the secondary sector than are white males. This will in turn determine differential incomes of these groups. Incomes in the primary market are largely determined by the speed of movement through (and differential access to) job structures. In the secondary market, incomes are likely to depend mainly on variation in hours worked, since the secondary labour market is relatively homogeneous, and wages will tend therefore to reflect aggregate market supply and demand rather than individual characteristics.¹³ In many ways, the dual labour market theory is an advance on orthodox labour market theory in explaining contemporary labour market dynamics, for it emphasises interaction and change, particularly the dynamic nature of institutions and the interactions between institutions and individual change. This is in contrast to the focus on stability and fixity of institutional environments that permeates the orthodox theory. The dual labour market theory argues that the definition of job structures and job designs, constitutes an important economic parameter, and that employer interests, employees, and technologies, interact simultaneously in the long run to determine the characteristics of both jobs and people, defining the nature of the jobs and the behaviour of the people.¹⁴

(c) *A Marxist Critique of Orthodox and Dual Labour Market Theories*

Gordon [1972: 86-96] has provided a useful categorisation in which to conduct a Marxist critique of orthodox and dual labour market theories. These two theories differ fundamentally from the Marxist theory of labour market segmentation in four ways: first, they have fundamentally different methodologies; second, the three theories differ in the ways they consider the complicated relationships among technology, jobs and people; third, the theories disagree sharply on the ways in which they analyse and interpret discontinuities in the labour market; and fourth, they differ in terms of the policy solutions that they generate. In addition to these we must consider an important issue neglected by Gordon. This concerns the processes that lie behind the generation of the labour force *per se*, and the characteristics of that labour force.

(i) First, orthodox theory is based on a partial, static analysis, within a fixed institutional environment, centered on individual maximising behaviour; it revolves around central notions of harmony and equilibrium. The general Marxist critique of orthodox theory from this point

of view is well known and will not be reiterated here;¹⁵ rather, a specific critique of human capital and discrimination theories will be made. The overriding critique of these theories must start with the absence of any concept of class. As Bowles and Gintis argue trenchantly, human capital theory is the most recent and perhaps ultimate step in the elimination of class as a central economic concept. Furthermore, they argue that the failure to encompass social relations, and to offer a theory of reproduction, are serious shortcomings of human capital theory:

By restricting its analysis to the interaction of exogenously given individual preferences, raw materials (individual abilities) and alternative production technologies, human capital theory formally excludes the relevance of class and class conflict to the explication of labor market phenomena. However, in our view such basic phenomena as the wage structure, the individual attributes valued on the labor market, and the social relations of the educational process itself can only be accounted for through explicit class analysis. (Bowles and Gintis [1975: 75])

In the absence of any concept of class, orthodox theory is unable to establish the nature of the crucial social relationships between employers and employees. This leads to absurd propositions that are central to the orthodox theory of discrimination. For example, the theory rests on the premise that the employer pays *more* in wages as a result of his or her preference for discrimination. As Reich [1971: 109] points out, the result of discrimination in the Becker model is that white discriminating employers *lose* in monetary terms, while white workers gain from discrimination. Similarly, the Arrow model is built on the premise '... that employers neither gain nor lose by their discriminatory behaviour. The entire effect is that of a transfer from B[lack] to W[hite] workers' (Arrow [1974: 8]).

Orthodox economists generally argue that class interests cannot be maintained in the face of conflicting individual interests, and that, if individual and class interests are complementary, one gains no additional insights by positing the independence of class interests. As Arrow argues:

Economic explanations for discrimination or other phenomena tend to run in individualistic terms ... Economists ask what motivates an employer or an individual worker. They tend not to accept as an explanation a statement that employers as a class would gain by discrimination, for they ask what would prevent an individual employer from refusing to discriminate if he prefers, and thereby profit.¹⁶

The dual labour market theory, on the other hand, offers a specific analysis of the labour market that *can* be interpreted in class terms. Indeed, the Marxist theory of labour market segmentation has incorporated the concepts of primary and secondary labour markets into its analysis, as has orthodox theory.¹⁷ However, the dual labour market theory itself does not rely on the concept of class, and therefore neither links the distinctions between primary and secondary markets to class divisions,

nor consistently bases its hypotheses on evaluations of the group interests of employees or employers in either market. The dual-labour market theory is, in fact, a hypothesis that lacks a theoretical or historical explanation for its institutionalist observations. As David Gordon puts it: 'The dual market theory, however much it emphasises the dynamics of change, does not provide an explicit analysis of conflict in society' (Gordon [1972: 87]).

For Marxists, of course, the C.M.P. is characterised by the emergence of a ruling class and a proletariat or working class. In a society like Australia, there is a dominant mode of production, the C.M.P. In all modes of production, Marx argued, feudal, capitalist, etc., there are certain invariant elements, i.e. (i) the labourer, the direct producer, or, more specifically, his or her labour-power; (ii) the means of production, i.e. the objects and means of labour, including the raw materials and the instruments of labour by which these are converted by the labourer into products, and (iii) the non-labourer. In the C.M.P., these elements combine according to a specific relation, the property relation, whereby the non-labourer intervenes in the production process as the owner of both the means of production and the labour power of the direct producer. Capitalism is thereby characterised by the emergence of a class that owns the means of production (ruling class) and a class that, dispossessed of the means of production, has no means of subsistence save the sale of its labour power (the working class). This class relationship is fundamentally antagonistic. Marxists utilise historical and dialectical materialism to analyse any mode of production. For them, '...the prime energy for systemic change is internal to the developing system, not exogenously imposed' (Zweig [1971: 49]). Marxist analysis is thereby dynamic, centering around class conflict, since the overriding logic of the capitalist mode of production is the capital accumulation, the extraction of surplus value out of the unpaid labour of the working class which is appropriated by the ruling class. The C.M.P. must reproduce both the means of production (i.e. the reproduction of labour power) and the social relations of production (class relations). For Marxists, then, the production process is a class process, with the maximisation of capital accumulation (subject to these constraints) the overriding logic of capitalist production.

It is from this perspective that the analysis of the labour market is approached. By failing to analyse these 'hidden' social relations of production, orthodox economic theory, in its analysis of the labour market, fails to transcend the level of appearances, and is constrained to 'commodity fetishism', whereby the basic relation between men (social relations) '...assumes in their eyes the fantastic form of a relation between things' (Marx, *Capital* 1:83). As Bowles and Gintis conclude:

The theory of human capital, like the rest of neoclassical economics, ultimately locates the sources of human happiness and misery in the interaction of human nature (preferences and 'abilities') with nature itself (technologies and resources). This framework provides an elegant apology

for almost any pattern of oppression or inequality (under capitalism, state socialism or whatever), for it ultimately attributes social or personal ills either to the shortcomings of individuals or the unavoidable technical requisities of production. (Bowles & Gintis [1975: 82])

(ii) The second major Marxist criticism of orthodox and dual market theories, stemming from the methodological differences noted above, concerns the relationship between technology, jobs, and people. Orthodox theory, given a capital-labour ratio, seems to suggest a unique set of most efficient job definitions and job structures within which labour is to be hired, trained etc. In the short run, this often leads to the assumption of fixed job structure, and job definition, with the theory concentrating on workers' decisions within these given structures. Hence the orthodox theory has been criticised for postulating a 'technological determinist' view of job structure and job design.¹⁸ On the other hand, both the Marxist and dual labour market theory see the evolution of job structures and job design as an endogenous parameter that is central to the operation of labour markets. In the Marxist theory this stems from a theory of the firm which sees production as a *social* process as well as a technical process. The implication of this view, at odds with orthodox economic theory, is fundamental: production is seen not only as a process of a transformation of raw materials into products, but also a transformation of workers with given skills and levels of consciousness into altered skills and consciousness. Hence, labour is not a commodity but an active agent whose efforts must be channelled, thwarted or redirected so as not to impinge on capital accumulation:

The social organisation of production is in large measure a reflection of the capitalist's need for incentive and control mechanisms which will extract labour from workers at the lowest possible wage and prevent the formation of worker conditions which could oppose their power. (Bowles & Gintis [1975: 76])

(iii) The third major difference between the contending labour market theories concerns their analysis of discontinuities. Gordon [1972: 90] points out that orthodox theory makes two arguments about discontinuities: first that they are departures from the competitive norm and hence are expected to erode away over time; and second that, where discontinuities persist, human capital theory and discrimination theory suggests that such imperfections consist of artificially erected barriers between groups. In this case, the theory argues, the behaviour of workers in any given sector can be explained by the same set of behavioural hypotheses as that of workers in any other group. That is, the theory postulates that characteristics of attitudes and personalities of workers remain constant between sectors, since they are determined exogenously. Apparent differences therefore stem from a common underlying behavioural response to dissimilar conditions.

With respect to the first argument, Marxist theory argues that discontinuities within the labour market tend to be *intensified* with the

development of the C.M.P. over time rather than gradually eroded. As the C.M.P. develops, and all labour becomes legally 'free', segmentation of workers according to ascriptive traits becomes an important means by which the economic progress and political stability of the C.M.P. can be ensured. On the second point, it is argued that the basic behavioural traits of workers in different sectors may differ quite fundamentally. Like the evolution of different job structures, worker behaviour and attitudes are endogenous to the capital accumulation process.

(iv) The next major difference between the theories concerns the policy implications of each theory, and the way in which institutions fit into these policy 'solutions'. Orthodox theory, as we have seen, explains labour market discontinuities in terms of human capital theory and discrimination theory. With respect to the former, prescriptions for eliminating labour market discontinuities are *via* policies to increase the 'human capital' embodied in individuals. This would be done through institutions such as education and the family, by policies designed to provide increased vocational training, education facilities, and the like.

However, Marxists argue, this embodies erroneous assumptions about the nature of institutions like the family and education, and the state, within the C.M.P. The major function of both the family and education is to ensure a continuation of the reproduction of both labour-power and the social relations of production.¹⁹ Elaborating the point concerning education, for example, Bowles and Gintis point out that human capital theory views education as the acquisition of services which turn raw materials into developed capacities on the basis of individual choice. Such a view abstracts from the function of education in social production:

The education system does much more than produce human capital. It segments the workforce, forestalls the development of working class consciousness, and legitimates economic inequality by providing an open, objective and ostensibly meritocratic mechanism for assigning individuals to unequal occupational positions. (Bowles & Gintis [1975: 78])

Discrimination theory locates the source of discrimination in the 'tastes for discrimination', or prejudice of employers. While these are exogenous to the Becker model, they are endogenous in the models of Arrow and Phelps.²⁰ Presumably the 'policy solution' to eliminate such discrimination lies in the 'education' of people to remove prejudice. However, as Castles and Kosack point out in another context, such analyses which see discrimination as a phenomenon of 'colour prejudice' or 'racialism', however well meaning, are totally inadequate. In such theories,

the problems are abstracted from the socio-economic structure and reduced to the level of attitudes. Solutions are to be sought not through political action, but through psychological and educational strategies. (Castles & Kosack [1972: 16])²¹

In stark contrast to the orthodox theory, Marxist theory locates the cause of labour market segmentation and the resulting differences in

income between segments, in the dynamics of class division and class conflict. It argues that these segments which largely correspond to the ascriptive (sex, race, ethnic-origin, age) characteristics of the workers, serve critical economic political and ideological functions for both individual employers and the capitalist class as a whole. Moreover, the theory argues that the capitalist class has strong and ultimately determining influence over institutions such as education, the relations of production, and the state. This being the case, segmentation—and resulting discrimination and inequality—is seen as the logical outcome of the operation of the C.M.P. in pursuit of capital accumulation and the reproduction of the relations of production. Any attempt to alter the segmentation processes, and to reduce the poverty and inequality that results from them, must therefore be through the political domain of class-struggle leading ultimately to the overthrow of capitalism, replacing it with a socialist society.

(v) Orthodox theory suggests that given the workforce, individual workers make optimising decisions in the competitive market. On the other hand, Marxist theory asks the question: By what mechanism is the demand for labour that is required by the C.M.P. for capital accumulation, actually obtained? And further, what mechanism ensures that this labour is available under such conditions, as to ensure that the product of labour is distributed between wages and profits, so as to permit an ever increasing accumulation of capital and, at the same time, maintain the social relations of production of the C.M.P.?²² Marx's answer to this question was that the 'relative surplus population', or the 'industrial reserve army' was

the pivot upon which the law of demand and supply of labour works. It confines the field of action of this law within the limits absolutely convenient to the activity of exploitation and domination of capital.²³

Marx argued that the industrial reserve army had two functions. The first was to supply additional labour reserves—a function so crucial to capital accumulation that Marx described it as 'the lever of capitalistic accumulation, nay, a condition for the existence of the capitalist mode of production' (Marx [*Capital*, vol. 1: 592]). The second function related to the *qualitative* difference between the indigenous workforce and the industrial reserve army, a central aspect to the accumulation process. Similarly, when analysing operations of the labour market in 'late capitalism', Marxists take into account the role of the industrial reserve army in both supplying the quality of workers necessary for capital accumulation, but qualitatively different—in terms of sex, race and ethnic origin primarily—from the 'indigenous' workforce. These particular characteristics of the industrial reserve army are central to the development of labour market segmentation, enabling employers to utilise sexist and racist ideologies to justify segmentation. Unfortunately, while the concept of the industrial reserve army has been central to Marxist analysis of the impact of immigration providing foreign workers for

western Europe and the U.K.,²⁴ it has been ignored by American economists who have developed the radical labour market theory.²⁵

3. The Marxist Theory of Labour Market Segmentation

The most useful contribution to the development of a Marxist theory of labour market segmentation is that of Reich *et al.* [1973]. They suggest that labour market segmentation in the U.S. can be most usefully understood as the outcome of four separate, but related, segmentation processes: first, segmentation into primary and secondary markets; second, segmentation within the primary sector; third, segmentation by race; and fourth, segmentation by sex.

The first utilises the distinction made by the dual labour market theory between primary and secondary segments, differentiated mainly by the degree of stability of work in each. Primary jobs are those which require and develop stable working habits, and often require skilled workers. High wages and developed job ladders are characteristics of this segment. Jobs in this segment tend to be filled by indigenous (white) male workers. In contrast, secondary jobs do not require stable working habits, and are characterised by low wages, high turnover and often unskilled, menial work where job ladders are few. Secondary jobs are mainly filled by minority workers (i.e. various ethnic groups), women and youth. Segmentation within the primary sector leads to the development of 'subordinate' and 'independent' primary jobs. Subordinate primary jobs are routinised and encourage personality characteristics of dependability, discipline, and responsiveness to rules and authority. This segment includes both factory and office jobs. Independent primary jobs, on the other hand, are seen to require 'creative, problem solving characteristics'. Voluntary turnover is high, individual motivation and achievement are highly rewarded, and these jobs often require 'professional' standards. Segmentation by race refers to the distinct segments of 'race-typed' jobs within the above segments, although as evidence from Syzmanski [1975] for example, suggests, they are mainly concentrated in secondary jobs. Prejudice and geographical separation are seen to be of importance in maintaining race segmentation.

Finally, the emergence of 'male jobs' and 'female jobs' leads to segmentation by sex. Female jobs usually receive lower wages and often require a 'serving mentality'—characteristics that are supported and encouraged by capitalist institutions such as schooling and the family. These four segmentation processes, as outlined by Reich (*et al.*) provide a useful basis from which to approach analysis of segmentation in the Australian labour market. However, it is important to establish just how these segments evolved in order to understand the functions of labour market segmentation.

(a) *Historical origins of labour market segmentation*

An understanding of the historical origins of labour market segmentation must be seen in two separate, but interrelated parts. On the one hand,

an analysis of the historical change of the forces of production and the internal social relations of the enterprise that accompanied the historical development of the C.M.P.; on the other hand, analysis of the broad characteristics and composition of the working class itself, in particular the role of the industrial reserve army in the development of the C.M.P.

(i) INTERNAL SOCIAL RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION

As the R.R.P.E. noted in a recent issue:

While Marx himself placed great emphasis on the development of the social relations of work in capitalist society ... most Marxist economic historians have limited their focus to the structure of capital and wage labour in the large.²⁶

Stone notes that this neglect has had a particular retarding effect on the development of the theories of labour market segmentation. She argues that:

by and large studies of labour market stratification have taken its essential precondition, the hierarchial division of labour within the enterprise, as a technical fact, while focussing on the struggle among groups of workers for positions within it as the only relevant social issue ... the division of labour on which labour market stratification is based must itself be seen as a central social issue related to the struggle between capital and labour over the process of production and its material fruits. Stone [1974: 113]

Recent contributions in the U.S. have begun to outline the significance of the change in the internal social relations of the enterprise (including the division of labour), which accompanied the growth and evolution of the C.M.P., to the creation of segmented labour markets.²⁷ In summary, the argument of Marglin [1974] is that the development of the enterprise—from the factory system to modern industry—paralleled the development of the C.M.P. in the transition to its present phase. The prime determinant of the type of organisation of the production process (i.e. the nature of the internal social relations of production) was the desire for the capitalists to gain hegemony over the production process and to diffuse potential class struggle. Hence 'divide and conquer' was the overriding concern in the development of the factory system, while conditions of technological efficiency were at best secondary considerations.²⁸ This was necessary since increased proletarianisation of the C.M.P. in its early stages was matched by an increasing homogeneity of the working class. Hence, for the first time, the proletariat was a potentially revolutionary force; the destruction of the old skilled/unskilled dichotomy and the decline of exclusive craft unionism created the probability that the workers might, as a class, unite to oppose the employing class.²⁹ As Sweezy argues:

in Marx's view the proletariat was not a revolutionary force from its birth but on the contrary acquired this quality in the course of its capitalistic development. (Sweezy [1972: 150])

Hence, during the period of competitive capitalism, the labour market developed towards the progressive homogenisation of the labour force; and as Reich *et al.* [1973: 360-1] point out, the increasing homogeneous and proletarian character of the workforce generated an upsurge of class conflict in railroads, steel, coal mining and textiles in the U.S. in this period. It was in response to this development of the potential for revolutionary class struggle that capitalists began to develop the internal job structures to 'divide and rule' the workers, laying the basis for labour market segmentation, rather than homogenisation, Marglin argues. Utilising theories such as the 'scientific management' of Fredrick Winslow Taylor, employers set out to break down the workers' collective identity and to gain control over the production process. Stone [1974] documents this in detail for the particular case of the U.S. steel industry: Tradesmen initially had control over the production process—they could hire their own workers, set production targets etc. To break this down, and transfer hegemony over the production process to the employer, employers created foremen and what was to be the basis of white collar workers—management and clerical staff. The response to this by employers was fourfold, Stone [1974: 127-142] argues. First, new methods of wage payment were introduced, giving the employers complete control of the production process and, at the same time, breaking down the collective interest of workers by dividing them into different earning groups to increase the social distance between workers. Second, new promotion policies and the development of job ladders enabled previously homogeneous workers to be strictly demarcated by status and pay. This gave the workers the incentive of vertical mobility and gave the employers more leverage with which to maintain discipline. Third, the corporation introduced welfare programmes to increase the ties between workers and their employers and thereby attempted to weaken the ties between workers and their class. Fourth, the employers developed new systems for managing their workforce, and, utilising 'Taylorism', redefined further the nature of jobs and the division of labour.

In many ways, the theory of the development of internal social relations of production—and the labour market segmentation to which it gave rise—is limited for our purpose. In particular, the false polarisation between 'conscious' political hegemony and the capital accumulation process (particularly the role of technological efficiency) needs closer research by Marxists. Moreover, the argument presented is for the case of the U.S. Any theory of labour market segmentation in Australia requires a similar study of the historical development of the social relations of production in Australian enterprises; this has been almost totally neglected by Marxists. Nevertheless, the crucial role that the development of 'internal' job structures has had on the emergence of labour market segmentation—and, indeed, the class structure of modern capitalism—is apparent. Attention must be given to this area if we are to begin to fully understand the political economy of Australian capitalism.

(ii) THE INDUSTRIAL RESERVE ARMY OF LATE CAPITALISM

In advanced capitalism, the traditional sources that generated the industrial reserve army in Marx's day are no longer sufficient to provide adequate labour reserves for capital accumulation.³⁰ The two most important sources of late capitalism's industrial reserve army have been female and migrant labour, reflecting an internationalisation of the division of labour. To quote Braverman:

In periods of rapid capital accumulation, such as that which has taken place throughout the capitalist world since World War II, the relative surplus population which is the 'natural' product of the capital accumulation process is supplemented with other sources of labour. In northern Europe and the United States, the capitalistic economies have increasingly made use of the masses of former agricultural labour in the colonies and neo-colonies. ... These masses are thrown off by the process of imperialist penetration itself, which has disrupted the traditional forms of labour and subsistence ... At the same time, in a process which cuts across racial and national lines, the female portion of the population has become the prime supplementary reservoir of labour. In all the most rapidly growing sectors of the working class, women make up the majority, and in some instances the overwhelming majority, of the workers. (Braverman [1975: 384-5])³¹

Invariably, this new 'industrial reserve army' (IRA) for late capitalism provides a cheap labour reserve that is channelled into menial, monotonous, low paid jobs. Utilising the entrenched racist and sexist ideologies, capitalists have thus been able to discriminate against these sections of the working class, facilitating the development of labour market segmentation on race and sex lines. As a result, not only does late capitalism generate a new, internationalised, relative surplus population, it also is able to utilise capitalist ideology to ensure that minimal economic and political dislocation results from the incorporation of very substantial numbers of workers into the labour market. As Ward argues for the case of migrants in Western Europe:

In addition to being plentiful to the point of inexhaustibility, mobile/expendable, and docile, the migratory labour force offers the capitalist still another great advantage. It is cheap. (Ward [1975(a): 26])

Female workers also provide a large, though not inexhaustible pool of workers, who are 'cheap' and often politically 'docile'.

(b) The functions of labour market segmentation

The impact and significance of labour market segmentation to the capitalist mode of production can be most clearly seen by outlining the interrelated economic, political and ideological functions that it plays. Each will be considered separately in turn; however, it must be remembered that all, while having a relative degree of autonomy, are integrally interrelated.³²

(i) ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS

Economically, the existence of segmented labour markets, which cor-

respond to racist, ethnic and sexist divisions in the workforce, particularly in respect to late capitalism's reserve army of workers, enhances the extraction of surplus value and facilitates capital accumulation. Further, it is a central means whereby the social relations of the C.M.P. are reproduced. As Marx argued, there are three major ways in which the capitalist could increase surplus value: the first was by increasing the length of the working day, thereby prolonging the period in which surplus labour is performed. This Marx called *absolute surplus value*.³³ Assuming that the length of the working day was given, Marx argued that the capitalist could increase surplus value by reducing the time devoted to necessary labour. This could be done by increasing the intensity of labour, or by cheapening the elements of necessary labour by increasing the productiveness of labour. This Marx called relative surplus value. At the same time, payment of wages below the value of labour-power would also increase surplus value. By segmenting the labour market, capitalists can enhance the extraction of surplus value by subjecting 'lower' segments to greater intensity of exploitation, low wages and longer working days. By utilising job hierarchies and job organisation, capitalists can create 'low wage' jobs, with what would otherwise be unacceptable conditions of work and intensity of work.³⁴ This is particularly the case, as foreign and women workers largely dominate manual, production-line work in the secondary sector of almost every major capitalist nation. Young workers form an important reservoir of cheap labour crucial to some sections of capital, particularly retailing. Moreover at a national level these segments often have a higher activity rate, have less dependants, and have often been educated and trained in their 'home' country. Hence the social cost of reproduction of migrant and women workers in the secondary segment, is much lower than for a corresponding amount of indigenous white male labour, thereby indirectly enhancing capital accumulation. As a direct outcome of labour market segmentation, poverty and inequality occur disproportionately amongst the racist and sexist segments of the secondary labour market.³⁵ It is here, within a theory of labour market segmentation, that the explanation of poverty amongst blacks, women and ethnic minorities should be located.³⁶

(ii) POLITICAL FUNCTIONS

The major political implication and significance of labour market segmentation lies in its impact on class struggle within the capitalist mode of production; indeed, the absence of such struggle has been a feature which Marxists must explain. One of the major reasons for a diffusion of class struggle has been the impact of labour market segmentation, preventing a homogeneous working class, united against capital, developing as a result of progressive proletarianisation. The overall impact of labour market segmentation has been to create a state of conflict among, and division between, classes. As Luria argues:

The serviceability of divisions based on certain ascriptive traits—notably race, sex and styles of personal self-presentation—has meant that the capitalist class, assisted by sexist and racist mass ideology, has been able to integrate many divisions based on ascription into the American political economy. Instead of labour market homogenisation as the partner of increasing proletarianisation, then, the result instead is the coexistence of that proletarianisation with the segmented labour markets which serve to emasculate the germ of working class unity it engenders. (Luria [1975: 174-5]).

In this way it has prevented the emergence of a united working class, and a working class consciousness—both of which would appear to be prerequisites to successful class struggle. As Wachtel comments for the case of the U.S.:

The impact of the stratification process on consciousness is to divert workers consciousness from a class orientation and replace it with an identification with one's strata in society, producing status consciousness. This, coupled with the inculcation of hierarchial forms of work organisation is a twin-edged sword which has had profound effects on the American working class. (Wachtel [1974: 12])

Gordon argues that employers have encouraged and permitted the evolution of the more advantaged strata (i.e. normally the white male strata) to develop class consciousness. At the same time, they have attempted to prevent the emergence of class consciousness within the lower classes and strata of workers.³⁷ The effect of this, he notes, is to induce the higher strata to identify as their 'enemies' those within the less advantaged class of workers, while preventing class consciousness among the lower strata who are the most exploited. This has the impact of forestalling revolutionary impulses among this class. Class-division in this sense is an essential precondition which enables the employing class to continue discrimination against the 'lower' segments of the workforce who fill the most secondary, unstable, undesirable and low paying jobs.

Particularly important in terms of class struggle is the role of the trade unions. Rather than challenging the professional, craft and job status distinctions on the job, the trade unions put themselves in a position of maintaining and administering the job arrangements consistent with those divisions. As Marglin and Stone argue³⁸ for the U.S., the trade unions have never questioned or challenged the work process, being concerned rather with 'bread and butter' issues of maximising workers' returns *given* the craft, industrial, racial and sexist wage and job structures that have developed as a result of labour market segmentation. And yet any substantial improvement to the 'bread and butter' position of the working class necessitates a challenge and overthrow of the hierarchial labour process. As Bowles argues:

The link between social relations of production and the income determination process is so intimate that any substantial change in the latter is

contingent upon the transformation of the hierarchical division of labour as the archetype of productive activity. (Bowles [1973: 355])

(iii) IDEOLOGICAL FUNCTIONS

Integral to the development of labour market segmentation has been the pervasion of bourgeois ideology, particularly racism and sexism, that has provided the means by which the division and conflict within the working class, and between segments, can be justified and maintained. Racism and sexism particularly, have allowed migrant, black and women workers—who have formed large increments to most workforces of capitalist modes of production in the post war period—to be separated and diverted off into segments of the labour market with distinctly inferior working conditions, wages, chances for promotion and the like. Indeed, racism and sexism have been the ideological underpinnings of labour market segmentation, which itself has created the material conditions for the perpetuation of racist and sexist ideology. In a very useful recent study of blacks in the U.S. working class, Syzmanski [1975] argues that racism is a necessary aspect of capitalism which has an important twofold economic function: to secure a stratum of compliant, menial labourers; and to prevent the development of a working-class consciousness, and moderate class struggle. He argues:

Racism of all kinds has been perpetuated to justify the continuing brutal and dehumanising exploitation of America's 'shit workers' of whatever colour. Such exploitation must be justified (1) in the eyes of the exploiters who must rationalise the way they treat fellow human beings, normally through use of racial myths about innate inferiority; (2) in the eyes of the rest of the working class who otherwise might well unite with the specially exploited workers in common struggle against the master class; and (3) in the eyes of the specially exploited menial labourers themselves who are thus discouraged from struggling against their lot. Racism also serves capitalism by creating mutual distrust and hostility within the working class. Each racial group struggles against the others for its own benefit with the result that most of their strength is wasted, deflected from the struggle against capital. (Syzmanski [1975: 4])

Similarly, sexism justifies the establishment of 'female jobs' that are low paid and unstable. It is also a powerful means of ensuring that class-struggle is male-dominated, with once again the most exploited sections of the working class separated off and isolated from class-struggle.

(iv) LABOUR MARKET SEGMENTATION AS A CONTINUOUS PROCESS

Syzmanski [1975] shows how the U.S. has had a continuous flow of racial or ethnic groups that have provided a source for menial labour upon. The latter half of the nineteenth century saw Irish, Polish and Italian immigrants as the source of menial workers; after capitalists supported the ending of massive immigration of European workers in the 1920s, southern blacks became the new source of menial labourers as the Irish, Poles and Italians improved their lot. Similarly, with a significant

improvement in the economic position of blacks, Latin Americans and West Indians have, since the mid-1960s, moved in to the vacated menial jobs.

A similar sequence of groups have supplied the demand for menial labourers in Western Europe. Before World War I, Eastern Europeans migrated to West Germany and France as menial labourers, as did the Irish to England. After World War II, with rapid capital accumulation demanding large reserves of labour, the Southern Europeans (Italians, Portuguese, Greeks and Spaniards) served as Western Europe's pool of 'guest workers'. As these workers became more demanding, the search for new menial labourers extended to encompass Yugoslavs, Turks, Algerians, Arabs and Black Africans.³⁹

Similarly, as will be outlined in the next section, Australia has had a change in the source of 'menial labourers'. Predominantly British and Irish migrants (with substantial inflows of Chinese and Kanaka labour in the late nineteenth century) provided most imported labour prior to World War I. In the immediate post-World War II period a substantial influx of menial labourers came from Eastern Europe (the Baltic States) and Southern Europe (Italy, Greece and Malta). As these groups became more established and moved out of menial jobs, Yugoslavs, Lebanese, Turks and Latin Americans have been the major source of menial labour.⁴⁰ As Syzmanski concludes:

In all cases the same phenomena with anti-Black discrimination, along with low pay, bad jobs, economic insecurity and personal hostility occur in all the major capitalist countries. Racism is indeed an inherent aspect of capitalism. But no one special group is its special victim forever. (Syzmanski [1975: 6])

(v) CONTRADICTIONS OF SEGMENTATION

The final major consideration of a Marxist theory of segmentation concerns the *contradictions* inherent in the segmentation processes. Wachtel [1974: 13-25] identifies two principal contradictions in the establishment of segmented labour markets and the hierarchial social relations of production that are its precondition. First, he argues, the relative prosperity of the post-war period has led to a decline in the work discipline the employing class has over labour, and provided the material basis for working-class demands to move away from economic struggle to 'worker control' type demands. Second, the proliferation of hierarchy, work rules and job supervision, added to the increasing intensity of work *via speed ups* etc., have led to worker discontent. This, in turn, is manifested by increased absenteeism, sabotage, turnover, wild-cat strikes and other expressions of spontaneous worker militancy. As Zimbalist [1975] has pointed out, these economic costs have led to substantive changes in work organisation away from Taylorist hierarchial arrangements of work towards 'work humanisation'. In particular, 'job enrichment' and 'job rotation' schemes, part of 'worker participation'.

programmes, have enabled increased productivity and decline in some of the manifestations of worker opposition to hierarchical job organisation. As Zimbalist argues, such changes in the internal social relations of production, while not threatening capitalist control of production, raise new contradictions and could have the potential to lead to fundamental changes which challenge capitalist control over the production process.⁴¹ Another contradiction Syzmanski notes, is exemplified in the gradual improvement of the economic position of blacks within the U.S. working class. As has been noted, blacks have gradually been replaced in the position of menial labourers by Spanish, Latin American and West Indians, and blacks have been increasingly integrated into the mainstream of the U.S. working class. In other words, the material basis for anti-black racism is being undermined. Explaining this, Syzmanski argues that this does not arise out of any benevolence on the part of the capitalist, but rather because occupational discrimination against blacks, at least to the extent of the past twenty years, does not pay: 'The profit possibilities involved in integrating Blacks into the labour force are apparently becoming more significant than the older profit opportunities accruing from racial discrimination against Blacks'. (Syzmanski [1975: 18]). Nevertheless, the erosion of occupational discrimination against blacks, as a by product of the pursuit of profit by the owners of capital, raises a central contradiction, creating the conditions for the elimination of anti-black racism:

The growing similarity in the working conditions of blacks and whites suggests that their mutual hostility might eventually diminish facilitating the development of a common class consciousness. There would seem to be a very real possibility that capitalism, by eliminating the material basis of Black-white separation, might lay the groundwork for the long term development of the class consciousness in the American working class that Marx long predicted, thereby ending the almost unique situation of the U.S. working class among the advanced industrial countries in its lack of a substantial working class movement. (Syzmanski [1975: 19])

4. Labour Market Segmentation in Australia

(a) Introduction

This section attempts to establish the extent and nature of labour market segmentation, and its relationship to capital accumulation and class-struggle for the post world war II period of Australian capitalism. Ideally, such a task would require an historical outline of the dynamics of Australian capitalism during this period, locating historically the function, impact and significance of labour market segmentation. However, the underdeveloped state of Marxist analysis of Australian capitalism prevents such a task being carried out; only scant and fragmentary recent empirical research is available; this section is therefore limited to utilising as much of the available empirical material as possible within the given theoretical framework. Much more work needs to be carried out to establish in sufficient detail the nature and significance of labour

market segmentation in Australian capitalism.

The four segmentation processes outlined by Reich (*et al.*) provide a convenient framework for establishing the nature and characteristics of Australian labour segmentation, *viz.*: segmentation into primary and secondary labour markets; segmentation within the primary labour market; segmentation by race, ethnic origin, and sex.⁴²

These segmentation processes lead to the identification of six broad but distinct segments within the Australian labour market. These are: males born in Australia, the U.K. and Eire, New Zealand, U.S.A., Canada, and Northern Europe, referred to as the male Australian and U.K. born segment; males born in Southern Europe (including Greece, Italy, Malta and Spain), Yugoslavia, Turkey and Lebanon, and Latin America, referred to as the male Southern European-born segment; females corresponding to the first two segments; and male and female Aborigines. This categorisation is not exhaustive, as Australia has received migrants from over sixty nationalities in the post-war period, so that only the major groups are considered. Moreover, as will be outlined, there is quite a degree of overlap between segments in some cases; further the segments have tended to change as the Australian C.M.P. has evolved. This section will utilise some of the most recent, disaggregated data on the Australian labour market to support the case for segmentation in the manner outlined, and will attempt to outline the segmentation processes. Further, utilising information from recent studies and surveys, an attempt will be made to establish the economic, political and ideological characteristics pertaining to each segment, so that some assessment of its impact on functions, particularly in relation to capital accumulation and class struggle, can be tentatively suggested.

(b) *Australian Capitalism and the Industrial Reserve Army*

It will be useful to begin by outlining some of the key features of the composition of the Australian labour market. Of particular importance, it has been argued, is the role of the industrial reserve army, and its impact on the size and composition of the Australian workforce. Indeed, it would seem that the industrial reserve army has been of particular importance for Australian capitalism, restricted as it has been by labour shortages almost continuously since settlement.⁴³ The two major sources of Australia's industrial reserve army in the post-war period have been immigration and women.

Immigration has been a crucial means of ensuring a population and workforce of the quantity and composition essential for Australia's post-war capital accumulation. Between 1947 and 1973, the net gain from immigration was 2,316,000.⁴⁴ Including the Australian-born children of migrant parents, immigration contributed 3.3 million people out of a total population growth of 5.6 million over this period (i.e. 59 per cent).⁴⁵ Moreover, the particular age and workforce participation characteristics of this 'imported industrial reserve army' enabled it to

contribute 61.2 per cent of the growth of the Australian labour force in the period 1947 to 1972.⁴⁶ In 1971, 27 per cent of the Australian workforce were migrants. The ethnic origin of these workers is very diverse, including over sixty-one nationalities. The U.K. and Ireland has been the major source, providing about 40 per cent of settlers arriving in Australia between the years 1947-1973. The other major countries of origin have been Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, Eastern Europe, the Netherlands and Germany.⁴⁷

Along with immigration, the growing workforce participation of Australian-born women has been the major source of Australian capitalism's post-war industrial reserve army. In the period 1947 to 1973, females increased as a percentage of the workforce from 22.4 per cent to 33.3 per cent.⁴⁸ Significant in this increase was the increase of married women in the female workforce from 15.3 per cent in 1947, to 56.8 per cent in 1971.⁴⁹

The very substantial increment to the Australian workforce from these two sources of the industrial reserve army provided the material basis for the present form of labour market segmentation. More specifically, the differences in the conditions surrounding the sale of labour power of the industrial reserve army *vis à vis* the 'indigenous' workforce, as well as within the industrial reserve army itself, are the most significant outward manifestations of labour market segmentation.

(c) *Industrial and Occupational Distribution in the Labour Market*

The basic labour market information is provided in Tables I, II, III, IV, and V. Tables I and II outline the industrial and occupational distribution for males derived from the 1971 Census. Tables III and IV provide similar

TABLE I: INDUSTRY GROUPS, MALES, BY BIRTHPLACE CATEGORIES, CENSUS 1971

<i>Industrial Group</i>	<i>Australia</i>	<i>UK/Eire</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Greece</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Yugo-slavia</i>	<i>Other</i>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Primary	10.7	2.7	8.3	2.2	2.2	3.1	3.0
Mining	2.0	2.1	0.9	0.5	2.6	1.7	2.0
Manufacturing	21.3	31.0	33.8	44.0	35.3	47.9	33.4
Construction	9.9	11.6	20.6	9.1	15.7	16.9	11.8
Transport	7.0	5.9	4.1	4.6	4.8	3.0	5.5
Commerce	23.2	21.8	14.8	19.8	18.7	9.2	20.1
Public Services	11.3	10.0	5.1	3.6	8.0	4.2	7.9
Recreation etc.	9.2	10.4	5.1	6.7	7.9	4.1	10.3
Other	4.0	2.9	6.2	7.6	3.2	8.0	4.2
Unemployed	1.4	1.6	1.1	1.9	1.6	1.9	1.8
<i>Total %</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>
<i>Nos. ('000s)</i>	<i>2643.7</i>	<i>380.2</i>	<i>127.2</i>	<i>66.4</i>	<i>45.5</i>	<i>57.4</i>	<i>318.2</i>

Source: *The Borrie Report* [1975], p.132.

TABLE II: OCCUPATIONS OF MAJOR BIRTHPLACE GROUPS: PER CENT DISTRIBUTION AND TOTAL NUMBERS OF EMPLOYED MALES AGED 15 YEARS AND OVER, CENSUS 1971

	<i>Australia</i>	<i>U.K.-Eire</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Greece</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Yugoslavia</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Total O'seas born</i>	<i>Total</i>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Professional, technical and related workers	8.7	10.3	1.8	1.1	9.5	2.0	11.3	8.4	8.6
Admin., exec., managerial workers	8.9	8.4	5.2	6.9	7.7	2.2	8.6	7.6	8.6
Clerical workers	9.4	7.8	2.0	1.4	6.3	1.3	6.6	5.8	8.4
Sales workers	6.4	6.4	4.1	7.7	4.1	1.5	4.9	5.3	6.1
Farmers, fishermen, hunters, timbergetters etc	11.5	3.5	9.2	2.6	2.7	3.7	3.5	4.1	9.6
Miners, quarrymen, related workers	1.0	1.0	0.5	0.3	1.3	1.2	0.9	0.9	0.9
Workers in transport and communication	7.7	6.1	4.5	4.5	4.6	3.2	5.1	5.2	7.0
Tradesmen, production process workers, labourers etc	36.3	46.4	61.7	61.3	55.1	73.6	49.0	52.2	40.6
Service, sport and recreation workers	3.7	5.0	4.4	6.5	3.6	3.7	4.8	4.8	4.0
Members of Armed Forces	1.9	2.0	0.3	0.1	2.0	0.1	0.9	1.2	1.7
Occupation inadequately described, not stated	4.5	3.1	6.3	7.6	3.1	7.5	4.4	4.5	4.6
<i>Total %</i>	100.0	100.0	100.0		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<i>Nos. ('000s)</i>	2607.1	374.0	125.7	65.2	45.8	56.2	312.4	979.4	3586.5

Source: *The Borrie Report* [1975: 129].

TABLE III: INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION OF FEMALE WORKFORCE OF MAJOR BIRTHPLACE GROUPS:
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION AND TOTAL NUMBER OF EMPLOYED PERSONS AGED 15 YEARS AND OVER, CENSUS 1971*

<i>Industry</i>	<i>Austra- lia</i>	<i>U.K.- Eire</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Greece</i>	<i>Ger- many</i>	<i>Yugo- slavia</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Total O'seas Born</i>	<i>Total</i>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	4.8	1.6	5.2	1.6	1.8	2.7	1.8	2.1	4.1
Mining	0.3	0.4	0.1	0	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.3
Manufacturing	14.8	21.7	46.0	54.9	27.2	55.1	28.1	30.8	18.9
Electricity, gas and water	0.5	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.5
Construction	1.3	1.2	0.9	0.2	1.7	0.6	1.1	1.1	1.2
Wholesale and retail trade	24.4	24.4	17.4	17.9	21.3	9.5	19.2	20.5	23.4
Transport and storage	2.1	2.0	0.9	0.9	2.1	1.0	1.9	1.7	2.0
Communication	1.7	1.2	0.3	0.3	0.9	0.2	0.9	0.9	1.5
Finance, Business Services etc	10.3	8.7	4.9	3.6	7.4	2.9	7.9	7.3	9.6
Public Administration, Defence	4.6	4.0	1.4	0.7	3.3	1.0	3.4	3.1	4.2
Community Services	21.5	22.1	8.5	4.6	18.8	9.4	21.1	18.1	20.6
Entertainment, Recreation etc.	9.8	9.5	6.7	5.7	11.1	7.5	9.4	8.9	9.6
Others, Not Stated	3.8	3.1	7.7	10.0	3.9	9.7	4.5	4.9	4.1
Total Percentage	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total Employed	1,229,503	166,881	44,452	33,280	24,244	27,869	132,673	424,399	1,653,902
Percentage	74.3	10.1	2.7	2.0	1.5	1.4	8.0	25.7	100.0

Source: Derived from 1971 Census. *Errors due to rounding.

TABLE IV: OCCUPATIONS OF MAJOR BIRTHPLACE GROUPS: PER CENT DISTRIBUTION
AND TOTAL NUMBERS OF EMPLOYED FEMALES AGED 15 YEARS AND OVER, CENSUS 1971

	<i>Austra- lia</i>	<i>U.K.- Eire</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Greece</i>	<i>Ger- many</i>	<i>Yugo slavia</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Total O'seas born</i>	<i>Total</i>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Prof., tech. and rei.*	14.7	13.3	2.0	0.9	12.5	2.6	14.3	10.9	13.7
Admin. exec. manag.	2.6	2.7	1.3	1.1	3.1	0.8	3.1	2.5	2.6
Clerical	34.6	33.4	12.0	4.3	27.7	5.8	25.3	24.5	32.0
Sales	13.0	12.1	9.7	11.8	10.4	3.8	9.2	10.4	12.3
Farm., fish., hunt., timb. getters etc.	4.4	1.5	5.2	1.6	1.7	2.7	1.7	2.0	3.8
Miners etc.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Transport and commun.	2.7	2.5	0.4	0.3	1.6	0.4	1.3	1.6	2.4
Trade., process-worker., labourer	9.3	14.1	44.8	55.9	20.0	54.7	23.0	25.9	13.5
Service, sport, rec.	14.1	16.8	15.2	12.9	18.4	17.7	16.8	16.4	14.7
Armed Forces	0.2	0.1	—	—	0.1	—	—	—	0.2
Inadequately described, not stated	4.4	3.5	9.4	11.2	4.5	11.5	5.3	5.8	4.8
<i>Total %</i>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<i>Nos. ('000s)</i>	1229.5	166.9	44.4	33.3	24.2	22.9	132.7	424.4	1653.9

*Abbreviations shown in full under MALES in Table 2.

Source: *The Borrie Report* [1975: 129]

TABLE V: LABOUR FORCE STATUS AND OCCUPATION. 'OFFICIAL' ABORIGINES, CENSUS 1966; ABORIGINES AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDERS 1971.

	Males		Females		Indexed to Total 1971 Population*	
	1966	1971	1966	1971	Males	Females
<i>Of those 15 and over</i>						
% in labour force	73.01	67.52	25.43	24.14	84.08	65.07
% not in labour force	26.99	32.48	74.57	75.86	164.87	120.60
<i>Of those in the labour force</i>						
% employed	93.18	90.84	93.61	91.58	92.19	93.63
% unemployed	6.82	9.16	6.39	8.42	627.40	384.47
<i>Of those employed</i>						
% employers or self-employed	2.05	3.26	1.14	1.70	22.56	20.84
% employees or helpers	97.95	96.74	98.85	98.30	113.08	107.20
<i>Occupation of those employed</i>						
% Professional, technical	0.88	1.74	2.86	5.65	20.23	41.61
% Administrative, executive	0.22	0.83	0.06	0.48	9.65	20.00
% Clerical	0.34	1.43	1.99	8.38	17.02	26.25
% Sales	0.38	1.45	0.92	4.88	23.77	44.72
% Farmers, etc	46.92	31.00	7.84	5.46	326.32	144.74
% Miners, etc.	2.71	2.49	0.26	0.26	277.78	—
% Transport and Communications	3.43	6.00	0.62	1.42	85.71	58.33
% Tradesmen, Process Workers, labourers	37.66	43.48	7.69	14.67	107.14	108.89
% Service, Sport and Recreation	2.82	3.70	68.75	47.92	92.50	325.85
% Armed Services	0.21	0.87	0.09	0.13	52.94	50.00
% Inadequately described, not stated	4.43	7.02	8.93	10.76	155.55	225.00

*Aboriginal proportion expressed as a percentage to total population proportion in each category.

Source: *The Borrie Report* [1975: 508].

information for females, while Table V provides particular information concerning the labour market portion of Aboriginal males and females. The case of Aboriginals will be considered later.

Taking Tables I and II first, the most significant observation is the degree of similarity of the occupational and industrial distribution of males born in Australia, U.K. and Eire, Germany and 'other'. They are relatively highly concentrated in the professional and technical workers, administrative and managerial workers' categories, that would largely

correspond to the independent primary sector of the labour market. Similarly, this group is relatively concentrated in the clerical and sales occupational categories that might be regarded as 'subordinate' primary jobs in the earlier categorisation of Reich *et al.* They tend to be professional or administrative or clerical workers in commerce and the public services, or skilled workers in the manufacturing sector. This is in sharp contradistinction to males in the workforce born in Southern Europe (Italy and Greece) and Yugoslavia. Only 36.3 per cent of Australian-born, and 46.4 per cent of U.K.- and Eire-born, males are employed as tradesmen, production and process workers, labourers etc. This contrasts strikingly with 61.7 per cent of males born in Italy, 61.3 per cent born in Greece, and 73.6 per cent born in Yugoslavia. These workers would seem to be predominantly employed in the secondary labour market or the subordinate primary market. This reflects the broad differences in the industrial distribution of this group of workers; they are predominantly concentrated in manufacturing and construction industries, as well as commerce. Further, as Table VI shows, these workers are generally unskilled or semi-skilled on arrival in Australia.

Thus a broad distinction may be made between what might generally

TABLE VI: OCCUPATIONAL SKILLS OF MALE SETTLERS AS STATED ON ARRIVAL
1949-51, 1967-68 AND 1971-72

<i>Birthplace</i>	<i>Profession- al, Admin.</i>	<i>Skilled Crafts</i>	<i>Semi- skilled</i>	<i>Un- skilled</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Nos.</i>
<i>1949-51</i>	%	%	%	%	%	
Baltic States	7.4	15.1	7.8	69.7	100.0	1,458
Czechs	7.6	24.9	21.7	45.8	100.0	603
Hungarians	7.0	29.3	10.7	53.0	100.0	615
Poles	4.3	24.2	14.2	57.3	100.0	2,601
Russians	4.2	21.9	17.1	56.8	100.0	961
Yugoslavs	4.5	29.0	18.8	47.7	100.0	1,224
Total	5.5	23.4	14.4	56.7	100.0	7,462
<i>1967-8, 1971-2</i>						
Canada	47.2	16.5	26.2	10.1	100.0	1,776
U.S.A.	59.2	14.4	20.2	6.2	100.0	5,429
New Zealand	36.9	25.5	28.2	9.4	100.0	5,672
U.K. and Eire	21.6	34.4	34.0	10.0	100.0	81,533
Germany	16.3	44.5	25.9	13.3	100.0	4,999
Netherlands	21.6	36.5	30.5	11.4	100.0	2,924
Malta	9.1	29.0	21.8	40.1	100.0	2,487
Italy	7.7	31.7	14.4	46.0	100.0	16,020
Greece	5.7	10.3	7.5	76.5	100.0	11,588
Yugoslavia	3.2	15.0	20.4	61.4	100.0	17,315
Total (including others)	19.1	29.0	27.0	24.9	100.0	193,710

Source: *The Borrie Report* [1975: 126].

be called the Australian, U.K. and Northern European-born segment, and a Southern European-born segment. Hence a segmentation on race or ethnic origin, seems broadly to correspond with a primary and secondary labour market segmentation, with some overlap in the subordinate primary segment.

Having identified fairly clearly defined segments among the Australian male working class, so too are the labour market characteristics (the conditions of the sale of labour-power) of women workers in Australia significantly different from those of male workers. Just as some occupations become increasingly the preserve of 'Southern European' migrant labour, so too do some jobs become 'female jobs'. Further, in terms of industrial and occupational distribution, wages, and conditions of work, the female members of the working-class sell their labour-power in distinctly different conditions to different sections of Australian capital, than do male workers. Table VII establishes that, for the whole period 1911-71, between 55 per cent and 75 per cent of women have been em-

TABLE VII: WOMEN IN DISPROPORTIONATELY FEMALE OCCUPATIONS:
AUSTRALIA 1911-1971

Year	<i>Females as a percentage of Total Labour Force</i>	<i>Disproportionately Female Occupations</i>	
		<i>Percentage of Female Labour Force expected in these occupations</i>	<i>Percentage of Female Labour Force found in these occupations</i>
1911	20	23	84
1921	20	26	83
1933	23	22	74
1947	22	33	78
1961	25	32	80
1966	30	34	80
1971	32	39	82

Source: Power [1975: 227].

ployed in occupations where more than half of the workers were women. Further, between 27 per cent and 41 per cent of women were working in those occupations where over 90 per cent of workers were women.⁵⁰ As Tables III and IV show, the industries and occupations with a large proportion of women workers are commerce (including wholesale and retail), community and business services (including health, hospitals and education) and amusements, hotels and personal services. They also concentrate in service, sport and recreation occupations (including house-keepers, cooks, maids, hairdressers etc.), clerical occupations (including stenographers, typists, cashiers, book-keepers), sales occupations and professional and technical occupations (including nurses and teachers etc.).⁵¹ Margaret Power argues that:

Female occupations are those in which work relationships require men to be in authority over women and where the nature of the work is often

derivative of housework, for instance, work associated with food, clothing and cleaning and work which involves caring for the young and the sick. A result of these views about the 'natural' economic roles of women is that women are concentrated in a very narrow range of jobs. In 1971 more than one-third of women worked in just three occupations—clerk, saleswoman, and stenographer and typist—and over half of all women worked in only nine occupations. (Power [1975: 228])

However, it is misleading to treat women workers as a homogeneous grouping. Migrant women workers from Southern Europe (including those from Turkey, Yugoslavia and Latin America) are disproportionately represented in the tradesmen, production-process workers and labourers category, while Australian-born and U.K. migrant women are concentrated more in clerical workers and professional, technical and related workers categories (see Table IV). The figures for the 1971 census show that 44.8 per cent of Italian-born women, 55.9 per cent of Greek-born, and 54.7 per cent of Yugoslavian-born women were employed in the tradesmen, production process workers, labourers category, compared to 9.3 per cent of Australian-born women, 14.1 per cent of U.K.-born and 20 per cent of German-born women. The 'clerical workers' occupation employed 34.6 per cent of Australian-born women, 33.4 per cent of British-born and 27.7 per cent of German-born women. In contrast, only 4.3 per cent of Greek-born women, 5.8 per cent of Yugoslav-born women and 12 per cent of Italian-born women were employed in this category. A similar imbalance is seen in the professional etc. category, while the categories of service, sport and recreation workers and sales workers seem to be evenly balanced. Hence it would appear that there is a distinct difference in the nuances of the sale of labour-power by Australian-born and British-born women (including Northern-European-born women) as compared to that of Southern European-born women including Yugoslav-born, Turkish-born and Latin American-born women.

From this data, it would suggest that 'Southern European' migrant women are largely confined to the 'secondary sector', while the 'Australian and U.K.-born' female segment would seem to also extend to a degree into the primary sector. At this high level of aggregation of labour market statistics, it is difficult to be more precise about the primary/secondary labour market correspondence with the 'Australian-and U.K.-born' and 'Southern European-born' segments. In particular, detailed information concerning the precise nature of work, and position within the internal hierarchical organisation of the firm, would be necessary to satisfactorily establish the precise nature of segmentation of male labour markets in Australia. One very useful piece of empirical work in this respect is that of Lever [1975]. In a detailed study of Victorian 1966 and 1971 census data, Lever attempts to establish the degree to which non-British migrants were concentrated within the working class and whether there was a discernible trend towards either economic integration or economic segregation. Although she employs a slightly different

degree of disaggregation than I have suggested,⁵² her results strongly support the segmentation that I have identified. As Table VI illustrates, there is a heavy concentration of non-British migrants, particularly 'Southern Europeans', in the manual jobs of the Australian workforce. The data shows over 90 per cent and 88 per cent of Italians, Greek and Yugoslav males were employed in manual jobs respectively in 1966 and 1971. The relevant figures for migrants from 'other countries' were 80.0 and 77.4 per cent. In contrast, only 64.3 per cent and 61.9 per cent of British and Australian-born workers were employed in manual jobs for these years.⁵³

Further disaggregated data suggest that more than half non-British male and female workers were employed in occupational categories which contain a disproportionate number of migrants. These occupations are mostly unskilled and semi-skilled manual jobs, although they also include a number of skilled jobs in metal work and construction. Moreover, the proportion of all workers in these occupations of migrant concentration who were non-British migrants *rose* for the 1966-1971 period, while the proportion of all jobs accounted for by these occupations fell. In other words, a falling proportion of migrant workers, male and female, are increasingly concentrated in shrinking sectors of the economy. In other words, Lever's study suggests that the segmentation process is being consolidated. This is supported by the more disaggregated later sections of Lever's data where she looks separately at the portion of Italian, Greek and Yugoslav-born, male and female, workers. She finds that 55 per cent of Italian, 59 per cent of Greek and 75 per cent of Yugoslav males, were working in 1971, in the twenty-one occupations that had a high concentration of non-British migrant males; these occupations provided only 29 per cent of all jobs. These three ethnic groups were concentrated mainly in the occupations of labourers and skilled metal workers.

For migrant women, Lever notes that 53 per cent of Italians, 69 per cent of Greeks, and 64 per cent of Yugoslavs, were working in 1971 in the twenty-three occupations with a high concentration of non-British migrant women. These twenty-three occupations provided only 20 per cent of all female jobs. These non-British migrant women were concentrated in the textiles and clothing industry. However, between 1966 and 1971, Lever noted that the numbers of males involved in skilled metal trades were falling slightly for Italians, rising slightly for Greeks and rising considerably for Yugoslavs. The absolute fall amongst Italian and Greek labourers was partly compensated by the rise amongst Yugoslavs. A similar pattern was found for female workers. As Lever argues: 'A process of succession was thus visible, with the older established groups finding their way out of some "classical" migrant occupations, while newer immigrant groups were replacing them' (Lever [1975: 32]). Hence, the position of different ethnic groups within the workforce is not static, and it appears that there is some 'upward mobility' amongst the older sections of the 'Southern European' segment. They

are being freed to jobs higher up the hierarchy or in higher segments, as newer immigrants from Turkey, Latin America, Lebanon etc., enter Australia in much the same way as these 'older' migrants provided the basis for upward mobility of Australian and U.K.-born workers.

Obviously this data is not conclusive and can only indicate broad trends. Disaggregated data comparing the whole post-war census years would be necessary to establish more clearly the nature of segmentation in Australia. One particularly useful empirical finding of Lever's is shown in Table VIII. Here she looks behind the category 'process

TABLE VIII: PROPORTION OF NON-BRITISH MIGRANTS BY OCCUPATION, 1966

<i>Labourers n.e.c.</i>	49.7
Subdivisions:	
Railway and tram repairmen	24.7
Manufacturing, textiles, shoes	79.6
" metal	76.7
" sawmills	48.8
" food and drink	55.0
" glass	60.4
" chemicals	58.7
" other	70.4
Transport	55.0
Construction	34.6
Power	34.1
Commerce	34.6
Others	36.7

PROPORTION OF NON-BRITISH MIGRANTS, METAL AND ELECTRICAL PRODUCTION

<i>Process workers</i>	45.3
Subdivisions:	
Assemblers	46.5
Factory Workers	54.2
Iron Workers	43.1
Tradesmen's Assistants	30.3
Inspectors	23.7

Source: Lever [1975: 15].

workers', and finds that within this category, non-British migrant workers predominantly take up jobs as assemblers, factory workers and iron workers. In contrast, they are relatively under-represented in the tradesmen's assistants and inspectors jobs. This tends to support our notions of the distribution of workers in the 'Southern European' segment into the menial jobs in industry. Needless to say, more research is required here to clarify the picture.

(d) *Other Labour Market Characteristics*

Scant and fragmentary evidence of other labour market characteristics tends to support the broad segmentation between 'Australian and U.K.-born', and 'Southern European born', and between male and female

workers. Workers in the 'Southern European born' segments have a higher labour force participation rate,⁵⁴ suffer from higher rates of unemployment⁵⁵ and in general receive lower wages and income than their Australian and U.K. born counterpart. Further, these differences occur both between the male and female segments themselves. Taking the point with respect to wages and income further, the results of the first Australian wide study of migrant income distribution support the segmentation hypothesis. The results in Table IX show that while Australian,

TABLE IX: AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: MALE AND FEMALE

<i>Country of Origin</i>	<i>Numbers Employed</i>	<i>Average Wage (\$)</i>
<i>MEN</i>		
Australia	2,177,600	152
Britain	323,300	162
America and Canada	17,100	175
New Zealand	23,500	189
Italy	95,600	138
Greece	49,500	127
Yugoslavia	52,700	140
<i>WOMEN</i>		
Australia	880,900	114
Britain	121,700	117
America and Canada	8,300	146
New Zealand	11,900	121
Italy	37,200	95
Greece	20,700	99
Yugoslavia	24,800	103

Source: *Australian*, 19 February 1976, p.3.

British, American, Canadian and New Zealand born males all received average weekly wages in the range of \$152-\$189 per week, males from Greece, Italy and Yugoslavia had lower average wages in the range of \$127-\$140. For women workers, the corresponding wages for women in the Australian U.K.-born segment were between \$114-\$146 per week, while those in the 'Southern European born segment' were between \$95-\$103 per week. Not surprisingly, every study of income distribution by ethnic origin, from suburban to Australian-wide coverages, supports the distinction between the segments we have established.⁵⁶ Moreover, there is clearly discernible difference in the living conditions. Much of the 'Southern European born' segment lives in conditions of relative inequality, deprivation, prejudice and poverty, relative to the 'Australian and U.K. born segment'.⁵⁷

Unfortunately, there are not any systematic studies of the actual labour-process: the job hierarchy, conditions of work, intensity of labour etc. that would allow a full development of the labour market segmen-

tation thesis. The evidence that is available, however patchy, supports the notions of the secondary labour markets as having worse working conditions and greater intensity of exploitation, and of the 'Southern European-born' segment dominating this secondary labour market.⁵⁸ The Jackson Report into the manufacturing industry of Australia found that 'Migrant workers predominate in those industries, plants and jobs where conditions are worst and where jobs are physically hardest' (Jackson Report [1975: 84]). Similarly, a study of migrant women in the clothing industry testified to their appalling working conditions:

Descriptions of poor working conditions and of women being treated with no dignity abounded in our talks with these ladies. Conditions in many factories is (sic) stiffling; ventilation is poor, conditions are often cramped and there are no lunch rooms, cool water fountains or other amenities. Women often have to sit at work benches to have lunch or eat it in the street. (Brown & Storer [1974: 13])

A recent strike at Ford Broadmeadows, Victoria, by migrant workers hinted at the greater intensity of labour of these Southern European migrant-dominated secondary jobs. One of the Greek-born workers located the main source of worker discontent at the speed of the line: 'People are upset working on the line', he said. 'They work like a horse because of the speed of the line. Conditions are not good. Foremen are always telling the men to hurry and hurry. Sometimes there are ten or fifteen men away from the line and the speed is still the same and production is just the same. We work like the horse in bad conditions.'⁵⁹ The workers got six minutes tea time, and when people left to go to the toilet the line continued. Little wonder the labour turnover was 200 per cent in a year and the absentee rate 10 per cent.⁶⁰ And, little wonder that migrant workers have a higher work accident rate than Australian-born workers.⁶¹

A recent survey of over 1,000, mainly Southern European, migrant women in the Sydney local government areas of Marrickville and South Sydney, has thrown some light on the workforce situation of this section of the industrial reserve army who occupy the 'secondary' labour market. For most of these women, job mobility was found to be minimal: 'There is no evidence from the women's job histories of any progression from one type of job to a more pleasant one'.⁶² Most of the women worked in semi-skilled or unskilled blue collar occupations, primarily as production-process workers and in the garment industry. Further, most of these women did not stay in their jobs for periods much longer than one year—a characteristic one would expect of the industrial reserve army. Systematic study is required to further establish the nature of 'secondary jobs' and of the southern European migrant segment, male and female, who are increasingly represented in them.

(e) Aboriginals in the Labour Market

Although Australian blacks are numerically not very significant in the

labour market, the particular pace of the repression and near-genocide of Aborigines by whites since settlement of Australia warrants particular attention to their present plight. This is all the more important given the recent black struggles over land rights and against the racism and discrimination to which they are subjected. Table V outlines the basic labour market information concerning Aboriginal workers. From this we can see that Aboriginal men are concentrated in agricultural jobs and tradesmen, process workers and labourers. The latter is growing and has replaced the former as the major occupation of Aborigines. This reflects the increasing metropolitan location of Aborigines.⁶³ With 43.48 per cent of Aborigines employed as labourers, process workers and tradesmen and a further 31.00 per cent employed as farmers,⁶⁴ Aboriginal workers are concentrated in jobs of much lower status, and of course correspondingly lower wages, worse conditions etc. than are the other segments of the Australian working class. Aborigines are under-represented in all other occupational groups. Moreover, Aboriginal males have a lower labour force participation rate than other workers in Australia.⁶⁵ Aboriginal women, while having a significantly lower participation rate than Australian-born or migrant women, are overwhelmingly concentrated in the service, sport and recreation occupational category. Although the breakdown is not given, we would expect these women would work in very menial and low-status jobs, often domestic and cleaning jobs.

Both Aboriginal segments are characterised by low educational qualifications. Moreover, Aborigines are almost all (approximately 97-99 per cent) employees. Unemployment among Aborigines is significantly higher, and their wages are often considerably lower, than in the case of other workers. Some figures for the wages of Aboriginal workers on Yarrabah reserve, Queensland, as compared to European workers can be seen in Table X. At the time these wages were paid, the average male wage for a Queensland worker was \$78.50. As a result of this labour-market position, poverty, infant mortality, sickness and deprivation are inevitable. One source, which studied children on

TABLE X: ABORIGINAL AND EUROPEAN AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE

	<i>Aboriginal weekly wage (\$)</i>	<i>European weekly wage (\$)</i>
Truck Driver	20.00	70.00
Tractor Driver	12.00-18.00	65.00
Labourer	10.00-18.00	60.00
Mechanic	24.00	65.00
Painter	16.00	65.00
Ganger	20.00	75.00
Police Constable	12.00-18.00	80.00

Source: Doobov and Doobov [1972: 162].

Aboriginal reserves, found that 50 per cent suffered from growth retardation due to poor diet.⁶⁶ The low wages of Aborigines go a long way to explaining these facts, particularly when it is recognised that \$25 a week was not large enough to adequately feed a family in Australia at that time—indeed, the 1966 poverty-line for a family of four was \$33, and the average Aboriginal family has eight members. The Henderson Report found that, of urban Aborigines, some 55 per cent were poor in Adelaide and Brisbane.⁶⁷ Only 26 per cent of men earned \$80 or more per week, while no woman earned above \$80.⁶⁸

(f) *Political and ideological characteristics*

Corresponding to the economic characteristics that suggest segmentation of the nature described, political and ideological differences strongly confirm it and provide more useful information on its function. Looking at the political characteristics of the Australian working class, the most significant aspect is that of the differing degree of political participation and representation between the Australian and U.K. born, the Southern European born and the Aboriginal segments. These differences are also significant within the male/female portions of these segments. The Australian and U.K.-born, particularly males, tend to dominate Australian politics at every level: parliamentary politics (at federal, state and local levels) as well as working-class politics (in the trade unions and/or on the shop floor). In stark contrast, the other segments are almost totally absent from these political processes.⁶⁹ The mechanisms that lie behind this political 'neutralisation' of such a large and significant section of the Australian working class are of course complex and warrant detailed study. Part of the explanation would be found in the historical/cultural background of the imported industrial reserve army. In particular, a study by Burnley shows that while 75 per cent of Dutch and Germans in Australia (and presumably similar numbers of British, Americans etc.) were born in cities and towns, over 80 per cent of Greeks and Italians, and over 70 per cent of Yugoslavs, were born in small towns or rural villages.⁷⁰ Without traditions of trade unionism, they are flung from rural Greece and Italy onto the production lines in Sydney and Melbourne.

There is evidence that employers consciously utilise the non-English speaking migrants' uncertainty and apprehension to create a docile workforce that would work for wages, and in conditions, that Australian-born workers will not accept. One government study argued that:

employers have positively contributed to keeping ethnic groups isolated. They have pursued a policy generally of putting members of the one ethnic group together in the same section of the industry, with a bi-lingual overseer for that group ... Some employers on the other hand, pursue a policy of fragmenting groups so that they are unable to communicate with anyone. (Jakubowicz & Buckley [1975: 42])

Another study found that this was verified for women migrants who

were working in the clothing industry:

All the women stated that piecework (i.e., payments on the basis of numbers of garments produced); use of favouritism and use of lack of communication between women of different ethnic groups was all used by bosses to divide women and to destroy any attempts at unity by the women. (Brown & Storer [1974: 11])⁷¹

Moreover, the female industrial reserve army has been isolated from politics primarily because of the sexist ideology that has, by and large, led to the exclusion of women from most political processes. The objective labour market differences of the Australian and U.K.-born male segments from the rest of the labour market provide the material basis for such class divisions to occur—in the first instance—and the subsequent destruction of class-unity provides conditions in which employers can carry out their 'divide and rule' strategies.

Corresponding to this political 'segmentation' are the reinforcing ideologies of racism and sexism and nationalism. These have long been rooted in Australian capitalism, particularly among the working class.⁷² These ideologies provide the means by which the very inferior working and living conditions of the female, Southern European-born and Aboriginal segments are justified and accepted by the working class; at the same time, these ideologies are reinforced and created by the material labour market differences themselves. The result has been a division within and among the working class. The southern European-born, who now dominate the jobs traditionally thought to be the bastion of working-class consciousness have, it seems, been effectively excluded from the political processes. As such, a large number of the proletariat have been politically contained; the same is true for blacks who have only recently been given the right to vote and be counted in the Australian census, but their political activity is, however, well outside the established political mechanisms and processes. The overall effect of these divisions has been to minimise class struggle in Australia.

5. Conclusions

This essay has argued that a Marxist analysis of Australian capitalism must focus on the hitherto neglected aspects of the labour process and the labour market. It is from this standpoint that the crucial 'segmentation' or 'fractioning' of the Australian working class can be analysed. One of the great weaknesses of the study of the political economy of Australian capitalism, and of the political practice of the Australian left, has been in treating the working class as more or less homogeneous. On the contrary it has been argued here that it is the *divisions* within the Australian working class—and their economic and political roots—that demand serious attention. It is only within a Marxist framework that such class segmentation can be fully understood. Orthodox human capital theory and discrimination theory represent fetishised apologies for the inequality and discriminations that are the consequences of labour market segmentation. Dual labour market theory, while throwing up

some useful hypotheses and empirical studies of segmentation, lacks an adequate theoretical framework in which to analyse labour market segmentation. Given the lack of appropriately oriented research, particularly in respect to the historical development of the structure of enterprises and the labour process, this essay has had to rely on static, fragmentary information; hopefully it will provide a theoretical framework in which future study and research can be located. Despite the lack of information it has been possible to sketch the present characteristics of labour market segmentation.

Segmentation has been crucial to Australian capitalism at a number of levels. Economically, it has provided the material basis for dividing the working class and creating low-wage manual segments dominated by migrant and female workers. The low wages, bad working conditions and greater intensity of labour in these secondary segments have facilitated the extraction of surplus value. Indeed, it could be argued that without low-wage, secondary sector employment, certain sections of Australian capital—particularly the old technologies of steel, chemicals etc.—would not have been able to operate profitably.⁷³ In this way, employers have been able to manipulate the ascriptive traits of workers (sex, race, ethnic origin etc.) so as to increase capital accumulation. Politically, the Australian working class has been divided and turned against itself rather than united in a common struggle against the ruling class. The impact that this has had on the political stability of post-war Australian capitalism, particularly in neutralising a large part of the three million post-war immigrants and the great majority of women and blacks in class struggle, has been greatly neglected. Moreover, the ideologies of sexism, racism and nationalism have at once been a crucial underpinning of labour market segmentation and at the same time, a product of the material conditions of labour market segmentation. These ideologies have been central to a maintenance of the social relations of production. In these ways, labour market segmentation has had a major impact on capital accumulation and class struggle and on the lives of the working class. Despite the importance of segmentation, however, it is not without its contradictions. These are manifested at the economic level by high levels of absenteeism, labour turnover, job sabotage and the like. At the political level, strikes such as that at Ford Broadmeadows in 1973, and the emerging women's and black movements suggest the latent militancy of these most exploited sections of the Australian working class.

One of the most important political implications of this analysis is the need for the Australian left to centre its revolutionary strategy on breaking down the class divisions, and the ideologies that prop them up. If the ideologies of racism, sexism and nationalism are broken down, if working-class organisations and movements strive to break down the divisions within the working class, the future political stability of capitalism will no longer be guaranteed, and a socialist Australia will come more and more on the agenda.

NOTES

- 1 Dos Santos [1970: 177].
- 2 See Freedman [1975] for a development of a similar methodological framework for the study of the U.S. proletariat.
- 3 See for example Niland & Isaacs (edd.) [1975].
- 4 For some very useful recent research into the position of women in the Australian workforce, see Power [1974], [1975], Australian Department of Labour [1974], Richmond [1973], Summers [1975] and Curthoys, Eade and Spearitt (edd.) [1975].
- 5 See Price (ed.) [1970] and Collins [1975(a)].
- 6 For example, recent studies by orthodox economists to assess the economic impact of post-war immigration have all treated migrant labour, both male and female, as homogeneous additions to a homogeneous Australian workforce, indistinguishable from their Australian-born 'counterparts'. See Kmenta [1966], Duloy [1967] and Jolley [1971]. However, it is precisely the *differences* in the migrant workforce *vis à vis* the 'indigenous' workforce, and the differences within migrant labour itself that is crucial to an understanding of the economic impact of migrant labour on Australian capitalism. (See Collins [1975(a)]).
- 7 The terms 'Radical' and 'Marxist' Theories are used interchangeably, although I prefer the latter since the precise definition of 'radical' economics is by no means clear.
- 8 See Gordon [1972: 3-11].
- 9 On the advancements of human capital theory over crude 'marginal productivity theory', see Bowles & Gintis [1975: 74].
- 10 For a survey on racial discrimination theory from a critical but orthodox perspective see Marshall [1974]. It is somewhat inadequate, however, as Marshall develops a caricature of the radical labour market theory, which he of course dismisses out of hand.
- 11 See for example the collection by Ashenfelter and Rees (edd.) [1974], which includes extension of the theory to cover discrimination by sex [Oaxaca], in education [Welch], and in trade unions [Ashenfelter]. The theory has been further refined and modified to cover discrimination by co-workers rather than employers (Arrow [1974: 10-13]), and to include elements such as 'personal costs' and 'imperfect information' in the analysis of discrimination (Arrow [1974: 20-32]).
- 12 For a concise summary of Becker's theory, see Cohen and Cyert (1965: 277-9).
- 13 See Gordon [1972: 43-52].
- 14 See Gordon [1972: 89].
- 15 The critique of orthodox theory has been carried out at various levels. For an outline of general Marxist critiques, see Hunt & Schwartz [1972], Zweig [1971] and Sweezy [1970]. For a recent methodological critique, see Hollis & Nell [1975].
- 16 As quoted in Gordon [1972: 88].
- 17 See Reich *et al.* [1975], and Gordon [1972] for examples of the dual labour market hypothesis being incorporated into radical labour market theory, and Holt *et al.* [1971] for its incorporation into orthodox labour market theory.
- 18 Gordon [1972: 89]. See Marglin [1974] *passim* and Braverman [1974: 14-24] for an elaboration of this point and an explanation of the meaning of technological determinism. For a critique of Marglin and Braverman, see Palmer [1975].
- 19 For a further elaboration of the role of education in the capitalist mode of production see Bowles & Gintis [1976]. For an outline of the Marxist theory of the role of the family see Zaretsky [1976]. For an outline of the Marxist theory of the state, see Althusser [1971: 127-86]; Poulantzas [1973].
- 20 Arrow [1974: 23-32] and Phelps [1972: 659-61] attempt to shift from Becker's exogenous 'taste for discrimination', to argue that discriminatory actions are based not on tastes, but on perceptions of reality.
- 21 For a very useful Marxist critique of theories which explain racism in terms of 'prejudice' or personal attributes, see Nikolinakos [1973].
- 22 See Marx, *Capital* vol. 1, chapter 25: 'The General Law of Capitalist Accumulation', and Marshall [1972: 3-19].
- 23 Marx [*Capital*, vol. 1: 598].
- 24 See for example the very useful work of Castles & Kosack [1973] who have analysed the impact of some eleven million foreign workers in post world war II Europe, Nikolinakos [1975], Marshall [1973] and Paine [1973].
- 25 This can probably be explained by the relative unimportance of immigration as a *net addition* to the U.S. workforce in the post war period—or indeed, for most of this century; population movements have been largely within the country. Nevertheless,

the industrial reserve army concept provides important 'aggregative' theoretical foundations which should not be ignored.

- 26 See *Review of Radical Political Economics* 6, 2 (Summer 1974), ix.
- 27 See Braverman [1974], Marglin [1974], Stone [1974], Wachtel [1974], Palmer [1975], Luria [1974], Davis [1975] and Zimbalist [1975].
- 28 Marglin has been criticised (justly, I would argue) for understating the role that technological change and efficiency played in the evolution of the social relations of the enterprise. Marglin places great emphasis on the 'conscious' divide and conquer strategy as do Reich *et al.* [1973]. For an outline of this criticism, see Palmer [1975: 31] and Luria [1974: 117].
- 29 This of course refers to Marx's famous distinction between a class 'in itself' and a class 'for itself'. The former became *possible* with the increasing homogeneity of the proletariat, but this is a *necessary*, not a sufficient, condition for class struggle. What is required is 'class consciousness' for the class to be 'for itself'.
- 30 See Braverman [1974: 386-402], Marshall [1974: 29-32] and Ward [1975: 17-19].
- 31 The Southern European countries of Italy, Greece, as well as Yugoslavia are major sources of Australia's migrant reserve army of labour; the most significant source of foreign labour for Australian capitalism, in quantitative terms, is the U.K. (See Collins [1975]).
- 32 Althusser [1969: 87-128] uses the concept of overdetermination of each of the instances in this regard.
- 33 See Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, chapter XVI: 'Absolute and Relative Surplus Value', pp. 476-85. Marx defined 'necessary labour' as that part of the working day in which labour produces the value-equivalent of the value of its own labour-power. The value produced during the rest of the working day Marx called 'surplus labour'. This value produced during this period of the day was appropriated by the capitalist as surplus value.
- 34 See Nikolinakos [1973] for a detailed outline of this mechanism.
- 35 For a fuller development of this argument, see Boughton & Collins [1976].
- 36 See Wachtel [1972: 189], and Bowles [1973: 355].
- 37 Gordon [1972: 80].
- 38 See Marglin [1974: 77-8] and Stone [1974: 152]. Of course, the trade union movement in the U.S. has a history quite distinct from that of Australia. Nevertheless, these general points hold equally well for the Australian case.
- 39 See Castles & Kosack [1973], and Nikolinakos [1975].
- 40 See Collins [1975 (a)].
- 41 While I would disagree with the strategy of supporting worker participation, it is difficult not to agree with Zimbalist that such changes in the organisation of work do throw up new contradictions for the C.M.P.
- 42 Segmentation by age is not considered in this essay. However, it is apparent that low wages paid to workers under twenty-one make them indispensable to sections of retail capital and the like.
- 43 See Collins [1975 (a)] for an extension of this point and an analysis of the role of immigration as the major source of Australian capitalism's industrial reserve army.
- 44 First National Population Inquiry [1975: 62].
- 45 For a useful summary of this and other immigration statistics, see Price [1975].
- 46 First National Population Inquiry [1975: 109]. During particular periods the contribution has been even more significant. For example, during the 1947-1961 period, immigration contributed 73 per cent of the total workforce growth in that period, and 81.8 per cent of the increment to the male workforce.
- 47 *op. cit.*, p.124.
- 48 Australian Department of Labour [1974: 4]. For a useful study of women in the Australian workforce, see Richmond [1973].
- 49 *op. cit.*, p.5.
- 50 Power [1975], p.227.
- 51 Australian Department of Labour [1973], p.52.
- 52 Lever compares non-British migrants in the workforce to Australian and British workers. She notes that these categories lead to 'a conglomerate of diversities including, for example, Germans, Dutch, Turks and North Americans' (Lever [1975: 18]). However, as the data on Tables I, II and V tend to suggest, it is more meaningful to separate out German, Dutch, North Americans, Canadians, New Zealanders etc. and associate them with Australian and British workers. Similarly, the labour market characteristics of Turks, Lebanese, Latin Americans, Arabs etc. place them much differently with the 'Southern European' segment.
- 53 Lever [1975: 6]. She takes non-manual jobs to be those in the professional, technical

- and related workers; administrative, executive and managerial workers, clerical workers, sales workers and members of the armed forces. The 'manual' category comprises all other occupations.
- 54 First National Population Inquiry [1975: 114].
- 55 See for example Collins [1975(a): 117]. Unemployment is obviously a feature of the industrial reserve army, who are employed or fired according to the cyclically responsive demands for labour. Women suffer higher rates of unemployment than do men.
- 56 For evidence of income distribution among particular ethnic groups, see Storer [1975]; among migrants in a few Melbourne suburbs see Krupinski & Stoller (edd.) [1971]; and in Sydney, Jakubowicz & Buckley [1975]. For surveys covering the whole Melbourne metropolitan area see Henderson *et al.* [1970] and Ware [1973]. For Australia-wide studies see Department of Labour [1974] and Martin [1974].
- 57 See Collins [1975(b)] and Boughton & Collins [1976].
- 58 See for example Brown & Storer [1974], Jackson Report [1975: 81-7], Jakubowicz & Buckley [1975: 40-5] and Cox, Jobson & Martin [1975].
- 59 As quoted in Geoffrey Cleghorn, 'Assembly Line Blue: How the Unions Failed', *National Times*, 18-23 June 1973, pp.18-19.
- 60 *Australian*, 10 January 1974, p.2. Labour turnover is higher in the migrant-dominated manual jobs than in the non-manual jobs (see Department of Labour [1973: 36-8].
- 61 Jakubowicz & Buckley [1975: 12].
- 62 Cox, Jobson & Martin [1975: 58]. It is significant that 64 per cent of these migrant women, mainly from Lebanon, Greece, Italy, Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia, had never worked in a paid job prior to coming to Australia.
- 63 See the First Report of the National Population Inquiry [1975: 491-504].
- 64 Within these categories, aborigines are found in the worst and least skilled jobs, although this is concealed by the degree of aggregation of the statistical categories.
- 65 First Report of the National Population Inquiry [1975: 50].
- 66 Cited in Doobov & Doobov [1972: 162].
- 67 Poverty in Australia [1975: 260].
- 68 Aborigines and Islanders in Brisbane [1975: 66]. This study found that 90 per cent of Aborigines were working in unskilled jobs.
- 69 See Collins [1976].
- 70 Burnley [1974: 166].
- 71 See also the Jackson Report [1975: 81-7].
- 72 See, for example, McQueen [1971].
- 73 McFarlane [1972: 52] has argued this. Further research is required, however, before this can be fully substantiated, although the evidence presented in this paper certainly supports the hypothesis.

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3

ITALIAN ANTI-FASCISM IN AUSTRALIA, 1922-45

GIANFRANCO CRESCIANI

DURING THE EARLY 1920s, Fascism was accepted by the great majority of the twenty thousand Italian-born migrants residing in Australia, because in the actions and the rhetoric of the new Italian government they seemed to detect a new determination to defend their economic interests and political rights and to counter the threats posed to their religion, language and traditions by a largely hostile social and political environment.

Yet the cause of Fascism did not gain the allegiance of all Italians in Australia. Although Fascism could count on the sympathy of a silent majority and on the vocal involvement of an articulate and educated *élite*, the opposition to the regime was in Australia a force by no means negligible. It came mainly from Italians who had seen the birth of Fascism in Italy and were militantly opposed to it; who had been persecuted for their ideals and compelled to emigrate after its coming to power. These Italians were predominantly industrial and agricultural workers from the northern part of the country and from the Po river valley. The bulk of them arrived in Australia between the years 1924 and 1926, and for this reason an organised anti-Fascist movement did not start there before 1927. Prior to this, opposition to the regime was vented only on an individual level, mainly by sending letters and clippings from anti-Fascist newspapers, to the *Italo-Australian*, the only Italian newspaper in Australia, notoriously pro-Fascist. Its editor, A. Folli, not only rebuked the critical correspondents, accusing them of being agents of Communism, but also sent their letters to the Italian consular authorities for possible retaliatory action.¹

Once in Australia, anti-Fascist Italians preferred to settle in areas where there was already a high concentration of their countrymen: in the sugar fields of Northern Queensland, in the cities of Sydney and Melbourne, in the industrial and mineral centres of Corrimal, Wonthaggi, Lithgow, Broken Hill, Kalgoorlie, Boulder, Wiluna, and in the agricultural areas of Griffith and Lismore. Their presence in the midst of communities which also harboured pro-Fascist elements sparked frequent clashes. In the cities, they lived in boarding houses, where after a day's

work they met, played cards and 'bocce' (Italian bowling) and discussed politics. On the whole, they preferred to congregate with people of the same village and region. Moreover, new immigrants brought into the boarding houses the latest news from Italy, about the native village, the economic conditions which had compelled them to emigrate, the political situation and the determination of Fascism to make life difficult for the opposition.²

These first hand, emotional reports had a strong impact on the boarders, who were in the main young, single and class-conscious, and in this respect the boarding houses performed the function of centres of anti-Fascist political indoctrination and propaganda. The political activities in these boarding houses were so widespread that they deeply worried the Fascist authorities, to the point that in 1927 the Consul-General, A. Grossardi, wrote to the Prime Minister, Bruce, suggesting to him that it would be wise to keep some of them under police observation.³ Grossardi's intervention reflected the great apprehension felt by the Italian government about the anti-Fascist activities carried out by Italian emigrants. The Duce not only personally resented the attacks on his regime by the Italian anti-Fascist press abroad, but was worried that anti-Fascism abroad could create the impression of a divided nation in which Fascism faced strong opposition. Italian consuls were instructed to fight anti-Fascism on all levels, for example by asking foreign governments to expel 'those Italian agitators who are most active and who work for the perversion of the working masses'.⁴

Although holding different political beliefs, the Italian Republicans, Socialists, Communists and Anarchists in Australia had in common their hatred for Fascism. The anarchist movement was particularly strong in this country and owed its success to the remarkable activity of its leader, Frank Carmagnola. Carmagnola arrived in Australia in May 1922 and went to work in the sugar fields of Northern Queensland. There, in March 1925, occurred the first anti-Fascist demonstration in Australia. When three Fascists from Mantua, who had been involved in beatings of anti-Fascists, arrived in Halifax, they were confronted by Carmagnola and other anti-Fascists, assaulted and forced to drink castor oil⁵. The political climate was so tense in areas of Northern Queensland that all Fascists were 'treated as they treated anti-Fascists in Italy'⁷ and compelled to leave the area, so much that the *Italo-Australian* lamented that 'the fact is that almost all Italians in North Queensland are bitter and irreconcilable enemies of Fascism'.⁷

By 1926, the position of anti-Fascism in Australia had consolidated enough to give birth to the first political organisation, the Lega Antifascista (Anti-Fascist League), founded in Sydney by Frank Carmagnola at the end of that year. Financial contributions came also from the miners of Corrimal and Lithgow. The League could count on the support of approximately three hundred people in Sydney and one hundred in Corrimal and Lithgow.

At first, the League printed leaflets and broadsheets and mailed them

to Italians all over Australia. The response to this initiative was so favourable that Carmagnola and his friends were encouraged to publish a newspaper. The first issue of *Il Risveglio* (The Awakening) appeared on 1 July 1927. One thousand copies were distributed. Although lacking an editorial, its programme was clearly stated by its correspondents. Isidoro Bertazzon, in an article 'The lies of Fascism', quite openly advocated the struggle against Italian as well as international Fascism, while the anonymous author of the article 'From the land of Maramaldo' advocated countering Fascist violence in Italy with equal violence in Australia. The second number of the paper was issued on 1 August, and expressed 'its regret that Mussolini has not been killed in one of the attempts on his life' and 'the hope that Mussolini may be hung to a lamp post and with him all his followers'.⁸ The third issue appeared in September, and enlarged on the themes of the previous issues: anti-Fascist, anti-capitalist, anti-religious and anti-monarchist articles figured prominently in its pages.

By this time the Italian authorities and the Fascists in the community were so incensed that the Consul-General deemed it necessary to make representations to the Prime Minister, Bruce, against the appearance of the newspaper, 'a monthly publication of extremist character' which he considered 'to be most dangerous, and likely to inflame the minds of the Italians and cause a lot of trouble as it is openly inciting class warfare, bolshevism, anarchy, violence and political murders'.⁹

The Bruce Government, sensitive to all outcries of subversion, had already taken action, in view of the fact that *Il Risveglio* was printed at the Communist Party's printery at Annandale, Sydney.¹⁰ On 23 August the Commonwealth Crown Solicitor banned the publication of *Il Risveglio*, and Frank Carmagnola was prosecuted and fined £3.¹¹ Unmoved by the setback, the anti-Fascist League started printing leaflets which were equally strongly worded against Fascism and its institutions, and distributed them to the Italian communities around Australia. Again the Consul-General wrote to the Prime Minister asking for their suppression. The Commonwealth Investigation Branch was unsuccessful in attempting to trace where the actual printing was done, notwithstanding the fact that Grossardi supplied names and addresses of anti-Fascist leaders.¹²

Anti-Fascism and Fascism in the meantime confronted each other with increasing animosity. There was an Anarchist provocation during a picnic organised by the Fascists at Killarney, Sydney,¹³ while in Melbourne, violence erupted between Fascists and anti-Fascists in Carlton, compelling the police to intervene to separate the two factions.¹⁴ Also in 1927, in Port Adelaide the sailors of the M.V. *Palermo* clashed with Italian anti-Fascists who were wearing red scarfs and singing the 'Red Flag' on the pier; and in Sydney, the Anarchists demonstrated against the execution of Sacco and Vanzetti by parading in the streets with flags and posters bearing the inscription 'Down with Mussolini, assassin of the Italian people'.¹⁵ The Fascist authorities, in order to counter the wave of anti-Fascism, in September 1927 issued *Il Littorio* (The Lictor Rods),

as a means of propaganda.¹⁶

Yet the most significant event of that year was the opening in Melbourne of an anti-Fascist club, the Matteotti Club. With Frank Carmagnola as secretary and Tom Saviane as president, the club attracted all anti-Fascist Italians, whatever their other political allegiances. A year after being established the club had 500-700 subscribing members. The Matteotti Club functioned as the main centre for the diffusion of anti-Fascism and of ideals of class solidarity. Funds were used to finance the distribution all round Australia of anti-Fascist and Anarchist literature and to support Italians when they were on strike; also money was sent to France, to pay the legal costs of trials of anti-Fascists. In 1928 Carmagnola tried to obtain permission from the Commonwealth Government to print another newspaper. *La Riscossa* (The Counter-attack), but he was refused it by the Prime Minister in June 1928.¹⁷ Not until November 1929 was permission granted to the secretary of the Matteotti Club to publish *La Riscossa*. The appearance of the newspaper gave new impetus to the cause of anti-Fascism in Australia. Three thousand copies were printed monthly or fortnightly according to the funds available and distributed throughout the country by Carmagnola's agents. They were also distributing other anti-Fascist literature which the Matteotti Club was sending them, mainly the leading Anarchist newspapers from Paris, New York and Buenos Aires.

The year 1928 saw the rise to prominence in anti-Fascist circles of a remarkable man, Omero Schiassi. Of middle-class and cultured background, Schiassi, as a lawyer, was active in the Italian Socialist Party before he emigrated to Australia in 1924. He hated Fascism and from Melbourne he maintained contact with the whole spectrum of the anti-Fascist movement, including F.S. Nitti, the ex-Prime Minister in exile in France. In 1925 Schiassi wrote two articles for the *Avanti* (Milan) newspaper, one on the police strike in Melbourne and the other, critical of the Australian government, on the federal election. Grossardi, the Italian Consul-General, then drew the attention of the Home and Territories Department to these articles.

Grossardi believed that his intervention was instrumental in Schiassi's application for a position as instructor in Italian at the University of Melbourne being unsuccessful in 1926.¹⁸ However, Schiassi obtained such a position the following year (he was a fine Dante scholar), to the annoyance of Grossardi, who had the effrontery to complain to Prime Minister Bruce that 'this was done without giving me any notice of the appointment and without informing me in any way that an appointment was taking place' and that it was done notwithstanding 'that the University was well acquainted with Dr Schiassi's political tendencies'.¹⁹ Grossardi took his revenge by 'advising' the Italian community not to attend Schiassi's lectures—thus keeping him in poverty, since his salary varied according to the number of his students.

In 1928, when there were some signs of division within Italian Fascist ranks in Australia, Schiassi made a bid for leadership of the anti-Fascists

by forming the anti-Fascist Concentration of Australasia. This body, in Melbourne, was a branch of the Paris-based Anti-Fascist Concentration which aimed to bring together most opposition parties. Schiassi saw the importance of collaborating with the Anarchists of the Matteotti Club; they had a network of useful contacts as well as a record of militancy and toughness. Schiassi also recognised the need to obtain support for anti-Fascism from Australian political parties and trade unions, and he achieved some acknowledgement from people like Maurice Blackburn, the federal Labor M.P., and W.J. Duggan, president of the ACTU.

Always impeccably dressed, Schiassi was a strange mixture: almost courtly in his manners, he was aloof and conscious of his intellectual superiority, yet he was a convinced Socialist, following the reformist trend. There was a big gap between him and the uneducated, barely literate Italian workers, and businessmen, but he had a very dramatic imagination which found expression in rhetorical speeches which were admired, though often not understood, by ordinary Italians. Despite Schiassi's considerable political influence, he was unable to weld together the various strands of anti-Fascism. He soon split with the Anarchists, regarding them as too inflammatory in their methods. For their part, the supporters of the Matteotti Club wanted action, not just words: they sought confrontation with the Fascists, and to this purpose went around in clubs and public places, armed with guns and iron bars, provoking Fascists to fight. On 2 February 1929, when the first talking picture was screened at the Auditorium in Melbourne, showing an address by Mussolini to the American people, Carmagnola and a few dozen anti-Fascists disrupted the show. Similar disturbances were staged during the visit of Father Salza, an agent of Fascist propaganda. In Ingham, in November 1928, anti-Fascists gathered outside the building where he was lecturing and threw stones on the tin roof thus causing panic among the audience. When Father Salza lectured at the Australian Hall in Sydney, about thirty anti-Fascists attempted to disrupt the meeting, but were confronted by the Fascists and thrown out.²⁰

The most remarkable incident was what was later called by the anti-Fascists, the Russell Street fight. On 27 October 1929, while 100-150 Melbourne Fascists, all wearing their black shirts, were celebrating at the Temperance Hall in Russell Street the seventh anniversary of the March on Rome, they were attacked by Carmagnola and his men who rushed into the hall and took them by surprise. Before they could realise what was happening, several Fascists were injured.²¹ The news of the fight quickly reached Sydney: the impact on the local Fascists was such that many did not attend the local celebration of the March on Rome, held on 29 October, for fear of a similar attack from Sydney anti-Fascists, and many of those who were present at the celebration refrained from wearing the black shirt.²²

There was a toughening of anti-Fascist positions in 1930. In January, anti-Fascist Italians at Corrimal demanded that the management of the local mines dismiss an Italian who admitted being a member of the Fascist

Party. In Coalcliff, Italian workers suspected of belonging to the Fascist Party were closely questioned and allowed to continue to work only when their 'innocence' was proved.²³ In February, in a letter to the All Australian Trade Union Congress, Carmagnola charged the Italian consuls in Australia with being 'actively engaged in organising strike breakers by forcing Italian workmen to accept work at less than award rates of pay'. The secretary of the Matteotti Club went on to claim that the consuls had given advice to unemployed Italians to accept the jobs of Australians while the latter were on strike. 'Any Italian worker who disregards the advice', the letter added, 'is put on the list of anti-Fascists, and the Government of Italy advised, which leads to the persecution of any relatives or friends in Italy'.²⁴ In March, Schiassi extended his activities to New Zealand by nominating a sympathiser, Umberto Colonna, as New Zealand representative of the Anti-Fascist Concentration of Australasia. On May Day, Italian anti-Fascists paraded in red shirts along with all Labour organisations, carrying banners and posters condemning Fascism.²⁵

In 1930 there also occurred a most serious crisis within the anti-Fascist movement. Hit by the Depression, many were unable to subscribe to *La Riscossa* or to pay the membership fee of one guinea to the Matteotti Club. Rivalries between Carmagnola and Bertazzon, as well as economic difficulties, split the anti-Fascist movement and Bertazzon was expelled from the Matteotti Club. On 14 June 1930, he started to publish a fortnightly paper, *L'Avanguardia Libertaria* (The Libertarian Vanguard), which was of strong Anarchist inspiration. Meanwhile Carmagnola was still issuing *La Riscossa* in Melbourne. During this period the two groups viciously attacked each other. By the end of 1931 the split had reached its logical conclusion: *La Riscossa* ceased publishing and the Matteotti Club was compelled to close; Carmagnola returned to North Queensland where he found work on a tobacco farm and still continued to publish *La Riscossa* from Ingham, although in a reduced format.

In Ingham, Carmagnola continued to harass Fascism and Fascists. On 26 December 1931, he and two other anti-Fascists, Tom Saviane and Mario Tardiani, abused and assaulted the Italian consul of Townsville, Mario Melano, beat him and ripped from his coat his Fascist Party badge. Later on the same day, a group of forty anti-Fascists stormed the hotel where Melano was staying and threw a glass at him. Carmagnola and Tardiani were charged with unlawful assault but were acquitted by a jury.²⁶

However, the anti-Fascist movement in Australia virtually disappeared as an effective, aggressive force. To mark its doom, the Commonwealth Government in 1932 took steps 'for the suppression of the two publications printed in Australia in the Italian language under the titles of *La Riscossa* and *L'Avanguardia Libertaria*'.²⁷ In addition, Schiassi's Anti-Fascist Concentration faded away. Incidentally, the difficulties met by Schiassi in his attempt to secure Australian citizenship in this period are a good indication of the way in which the cause of Italian anti-Fascism

was regarded adversely by the Commonwealth Government before World War II. Schiassi applied for naturalization on 12 April 1929, precisely at the end of the required five years of residence. Although the Commonwealth Investigation Branch could find 'no reason why the application should not be granted', a decision was deferred for a year on the ground that 'Schiassi is regarded in his own country as a Communist, and if he still holds Communistic views, his naturalization would be debarred under the Minister's general ruling'.²⁸

When Labor came to power in October 1929, Schiassi thought that he had a better chance, especially as he was a personal friend of A.E. Green, the new Minister for Defence. But Schiassi's pleas were unsuccessful, until February 1931 when he was granted naturalization. The decision had been delayed because the Government was influenced by the slanders circulated by the Fascist authorities. For anti-Fascists, naturalization was a guarantee of protection against any request for their deportation made by the Italian Government. It was ironic that Fascists in Australia, who had no need for such protection, gained naturalization without difficulty. Thus when Remigio Budica, one of the most violent Fascists in Melbourne (he assaulted Schiassi on one occasion), applied for naturalization he got it in less than a month, thanks to Italian consular support and a sympathetic report by the Commonwealth Investigation Branch.²⁹ Evidently, double standards applied—the Fascists were representatives of law and order, of stability.³⁰

Depression and The 1930s

Whereas the driving force in the Italian anti-Fascist movement in Australia was provided by Anarchists in the 1920s, that role was taken up by Communists in the following decade. This was partly because of a change in policy by the Communist International, which now recognised Fascism rather than social democracy as the real enemy. Communists worked towards alliances with other left-wing bodies.

How great was Communist influence in the Italian community in Australia? An ex-Fascist businessman, G. Vaccari, estimated that in 1940 there were about 200 Communists, 150 of whom were nominal only. According to Vaccari the great majority of Italians, about 123,000, were 'satisfied with the Australian democratic liberal order and therefore refractory to autocratic totalitarian system. Not belonging to extreme parties in Australia . . . Sympathising with the legitimate national aspirations of Italy such as independence, order, tolerance, welfare, but disinterested in Italian politics'.³¹

Although this statement underplays the extent to which Italians had succumbed to Fascist propaganda, Vaccari's figures on Communist strength are basically correct. Yet the Communist contribution to the anti-Fascist struggle was crucial in the 1930s, in the face of economic depression and the collapse of the press and club established in the previous decade. Apart from the Communists and their supporters, opposition to Fascism became once again a personal act of defiance, of emotional

and sometimes violent reaction to specific issues or events. One of the few of these outbursts worth remembering occurred in Ingham in December 1934, during a visit by the Italian Consul-General, Marquis Agostino Ferrante. Propaganda leaflets against his coming were printed, and the Consul-General had to be granted police protection for the duration of his stay in Ingham.³²

In that same year, a group of people established in Melbourne the Gruppo Italiano contro la Guerra (Italian Group against War). Outstanding figures in this project were Luigi Stellato, a Calabrian fruit and vegetable market agent, who held strong pacifist ideas, and Matteo Cristofaro, who became the leader of Italian Communists in Australia. Cristofaro had migrated to Australia in 1927, and in 1931 he joined the Communist Party of Australia.

To Cristofaro and others, Communism was the most attractive single force of the Australian political system, not only because the Communist Party of Australia in the past had often supported the anti-Fascist movement and lent to Italian anti-Fascists its facilities, such as printing presses and halls, but mainly because it was the brother-party of the Italian Communist Party in exile, the only Italian party which survived the Fascist totalitarian onslaught. In the 1930s it still operated an efficient network of underground contacts all over the world, through which anti-Fascist propaganda was distributed to the masses of Italian migrants and political refugees abroad. To Italian anti-Fascists in Australia, Communism was attractive for what it offered: an organization to rely upon; political guidance; a source of information on the development of international anti-Fascist movements and activities; a wealth of readily available propaganda material in the Italian language.

The Gruppo Italiano contro la Guerra was involved in all activities promoted by the Communist Party of Australia and other left wing organisations: when Egon Irwin Kisch, a Czech writer delegate to the Second National Congress Against War and Fascism in Melbourne, was refused permission to disembark by the Lyons Government in 1934, and later on was arrested for illegally entering the Commonwealth, the Gruppo Italiano assembled almost three hundred Italians who took part, along with members of the Victorian Council Against War and Fascism, in anti-government demonstrations. By the end of 1934 the Gruppo included approximately forty militants, a dozen of whom were also members of the Communist Party of Australia. The Communists, by far the most active in the Gruppo, met under the ideological supervision of Ralph Gibson, then a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, who was present at their weekly meetings and counselled on the political line which they ought to follow: the motions carried by the Communists were then put forward to the whole membership of the Gruppo Italiano and discussed.³³

Propaganda material received from Communist sources overseas supplemented the scarce anti-Fascist literature printed in Australia. After the disappearance of the two Anarchist newspapers, the anti-Fascist

movement was unable to publish another newspaper, although the Gruppo Italiano printed some leaflets and small pamphlets. The Gruppo also tried to influence the situation in Italy itself. In 1936 the Italian Communist Party began forwarding to members of the Gruppo Italiano, lists of addresses of people living in Italy to whom they should mail, anonymously, propaganda material. The Party hoped to avoid in this way the strict censorship affecting all mail and printed literature coming to Italy from countries such as France, Belgium, the United States or Argentina, which hosted large communities of exiles. About sixty to eighty names were supplied to members of the Gruppo Italiano and Cristofaro sent propaganda material, mainly newsprint on rice paper.

The Italo-Ethiopian conflict boosted the political activities of the Gruppo Italiano. So, too, did the Spanish Civil War. The Gruppo took part in huge rallies at the Exhibition Buildings in Melbourne along with other organisations of a People's Front character, and was in close contact with many of them, such as the Victorian Council against War and Fascism; the Spanish Relief Committee, chaired by Nettie Palmer (who was a personal friend of Cristofaro); and the Council for Civil Liberties, whose secretary, Brian Fitzpatrick, was a friend of Schiassi.

By 1938, those members of the Gruppo Italiano who were also members of the Communist Party of Australia numbered about thirty-five. Also, non-Communist members and sympathisers of the Group had increased considerably. Many felt the need to have their own club, where they might meet socially and where politics could be discussed. So the Casa d'Italia (House of Italy) was established in Carlton in 1938. Membership of this club was formally denied to people 'having political opinions incompatible with the principles of social progress' (i.e. Fascists).³⁴

In the final analysis, the Gruppo Italiano did not achieve spectacular results in the 1930s. It was unable to create a mass movement and its strength was limited to Melbourne and a few Victorian country towns. It was unable to overcome the severe obstacles which faced all the anti-Fascist groups in the interwar period. In the first place, anti-Fascism had the disability of fighting a doctrine which ascribed to itself the right of being the sole dispenser of patriotism. Fascism appealed quite successfully to the unsophisticated, scarcely educated migrants, who were linguistically and socially insecure and isolated, targets of discrimination and abuses. Italians abroad in general, and in Australia in particular, fell for the Fascist rhetoric, the ceremonies, the speeches, the trappings of the regime, and its aggressive and bombastic style. Italian anti-Fascists, much as they explained that they 'were not, as the Fascists claimed, anti-Italian, but were more Italian than them, only we were for an Italy as Mazzini and Garibaldi wanted it, for a Republic Italy', were not believed.³⁵

Secondly, anti-Fascism had to fight a subtle, efficient and well financed Fascist propaganda machine. The Fascist consuls, the secretaries of the Fascist branches, the Italian press, the clubs, all diligently carried out the Italian Government's policy towards anti-Fascism: Italians were warned not to finance anti-Fascist newspapers such as *Il Risveglio*,³⁶ and the anti-

Fascists were threatened with being deported back to Italy. Anti-Fascists were denied membership of the 'national' clubs such as the Club Cavour in Melbourne, because of their 'anti-national' activities.³⁷ Also they were discriminated against by the Italian employers and businessmen who, having to rely on the good offices of the Italian authorities for obtaining licences to import goods from Italy, were forced by the circumstances to declare their allegiance to Fascism.³⁸ With the passing of the years, the effects of Fascist propaganda became obvious: many anti-Fascists, frustrated by years of activities that seemed to be leading nowhere, deserted the anti-Fascist ranks, and Fascist propaganda reaped its fruits even among its opponents.

The third factor which hampered the progress of the anti-Fascist cause was the narrow base of support which the movement enjoyed. Outside general links with the Communist Party of Australia and the Trade Union movement, Italian anti-Fascism here was politically isolated, both nationally and internally. Allegations made by the Fascist authorities that the enemies of Fascism in Australia were acting under orders from international Communism could not be corroborated by any evidence. Also, due to their inability to work harmoniously together and to present a united front against Fascism, the Italian anti-Fascists scattered their meagre intellectual and financial resources and weakened the political effectiveness of their activity. Furthermore, the anti-Fascists had to face a hostile public opinion: their internationalism, their class consciousness, the advocacy of violence, alienated and isolated them from the majority of the population. They 'were believed to be what the Fascists and the Consuls said we were: Communists, troublemakers, dangerous people; instead, we were only poor immigrants who came here to improve our conditions'.³⁹ Anti-Fascists were frequently warned, 'in their interest, to abstain from provoking further public disorders and from bringing into Australia their political wrangles and national divisions'.⁴⁰ Missing completely all ideological implications and historical realities, Australians believed that the place for Italians to settle their quarrels was Rome, and not Sydney or Melbourne. Finally, an important obstacle met by the opposition to Fascism was the absence in its ranks—with the exception of Schiassi—of an educated elite, of an intellectual leadership. In Australia there were no 'fuorusciti' as in France or the United States who could be at the fore of an articulated and informed opposition; instead, here, the character of Italian anti-Fascism was brisk, rough and sharp tongued.

The Italia Libera Movement⁴¹

Italy's entry into World War II marked the end of the Gruppo Italiano and the Casa d'Italia. Their members were as uncertain about their future as the Fascists were, and the club was closed by the police in September 1940 (three months after the Communist Party of Australia had been declared an illegal organisation by the Menzies Government). Nevertheless, Cristofaro persisted in the struggle. By 1941 he had formed

the Movimento Antifascista Italiano, which carried on the same sort of activities as the defunct Gruppo. Carmagnola wrote to Cristofaro that his leaflets 'got on the nerves of the local Italian greengrocers at the market'.⁴² Yet the response of the Italians who had not been interned was very poor. In Australian society, there was widespread distrust of all Italians, whatever political ideas they professed, and irrespective of how long they had lived in Australia. They were suspected of being potential, if not actual, fifth columnists. Consequently, Italians tended to shun political discussions.

In 1942, many anti-Fascists recognised the necessity for a radically new approach on their part. They realised, for instance, that they had committed a great mistake in neglecting to obtain the support, or at least the interest, of the Australian people for their cause. They had restricted their activities to the Italian community and failed to establish a liaison with Australian politicians. Anti-Fascism had never become a pressure group. Thus, the Australian Government and the politicians had been approached only by the Italian consuls and by pro-Fascist businessmen.

Further, it was realised that it was necessary to attract to the anti-Fascist ranks not only the Italians who had been and were opposed to Fascism because of its totalitarian philosophy, but also those who in the past had been the victims of Fascist propaganda, and were now ready to support the Allied cause and the creation of a new, democratic Italian state. The policy of confrontation carried out for twenty years had to give way to a policy of persuasion. With these ideas in mind, the Movimento Italia Libera (Free Italy Movement) was founded in 1943, with Schiassi as its chairman. A concerted effort was made to secure the support of distinguished Australians and a letter was sent to the Australian Attorney-General, Dr Evatt, requesting official permission to work amongst Italians in aid of the Allied war effort. The letter stressed the fact that the Movement was being sponsored by eighteen prominent Australians. The Attorney-General's Department immediately agreed to allow the Movement to operate as requested.⁴³

One of its first tasks was to seek the release of all anti-Fascists from the internment camps. The Movement corresponded with a large number of internees and in many instances was able to make successful representations on their behalf to the Federal Government. The Government was asked to change the classification of anti-Fascist Italians from 'Enemy Aliens' to 'Friendly Aliens'. Besides this, Italia Libera protested against the discrimination perpetrated against Italians conscripted in the Allied Works Council, since they were treated and paid worse than Australian workers and their civil rights were not respected. Also, the Movement pressed the Commonwealth to allow all naturalized anti-Fascist Italians to serve in the armed forces against the Axis.⁴⁴

Notwithstanding the inevitable failures, Italia Libera succeeded in obtaining the release of many anti-Fascists, some of whom were Jewish refugees who had escaped from Italy after the 1938 racial laws. They

joined the Movement and became its intellectual leaders. Claudio Alcorso, a textile engineer, soon became the political and financial mentor of the anti-Fascist movement. He had left Italy on 1 September 1938 and gone to England where he attended a post-graduate course at the London School of Economics; in March 1939 he migrated to Australia. At the outbreak of the war, he was interned and sent to the South Australian camp of Loveday. Here he frequently showed his anti-Fascist feelings, most notably on 28 October 1941, when he and other Italians went out to work in defiance of the 'holiday' proclaimed by the Fascist leaders of the camp to commemorate the March on Rome.

The contacts with Italian internees at the end of 1942, and during the first half of 1943, were instrumental in the creation of a solid infrastructure for the Movement. Indeed, after its official birth, Italia Libera expanded considerably all over Australia. In New South Wales its rapid growth was, to a large extent, due to the excellent work carried out by its Secretary and old-time anti-Fascist, Tom Saviane. During the first year of activity in New South Wales, the Movement opened five branches—at Griffith, Leeton, on the South Coast, in Broken Hill and in Canberra. The Movement grew rapidly also in other parts of Australia. Branches were opened at Brisbane and Ingham in Queensland; at Perth in Western Australia; at Morgan, Renmark and Port Augusta in South Australia; at Melbourne, Shepparton, Tatura, Geelong, Silvan, and in the Gippsland district in Victoria. On 29 March 1944 Massimo Montagnana reported to the Central Committee that the national membership of the Movement was 1,500.

The leaders of Italia Libera tried hard to make their presence felt with regard to the conduct of Italian affairs in Australia. Huge donations were made to the Liberty Loans launched by the Australian Government: Schiassi was proud to mention to Evatt that Italians had contributed fifty thousand pounds to the First Liberty Loan Campaign.⁴⁵ In July 1943, Montagnana asked for the Federal Government's permission to print a monthly newspaper, but it was not granted. In July 1944 another application was filed. This time the application was successful, not in virtue of the arguments put forward by Schiassi in support, but because the Security Service believed that, by allowing the several factions co-existing in the Movement to have a public outlet for their political discussions, it would tighten its control over the Communist minority and the more extreme elements.⁴⁶ The first issue of the newspaper, called *Il Risveglio* (The Awakening), appeared in November 1944, although bulletins of the same name had been issued since August 1944. The newspaper was sold fortnightly and lasted for many years until 1956, when it was closed down. The main aim of the newspaper was to win Italian public opinion for the anti-Fascist cause. *Il Risveglio* failed to achieve this goal. At the peak of its fame, it reached only five per cent of the Italian migrants and its impact on the Italian community was slight.

Moreover, Italia Libera was not successful in many other respects. It did not become a mass party, since it was not able to reach the Catholic

masses or the masses influenced by Fascist propaganda. It failed to win recognition from the Australian Government, as the sole spokesman of the Italian community, and did not exploit to the utmost its political opportunities because of its internal disunity. There were political and organisational disputes between the Sydney and Melbourne centres. The progress of *Italia Libera* was hindered by other factors besides its own mistakes and human weaknesses. The war years did not destroy the social and political infrastructure of the Italian community. Although the most rabid Fascists were interned, other people, who had supported Fascism for twenty years but had been more restrained in their public life, were still holding positions of influence. Now, as twenty years before, they were ready to dump an uncomfortable ideological baggage; while in the 'twenties they sold Liberalism for Fascism, in 1943 they traded Fascism for Democracy.

The most remarkable representative of this group was Vaccari who, amongst other things, had publicly expressed his support for the Fascist aggression against Ethiopia.⁴⁷ When World War II broke out, Vaccari was not interned; instead, he became the protege of the other institution which from the outset was strenuously opposed to *Italia Libera*, the Catholic Church. Archbishop Mannix, and the Jesuit directly responsible to him for affairs concerning the Italian community, Father Ugo Modotti, immediately saw that the new anti-Fascist movement was determined to win the allegiance of Italian Catholics, and was undermining the political and moral authority of the Church. Their opposition, of course, was not solely an expression of pro-Fascist tendencies, but to some extent also an expression of anti-Communist fears. A few months after the creation of *Italia Libera*, Mannix held a rally, on 12 September 1943, at the Cathedral Hall, Fitzroy, to launch a Relief Fund for Italy and to explain what were the duties of Catholics in the existing political situation. Mannix declared that 'Mussolini is the greatest man living today. His will go down in history as the greatest government Italy has ever had. The cultural, educational civilization created by him, Italy and the world will always admire and hold it as the greatest in the history of the globe'.⁴⁸ But the *pièce de résistance* was the speech by the federal Minister for Information, A.A. Calwell. He had previously attended and given his support to anti-Fascist meetings, but he now took a completely unexpected stand. 'I say', he uncompromisingly stated, 'that those who have been associated with *Italia Libera*, . . . are not rendering any service to the Italian community by maintaining that body in existence'. The last speaker was G. Vaccari.

After this public declaration of war on *Italia Libera*, Archbishop Mannix adopted more devious methods of political intrigue. On 13 September 1943, he wrote to Prime Minister Curtin asking him to appoint an Italian as an accredited liaison officer between the Government and the Italian community. Curtin accepted Mannix's proposal, and the name of G. Vaccari was suggested to the Prime Minister for consideration. The Security Service investigated Vaccari's past and advised the Prime

Minister that 'Vaccari is *persona grata* with Security Brigadier Simpson. Major Brown knows him well'.⁴⁹ On 26 November 1943, Vaccari was appointed Unofficial Italian Liaison Officer in Australia. The appointment was a severe blow to Italia Libera, because it meant that the Government had granted to Vaccari unofficial recognition as the sole spokesman for Italian affairs in Australia, a more or less *de facto* consular position.

In December 1943, Italia Libera sent a strong letter of protest because 'the Commonwealth Government has accorded official recognition to one who has always been and still is a Fascist',⁵⁰ and two months later Dr Evatt withdrew the authorisation which had been given to Vaccari to make representations in relation to members of the Italian community.⁵¹ But if Vaccari was the secular weapon in the arsenal of the Catholic Church, there also was a clerical one, no less efficient, in the person of Father Ugo Modotti. In August 1944 Modotti launched a new newspaper, *L'Angelo della Famiglia* (The Angel of the Family) from whose columns Italians were warned to beware the anti-Fascists who were described as atheist traitors of their fatherland. The editorial in the first issue made clear the unequivocal opposition of the Church to Italia Libera. At the same time, attempts were made to stop the publication of *Il Risveglio* by accusing its editor of picking out and publishing 'all anti-Catholic and anti-monarchical matter in order to disseminate Communist theories'. In short, in 1944-45 Modotti adopted the same policy which Consul-General Grossardi had carried out in 1926-28; that of branding all anti-Fascists as Communists and of setting up an effective propaganda machine. However, this time the campaign of denigration failed; the Government knew that neither the editors of *Il Risveglio* nor the leadership of Italia Libera were Communist. However, by the end of World War II, Alcorso, the editor of *Il Risveglio*, had to admit Italia Libera's goal to become a mass movement had failed. The Catholics had been reluctant to accept its overtures and the Fascists were certainly not prepared to join such a left-wing organisation, not even after February 1945, when Alcorso accepted the sponsorship of people who had been in sympathy with Mussolini's Government, such as Sir Raphael Cilento, President of the Dante Alighieri Society in Brisbane during the Fascist period. Alcorso was ready to go a long way on the road of compromise in order to gain widespread support.

The lowering of the standards of ideological purity upset many anti-Fascists who, aware that the Movement had failed to grow, notwithstanding Alcorso's last-hour exercises of political pragmatism, became estranged from it. Also, Italia Libera was not able to obtain recognition from the Commonwealth as the sole representative of the democratic aspirations of the Italian community. Canberra never consulted Schiassi or Alcorso on any problem. Besides, Italia Libera's efforts to draw the Australian people's attention to the anti-Fascist contribution to the Allied cause, both here and in Italy, achieved only a very limited success. Many Australian organisations and the press continued in their attacks against Italians in general, without giving consideration to the fact that

some of them were anti-Fascists. Although the censor had instruction not to allow the publication of the word 'dago', this epithet was used on several occasions. When *Il Risveglio* appeared, *Smith's Weekly*, in an article entitled 'Another Wop Newspaper', advocated its banning, reminding the readers of *Smith's* successful fight to ban the supplement in Italian which the Queensland *Worker* printed 'for Dago members of the A.W.U.'.⁵²

In the end, Italia Libera's main policies failed. Alcorso's hopes to create a mass movement were frustrated by the apathy and the political illiteracy of the Italian masses, and by the xenophobic malaise of most Australians. Yet Italia Libera was not a complete failure, since some of its policies had a lasting effect. The Movement gave to all Italians the opportunity to exercise a distinct political choice and, to those who took it, a feeling of pride in contributing to the liberation of their country. It freed many of them from the internment camps, and fought against the conformism, the bigotry and the interested opportunism of many others. Australians were urged to realise that Italians were not just a mass of stereotyped foreigners, but were human beings who cherished strong political beliefs, and who were ready to fight even their own people in order to uphold their right to social justice and political democracy. It is difficult to measure to what extent Italian anti-Fascism was successful in these areas. Yet all available evidence substantiates the claim that between 1943 and 1945, Italia Libera made a real contribution towards creating a climate of political détente between the Italian community and the Australian people. An indication of its success in this particular area is given by the fact that Italian migrants after World War I, in which Italy fought as an ally of Australia, were met only with barely concealed contempt, open hostility and discrimination; yet after World War II, when Fascist Italy was an enemy of Australia, Italian migrants found more respect and consideration than ever for their social and political problems.

NOTES

- 1 *Italo-Australian*, 3 May 1924. For the first section of this essay, see also G. Cresciani, 'The Italian Resistance to Fascism in Australia: 1922-1940', *Teaching History* (July 1973).
- 2 While the boarding houses were the exclusive meeting point for anti-Fascist working class Italians, the supporters of Fascism (the employees of the Lloyd Sabaudo Shipping Agency, of the Italian newspaper, the businessmen, traders, greengrocers and in general the members of the Italian Establishment) congregated in clubs like the 'Circolo Isole Eolie' and the 'Club Italia' in Sydney, or the 'Club Cavour' in Melbourne.
- 3 Australian Archives, CRS, A446, item 57/67255, Grossardi to Bruce, 19 September 1927.
- 4 Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, Series VII, vol. II, Doc. 71, Romano Avezzana to Mussolini, 6 June 1923.
- 5 *Italo-Australian*, 14 March 1925.
- 6 Interview with F. Carmagnola, 18 September 1971.
- 7 *Italo-Australian*, 14 March 1925.
- 8 CRS, A 446, item 57/67255, Grossardi to Bruce, 19 September 1927.
- 9 *ibid.*
- 10 CRS, A 446, item 57/67255, NSW Premier to Bruce, 3 November 1927.
- 11 CRS, A 446, item 57/62755, Bruce to Grossardi, 14 October 1927.
- 12 CRS, A 446, item 57/67255, Grossardi to Bruce, 2 December 1927, and Attorney-General to Prime Minister, 16 April 1928.

- 13 *Italo-Australian*, 28 September 1927.
- 14 *Il Risveglio*, 1 September 1927.
- 15 Interview with T. Saviane, 7 November 1971.
- 16 *Italo-Australian*, 5 October 1927.
- 17 CRS, A 445, item 232/4/12, External Affairs Opinion No. 9.
- 18 CRS, A 1606, item SC C5/1, Grossardi to Strahan, 1 December 1926.
- 19 CRS, A 446, item 57/67255, Grossardi to Bruce, 2 December 1927.
- 20 *Italo-Australian*, 2 March 1929.
- 21 *Argus*, 29 October 1929; also *Sydney Morning Herald*, 28 October 1929.
- 22 *Italo-Australian*, 2 November 1929.
- 23 *ibid.*, 25 January 1930.
- 24 *Argus*, 1 March 1930.
- 25 *Italo-Australian*, 17 May 1930.
- 26 *Brisbane Courier*, 14 January, 12 and 13 February 1932.
- 27 CRS, A 445, item 232/4/12, Postmaster General to Prime Minister, 10 November 1932.
- 28 CRS, AI, item 31/721, Attorney General's to Home Affairs, 22 April 1929, and Department of Home and Territories, Memorandum No.29/3939, 30 April 1929. Actually, Schiassi was never a Communist.
- 29 CRS, AI, item 28/1049, consul Melano certificate, 18 January 1928, and Attorney General's to Department of Home and Territories, 24 January 1928.
- 30 A parallel may be noted in the refusal of naturalization, on political grounds, to a number of left wing Greeks and Cypriots in Australia in the 1950s and 1960s. See Kenneth Buckley, 'ASIO and Civil Liberties', *Meanjin Quarterly* 32, 4 (December 1973), p.474.
- 31 CRS, A989, item 455/7/2, Vaccari to Prime Minister of Italy, 7 August 1944.
- 32 *Worker's Weekly*, 21 December 1934.
- 33 Interviews with Cristofaro, 1973-4.
- 34 Statute of the club, in Stellato papers, held by the author.
- 35 Interview with T. Saviane.
- 36 *Italo-Australian*, 27 June 1927.
- 37 *ibid.*, 16 November 1929.
- 38 Anti-Fascists were not accepted as cane cutters in the gangs hired by Italian cane farmers (interview with T. Saviane).
- 39 Interview with F. Carmagnola.
- 40 *Italo-Australian*, 28 March 1925.
- 41 For an expanded version of this section, see G. Cresciani, 'The Second Awakening: The Italia Libera Movement', *Labour History* 30 (May 1976).
- 42 Carmagnola to Cristofaro, 13 November 1941, in Cristofaro papers, held by the author.
- 43 Cristofaro papers, A.R. Chisholm to Cristofaro, 14 February 1943.
- 44 CRS, A989, item 455/7/2, Italia Libera to External Affairs, 28 June 1943.
- 45 CRS, A446, item 57/67255, Schiassi to Evatt, 18 July 1944.
- 46 W.B. Simpson, Director-General of Security, declared: 'I consider that the proposed publication would assist this Service to keep a check on any undesirable or subversive elements which may endeavour to influence the policy of the Movement'. (CRS, A446, item 57/67255, Security Service to External Affairs, 3 August 1944).
- 47 *Il Giornale Italiano*, 10 July 1935.
- 48 Cristofaro papers, Minutes of the meeting, 1943 file.
- 49 CRS, A1608, item AA 19/1/1, Mannix to Curtin, 13 September 1943, and handwritten note by Curtin.
- 50 *ibid.*, Italia Libera to Prime Minister, 8 December 1943.
- 51 CRS, A989, item 40/40, External Affairs note, signed by Evatt.
- 52 *Smith's Weekly*, 3 March 1945.

4

'REALLY RATHER LIKE SLAVERY': LAW AND LABOUR IN THE COLONIAL ECONOMY IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA

PETER FITZPATRICK

Colonization . . . contained every expression of communal life and every action that seemed to limit or threaten its grip, irrespective of the forms of native political society and the colonial regimes that organised their domination.

Georges Balandier¹

THE CLAIM HAS often been made that Australia as a colonist was possessed of a particular, humanitarian virtue. Indeed, in relation to Papua New Guinea, it appears that Australians did not consider themselves colonists at all.² However, a look at the reality rather than the rhetoric of its administration in Papua New Guinea shows Australia to be a colonist much like any other. Australia may have been ostensibly a more humane colonist than many, but its record on this can be explained in terms of its position as a late and little imperialist. Contrary explanations in terms of Australian subjective morality and good intentions do not stand up to the facts. This essay will try to illustrate and support this argument in relation to the colonial regulation of wage-labour—an area that is of central importance to the type of colonialism that operated in Papua New Guinea.

The indenture system has been basic to the supply of wage-labour in Papua New Guinea. First, that system and the official view of it will be described here. The official view is then contrasted with the actual operation of the system to show that it was used to tie Papua New Guinea societies into the colonial economy in such a way as to ensure and maintain a supply of cheap labour to that economy. However, it is then suggested that explanation in terms of supply does not fully account for the colonial regulation of labour; one must look also at the threat to the colonist of non-traditional organisation that has a potentiality for class

action. After applying this last type of explanation to the indenture system, it is then applied to more recent colonial labour laws dealing with trade unions and ‘industrial relations’. The essay concludes with a brief look at the neo-colonial situation.

The Indenture System and its Ideology

The indenture system was inherited from the Germans in New Guinea and from the British in Papua; the Australians did not make any basic changes in its legal provisions or in its operation, but initially they did modify the system in the interests of planters.³ There were two main aspects of the system. First, it was recognized that the ‘native’ had to be forced to work: he was seen by planters and officials as ‘lazy’⁴ but even those who apologise for the system now acknowledge that force was needed to some extent because Papua New Guinea generally preferred village life to working on plantations or at mining sites.⁵ In any case, the result was that the worker in the indenture system was subject to criminal penalties if, among other things, he ‘deserted’ his employer or failed to work diligently. To this extent the system was ‘really rather like slavery’ as Lieutenant-Governor Murray of Papua described it.⁶ Unlike slavery, the entry into employment was, in theory, voluntary. The other main aspect of the system—‘the gesture at justice’ as Rowley has put it⁷—comprised measures that purported to protect the ‘native’ and to assure his welfare. In terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations (which was binding on Australia in the case of New Guinea and accepted as policy in Papua) ‘the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation’.⁸ Consequently, labour law in Papua and in New Guinea made provision for such things as maximum hours of work and minimum wages and for health, dietary and accommodation standards. The law also provided for the protection of the worker against fraud and cruelty on the part of employers and labour recruiters. A recent academic study says that the law was mostly complied with, and so the system ‘on the human level . . . was neither brutal nor particularly oppressive’.⁹ As the same account shows, Australia was also concerned to fulfil the ‘sacred trust’ by seeking to preserve traditional¹⁰ Papua New Guinea societies—to prevent ‘detrribalisation’ and the creation of a ‘landless proletariat’.¹¹ Hence labour law provided that after a certain period in employment the worker had to be returned to his village and not ‘re-engaged’ under indenture for a certain further period.¹² As well, limitations were, from time to time, imposed to prevent over-recruiting of labour in some areas.

As will be shown later, most of these various protective provisions in the system did not fit the reality of its operation but it should also be mentioned that the provisions themselves were not always beneficent and humane. For much of the colonial period, the minimum wage (which was in practice a maximum wage) was five shillings a month in New Guinea and ten shillings in Papua. To take only one more of many possible instances, the death-rate among labourers, especially on the

goldfields, was frequently extremely high¹³ and this was mainly because of the inadequate dietary standards; yet despite official recognition of this, little was done to correct the situation.¹⁴

More generally, the 'native' must be '[raised] . . . eventually to the highest civilisation of which he is capable' but the process must not be rushed.¹⁵ It was believed by the colonists (ostensibly anyway) that requiring the 'native' to work on plantations and at mines was part of the 'sacred trust' because to so work was a civilising influence and the best sort of education the 'native' could get. As for 'economic development', this could only be developed by Europeans; apart from some limited cash-cropping, the only role the Papua New Guinean could play in development was that of labourer for the European.¹⁶ Altogether, this was a neat and omni-sufficient ideology.

The System in Operation

Mair has said of 'conditions in practice' in New Guinea:

Where conditions of work were concerned the pressure of economic demand was stronger than humanitarian considerations. Rapid development, it was argued, was in the interests of the whole country, and therefore of course in those of the native population; it must not be hampered by pedantic insistence on the letter of the law. The plantations had had to encounter every kind of difficulty, and should not have their burdens increased beyond what they could bear. Inspection was in any case inadequate, and officers who were anxious to enforce the prescribed conditions felt that they could not count on support from headquarters.¹⁷

Papua was basically no different. In fact, in Papua and in New Guinea, breaches of the law by employers were flagrant, widespread and usually uncorrected, and in the early days of Australian rule, labour-related atrocities were common.¹⁸ Rowley, a knowledgeable and sensitive observer, saw 'the (long illegal) use or threat of violence as the basic labour incentive'.¹⁹ Nor is all this of the past. For example, breaches of the minimum-wage provisions have in recent times been common in the Highlands and perhaps also in the rural areas generally.²⁰ Officially-recorded complaints by workers that on the face of them could warrant prosecution, run into hundreds and sometimes thousands each year, but prosecutions of employers are few.²¹

The ethos in which the law operated was hardly conducive to compliance with it or to its adequate enforcement. The employer had ready access to a white man's court to enforce his side of the labour laws, but the Papua New Guinean had, in practical terms, almost no access to courts to enforce his side. Enforcement of his side depended on a system of official inspection which was grossly inadequate.²² As Rowley has noted, it was 'all too commonly the case for officials to regard as their duty assistance to employers'.²³ Generous allowance was made, sometimes in the law and always by officials in its enforcement, if employers found it difficult or impossible to comply. Even where they were inclined to take action, officials have always operated on a 'warning' basis that gives

the employer a chance to rectify his breach of the law.²⁴ If the law or the officials were not adequately sympathetic, then planters could resort to their pressure group associations and their usually strong representation in colonial legislatures.²⁵

The plantation itself (and to a lesser extent the mine) was a 'total institution'—a 'small state'—with the employer as the ruler.²⁶ As an illustration of this, there was legal power given to employers for a time in Australian New Guinea, to mete out 'disciplinary punishments' (confinement or fines).²⁷ The worker could only participate in the wider economy through the employer;²⁸ this position was emphasised in the law which said that, whilst indentured, the worker could not enter into any other contract apart from his contract of employment. Generally, and in terms of preserving a correct order in the 'small state', it was for some time an offence for a worker 'to create or foster a bad influence among his fellow workers', and such has usually been a sufficient ground for terminating his employment contract.

The practice of the system is vividly reflected by the people's response to it. Usually they chose not to 'sign on'²⁹ again after a period under indenture and, on the available figures, almost 4 per cent of the indentured workforce 'deserted' each year. Desertion is particularly significant for there were so many pressures on the labourer to stay: as well as the standard criminal sanctions against 'desertion', the 'deserter' stood to lose his deferred pay (half of his wages were, by law, accumulated for payment on expiry of the indenture). He would usually find himself in a strange and hostile area; even if he got home he could be in trouble with the traditional leader who perhaps had him recruited, and there would still be the economic pressure of the 'native tax' forcing him to return or to find work elsewhere.

As for enforcement, if the available figures are taken for the whole colonial period (which means confining the figures to New Guinea), the 'native labour' laws were, up to and including the year 1950-51, enforced ten times more against workers than against employers.³⁰ After 1950-51 (most of the penal sanctions against workers having been abolished at the end of 1950), convictions of employers decreased sharply. The average number of convictions of employers then was 7.56 a year with long periods when there were hardly any at all.³¹ For the whole of Papua New Guinea there were only three employers convicted between December 1969 and March 1976 inclusive.³² Nor did conviction for an offence under the 'native labour' laws hold much terror for an employer. He was fined but never imprisoned. For the available figures from New Guinea the average fine per conviction of an employer was A\$5.80. Fines have increased recently but not very significantly. The average fine per conviction of an employer for Papua New Guinea between December 1969 and May 1976 inclusive was A\$53.00.

Maintaining the Labour Supply

Development theory of the conventional varieties sees traditional society

as eventually being transformed and replaced in the process of 'modernisation' and as, in the meantime, being a block (in many ways) to such progressive change. However in the perspective of theories of 'under-development'³³ the advance of the capitalist economy 'partly derives from the extraction of cheap factors of production from the . . . [traditional] sector thereby maintaining its backwardness'.³⁴ More particularly, colonialism (or at least colonialism of a variety relevant to Papua New Guinea) involves 'using the economic basis characteristic of lineage society to establish the conditions of transition to capitalism'.³⁵ But the transition is and remains ambiguous for, as Bettelheim has put it, 'the main tendency is not to dissolution of the non-capitalist modes of production but to their *conservation-dissolution*'.³⁶ Indeed, and in contrast to only transforming traditional society, capitalism has 'imparted a certain *solidity*' to it, as Banaji has put it. Further, Banaji would see the capitalist and traditional elements as forming a distinct, interdependent combination in a 'colonial mode of production'.³⁷ Meillassoux has put the emphasis on labour supply as the reason for conserving traditional society and this emphasis fits the Papua New Guinea case. For him, 'the agricultural self-sustaining communities' form 'an organic component of capitalist production' in, basically, performing the 'functions of social security' that capitalism avoids in the colonial situation.³⁸ To elaborate on this: the worker's wage is enough for his sustenance while working and for his and his family's tax (and there is sometimes a small savings component); traditional society continues to support the worker's family, to support the worker when he is not under indenture as a result of compulsory repatriation, illness or old age and, generally, it bears the cost of maintaining the supply of labour.

In Papua New Guinea, capitalist penetration and the indentured labour system in particular have certainly made in part for the 'dissolution' of traditional society.³⁹ But traditional society has reacted in ways that make for, or are consistent with, its 'conservation'. The introduction of time-saving technologies in the period of initial trade and also later in the colonial period, as well as the reduction in warfare in the latter period, led to the strengthening of traditional forms of organisation.⁴⁰ These factors also created space, as it were, in the village to accommodate the absence of some men under indenture.⁴¹ The indenture system, as Rowley has indicated,⁴² helped in the 'conservation' of traditional society. Admittedly, restrictions on recruiting were not always enforced, but the repatriation laws were closely administered, and it is indicative of their adequate enforcement that employers constantly complained about them. The tendency of workers not to 'sign-on' for a further period under indenture, combined with the application of these conservation-oriented laws, had the effect of pushing the 'labour frontier' further and further back.⁴³ So whilst a new frontier was being tapped, pressure on supply within the frontier was lessened, and this development greatly facilitated the aim of conservation. Other important aspects of the 'native labour' laws can be explained in terms of conservation,⁴⁴ and it is also in the light

of such an explanation that the basis for the Australian ideology described earlier becomes clearer. As Wolpe has put it:

Indeed, it is in part the very attempt to conserve and *control* the non-capitalist societies in the face of the tendency of capitalist development to disintegrate them and thereby to undermine the basis of exploitation, that accounts for political policies and ideologies which centre on cultural, ethnic, national and racial characteristics.⁴⁵

The colonist was also able to build on and 'solidify' particular aspects of traditional society that helped in supplying labour. This was done through using existing inequalities⁴⁶ and patterns of authority in Papua New Guinea societies.⁴⁷ It was common practice for labour recruiters to use persons in authority to put pressure on young men to 'sign-on' and for this purpose a 'bonus' was paid and, it would appear, some leaders became very wealthy in the process.⁴⁸ In this way traditional authority lent itself also to the maintenance of the labour contract: the returning 'deserter' could incur the displeasure of the traditional leader who had him recruited and this leader would often be or would have control over a *luluai*—a 'native' official appointed by the colonial administration. This factor should be added to the earlier description of the worker's dependence and isolation (he was usually far from the labour frontier where he was recruited), to explain why he served out his contract. On the figures mentioned earlier, convictions of New Guineans under the 'native labour' laws averaged (up to 1950-51) 652 a year, and 93 per cent of these convictions were for 'desertion' or failure to work or 'perform duty'. The number of workers convicted in any year was only a very small proportion of the total number under indenture, but this factor does not exhaust the significance of these laws. As shown earlier, the law, in its enforcement and administration generally, was almost totally biased in favour of the employer; this patent bias would have made the isolation of the worker more than geographical, and would have underscored his dependence. Other legal measures were influential on the supply side. The 'native tax' was used to create a need for cash and thus force people into wage-labour.⁴⁹ Also, and in contrast to the German record, for much of the colonial period, Australian legal measures discouraged cash-cropping and cash-crop processing among New Guineans, and this restricted a source of money to pay the tax—a source that successfully competed, in attractiveness, with wage-labour.⁵⁰ Perhaps similar supply considerations lay behind the provision, for a time, of a legal *maximum* wage (ten shillings a month) in New Guinea, since a higher wage would enable the tax of more people to be paid, and thus decrease the pressure on the people to seek wage-labour.

The Colonist and Non-Traditional Organisation

The fact of the labour frontier indicates that 'native labour' laws, in seeking to conserve traditional society, were not just concerned with preserving the source of the labour supply. To the extent that labour continued to be supplied from within the frontier, it would often be the case

that such a limited supply would not threaten particular traditional societies, if the repatriation laws were not applied. Yet, in the face of contrary pressures from planters, the colonial administration continued to enforce the repatriation provisions without distinction. Dealings in land were also strictly controlled with the aim of preserving the traditional society as a supplier of labour, yet such control was also exercised within the labour frontier.⁵¹ For the towns a detailed system of laws dealing with curfews, migration, 'vagrancy', residence location and recreation was used to restrict severely the extent to which Papua New Guineans could stay and could associate together in towns.⁵² These laws can be explained in terms of facilitating repatriation of workers, but in this regard they import such a high element of 'overkill' as to prompt further examination.

The explanation suggested here is grounded in Australia's position in Papua New Guinea. Australia was a relatively 'weak' colonist.⁵³ Despite rapid economic expansion in the early days of Australian rule both New Guinea and, especially, Papua were economically stagnant and weak, and very little interest in them or support came from Australia until the rapid expansion of Australian involvement after the second world war.⁵⁴ This weakness was aggravated by the ever-receding labour frontier, and other related factors which resulted in the capitalist economy being too widely dispersed.⁵⁵ Australia, in its typical colonial concern to protect its own monopoly, kept out non-Australian or non-British interests.⁵⁶ Britain was past its expansionist phase. Australia itself, so it has been said, was preoccupied with its own continent and lacked the 'surplus energy' necessary for external colonisation.⁵⁷ A more incisive explanation could explore the limitations arising out of Australia's own dependence or 'satellite' status as a colony and neo-colony.⁵⁸

The Australian colonist, with some accuracy then, perceived his position as weak and precarious.⁵⁹ Several events could serve to instance this perspective but perhaps the most powerfully indicative was the Rabaul strike of 1929. This was a 'peaceful and purposeful'⁶⁰ strike of almost all the New Guinean workers in Rabaul (including the New Guinean police) which was so effectively organised in terms of solidarity that no white resident knew of it until it had happened. The Australian response was swift, fearful and furious and resulted in the infliction of draconic punishments on the leaders of the strike. This response indicated that what most concerned the colonist was the ability of the people to combine across ethnic divisions.⁶¹

It is well recognized that migratory labour systems make the class organisation of workers difficult if not impossible.⁶² What the foregoing points try to show is that one aspect of the indenture system or 'native labour' laws, and of other functionally related colonial laws, is a concern to counter organisation outside of the traditional context and independently of the colonist—a type of organisation that could be said to have potentiality for class action. The actual threat involved to the colonist was doubtless much less than that perceived by him, and it would now

seem that, given Australia's relatively 'weak' colonial penetration and the geographical dispersal of capitalist economic development, it was most unlikely that any potent working-class organisation would have emerged anyway.

The Emergence of Free Labour and The Quasi-Indenture System

To be an effective means of containment and control, the indenture system had to cover all or almost all employees. But the law did allow some very limited exceptions—sometimes for employment near the worker's home and other times for short periods of employment. Through these exceptions a non-indentured or 'free' labour force emerged, and the exceptions themselves were progressively widened. After the greater Australian involvement from the end of the second world war, the indenture system could no longer meet the demand for labour. It was also inconsistent with investment in the needed development of a more skilled workforce. The non-indentured workforce grew fairly rapidly and by 1950, it has been suggested, a 'free' labour force had emerged, 'forced to rely on the European for existence'.⁶³ This would fit neatly with the abolition of the indenture system at the end of 1950. It might be said that with 'free' labour the legal controls of the indenture system were no longer apposite or needed, but other more appropriate legal controls may be seen as needed to contain this new labour force.

This needs some qualification. The labour force was not free in the classical (and paradoxical) sense of being totally dependent on wages; even to-day it seems to be the unusual case where land and subsistence livelihood are not available to the Papua New Guinean.⁶⁴ Also at this stage 33 per cent of the total workforce was still under indenture.⁶⁵ The abolition of the indenture system was a consequence of the 'new deal' promised by the Australian Labor Government after the second world war. However, this abolition of the system and its replacement by the 'agreement system' amounted to little more than a change in name. The basic structure of the system (especially the repatriation provisions) remained unchanged, but most of the penal provisions, such as those requiring workers to be diligent and not to desert, were repealed. To a considerable extent, at least initially, the system 'survived by bluff'; officials would act as if the penal provisions still existed and the worker, not having heard otherwise, would usually fall into line. Further, an alternative type of sanction was then introduced: this involved a simple type of court action whereby, on certain grounds, an employer (and, on other grounds, a worker) could apply to the court to have the employment contract terminated and to have 'damages' paid out of the worker's deferred pay. The grounds included such as being absent from work for more than seven days, and 'exerting a bad influence on his fellow workers'. Taking the New Guinea figures referred to earlier, the average number of court orders of this type made annually in favour of employers was 549 (the average number a year in favour of workers was five) and this figure

was quite on a par with the pre-1950 level of convictions of workers under the penal provisions of the indentured labour system.⁶⁶

Any foreseeable risk in 'abolishing' the indenture system was more than off-set by the opening up of the Highlands—the greatest labour frontier of them all. The Highlands Labour Scheme was introduced because the supply of indentured labour was drying up.⁶⁷ It was a massive recruiting operation run by the colonial administration.⁶⁸ Although the scheme did not formally come into operation until the end of 1951, it had, effectively, been operating on a trial basis for two years before that. By the time the indenture system was purportedly abolished and replaced by the 'agreement' system at the end of 1950, 14 per cent of the indentured workforce had been supplied through the Highlands Labour Scheme; within a further fifteen years more than half the indentured or 'agreement' workforce was supplied through the Scheme.⁶⁹

The 'free' or non-indentured labour force increased in the 1950s (from 33,927 in 1950 to 41,746 in 1960), and the increase was much more rapid in the 1960s (to 93,771 in 1968). Changes were made in the 'native labour' law in 1958 to broaden the exceptions under which employment could be entered into outside the indenture or agreement system. The number of workers in the indenture system peaked in 1960 and thereafter gradually declined.⁷⁰ On 28 March 1963, all restrictions in the 'native labour' law on entering into employment outside the indenture system, were abolished. On the same day new legal methods of controlling labour came into effect—the trade union and industrial relations legislation.

Trade Union and Industrial Relations Legislation

The first Papua New Guinean trade union was an organisation of workers based in the capital and founded in 1960; it emerged out of an ethnic association set up in 1958. These bodies had political as well as 'industrial' aims and they strongly (for the times) asserted both.⁷¹ Hasluck, the then Australian minister with responsibility for Papua New Guinea, was quick to provide assistance for the union in pressing its industrial claims. As a result, the union was instrumental in obtaining, in 1960, a doubling of the minimum wage in certain urban areas. In 1960, also, a union based in Madang was formed arising out of a prior ethnic association. Soon after, unions were formed in Lae and Rabaul and in the next few years several more were formed in other urban areas.⁷²

Of these first two unions the colonial administration said that 'special attention is being given to such organisations to ensure that they are founded on sound principles and develop along constructive lines . . .'⁷³ Until these unions were formed, it was officially thought that the time was not ripe for trade unions, basically because the people would not be able to organise them, and so administration 'protection' of the worker would have to continue. On 15 August 1961, Hasluck announced a major change in approach. He said that 'new labour measures' would be introduced; these would be of particular 'interest' to an emerging group of

‘urban workers’ who were not greatly in need of protection. These changes quite explicitly anticipated the accelerated ‘development’ that Australia would promote in the sixties.⁷⁴ Hasluck instanced co-operatives and local government councils (previously successful efforts at colonial containment⁷⁵) as indicating that reliance could be placed on officials ‘to give impartial and disinterested counsel and guidance to those wishing to form a trade union, and to arrange for the training on accepted lines of their union officers’. He saw the measures themselves as being ‘the minimum necessary’ and as leaving ‘as much room as possible’ for Papua New Guineans to work things out their own way. Dr Gunther, the then Deputy Administrator, in introducing the new measures to the colonial legislature in 1961, was even more disarming:

Quite simply the purpose of this [‘industrial organisations’] Bill is to recognize the existence of such formal organisations, and to regulate their existence so that they will best serve the purpose for which their members came together . . . It can be said that the Bill generally is a fairly standard piece of industrial legislation providing for the prevention and settlement of dispute.⁷⁶

But he did add that registration as an ‘industrial organisation’ would be compulsory because of the ‘relatively great degree of supervision, and perhaps assistance’, that trade unions would need, and because without this compulsion there would be ‘a strong likelihood’ of unions being used ‘for purposes which were basically non-industrial, perhaps subversive’.⁷⁷

It was quite clear by 1960, that the rapid growth of trade unions in the Third World after the second world war was due more to growing demand of colonised peoples for freedom than to ‘industrial unrest’ narrowly conceived.⁷⁸ Perhaps as a result, we find in this ‘fairly standard piece of industrial legislation’⁷⁹ that political affiliation by trade unions is obliquely but effectively prohibited, and strikes by organised workers are in effect prohibited.⁸⁰ The ‘industrial organisations’ law makes it an offence for any person to manage or act for an unregistered trade union. The Registrar of Industrial Organisations has wide powers of supervision and control over registered trade unions. In their internal ordering, trade unions are subjected to a system of complex and detailed legal rules. For various and numerous infractions, individual unions can be de-registered by the Registrar and thus it would become an offence, then, to manage or act for them.

The actual operation of these new laws followed and refined their general orientation. Under the guise of the new policy ‘to facilitate the growth of industrial organisations’,⁸¹ officials became closely involved in the affairs of trade unions, sometimes going to great lengths to sustain trade union organisation. Trade unions were clearly meant to integrate organised workers into a controlled system of ‘industrial relations’.⁸² Officials typically claim that were it not for their involvement unions would not exist at all. A former head of the Department of Labour has said that the colonial administration could not wait for trade unions to

develop 'entirely from below' because opposing political views could otherwise gain a foothold;⁸³ and another former head has said off the record that his aim was to create 'tame-cat' unions. Moderate observers find the system under the new measures repressive and restrictive; they see the legislation and its enforcement as smothering and hindering rather than helping union activity.⁸⁴

The Neo-Colonial Situation

Following through on a few significant themes, it can be said that the capitalist economy in Papua New Guinea in the neo-colonial situation leans only somewhat less heavily on traditional society for maintaining its labour supply; the dependence of traditional society for its own maintenance upon the capitalist economy (and on wage-labour) has increased.⁸⁵ So the two are now more 'naturally' integrated, and many of the colonial legal controls can be and have been eased. But the economic basis and the structures of containment and control remain unchanged in some important ways. As Meillassoux has noted generally 'through low wages and precarious employment the labourer is periodically expelled from the capitalist sector and sent back to the rural areas', so conservation of traditional (or some other alternative) society remains an 'absolute requirement' for these labourers.⁸⁶ The rural subsistence alternative appears to remain open generally to the Papua New Guinean worker. As indicated earlier, the conservation of traditional society was rationalised ideologically by the colonist in terms of racial division. Such an ideology is no longer conspicuously admitted, but it may be that the new ethnological ideology emphasising 'Papua New Guinean ways'⁸⁷ can serve a similar function.

Looking in more detail at the continuing exploitation of traditional society, it is evident that the minimum wage, from its inception in 1960 until 1972, was related to the needs of a 'single man' only.⁸⁸ Since then, some allowance has been made for a worker's family but the basic dependence on the traditional society remains, especially for rural workers. Moreover 'equity' and other arguments used by economists now serve to legitimize the holding down of urban wages, by comparing them to the actual and notional income of the villager in traditional society.⁸⁹

New legislation purportedly doing away with the 'agreement' or quasi-indenture system is said to be imminent. Yet legislation with a similar aim has been in the system for many years—despite which, the changes it provided for were basically ones of nomenclature. What makes it further unlikely that the indenture system will really be done away with soon is that the Highlands Labour Scheme has been vigorously defended by the Minister responsible for labour in terms more than reminiscent of those of his former colonial rulers.⁹⁰ Other legal changes have been more substantial.⁹¹ Most of the repressive colonial system regulating migration to, and residence and association in, towns was done away with in the 1960s and some of the last vestiges went in 1976. However 'vagrancy' laws continue to be rigorously enforced against those having

‘insufficient lawful means of support’ which, in practice, appears to mean those without formal sector employment.⁹² The colonial trade union and industrial relations laws continue to apply, and there appears to be no substantial move on foot to liberalise them.

From the end of the second world war, the Australian administration encouraged Papua New Guinean capitalist-type farmers and, later, pastoralists (again building on the traditional base). Less enthusiastically and less successfully, from the early sixties it encouraged urban ‘businessmen’. The considerable number of Papua New Guinean employers emerging through these developments appear to be just as exploitative of their workers as the Europeans.⁹³ In order to encourage such ‘entrepreneurs’ the Department of Labour has a policy of not prosecuting them for breaches of legislation protective of workers.⁹⁴ Moves have been made by some Papua New Guinean employers and by officials on their behalf formally to allow them to pay less than the otherwise required minimum wage.

*Those who are certain to gain by the offering
Demand a spirit of sacrifice.*

Brecht

NOTES

- 1 Georges Balandier, *Political Anthropology* (Allen Lane The Penguin Press, London, 1970) p.160. In preparing this paper I have been indebted in various ways to Robert Wanji, Ken Good, Donald Denoon, Rex Mortimer, Utz Wellner and Hank Nelson.
- 2 For some examples see *Report . . . on the Administration of the Territory of New Guinea for Years 1914-21*, p.14 (hereafter referred to as *New Guinea Report*, with the appropriate year or years added); and Hank Nelson, *Papua New Guinea: Black Unity or Black Chaos?* (Penguin Books, Ringwood, 1974), p.84, quoting a former Minister in the Australian government with responsibility for Papua New Guinea. See also C.D. Rowley, *The New Guinea Villager: A Retrospect from 1964* (Cheshire, Melbourne, 1972) p.7; W.J. Hudson, Introduction in W.J. Hudson (ed.), *Australia and Papua New Guinea* (Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1971); and E.P. Wolfers, ‘Trusteeship Without Trust: A Short History of Interracial Relations and the Law in Papua and New Guinea’, in F.S. Stevens (ed.), *Racism: The Australian Experience* vol. 3 (Australia & New Zealand Book Company, Sydney, 1972), p.75. Of course Australia is far from unique as a colonial power in the belief in its superior benevolence.
- 3 For New Guinea see *New Guinea Report 1914-21* p.12, and R.F. Salisbury, *Vunamami: Economic Transformation in a Traditional Society* (Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1970) p.40; and for Papua J.D. Legge, *Australian Colonial Policy: A Survey of Native Administration and Development in Papua* (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1956), pp.156-7.
- 4 H.N. Nelson, ‘European Attitudes in Papua, 1906-1914’, in The University of Papua and New Guinea, *Second Waigani Seminar: The History of Melanesia* (Research School of Pacific Studies, Canberra and The University of Papua and New Guinea, Port Moresby, 1969), pp.600-1. Generally Lieutenant-Governor Murray of Papua put it that for ‘people at so low a stage of evolution . . . argument and moral suasion [do not] have very much influence . . . [and] advance must be made with the sanction of Ordinances and Regulations’, (*Territory of Papua, Annual Report for . . . 1919-20*, p.111). This was from a presidential address to the Anthropology Section of the Australian Association for the Advancement of Science.
- 5 For example, D.W. Smith, *Labour and the Law in Papua New Guinea* (Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1975), p.20. This acknowledgement is implicit here in the acceptance of ‘primitive affluence’ as a factor in restraining supply.

- 6 Hubert Murray, *The Scientific Method as Applied to Native Labour Problems in Papua* (Government Printer, Port Moresby, 1931), p.9.
- 7 C.D. Rowley, 'The Occupation of German New Guinea', in W.J. Hudson (ed.), *op. cit.*, p.66.
- 8 B. Jinks, P. Biskup & H. Nelson (edd.), *Readings in New Guinea History* (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1973), p.121.
- 9 D.W. Smith, *op. cit.*, pp.31, 33, 37.
- 10 'Traditional' is used throughout the essay but this or any other 'fixed' category must be unsatisfactory in this context.
- 11 D.W. Smith, *op. cit.*, chapter 2. This concern could be seen as legitimised also by the similar thrust of the I.L.O. *Recruiting of Indigenous Workers Convention* No. 50 of 1936.
- 12 The law on this has changed often, but generally in Papua a worker had to be returned to his village after no more than three years and, in New Guinea, after no more than four and a half years.
- 13 For example, 'expressed as a percentage of the average number of labourers in the Northern Division [of Papua] the death rate varied from about 30 per cent in 1898/99 to 10 per cent in 1903/04, and even in later years it was probably never less than 5 per cent'. (H.N. Nelson, *Black, White and Gold: Goldmining in Papua New Guinea 1878-1930* [Ph.D. Thesis, Department of History, University of Papua New Guinea, 1975], p.313.)
- 14 See *Territory of Papua, Annual Report for . . . 1915-16*, p.25. *New Guinea Report 1924-25*, p.11; and J.D. Legge, 'The Murray Period: Papua 1906-40' and Margriet Roe, 'Papua-New Guinea and War 1941-5', in W.J. Hudson (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp.89 and 144 respectively.
- 15 B. Jinks *et al.* (edd.), *op. cit.*, p.118 quoting Murray, and Don Woolford, 'Blacks, Whites . . . and the Awful Press', *New Guinea and Australia, the Pacific and South-East Asia* 8, 4 (January 1974), p.15.
- 16 See A.P. Power, *A Study of Development in Niugini from 1880 to 1940* (M.A. Thesis, Department of History of Science and Technology, University of Papua New Guinea, 1974), pp.5, 91, 186.
- 17 L.P. Mair, *Australia in New Guinea* (Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1970), p.184.
- 18 For some general indication see for Papua, H.N. Nelson, *loc. cit.*, footnote 13 and, for New Guinea, Ian Willis, *Lae: Village and City* (Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1974), pp.70-1.
- 19 C.D. Rowley, *op. cit.*, p.115.
- 20 For the Highlands see H.C. Brookfield, 'Native Employment in the New Guinea Highlands', *Journal of the Polynesian Society* 70, 3 (1961) p.306, and J.E. Isaac *The Structure of Unskilled Wages and Relativities between Rural and Non-Rural Employment in Papua and New Guinea* (Port Moresby, 1970), p.24. For rural areas generally see Public Service Association of Papua New Guinea, *Submission to National Minimum Wage Enquiry* (no date), p.5: this is an analysis of 1972 figures submitted by employers to the Department of Labour which strongly suggests widespread breaches of the minimum wage law in rural areas. One cannot be categorical about the figures because the classifications used in collecting the information are too crude. They do not include the actual minimum wage figure as a wage-level category marker and no allowance is made for part-time and piece-work arrangements.
- 21 For example in New Guinea for the year 1959-60 there were 2286 such complaints and seven prosecutions (*New Guinea Report 1959-60*, pp.237-8).
- 22 The New Guinea law for much of its history provided merely for an annual inspection of the plantation or mine but even this requirement was often not complied with. See also D.W. Smith, *op. cit.*, p.31.
- 23 C.D. Rowley, *op. cit.*, p.104.
- 24 Here and in a few places later I am relying on information supplied by officers of the Department of Labour. The information was not supplied with publication in view so, unsatisfactory as it may be, I cannot adequately attribute these points. *Cf.* on softening criminality for employers, E.H. Sutherland, *White Collar Crime* (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1961), p.35.
- 25 Heather Radi, 'New Guinea under Mandate 1921-41', in W.J. Hudson (ed.), *op. cit.*, p.121, and A.P. Power, *op. cit.*, pp.180, 188-9.
- 26 G.L. Beckford, *Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment in Plantation Economies of the Third World* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1972), p.19.
- 27 *New Guinea Report 1914-21*, p.51 (section 49).
- 28 The worker depended on the employer for the basics of life (provided as part of his wage in kind) and, besides tax, often the only outlet for his cash wage was the employer's

store.

- 29 Here and elsewhere in the text there is a deliberate ambiguity in talking about people not ‘signing-on’ again. In New Guinea a worker could renew his contract for a further period before returning home. On the figures in the *New Guinea Reports*, the great majority chose not to do this. One reason could have been that they wanted to go home but would still sign on later. But there was a fairly general aversion to working under indenture once experienced.
- 30 This figure and the rest of the New Guinea figures in the paper are derived from a necessarily hefty sample of half the years of Australia’s rule in New Guinea. The figures (where available) for the years so selected were then extracted from the Annual Reports covering those years and the calculations in the text were derived from those figures.
- 31 For all of Papua New Guinea from 1961 to 1970 inclusive there were only four convictions of employers.
- 32 This figure comes from a survey of Labour Department files. It is possible but unlikely that all of the relevant files were not found.
- 33 Most notably propounded by A.G. Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1971), and Keith Griffin, *Underdevelopment in Spanish America: An Interpretation* (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1969).
- 34 Henry Bernstein & Michael Pitt, ‘Plantations and Modes of Exploitation’, *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 1, 4 (July 1974), p.516.
- 35 Georges Dupre and Pierre-Philippe Rey, ‘Reflections on the Prevalence of Theory of the History of Exchange’, *Economy and Society* 2, 2 (May 1973), p.147.
- 36 Charles Bettelheim, ‘Appendix 1: Theoretical Comments by Charles Bettelheim’, in Arghiri Emmanuel, *Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of Trade* (Monthly Review Press, New York and London, 1972), p.298 (his emphasis).
- 37 Jairus Banaji, ‘Backward Capitalism, Primitive Accumulation and Modes of Production’, *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 3 (1973), p.395 (his emphasis).
- 38 Claud Meillassoux, ‘From Reproduction to Production: A Marxist Approach to Economic Anthropology’, *Economy and Society* 1, 1 (February 1972), p.102.
- 39 See for example Mervyn Meggitt, ‘From Tribesmen to Peasants: the Case of the Mae Enga of New Guinea’, in E.R. Hiatt & C. Jayawardena (edd.), *Anthropology in Oceania: Essays Presented to Ian Hogbin* (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1971), and for the indentured labour system, Peter Worsley, *The Trumpet Shall Sound: A Study of “Cargo” Cults in Melanesia* (Granada Publishing, London, 1971), p.50.
- 40 Perhaps the best known study on this point is R.F. Salisbury, *From Stone to Steel: Economic Consequences of a Technological Change in New Guinea* (Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1962).
- 41 Peter Lawrence, *Road Belong Cargo: A Study of the Cargo Movement in the Southern Madang District New Guinea* (Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1964), p.228.
- 42 C.D. Rowley, *op. cit.*, pp.90, 102, 104.
- 43 H.C. Brookfield with Doreen Hart, *Melanesia: A Geographical Interpretation of an Island World* (Methuen and Co., London, 1971), p.264.
- 44 To take one instance, the colonial administration has basically only ever allowed the ‘signing-on’ of ‘single’ men and this despite a professed concern with homosexuality on plantations and despite occasional pressure from employers to promote the recruitment of families. The law did make provision for wives to accompany workers but this provision was so hedged about and put such greater obligations on the employer that it was rarely availed of. Allowing families to reside near the workplace would tend more towards the dissolution of traditional society and the creation of a permanent wage-labour force.
- 45 Harold Wolpe, ‘The Theory of Internal Colonialism: The South African Case’, in Ivar Oxaal, Tony Barnett & David Booth (edd.), *Beyond the Sociology of Development: Economy and Society in Latin America and Africa* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London and Boston, 1975), p.244 (his emphasis).
- 46 This may be thought somewhat of a heresy as it is common to assert that Papua New Guinean societies are, or at least were, equalitarian but even in those societies (the great majority) where ‘status’ is said to be ‘achieved’ rather than ‘ascribed’ there are deep inequalities. See for example, Andrew Strathern, *The Rope of Moka: Big-men and Ceremonial Exchange in Mount Hagen, New Guinea* (The University Press, Cambridge, 1971), p.205-8.
- 47 See R.F. Salisbury, ‘Despotism and Australian Administration in the New Guinea Highlands’, in James B. Watson (ed.), *New Guinea: The Central Highlands* (Special Publication, *American Anthropologist*, 66 (1964) and cf. Paula Brown, ‘From Anarchy to Satrapy’, *American Anthropologist* 65, 1 (1963). See also A.L. Epste, *Matupit: Land,*

- Politics, and Change among the Tolai of New Britain* (Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1969), 18-19.
- 48 See C.D. Rowley, *The Australians in German New Guinea 1914-1921* (Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1958), pp.124-5, and L.P. Mair, *op. cit.*, pp.193-4. S.G. Firth, *German Recruitment and Employment of Labourers in the Western Pacific before the First World War* (D. Phil. Thesis, Oxford, 1973) notes (p.146) that the village 'chief' selected by the Germans in New Guinea could be relied upon for a reasonable offering of 'free recruits' for planters. E.W. Docker, *The Blackbirders: The Recruiting of South Seas Labour for Queensland, 1863-1907* (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1970) has instanced alliances between recruiters and chiefs in the New Hebrides (p.149) and the Solomons (p.234).
- 49 This was done explicitly in New Guinea (S.W. Reed, *The Making of Modern New Guinea* [The American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, 1943], p.149). But the claim has been made that this was not the intention (even though it was the effect) in Papua (Legge, *loc. cit.*, as in footnote 14, p.47). Murray, *op. cit.*, p.4 supports a similar claim by pointing out that in Papua the worker whilst under indenture does not have to pay the tax. Surely this would be an added incentive to 'sign-on'.
- 50 See Peter Lawrence, *op. cit.*, pp.45 and 227, Heather Radi, *loc. cit.*, 107-8, and J.K. McCarthy, *Patrol into Yesterday: My New Guinea Years* (Cheshire, Melbourne, 1963) pp.79-81.
- 51 C.D. Rowley, *The New Guinea Villager: A Retrospect from 1964*, p.90. From the colonist's perspective, controlling land dealings could be explained in terms of the 'sacred trust'. The reason most commonly given was that 'native' land had to be protected from predatory Europeans. To fit that reason however, it would only have been necessary to control dealings between 'natives' and Europeans as was done in British New Guinea. However, no dealings outside 'customary' transactions were allowed unless done under the control of the colonial administration.
- 52 For a general account see R.T. Jackson, P. Fitzpatrick & Loraine Blaxter, 'The Law and Urbanisation' in Richard Jackson (ed.), *An Introduction to the Urban Geography of Papua New Guinea* (University of Papua New Guinea, Department of Geography, Occasional Paper No. 13, 1976).
- 53 The most apt contrast would be with the 'strong' colonialisation within Australia itself—a colonisation that totally dominates the indigenous population. But this is not to deny that the degree of Australia's penetration in Papua New Guinea was quite extensive. 2.08 per cent of the land was alienated to Europeans and most of this was alienated in the early days of colonisation, but probably only about 12 per cent of the total land area is suitable for cash-cropping. On the 12 per cent figure, see Tony Barnett, *Land and People in Papua New Guinea: A Discussion Paper* (Central Planning Office and United Nations Development Programme, 1976), p.8.
- 54 A.P. Power, *op. cit.*, pp.82-6, 228. Overall, Australia does not seem to have been a case of profitable colonialism (E.K. Fisk & Maree Tait, 'Aid', in W.J. Hudson (ed.), *Australia's New Guinea Question* (Nelson, Melbourne, 1975), pp.116-17).
- 55 H.C. Brookfield, *Colonialism, Development and Independence: The case of the Melanesian Islands in the South Pacific* (Cambridge University Press, London, 1972), pp.51-2.
- 56 Edward P. Wolfers, *Race Relations and Colonial Rule in Papua New Guinea* (Australia & New Zealand Book Company, Sydney, 1975), pp. 143-4, H.C. Brookfield, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-8, and Heather Radi, *loc. cit.*, p.75. There were other restrictions besides those mentioned in these references. Even British investment was on occasion restricted in Papua (A.P. Power, *op. cit.*, p.71.)
- 57 See C.D. Rowley, *The New Guinea Villager*, p.121, and as to the 'energy' point see F.W. Eggleston, 'The Mandate and the Australian People', in F.W. Eggleston (ed.), *The Australian Mandate for New Guinea* (Macmillan and Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1928), p.7.
- 58 E.L. Wheelwright, *Radical Political Economy: Collected Essays* (Australia & New Zealand Book Company, Sydney, 1974), p.257.
- 59 The relatively enlightened Murray wrote, in justifying capital punishment, of 'the Territory of Papua, where a small white community, is surrounded by a barbaric population hardly out of the stone-age' (Amirah Inglis, 'Not a White Woman Safe': *Sexual Anxiety and Politics in Port Moresby, 1920-34* [Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1974], p.109). See also Peter Fitzpatrick 'No Stronger Law: Colonial Rule and the White Women's Protection Ordinance', *Melanesian Law Journal* III, 1 (April, 1975).
- 60 B. Gammage, 'The Rabaul Strike, 1929', *Oral History* III, 2 (February 1975) p.23.
- 61 See for example, A.L. Epstein, *op. cit.*, p.29:

- ... the entire episode indeed must have been highly disconcerting to those who, like the Administrator himself, ‘knowing anything of the native mentality’ found it ‘quite inconceivable that the natives who belong to different tribes, and who nurse hereditary enmities against each other should sink their differences and combine in a general demonstration’.
- The *Rabaul Times* in the same vein said, ‘the alarming thing is that the matter was well organised’ (Woolford, *op. cit.*, p.16).
- 62 Peter Worsley, *The Third World* (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1967), p.153.
- 63 See the quotation in Chris Gregory, ‘The Concept of Modern Monetary Sector as “Engine for Development” in Underdeveloped Dual Economy Countries’, *Seminar on Industrial Democracy in Papua New Guinea* (University of Papua New Guinea, July 1975), p.2.
- 64 Michael Wright, Ross Garnaut and Richard Curtin, ‘Employment and Incomes in Papua New Guinea Towns’, *New Guinea Research Unit Discussion Paper No. 2* (New Guinea Research Unit, Boroko, May 1975), p.47; and Michael Wright, ‘Towards an Understanding of Being Without Formal Employment in Papua New Guinea Towns’, *New Guinea Research Unit Discussion Paper No. 9* (New Guinea Research Unit, Boroko, November 1975), p.12, n.
- 65 Territory of Papua and New Guinea, *Report of Board of Inquiry . . . Investigating Rural Minimum Wages . . . Minimum Wage Fixing Machinery and Related Matters* (1970) (the ‘Cochrane Report’), p.33.
- 66 Such convictions averaged 652 a year but the number of people under indenture for most of the pre-second world war period exceeded the number under indenture or under ‘agreement’ post-war. However it has not been possible to take account of the pre-war civil actions against workers for damages and this should be done for a valid comparison. It is not likely that such actions were significant.
- 67 G.D. Collins, *An Appraisal of the Highlands Labour Scheme* (Department of Labour, Port Moresby, no date), p.1. By 1940 recruitment of indentured labour was close to saturation point (Legge, *loc. cit.*, p.48, and Heather Radi, *loc. cit.*, p.132). The unparalleled (in Papua or New Guinea) severity in labour matters of the Australian military administration during the second world war probably had an effect in further decreasing the post-war supply.
- 68 Employers were charged a ‘handling fee’ but this was below the cost of the operation to the administration (G.D. Collins, *op. cit.*, pp.4, 24).
- 69 ‘Cochrane Report’, *op. cit.*, as in footnote 65, p.33. As elsewhere, however, people in the Highlands generally did not renew their contracts: see for example Sachiko Hatanaka, ‘Leadership and Socio-Economic Change in Sinasina, New Guinea Highlands’, *New Guinea Research Bulletin No. 45* (The New Guinea Research Unit, Port Moresby and The Australian National University, Canberra, 1972), p.35.
- 70 ‘Cochrane Report’, *op. cit.*, p.33. However for recent years separate figures for workers under indenture have not been collected by the Department of Labour. They form part of an inconsequential category embracing all people with a written employment contract.
- 71 Albert Maori Kiki, *Kiki: Ten Thousand Years in a Lifetime* (Cheshire, Melbourne, 1968), pp.97-9. See also A. Maori Kiki, ‘Development of Trade Unions in the Territory’, in Marion W. Ward (ed.), *The Politics of Melanesia* (The Research School of Pacific Studies, Canberra and The University of Papua and New Guinea, 1970), p.616.
- 72 Michael Stevenson, ‘A Trade Union in New Guinea’, *Oceania XXXIX* (1968), p.114, *New Guinea Report 1961-62*, p.118.
- 73 *New Guinea Report 1960-61*, p.118.
- 74 *Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, H. of R.*, 15 August 1961, pp.11-12. Hasluck said:
- I suggest that we will see the situation more clearly if we recognize the present measures as indicating the direction of changes which are just beginning and which will gather pace in the next ten years. What we do now is less for to-day than for the decade ahead of us.
- 75 Peter Fitzpatrick, ‘A New Law for Co-operatives’, *Annals of Public and Co-operative Economy*, 46, 3 (1975), and David Simpson, ‘Local Government Councils and Political Development in Papua New Guinea’ (Department of Political Studies Seminar, University of Papua New Guinea, August 1976).
- 76 Territory of Papua and New Guinea, *Legislative Council Debates* (5th Council, 3rd Meeting of the First Session, vol. VI, no. 3, 1961), pp.229, 232.
- 77 *ibid.*, p.230.
- 78 See William H. Knowles, ‘Industrial Conflict and Unions’, in Wilbert E. Moore & Arnold S. Feldman (edd.), *Labour Commitment and Social Change in Developing Areas*

(Social Science Research Council, New York, 1960), p.311.

- 79 See, for example, Joan Davies, *African Trade Unions* (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1966), pp.40, 42, 76. Of course even a 'fairly standard' Australian model in this area would be comparatively restrictive.
- 80 The industrial relations law prohibits the organising of a strike when an award applies as one would to most urban workers. Almost all other organised urban workers would be prohibited from striking by specific legislation covering their occupation such as the Public Service Act. Except for some recent efforts in the Sepik area, rural workers remain unorganised.
- 81 *New Guinea Report 1960-61*, p.109.
- 82 R.J. Worsley, 'The Developing System of Industrial Relations in Papua New Guinea' (thesis for Bachelor of Commerce Degree, University of New South Wales, Sydney, 1966), pp.41, 60-1. See also John Paterson, 'New Guinea's Trade Unions', *New Guinea and Australia, the Pacific and South-East Asia* 4, 1, (March-April 1969), p.28.
- 83 R.J. Worsley, *op. cit.*, p.43.
- 84 R.M. Martin, 'Tribesmen into Trade Unionists: the African Experience and the Papua-New Guinea Prospect', *Journal of Industrial Relations* ii, 2 (1969), pp.159-61, and N. Seddon, 'Legal Problems facing Trade Unions in Papua New Guinea', *Melanesian Law Journal* III, 1 (April 1975), p.103.
- 85 The degree of dependence varies among different societies and takes different forms. For one of the best accounts of the present context of this dependence, see the strong but not unusual case described by Thomas G. Harding, 'Wage Labour and Cash Cropping, the Economic Adaptation of New Guinea Copra Producers', *Oceania* 41, 3 (1971).
- 86 Claude Meillassoux, 'The Social Organisation of the Peasantry: The Economic Basis of Kinship', *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 1, 1 (October 1973), p.89.
- 87 For example, that is the heading to the fifth goal of the Constitution, which goal is to achieve development primarily through the use of Papua New Guinean forms of social, political and economic organisation. Department of Labour and Industry, *Submission to the Urban Minimum Wages Board* (June 1974), part B, pp.2, 3, 5.
- 88 Department of Labour and Industry, *Submission to the Urban Minimum Wages Board* (June 1974), part B, pp.2, 3, 5.
- 89 Allowance has been made for a worker's wife in some urban areas and for a wife and one child in others and also there has been a small loading added to the single man basis of the rural minimum wage: See National Minimum Wages Board, *Reasons for Decision and Determination* (June 1976), p.15.
- 90 *Post Courier*, 8 August 1973.
- 91 The position with land administration is not covered here because it is now so complex. Very generally, government land administration remains predominantly and strongly focused on conserving the traditional base but there are strong tendencies toward individualisation of rural land tenure and these tendencies are aided by government extension and lending agencies.
- 92 There is currently a government Bill before the legislature which would do away with the vagrancy offence but the Bill is being continually delayed.
- 93 There are numerous instances in the literature. For minimum wage standards see, for example, T.S. Epstein, *Capitalism, Primitive and Modern: Some Aspects of Tolai Economic Growth* (Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1968), p.104. B.R. Finney, *New Guinean Entrepreneurs*, *New Guinea Research Bulletin No. 27* (New Guinea Research Unit, Port Moresby and Australian National University, Canberra, 1969), p.38, and Louise Morauta, *Beyond the Village: Local Politics in Madang, Papua New Guinea* (Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1974), p.55.
- 94 See footnote 24. Protective legislation here means not only minimum wage laws but all laws administered by the Department of Labour, including safety laws. The policy was slightly departed from with some recent prosecutions (which themselves had trouble getting through the system) of some Papua New Guinean and expatriate employers for failure to lodge information returns with the Department. Also the New Guinea Development Corporation on the Gazelle, a comparatively radical organisation, has been prosecuted for failure to insure its workers.

5

CAPITALISM AND ABORIGINES: THE THEORY OF INTERNAL COLONIALISM AND ITS RIVALS

MERVYN HARTWIG

The comparative history of race and ethnic relations in situations brought about by the expansion of capitalism, is increasingly coming to be written within the framework of a Marxist or neo-Marxist model of the development of capitalism and its articulation with other modes of production.

Mervyn Hartwig

IN A RECENT critique of the literature on internal colonialism and an impressive attempt to render the concept more rigorous and explore its usefulness for a Marxist analysis of South African society, Harold Wolpe left open the question 'Whether the notion of "internal colonialism" has any proper application in conditions of racial discrimination where . . . the internal relations within the society are overwhelmingly capitalist in nature, that is, where non-capitalist modes of production, if they exist at all, are marginal'.¹ Australia is a clear example of one such society. This essay argues that the theory as elaborated by Wolpe, with some modification, does have proper application to many of the conditions of racial discrimination that have obtained within it in respect of Aborigines. It explores the usefulness of the theory for an historical understanding of those conditions, and suggests that it has significant advantages over its chief 'rivals' in the field of race and ethnic relations—structural-functionalist theory and the theory of plural society. It is argued in a preliminary way that, for much of the period and for many of the conditions obtaining since 1788, the theory

1. best helps to explain the specific terms in which ideological and political domination over Aborigines have been expressed, by

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- relating them to specific modes of exploitation of Aboriginal societies;²
2. offers an adequate theoretical framework for an analysis of the intersection of class with race and ethnicity and of the profound duality—class/nation, integration/separation—that has characterized Aboriginal aspirations;
 3. provides the best theoretical perspective for locating the history of Aboriginal-White relations in the comparative history of race and ethnic relations in situations brought about by the expansion of capitalism.

The essay offers no new data but seeks rather to commence the task of re-interpreting existing data within a more adequate theoretical framework. It proceeds largely by way of summarizing Wolpe's argument,³ elaborating at certain points and indicating theoretical limitations in the Australian literature; offering a critique and refinement of it; and indicating some of the general lines along which the revised theory might provide the basis for a thoroughgoing structural analysis of the history of Aboriginal-White relations.

The Theory of Internal Colonialism—A Critique

The concept of 'internal colonialism', as Wolpe points out, has its origin in 'the view that there are close parallels between the *external* relationships established by colonial powers over colonized peoples' in the era of capitalist expansion, and the relationships between dominant and subordinate racial and ethnic groups '*within* some Latin American societies, the United States, [Canada], and South Africa'. While 'internal' is to be distinguished from 'normal' colonialism, in that in the former the colonizing racial or ethnic group 'occupies the same territory as the colonized people', and in the latter 'the colony is a distinct territorial entity, spatially detached from its imperial metropolis',

In all other important respects, the implication is, the components of the 'normal' imperial-colonial relation are to be found within the borders of a single state to an extent which justifies the view that it constitutes an internal colonialism. In particular, it is argued in this approach, that the 'underdeveloped' (and 'underdeveloping') condition of subordinate ethnic and racial groups and the geographical areas they occupy within the boundaries of the state, is produced and maintained by the same mechanisms of cultural domination, political oppression, and economic exploitation which, at the international level, produce the development of the advanced capitalist states through the imperialist underdevelopment of the colonial satellites.⁴

Two main characteristics are ascribed to the colonial relation in the literature. First, it occurs between total populations (e.g. Westerners and Third World peoples), nations (e.g. the United States and any Latin American country), geographical areas (e.g. the North and the South in the U.S.) or racial and ethnic groups (e.g. English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians, Ladinos and Indians in Latin America, whites and

blacks in South Africa). Second, it is said to involve, in a general way, political domination, cultural oppression, and economic exploitation.⁵

While no-one has employed the theory of internal colonialism in relation to the history of Aboriginal-White relations in Australia, one writer has resorted to the colonial *analogy* extensively—C.D. Rowley in his three volumes on *Aboriginal Policy and Practice*,⁶ and we might note here that he nevertheless takes essentially the same view as that just indicated. For convenience of analysis he divides Australia into two regions, which he refers to as ‘colonial’ and ‘settled’, the former comprising the desert and sparsely settled northern and central areas, the latter the remainder of the continent. It is important to note that this is for purposes of contemporary, synchronic analysis, and not for historical analysis: he stresses that colonial relations once obtained also in most areas of ‘settled’ Australia. The following passages indicate the specific characteristics he ascribes to the colonial relationship:

In applying the term ‘colonial Australia’ . . . I have it in mind that in these northern and central regions the social relationships between the indigenous and settler populations represent *an earlier phase* of changes brought by European settlement, and that there are many aspects remaining in the relations between the races which are typical of industrial colonialism. Aborigines of the full descent form the majority of non-Europeans in this region. Here, also, Aboriginal culture retains, to varying degrees, its significance for conduct and as a determinant of the Aboriginal ‘world view’ and value system. Significant also is the relationship of white settler to coloured labour; of white missionary to coloured mission community; and of white public servants engaged in ‘native’ administration, to those who come under the legislation . . .

It seems to me that settler and employer attitudes to ‘natives’ in this northern region . . . range . . . broadly from the benevolently paternal to the crudely exploitative of the coloured ‘unit of labour’; *and that certain common factors in the historical background of northern and central Australia and of New Guinea (and the colonial areas generally) have made this inevitable* . . . The history [of labour relations in the region] has involved much heavier impact from what is commonly referred to as ‘colonial exploitation’ than one can find in the background of many admittedly colonial situations, like that of New Guinea, for instance.⁷

It is apparent from these passages (and from others scattered throughout the three volumes) that Rowley’s concept of ‘colonialism’ is essentially similar to the concept employed in the general literature on ‘internal colonialism’. There is the suggestion that most aspects of a ‘normal’ colonialism are present in northern and central Australia, and were once present in ‘settled’ Australia, and the colonial relationship is clearly held to occur between two peoples of different colour and culture and to involve political domination, cultural oppression, and economic exploitation.

It might also be noted here, since the question will become pertinent later, that Rowley’s distinction between ‘colonial’ and ‘settled’ Australia is (on his own confession) somewhat arbitrary. *When* did relations

between Whites and Aborigines in any one part of 'settled' Australia cease to be 'colonial'? The question is never directly confronted. The answer implicit in the passages cited (and elsewhere),⁸ is that the colonial relation ceased when the destruction of Aboriginal society had proceeded to a point where Aborigines of the full descent, with a recognizably 'traditional' Aboriginal culture, no longer outnumbered part-Aborigines, whose culture was now "not something independent of general [Australian] culture" but at most "a distorted development, or a pathological condition, of general [Australian] culture"⁹; or were no longer a numerically significant element in the local population. This is a distinction that Rowley fails to maintain with any consistency, however. We are told in volume 3, for example:

So long as the indigenous people within a nation state are not charmed into participation in a new way of living or somehow included to the point where they wish to lose themselves in the settler society or find some basis for self-contained adjustment within it, they are in a situation broadly comparable with that of the 'natives' in the tropical or other colony of exploitation. That such people may form a small racial and cultural minority, trapped, as it were, within the European state will, so long as they retain any determination to resist an administration which appears to them alien, tend to maintain or exacerbate the responses which have resulted in the colonial revolts.¹⁰

However, this would seem to hold good in respect of many Aborigines in 'settled' Australia today, and indeed, in the succeeding paragraph we are told that 'the intransigence of Aborigines, whether part-Aboriginal or of the full descent, in the southern regions, in fringe dwellings, on Government Aboriginal stations and reserves, and more recently in the central areas of the metropolitan cities, has a *direct* relationship to the intransigence of the colonial rebel'.¹¹ Such are the hazards of operating with a loose analogy rather than within the framework of a rigorously elaborated theory.

The difficulty arises in part from Rowley's failure to tie the colonial relation to an adequate notion of exploitation. Indeed, what seems most problematic in the literature on internal colonialism in general is the notion of 'colonial exploitation'. How does such 'exploitation' differ from class exploitation in capitalist societies? And 'what is the relationship between the system of class exploitation and domination and the relations of racial [and] ethnic . . . exploitation and domination characteristic of internal colonialism?'.¹²

Wolpe identifies three variants of the theory of internal colonialism. One version, as elaborated by American sociologists in particular,¹³ sidesteps these questions in that it asserts that race and ethnicity are independent dynamic forces not ultimately reducible to other causal determinants. These theorists are consequently unable to conceptualize the relationship of race and ethnicity to the total social structure. We are left, therefore, 'with racial and ethnic groups abstracted out of the social formation'.¹⁴

Two other versions do not assert the independence and irreducibility of race and ethnicity, but nevertheless do not succeed in taking the analysis beyond that of the first version. In one of these, 'the contrast is implicitly drawn between capitalist societies which are culturally, ethnically, and racially homogeneous, and in which relations of class exploitation are dominant, and those societies in which both capitalist exploitation and internal colonial relations exist side by side'.¹⁵ This version fails to identify, however, any specific mode of colonial exploitation and domination which might be held to distinguish it from class exploitation and domination.

Instead, there is a general reference to exploitation, used in a descriptive sense, and to undefined states of racial or ethnic oppression and these are in no way linked to the system of class exploitation. The consequence . . . is that, [as in the first version], internal colonial relations are not only left obscure but are said to hold between racial, ethnic, and cultural groups which are analysed as if they are autonomous of the total social structure.¹⁶

A third version of the theory arrives at the same result by *assimilating* class relations to race relations. In the programme of the South African Communist Party, for example, "'White South Africa" is identified with the "capitalist state" and the capitalist system, while "non-White South Africa" is identified with "the colony". From this point on the analysis of class relations gives way to the description of White domination and exploitation of Blacks in terms of the internal colonial analogy.¹⁷

Thus the second and third versions of the theory, while purporting to rest on an analysis of class relations of exploitation, fail 'to relate classes *within* racial or ethnic groups to the class structure of society as a whole', and the consequence is that, as in the first version, 'racial or ethnic entities are treated abstractly and as if their internal class structures are irrelevant to their existence as groups and to their political and ideological practices'.¹⁸ The same failing is evident in Rowley's work. While it is a weakness that characterizes his analysis in general,¹⁹ a single example must serve to make the point here. 'A whole system of production', he writes with reference to the Northern Territory pastoral industry,

has been based on the use of 'fit adult males' of a subordinate community as 'units of labour', in a system of production where the gap between work force and management has corresponded to the cultural gap, and has been reinforced by the assumption that all Europeans are of 'managerial', and all 'natives' of labouring rank . . . Nothing indicates more clearly the 'colonial' nature of the society in the north than such arrangements for production.²⁰

Not *all* 'fit adult males', let alone all members of the 'subordinate community' *are* 'units of labour', nor are all Europeans 'managerial'. We are not told how Aborigines who are not 'units of labour' are exploited,²¹ nor is any analysis presented in class terms concerning who exploits them. Here, as elsewhere in Rowley's analysis, Aborigines and Europeans stand in a vaguely defined relationship of 'colonial' domination and exploitation. Their internal class relations, and class relations *between* them, are left

largely unanalysed. The analysis of their ideological and political practices consequently also proceeds with little reference to the class relations in the social formation as a whole.

The Theory of Internal Colonialism and its Rivals

Wolpe demonstrates that

the unexplained autonomy of racial, ethnic, and cultural groups and the obscurity of the relationships between them which [are] the outcome of the theory of internal colonialism, brings this theory within a conceptual framework which is similar to that of the theory of plural society. Despite the very different origins of these theories they suffer from identical analytical limitations.²²

While there are no examples of a systematic application of a plural society model to the Australian situation,²³ it constitutes the dominant approach to the study of race relations in situations brought about by the expansion of capitalism. We might therefore expect an example to materialize and it might be well to point out its limitations in advance.

The intellectual context against which the theory of plural society emerged, was pervaded by structural-functional theory, as elaborated by Talcott Parsons in particular. As David Lockwood has pointed out, Parsons is in agreement with those Marxist theorists who subsume race relations to class relations insofar as he defines

the problem of the Negro American as one of 'lower class status' and [perceives] the solution of this problem as being inextricably bound up with the fate of the whole of the lower class of American society. Parsons, of course, sees the solution in essentially Durkheimian terms: the Negro can be brought into full membership of the societal community through a planned process of 'inclusion' analogous to that which has been achieved more or less spontaneously by other immigrant groups. The key mechanism of such a process of inclusion is the implementation of the 'social' rights of citizenship, which, together with civil and political rights, may be regarded as the substantive conditions of what Durkheim meant by 'organic solidarity'. By making possible their *de facto* rather than simply formal legal opportunity of participation in the larger community, American Negroes will become included within the existing socio-economic system without losing that sense of group identity and cultural distinctiveness which is part of the American pluralistic tradition. Such a change, however, is only part of a wider civic incorporation which is necessary in order to bring 'not only the Negro but the whole lower class into the societal community'.²⁴

Thus, problems of inequality in general are resolved, and conflict kept at a minimum, through a process of inclusion in a consensually based social structure. Not surprisingly, this has been implicitly or explicitly the dominant approach in the literature on Aboriginal-White relations for some time.²⁵

It is not intended to present a thoroughgoing critique of this approach here, but its basic limitations and the directions in which these lead it,

when problems of inequality appear to threaten the stability of the system, might at least be noted. The limitations are, ultimately, ideological in origin. That is to say, the approach, while purporting to offer an explanation of inequality and an analysis of how it can be significantly reduced, actually incorporates a notion of the inevitability and functionality of stratification. Discrepancies in power, status, and economic rewards are seen as important structural devices to enable common goals to be achieved. The notion of 'equality of opportunity' thus becomes, in reality, *a notion of equality of opportunity to become unequal*. A tendency towards meritocracy is predicated, since industrial societies are held to require maximization of individual talent, but it is postulated that pre-industrial modes of allocating roles in the structure have not finally been eradicated. However, this 'cultural lag' theory is not always adequate to the task of explaining the continuation of inequality, co-existing with an ideological commitment to formal equality. This being so, a social and individual pathology model of socially disadvantaged groups is introduced; these are seen as inadequately socialized into the dominant value system. Terms such as 'deprivation', 'cultural deficit', 'cultural difference', 'culture of poverty', are used. Middle-class values, furthermore, are assumed to constitute the consensual value system on which the social order depends. This is done without any examination of the structure of that value system in relation to the power of the hegemonic class, and its ability to manufacture consensus, and mobilize bias, through its control over the means of ideological reproduction. This ultimately rests on its monopoly of the means of coercion. Coercion and power are treated as residual categories not fully integrated into the theoretical structure. *In short, the approach serves to rationalise the status quo.*²⁶

When inequality appears to threaten the status quo, as in America in the 1960s, increasing resort is made to deterministic theories of the position of 'disadvantaged' groups, i.e., their position is seen as basically unchangeable. In a recent withering critique of the 'equality debate' which has been raging in the 'West' since the 1960s, and in America in particular, Charles A. and Bettylou Valentine demonstrate that the controversy 'masks an underlying *agreement* in support of the status quo'.²⁷ All major parties to the debate share the key ideas, that the position of oppressed groups stems from their own weaknesses, and that these alleged deficiencies, whether sociocultural or biosocial in origin (commonly both), are not eradicable in the foreseeable future. 'A consensus has been developing that low status groups suffer from organic damage and dysfunction of the central nervous system',²⁸ as a result both of malnutrition and of socio-psychological deprivation. Socio-cultural determinism, 'represented by such . . . phrasings as "cultural disadvantage" leading to a "cycle of poverty", a "self-perpetuating culture of poverty", and the like',²⁹ is thus being assimilated to neo-determinism of a biological kind. Meanwhile, 'a pair of obvious answers' to questions of inequality continue to be expertly avoided—'that parity among human groups cannot be expected without a radical restructuring of the system

of intergroup relations and that such restructuring will require revolutionary change in all major aspects of society, from control over productive sources to ideology and value patterns'.³⁰ Similar trends are only too evident in the Australian literature.³¹

Thus, structural-functionalist theory, while it does not make the mistake, unlike the versions of the theory of internal colonialism so far reviewed, of asserting or implying the independence and irreducibility of race and ethnicity, *nevertheless fails to relate racial and ethnic inequality to an analysis of class relations of exploitation and domination*. Plural society theory arrives at much the same result.

The theory of plural society is sometimes held to have been 'worked out in explicit opposition to theories that postulate consensus on common values as a prerequisite of social integration'.³² In one respect at least, this seems doubtful. As Wolpe points out, while it was initially claimed that structural-functionalism constituted a *general* sociological theory, it soon became apparent that it could be regarded only as a *specific* model appropriate to those societies—Western Europe and the United States in particular—which were thought to be integrated around a common value system.

By contrast colonial and former colonial societies were seen by Furnivall and later by Smith to be characterized by conflicts, cultural heterogeneity and an absence of common values. Not consensus, but domination is said to be the basis of social order and cohesion in such societies. If consent is the basis of social solidarity in Western societies, then clearly a different 'model' had to be devised for societies held together largely by coercion. At this point 'conflict theorists' enter the stage with various 'theories' of plural society.

... the construction of two quite different models of society in this way [does not imply, however] that some societies are totally free of conflict and bound together solely by consensus, while others are racked with conflict and bound together only by coercion... Thus as Lockwood has pointed out in relation to Parsons: 'The presence of a normative order, or common value system, does not mean that conflict has disappeared, or been resolved in some way. Instead, the very existence of a normative order mirrors the potentiality of conflict'.³³

Some of the major theorists of plural society take the same view. Van den Berghe, for example, does not

believe that much is to be gained by distinguishing plural societies (characterized by political domination of a cultural minority) from societies with plural features and from heterogeneous societies (e.g. those based on class stratification). I prefer to regard pluralism as a variable, and to include cases of stratification based on 'race', caste, estate, or class (class in the corporate sense as distinct from strata) as instances of pluralism, even though the constituent groups share the same general culture. To the extent that classes are corporate groups, they will develop subcultural differences and some class-specific institutional structures (e.g. labour unions and political parties).³⁴

Thus, at one level, the theory of plural society is part of a general attempt to reconcile conflict with consensual models of society, by incorporating a conflict model into structural-functionalist theory.³⁵

Since all societies are characterized by consensus and conflict and 'plural' groups,³⁶ a difficulty immediately arises, however, in deciding to which societies a plural model might be held to be relevant; to those societies with some *degree* of conflict along racial, class, etc. lines? The judgement here can only be an *ad hoc* empiricist one which is not based on any conceptual distinction arising from the theory.³⁷ Some theorists attempt to get around this difficulty by arguing that plural societies represent a different kind of society from those to which a consensualist thesis might properly apply.³⁸ The *salient* groups in plural societies, it is argued, 'are racial, cultural, religious, national but *not* classes or strata',³⁹ but this is simply to beg the question of how and why such groups come to exist and come into conflict with each other; 'to base an analysis on the criteria (race, religion, etc.) by which groups define themselves and the conflict between them is to take as given precisely what requires explanation'.⁴⁰ Or perhaps one can decide to which societies a plural model is appropriate by defining the *nature* of plural groups more rigorously? Such an attempt has led to a conceptualization of a plural society as a society 'segmented into corporate groups' which are incorporated around 'non-complementary but distinguishable sets of institutions'.⁴¹ But this is to assert that the 'institutions, and therefore the groups, operate *independently* of other groups and institutions in the society',⁴² and the question then arises as to the basis on which such groups and institutions might be deemed to constitute a society. Some theorists answer, in effect, that they are held together as a society by the political domination of one of the groups,⁴³ others that they are held together both by political domination and by economic interdependence.⁴⁴ But on what basis can it be maintained that the polity holds them together whereas the economy does not?

Again, once it is argued that the political and the economic institutions do hold the society together despite the plurality of the institutions, how can it be maintained that the other institutional orders remain autonomous? The assertion of institutional 'segregation' and autonomy presses plural theory to its logical conclusion and emphasizes the abstractness of its formulation. This is so since we are asked to understand institutions independently of any relationship outside of their own 'boundaries'.

One result of this is that there is no way in which it can be meaningfully asked (let alone be answered) within this 'theory': how can the development and maintenance of distinguishable institutional practices be explained?⁴⁵

Plural society 'theory' can thus lay little claim to be regarded as anything other than a static schema for the classification of societies along various dimensions.⁴⁶

The discussion in this section of the essay may be summarized as follows: to the extent that the theory of internal colonialism views society

as a composite of class relations and race and ethnic relations, it provides a more satisfactory framework for the analysis of the relationships between racial and ethnic groups than structural-functionalist theory, in that it does not rule out the importance of relations of class exploitation and domination; and provides a more satisfactory framework than the theory of plural society, in that it does not accord racial and ethnic groups sole salience. In that it is unable to explain the relationship between class relations and racial and ethnic relations, however, and consequently tends to treat racial and ethnic groups as if they were autonomous and isolated from class relations, it converges with plural society theory and suffers from the same analytical limitations.⁴⁷ It remains to be seen whether the theory as elaborated and refined by Wolpe overcomes these limitations by providing 'the foundation for an adequate analysis of the internal structure and development of certain social formations'.⁴⁸

The Articulation of Capitalist and Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production

Wolpe attempts to provide such a foundation by locating the concept of internal colonialism within the framework of Marxist theory of the articulation of modes of production. He argues, first, that the notion of exploitation in the literature on internal colonialism is necessarily obscure because exploitation can have only a vague, descriptive meaning with reference to such entities as countries or racial and ethnic groups. If it is to have a rigorous and explicit meaning, it can only express a *production relation*—production of surplus labour and expropriation of this by a social *class*. 'In order to avoid the abstraction involved in treating racial and ethnic groups as undifferentiated and homogeneous', he concludes,

we must think of each group as having a 'specific structure, in particular because of the existence of classes with contradictory interests'. It follows that the concrete social totality is constituted by the complex articulation of class relations within racial or ethnic groups, as well as the relations of classes across these groups, together, we may add, with the ideological and political practices which 'fit' these relationships.⁴⁹

In the second place, he points out:

the concept of colonialism upon which the internal colonial thesis is based is [also] extremely vague and unspecific. In part, this is due to the failure to distinguish between forms of colonial, political, ideological, and cultural domination and modes of imperialist exploitation. In turn this conflation stems from the failure to distinguish differing modes of imperialist economic exploitation with the result that the different forms of colonial domination cannot be explicitly related to different modes of exploitation.⁵⁰

In the literature on imperialism and underdevelopment generally, there has been a tendency until recently to assume

that in the era of capitalist imperialism, exploitation everywhere takes place according to a single invariant mode. There are two variants of this argu-

ment but both contend that capitalist relations have, as Laclau puts it, 'effectively and completely penetrated even the most apparently isolated sectors of the underdeveloped world'.⁵¹

'In fact', Wolpe argues, 'the relationship of capitalist to non- or pre-capitalist modes of production may vary in a number of ways and for different reasons'. It may revolve around:

1. The extraction of commodities in different ways.
2. The extraction, not of the product, but of labour-power. In both these instances the associated political policy is likely to turn on the domination and *conservation* of the non-capitalist societies.
3. In other instances the particular mode of economic exploitation may be accompanied by a policy aimed at or having the effect of *destroying* the non-capitalist societies, such that the producers are 'freed' of the means of production.⁵²

Wolpe attempts to clarify the relevance of this to a discussion of internal colonialism in the following way:

In the course of its development, the capitalist mode of production enters into relationships with other, non-capitalist, systems of production—the very origins of capitalism in the interstices of feudalism testifies to this. Relations with other modes of production first occur within the boundaries of the nation state. First with trade and later with the development of monopoly capitalism and the export of capital, capital increasingly enters into new relationships with other, non-capitalist, modes of production, beyond the borders of the nation-state. These relations, which are exploitative in the strict sense of the term—they involve directly or indirectly the extraction of the surplus from the direct producers—characterize, in general, the period of capitalist imperialism. These relations of imperialism are constituted within a particular context of political domination and are sustained and supported by a mode of ideological and political practice which varies with the mode of exploitation. But, as Lenin pointed out, both imperialism and colonialism undergo historical changes:

Colonial policy and imperialism existed before the latest stage of capitalism, even before capitalism. Rome, founded on slavery, pursued a colonial policy and practised imperialism. But "general" disquisitions on imperialism which ignore, or put into the background, the fundamental differences between socio-economic formations, inevitably turn into the most vapid banality . . . Even the capitalist colonial policy of previous stages of capitalism is essentially different from the colonial policy of finance capital.

In certain conditions of imperialist development, ideological and political domination tend to be expressed not in terms of the relations of class exploitation which they must sustain but in racial, ethnic, national, etc., terms and, in all cases, this is related to the fact that the specific mode of exploitation involves the conservation, in some form, of the non-capitalist modes of production and social organization, the existence of which provides the foundation of that exploitation. Indeed, it is in part the very attempt to conserve and *control* the non-capitalist societies in the face of the tendency of capitalist development to disintegrate them and thereby

to undermine the basis of exploitation, that accounts for political policies and ideologies which centre on culture, ethnic, national and racial characteristics.

In certain circumstances capitalism may, within the boundaries of a single state, develop predominantly by means of its relationship to non-capitalist modes of production. When that occurs, the mode of political domination and the content of legitimating ideologies assumes racial and ethnic and cultural forms and for the same reason as in the case of imperialism. In this case, political domination takes on a colonial form, the precise or specific nature of which has to be related to the specific mode of exploitation of the non-capitalist society.⁵³

He then proceeds to illustrate these points with reference to the South African social formation. There, the relationship of capital to the non-capitalist modes of production has revolved around the extraction of labour-power at a cost below its cost of reproduction, and there, consequently:

the tendency of capital accumulation to dissolve the very relationship . . . which makes that accumulation possible [has been] blocked by the contradictory tendency of capital to conserve the relationship and with it the non-capitalist economies, albeit in a restricted form . . .

The political expression of this imperialist-type relationship [consequently] takes on a colonial form . . . the conservation of the non-capitalist modes of production necessarily requires the development of ideologies and political policies which revolve around the segregation, and preservation and control of African 'tribal' societies. The ideological focus . . . is always necessarily on the 'racial' or 'tribal' or 'national' elements, *precisely because of the 'tribal' nature of what is being preserved and controlled*. So, too, the policies pursued and the laws passed must have the same focus.⁵⁴ [Emphasis added]

The South African social formation, in the period of capitalism, thus constitutes a 'true' internal colonialism in that there is embodied 'within a single nation-state a relationship characteristic of the external relationship between imperialist states and their colonies (or neo-colonies)'.⁵⁵

Wolpe's argument suffers from a number of deficiencies and requires elaboration at certain points.

1. It must be insisted that ideological and political domination are never 'expressed in terms of the relation of class exploitation which they must sustain'. It is the function of ideology rather to mask such relations and in so doing to 'sustain' them.⁵⁶ This masking function may be performed for capital, either by conventional bourgeois juridico-political ideology, or by an ideology focussing on race and ethnicity, or by a combination of both.
2. If the chief defining characteristic of an internal colonialism is that the exploitative articulation of the capitalist mode of production with non-capitalist modes, within the boundaries of a single state, is masked by an ideology focussing on race and ethnicity; then there is no reason why, for internal colonial relations to obtain, capitalism should develop 'predominantly'

by means of its relationship to non-capitalist modes (except in the obvious sense that procurement of much of the land through expropriation or otherwise is necessary for its development). This is a question, as noted earlier, that Wolpe left 'open'. In terms of his own analysis all that is required for internal colonial relations to obtain, is that there *be* an exploitative articulation between capitalist and non-capitalist modes (however marginal or insignificant the latter might be) within a single state which is masked by an ideology focussing on race and ethnicity. Thus there is nothing in his theory which would suggest that it does not have proper application to cases such as the Australian or Canadian or American (Indian-White relations), where non-capitalist modes of production are clearly marginal.

3. The masking, at the ideological and political level, of exploitative relations chiefly in terms of race or ethnicity, is arguably *not* in all cases related to the fact that the specific mode of exploitation involves *conservation* of non-capitalist societies. While it is true that *where* the specific mode of exploitation requires conservation, 'the ideological focus is always necessarily on the "racial" or "tribal" or "national" elements precisely because of the 'tribal' etc. nature of what is being preserved or controlled',⁵⁷ it might equally be true that where the specific mode of exploitation requires the *dissolution* of non-capitalist modes of production the ideological focus is sometimes on the 'racial' or 'tribal' etc. *precisely because of the 'tribal' nature of what is being changed and (in the meantime) controlled*. Exploitation of non-capitalist modes of production in an internal colonial situation will tend to require their dissolution, where they do not produce on any scale suitable products for exchange (as commodities or labour-power) that are directly transferable to the capitalist circuit of production in usable form. Where this is the case, there will be an associated policy of destroying them, and of *resocialising* their agents for entry as sellers of labour-power, into capitalist relations of production. To the extent that this is successful, colonial relationships will tend to dissolve. But while it lasts or where it fails, the ideological focus will be *on that which attempts are being made to change*—the 'racial', 'tribal', etc.—the more so because any resistance to such a programme will be expressed in terms of 'withdrawal' into the security of the 'racial' or 'tribal' group, or in terms of 'nationalism', while failure will be construed as a sign of racial inferiority.
4. Wolpe tells us nothing explicitly about the crucial question raised earlier, concerning when internal colonial relations might be deemed to have ceased. Since an internal colonialism cannot exist unless the capitalist mode of production is in an exploitative articulation with another, it is necessary to ask at what stage the non-capitalist mode may be deemed to have dissolved. We

are not dealing with the 'mode of production' in the narrower economic meaning Marx gave the concept—material relations of production—but in the broader meaning he assigned to it of a complex structure of various levels or instances (economic, political, ideological) in a specific combination in which the economic is dominant only in the last instance.⁵⁸ Hence the process of dissolution is by no means necessarily complete when the 'economy' has been destroyed, or its land-base appropriated, although in the long run the eradication of the economic base creates the preconditions for dissolution of the non-capitalist mode. If the ideological and political instances survive, albeit in a modified form, if the partly dissolved mode of production is still exploitatively articulated with the capitalist mode we still have a case of internal colonialism. (Where we do not, the analysis would proceed in terms of the formation and development of social classes, albeit with a more or less profound racial and ethnic dimension, within the capitalist model).⁵⁹

Internal Colonialism in Australia

What follows is a very preliminary attempt to suggest some of the general lines along which the theory of internal colonialism, thus revised, might provide the basis for a throughgoing structural analysis of the history of Aboriginal-White relations. Particular attention is paid to an explanation of the terms in which the ideological and political domination of Aborigines have been expressed.

Since Aborigines, as hunter/gatherers, produced only a very limited surplus, exploitation could not proceed by extraction of commodities with an associated policy of conservation. With few exceptions, the only commodities Aborigines had to sell were labour-power and the sexual services of women. It is not the case, however, that, as Rowley states, the developing capitalist mode of production required the land and *only* the land.⁶⁰ There was a labour shortage in the capitalist sector virtually throughout the period when the land was expropriated from most Aborigines.⁶¹ *The point is that Aboriginal labour-power was not directly transferable to most sectors of the rapidly developing economy.* Because of their profoundly different socialization—labour in the primitive communal mode of production was expended predominantly in extracting the means of subsistence directly from the land for immediate use (not exchange)—Aborigines found all but pastoral work, and some forms of work associated with maritime extractive industries, uncongenial.⁶² Exploitation could proceed, therefore, only through the dissolution of the Aboriginal mode of production and the resocialization of its agents for entry into capitalist production relations. (We might note that appropriation of accumulated labour in the form, among others, of pastures created by Aborigines through the use of fire was involved in expropriation of the land—the land was as Aborigines made it, not as God made it.⁶³) The dominant ideological and political practice of the state has therefore aimed

at this effect—resocialization.

To the extent that retraining was successful, or believed likely to succeed (broadly speaking down to the 1830s), ideological and political domination, at least at the official level, was expressed less in terms of 'race' and 'ethnicity' than in terms of conventional bourgeois juridico-political ideology. The dominance of such an ideology was necessary, chiefly because it was only in this way that expropriation of the land could be justified, if it had been officially recognized that Aborigines had their own systems of law and government that would have implied that they had some form of title to the land. Since they did not, in the Lockean view of the colonists, improve the land by their labour, they were not entitled to it and should be encouraged to become productive members of society as soon as possible. The main function of bourgeois ideology in this case was to mask, not exploitative relations of production, but the enormity of the expropriation of the Aboriginal means of subsistence—the land. And since, after retraining, Aboriginal labour-power would be exploited in the same way as any other, an elaborate ideology centering on race and ethnicity, which would perform the role of masking super-exploitation of Aborigines *qua* Aborigines was not required (as it was, for example, in South Africa or, to some extent, the Australian pastoral industry at a later date). Of course, had a different mode of exploitation been possible, had labour-power physically produced in the Aboriginal mode been capable of introduction into the capitalist production process in quantity, things might have been very different (as in South Africa, though the smallness of the Aboriginal population would have meant that things would have been different on a smaller scale). In the circumstances, it was simply held that the traditional rights of Aborigines had been superseded; they were British subjects and as such should become 'useful' members of 'society', as labourers, of course, or at most as petty commodity producers.⁶⁴

At first it was thought that Aborigines would voluntarily or 'automatically' enter into production relations. As they failed to do so, except in isolated individual cases, training schemes in institutions of various kinds were initiated. By the 1840s most of these schemes had failed roundingly. The chief reason seems to have been simply that stated by Marx himself in his discussion of primitive accumulation in Europe: 'these men, suddenly dragged from their wonted mode of life, could not as suddenly adapt themselves to the discipline of their new condition'.⁶⁵ Resocialization of the agents of any mode of production is likely to involve more than the first generation, especially where the process is as radical as that involved in resocializing hunter/gatherers as wage-labourers or petty commodity producers⁶⁶ and where the attempt at resocialization has been preceded by conquest and dispossession. The effects of conquest were in any case so far-reaching that many of the schemes failed for want of an Aboriginal population *to* resocialize.

As Aborigines failed to enter into production relations, and retraining scheme after retraining scheme was abandoned (including Governor

Phillip's attempts to retrain Bennelong) there was a growing conviction among the settler community that Aborigines were an inferior people, incapable of 'improvement', and doomed to die out. This conclusion was underlined by the objective process of Aboriginal depopulation and could be supported, if necessary, by appeal to theories of social development, and later of biological evolution, which dovetailed neatly with economic liberalism.⁶⁷ By the 1850s there was a consensus in the colonies that Aborigines were hopelessly inferior and incompetent. This is another way of saying that, since it was no longer believed that Aboriginal labour-power was exploitable through retraining, settler domination had come to be expressed predominantly in terms of 'race'. The liberal political ideology which became hegemonic in the 1850s, was simply held not to apply to Aborigines; an inferior people beyond the pale of liberal society, they could be relied upon to fade away and so not contradict its ideals in any way.⁶⁸

A new tendency in the ideology is noticeable when Aborigines in the southern settled areas began to prove they were not going to fade away. They began to increase (speaking very generally) in the late nineteenth century. As they increased, they were gathered up into reserves and institutions partly for reasons of social control, and partly for yet further attempts at retraining. There was, therefore, a profound ambivalence in the terms in which their ideological and political subordination was expressed. To the extent that it was believed that retraining would succeed, it tended not to be expressed in 'racial' or 'racist' terms; but there was a profound pessimism which tended to vary according to the degree of 'white blood' which the trainees had. A thoroughgoing analysis would discuss the self-perpetuating aspect of social control and training in multi-purpose institutions.⁶⁹ It would also relate the worst periods of such racist pessimism—the 1890s, 1930s, and late 1970s—to structural crises in world capitalism. But suffice it to suggest that the situation did have the characteristics of an internal colonialism. Though ambivalent, the policies pursued and the laws passed to effect control and training, necessarily had a 'racial' and 'ethnic' focus because of the 'racial' and 'ethnic' nature of what was being controlled and changed; people of half or more Aboriginal descent were subject to increasingly rigid and restrictive legislation (until the late 1930s). And one purpose of control and training was that trainees should, ultimately at any rate, become regular sellers of labour-power in the general society. Meanwhile, they performed some of the functions of a colonial migrant-labour force on a casual basis. On some stations or reserves, the following situation obtained:

Work either without wages or for a payment which would fluctuate with the amount available in the station budget inevitably conditioned those who worked 'outside', whilst living on the stations, to accept low wages. Thus on a small scale, even in the settled areas, the station served the purpose of the village or tribal lands in a colony, as a place from which labour could be obtained as required, to which it could be returned when not, and payment for which might make no provision for maintenance of dependants.⁷⁰

While in the southern areas of the continent the development of the capitalist mode of production was accompanied by a policy aimed at *destroying* Aboriginal society, in the northern and central areas it often went hand in hand with a policy of *conservation/segregation*. This was so because in these regions Aboriginal labour-power was exploitable without any extensive retraining. In the more marginal pastoral areas of the Northern Territory, South Australia and Western Australia, conquest and stocking of the land destroyed the basis of the Aboriginal mode of production, but not all important features of Aboriginal social organization as such. Aborigines were forced to enter into an unequal exploitative symbiosis with the pastoralists.⁷¹ In return for labour and the sexual services of women, the 'restructured' communities received most of their means of subsistence; otherwise they were typically left largely to their own resources. In Queensland a different general pattern prevailed. There, Aborigines as defined in legislation, were rounded up and moved to reserves under the control of police protectors, or to missions, and a system of migrant labour with the contract of service and the single-man's wage was evolved.

What is important to note is that in both cases, whether labour was migrant or resident, *employers were relieved of paying a portion of the necessary means of subsistence, and hence acquired labour-power at a cost below its value.*⁷² While the employer, where labour was resident, provided most of the immediate sustenance not only of employees but also of the community as a whole, this was more than offset by the fact that Aborigines were excluded from pastoral awards until 1965/8,⁷³ that the community continued to provide some of its sustenance by traditional methods, and that, until recently, neither the employer nor the state paid any 'indirect' wages (unemployment payments, family allowances, education, health, etc.); nearly all 'social security' functions were performed by the Aboriginal communities themselves. In Queensland, such functions were performed by the state, but paid for largely by Aborigines who received 'single' wages and paid income tax like everyone else:

The Aboriginal wage [in the pastoral and pearling industries or on settlements, which was considerably lower than the award wage] was subject to income taxation. In addition, there were, until 1965, contributions made compulsorily from *gross* earnings to the Welfare Fund, for their own welfare and relief . . . Aborigines received savings bank rates of interest. Additional proceeds from investment seem to have been paid into the Welfare Fund, along with the proceeds of trade stores operated by the Department on the settlements, proceeds from the sale of produce from settlements and reserves and fines.⁷⁴

It is Rowley's opinion that Aborigines were *better* provided for under this system than in the Northern Territory (where there was a lower minimum wage) and than in Western Australia and South Australia (where there was none).

As in South Africa, the political expression of these kinds of production relations necessarily took on a colonial form—ideology and political

policies necessarily revolved around the segregation, preservation and control ('protection') of Aboriginal 'tribal', 'racial', groups.⁷⁵

The shift to the policy of 'assimilation' in the 1930s (in reality the 1950s, since little was effected in practice until then) was not a radical one so far as the southern areas were concerned, where training for enjoyment of 'equal rights' was supposed to have been going on since the late nineteenth century, but it was radical with respect to the northern and central areas. That is to say, what was really new was that the policy of retraining (now supposed to go forward at greater speed) was extended to these areas. Nevertheless, it was probably related to post-war labour shortages and to the increasing manpower requirements of Australian capitalism in the period of secondary industrialization; it is scarcely an accident that the change coincided with the beginnings of the federal government's massive post-war immigration programme. Rowley himself provides an example of the kind of thinking probably involved:

'Northern development' requires efficient use of manpower . . . here is a potential economic asset, of workers who do not require special living allowances to attract them there and whose increased welfare and sophistication can provide an increasing supply of manpower, not only for the areas of the north and centre, but to swell the labour force of the whole country. In doing this they would serve the same national economic purposes as the European migrant but they were potentially more adaptable in the short term.⁷⁶

The pastoral industry and its spokesmen in the Country Party were not strong enough to resist the new initiatives. In any case, the labour policies of the pastoralists had been extremely wasteful. The cost of a system under which Aboriginal communities themselves provided most 'social security' services, had been appalling health and mortality, especially in South Australia, the Northern Territory and Western Australia; exploitation of cheap Aboriginal labour, in spite of reservation of land and other measures aimed at conservation, had tended to undermine the conditions for the reproduction of labour-power.⁷⁷ Rather than assume the burden of indirect wages themselves, pastoralists thought it best that the public at large should do so, even though this would eventually mean payment of award wages to Aborigines in the industry. It was no accident that the leader of the Country Party himself took the initiative in formulating the new policy.⁷⁸ The general strategy of the state arguably remains much the same today.

The comparative history of race and ethnic relations in situations brought about by the expansion of capitalism, is increasingly coming to be written within the framework of a Marxist or neo-Marxist model of the development of capitalism and its articulation with other modes of production. This essay has attempted to locate the history of Aboriginal-White relations within that perspective. This last section, in particular, has necessarily been tentative, and many of the generalizations need to be elaborated in greater detail with reference to the empirical data. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that, while there has recently been an upsurge

of work in the field, most of this has been conducted within an empiricist paradigm. The history of Aboriginal-White relations has lacked a coherent theoretical approach. (It has often *implicitly* employed a structural-functionalist model, in that its guiding assumptions have been ultimately integrationist, but the inadequacies of this approach have been indicated.)⁷⁹ This is not to argue against the need for empirical studies, but to stress that empirical work needs to be guided by an overall theoretical orientation, which it is suggested the theory of internal colonialism adequately provides. Using such a perspective, it is suggested that it would be particularly pertinent to explore the following areas or problems:

1. The analysis provided in this essay might appear to be too mechanistic in that it has not considered sufficiently the Aboriginal response to conditions of exploitation, and the class and ethnic struggles within the Aboriginal community. Further elaboration ought to take into account the strategies of the state in relation to these struggles, in terms of the general theoretical approach suggested.
2. Further analysis of the intersection of class with race and ethnicity, especially at the local and period level, is required. At this level it should be conducted within a comparative perspective, i.e. it should examine the articulation of the modes of production in relation to the different types of capitalist development, and the ideological and political concomitants of this.
3. It is important to examine ideology in relationship not simply to the state, as this last section of the essay has tended to do, but in relationship to different classes affected by the articulation of the modes of production, since while the state may be serving the interests of the capitalist class as a whole, the class interests, struggles and consciousness may reveal interesting variations *vis-à-vis* their relationship with the Aboriginal community.
4. There is a need for comparative structural studies of the role of Aborigines and immigrants in the development of Australian capitalism.
5. There is a need for comparative studies of 'internal' and 'normal' colonialisms, particularly in relation to the historically and regionally different requirements of capital. What is specific about an internal colonialism, particularly now, given the internationalization of capital and the eclipse of the nation-state as a unit of analysis?

Conclusion

It has been argued that the theory of internal colonialism helps to explain, better than the prevailing functionalist mode of assimilation or integration, or than the theory of plural society, the specific terms in which ideological and political domination over Aborigines have been expressed, by relating them to specific modes of exploitation of Aboriginal societies. It also offers the best framework for an analysis of the inter-

section of class with race and ethnicity. The assimilationist model *reflects* the objective long-term tendency of the relationship between the capitalist and primitive communal modes of production, the dissolution of the non-capitalist mode and the subsuming of its agents into capitalist production relations; precisely for this reason it is unable to account for Aboriginal resistance to the tendency, or, except in descriptive and idealist terms, to account for white policies and practices that run counter to it. Unlike the assimilationist model, the theory of internal colonialism offers a satisfactory explanation of the profound duality—class/nation, integration/separation—that has characterised Aboriginal aspirations,⁸⁰ and it locates the history of Aboriginal-White relations adequately in the comparative history of race and ethnic relations.

NOTES

- 1 Harold Wolpe, 'The Theory of Internal Colonialism—the South African Case', in Ivar Oxaal *et al.* (edd.), *Beyond the Sociology of Development: Economy and Society in Latin America and Africa* (London, 1975), p.252.
- 2 Cf. *ibid.*, pp.244, 250.
- 3 The summary is extensive, but this seemed preferable to assuming that readers are familiar with the argument.
- 4 *ibid.*, p.229. The literature on internal colonialism is extensive. See, e.g., Rodolfo Acuña, *Occupied America: The Chicano's Struggle toward Liberation* (San Francisco, 1972); Robert Allen, *Black Awakening in Capitalist America* (New York, 1969); Mario Barrera *et al.*, 'The Barrio as Internal Colony', in Harlan Hahn (ed.), *Urban Affairs Annual Review* 6 (1972); Ronald Bailey, 'Economic Aspects of the Black Internal Colony', in Frank Bonilla & Robert Girling (edd.), *Structures of Dependency* (Stanford, 1973); Robert Blauner, *Racial Oppression in America* (New York, 1972); Stokely Carmichael & Charles V. Hamilton, *Black Power* (Harmondsworth, 1969); G.M. Carter *et al.*, *South Africa's Transkei: The Politics of Domestic Colonialism* (London, 1967); Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, 'Internal Colonialism and National Development', in Irving L. Horowitz *et al.* (edd.), *Latin American Radicalism* (New York, 1969); Julio Cotler, 'The Mechanics of Internal Domination and Social Change in Peru', in Irving L. Horowitz (ed.), *Masses in Latin America* (New York, 1970); Guillermo V. Flores & Robert Bailey, 'Internal Colonialism and Racial Minorities in the U.S.: An Overview', in Bonilla & Girling (edd.), *op. cit.*; Guillermo V. Flores, 'Race and Culture in the Internal Colony: Keeping the Chicano in his Place', in *ibid.*; Eugene Havens & William Film (edd.), *Internal Colonialism and Structural Change in Colombia* (New York, 1970); Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966* (London, 1974); D.L. Johnson, 'On Oppressed Classes', in J.D. Cockcroft *et al.* (edd.), *Dependence and Underdevelopment* (New York, 1972); Joan W. Moore, 'Colonialism: The Case of the Mexican Americans', *Social Problems* 17 (Spring 1970), pp.463-72; J.H. O'Dell, 'Colonialism and the Negro American Experience', *Freedomways* 6 (Fall 1966), pp.296-308, and 'A Special Variety of Colonialism', *ibid.* 7 (Winter 1967), pp.7-14; E. Palma Patterson, *The Canadian Indian: A History Since 1500* (Don Mills, Ontario, 1972); H.J. & R.G. Simons, *Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950*; South African Communist Party, *The Road to South African Freedom* (London, n.d.); Rodolfo Stavenhagen, 'Classes, Colonialism, and Acculturation', in Horowitz (ed.), *Masses in Latin America*; William K. Tabb, *The Political Economy of the Black Ghetto* (New York, 1970).
- 5 Harold Wolpe, *loc. cit.*, pp.230-1.
- 6 C.D. Rowley, *Aboriginal Policy and Practice*, Vol. I, *The Destruction of Aboriginal Society* (Canberra, 1970); Vol. II, *Outcasts in White Australia* (Canberra, 1971); Vol. III, *The Remote Aborigines* (Canberra, 1971). The references Rowley supplies suggest that he was not aware, at the time of writing, of the literature on internal colonialism. While much of the literature is recent, it is possible that he ignored what was available because of his particular ideological stance, which is ultimately integrationist. His work may well be regarded as the Australian counterpart, in important respects, of Gunnar Myrdal's *An American Dilemma*. A detailed analysis and critique of the theoretical assumptions underlying it would constitute a valuable piece of research.

- 7 *Remote Aborigines*, pp.1-3, 14. (Emphasis added).
- 8 See especially *Destruction of Aboriginal Society*, pp.375-6.
- 9 *Outcasts in White Australia*, p.234, citing Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*. The full sentence reads: 'If one might be allowed to adapt to this situation the words of Myrdal about Negro culture in the United States, "In practically all its divergences [Australian part-Aboriginal] culture is not something independent of general [Australian] culture. It is a distorted development, or a pathological condition, of the general [Australian] culture"'.
- 10 *Remote Aborigines*, p.5.
- 11 *ibid.*
- 12 Wolpe, *loc. cit.*, p.233.
- 13 E.g. Blauner, *op. cit.*; Jeffrey Prager, 'White Racial Privilege: An Examination of Theories of Racism', *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 17 (1972/3), pp.117-50.
- 14 Wolpe, *loc. cit.*, p.232.
- 15 *ibid.*, p.233.
- 16 *ibid.*, p.234.
- 17 *ibid.*
- 18 *ibid.*, p.235.
- 19 Ann Curthoys has made a similar point in 'Destruction of Aboriginal Society', *Arena* 27 (1971).
- 20 *Remote Aborigines*, pp.221-2.
- 21 Rowley correctly thinks that they are (indirectly) exploited, in that they bear the cost of the worker's 'old age or illness, of his family, and of the next generation of workers', but he regards this as a question of 'justice', the meaning of which 'will differ according to circumstances [and] point of view'. (*ibid.*, p.222). The law of value is foreign to Rowley's whole approach.
- 22 Wolpe, *loc. cit.*, p.235.
- 23 Some notion of 'plural society', 'pluralism', 'cultural pluralism', etc. is common in the Australian literature but almost invariably in the functionalist sense of 'pluralism as democracy'—an assumption is made of equilibrium and consensus about ultimate values. For an example of how plural society theorists distinguish their theory from 'pluralism as democracy', see Pierre L. van den Berghe, *Race and Racism: A Comparative Perspective* (New York, 1967), pp.145-7.
- 24 David Lockwood, 'Race, Conflict, and Plural Society', in Sami Zubaida (ed.), *Race and Racialism* (London, 1970), p.60, citing Talcott Parsons, 'Full Citizenship for the Negro American', *Daedalus* 94 (1965). For a good Australasian example of the application of the Parsonian concept of 'inclusion' see Erik Schwimmer, 'The Aspirations of the Contemporary Maori', in Schwimmer (ed.), *The Maori People in the 1960s* (Auckland, 1968).
- 25 It was given one of its most explicit expressions in 1951 in A.P. Elkin, 'Reaction and Interaction: A Food Gathering People and European Settlement in Australia', *American Anthropologist* 53 (1951), 164-86. See the literature generally since then.
- 26 See generally P. Bachrach & M. Baratz, *Power and Poverty* (New York, 1970); H. Blumer, 'Industrialisation and Race Relations', in Guy Hunter (ed.), *Industrialisation and Race Relations* (London, 1965); Ralph Dahrendorf, *Essays in the Theory of Society* (London, 1968), Chapter 4, 'Out of Utopia: Towards a Reorientation of Sociological Analysis'; A. Davis & W.E. Moore, 'Some Principles of Stratification', *American Sociological Review* 10, 2 (1945), pp.242-9; Anthony Giddens, "'Power" in the Recent Writing of Talcott Parsons', *Sociology* 2 (1968), pp.257-70; John Horton, 'Order and Conflict Theories of Social Problems', *American Journal of Sociology* 71 (1966), pp.701-13; David Lockwood, 'Some Remarks on "The Social System"', *British Journal of Sociology* 7, 2 (1956), pp.134-46, and 'Social Integration and System Integration', in George K. Zollschan & Walter Hirsch (edd.), *Explorations in Social Change* (London, 1964); Charles A. Valentine, *Culture and Poverty* (Chicago and London, 1968); Dennis H. Wrong 'The Over-Socialized Concept of Man in Modern Sociology', *American Sociological Review* 26 (1961), pp.184-93.
- 27 'Brain Damage and the Intellectual Defense of Inequality', *Current Anthropology* 16, 1 (1975), p.118. (Emphasis added).
- 28 *ibid.*, p.138.
- 29 *ibid.*, p.131.
- 30 *ibid.*, p.137.
- 31 E.g. J.E. Cawte, *Cruel, Poor and Brutal Nations: The Assessment of Mental Health in an Australian Aboriginal Community by Short-Stay Psychiatric Methods* (Honolulu, 1972) and 'Psychological Adjustment to Cultural Change: The Case of the Australian Abori-

- gines', *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry* 3 (1969); G.E. Kearney *et al.* (edd.), *The Psychology of the Australian Aborigines* (Sydney, 1973); Keith R. McConnochie, *Realities of Race: An Analysis of the Concepts of Race and Racism and their Relevance to Australian Society* (Sydney, 1973), e.g. pp.130-1 (note the central position assigned to *BRAIN DAMAGE* in the diagram); Peter M. Moodie, *Aboriginal Health* (Canberra, 1973); B. Nurcombe, 'Deprivation: An Essay in Definition with Special Consideration of the Australian Aboriginal', *Medical Journal of Australia*, 11 July 1970.
- 32 Lockwood, 'Race, Conflict, and Plural Society', *loc. cit.*, p.62. Cf. Malcolm Cross, 'On Conflict, Race Relations, and the Theory of Plural Society', *Race* 12, 4 (1971), pp.477-94.
- 33 Wolpe, *loc. cit.*, p.236.
- 34 Pierre L. van den Berghe, 'Pluralism and the Polity', in L. Kuper & M.G. Smith (edd.), *Pluralism in Africa* (Berkeley, 1969), p.68. Cited in part in Wolpe, *loc. cit.*, p.237.
- 35 This has been one of the main endeavours of van den Berghe. See especially his paper 'Dialectic and Functionalism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis', *American Sociological Review* 28, 5 (1963), and *Race and Ethnicity* (New York, 1970). See also Leo Kuper & M.G. Smith (edd.), *Pluralism in Africa* (Los Angeles, 1969); Leo Kuper, *Race, Class and Power* (Liverpool, 1974). Perhaps the most ambitious attempt to date is R.A. Schermerhorn's *Comparative Ethnic Relations* (New York, 1970).
- 36 Van den Berghe (*Race and Racism*,) distinguishes plural societies from segmentary, undifferentiated societies and from societies with a high degree of functional differentiation in their institutional structure, but the former have everywhere been incorporated into what he would define as plural societies and he fails to give any examples of the latter that do not exhibit 'instances of pluralism', for the good reason that there are none.
- 37 Wolpe, *loc. cit.*, p.237. Cf. van den Berghe, 'Pluralism and the Polity', *loc. cit.*, p.69: 'Of course, in extending the meaning of pluralism, and in failing to distinguish between "pluralism" and "plural societies" there is a risk of stripping the concept of all its analytical power'.
- 38 See especially M.G. Smith, 'Social and Cultural Pluralism', *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 83, 5 (1960), and 'Institutional and Political Conditions of Pluralism', in Kuper & Smith (edd.), *op. cit.*,
- 39 Wolpe, *loc. cit.*, p.237.
- 40 *ibid.*, p.238.
- 41 *ibid.*, citing van den Berghe, *Race and Racism*, p.67.
- 42 *ibid.* (Emphasis added.)
- 43 E.g. M.G. Smith.
- 44 E.g. van den Berghe.
- 45 Wolpe, *loc. cit.*, p.239.
- 46 Cf. Malcolm Cross, *loc. cit.* The main motor of change—industrialisation and urbanisation—which the theorists themselves adduce in analysing race relations situations is extraneous to the theory. Since racist ideology and politics are held to be ultimately independent dynamic forces, this produces some curious results. Thus van den Berghe, e.g., is led to the fantastic conclusion that apartheid in South Africa is 'anachronistic', 'a living political dinosaur'—'it is basically an old-fashioned colonial regime coerced through the dynamics of industrialization into modernizing its repressive apparatus' (*Race and Racism*, p.109).
- 47 Cf. Wolpe, *loc. cit.*, pp.230, 240.
- 48 *ibid.*, p.230.
- 49 *ibid.*, p.241, citing C. Bettelheim, 'Theoretical Comments', in A. Emmanuel, *Unequal Exchange* (London, 1972). See also Geoffrey Kay, *Development and Underdevelopment: A Marxist Analysis* (London, 1975).
- 50 *ibid.*
- 51 *ibid.*, citing E. Laclau, 'Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America', *New Left Review* 67 (1971).
- 52 *ibid.*, pp.243, 250. Cf. John Clammer, 'Economic Anthropology and the Sociology of Development: "Liberal" Anthropology and its French Critics', in Ivaar Oxaal *et al.* (edd.), *Beyond the Sociology of Development...*
- 53 *ibid.*, pp.243-4, citing V.I. Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*.
- 54 *ibid.*, p.249. See also his 'Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid', *Economy and Society* 1, 4 (1972). For an argument that the restructuring of pre-capitalist modes of production in South Africa entailed their destruction, see M. Williams, 'An Analysis of South African Capitalism', *Bulletin of Socialist Economics* (1975). Cf. David Rosenberg, 'Underdeveloped Sociology' (review article), *Sociology* 10, 2 (1975).

- 55 Wolpe, 'Theory of Internal Colonialism', *loc. cit.*, p.248.
- 56 See N. Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes* (London, 1973), Part III.
- 57 Wolpe, 'Theory of Internal Colonialism', *loc. cit.*, p.249.
- 58 See Louis Althusser & Etienne Balibar, *Reading Capital* (London, 1970), Part III, Chapter 1; Maurice Godelier, *Rationality and Irrationality in Economics* (London, 1972).
- 59 Cf. Eugene D. Genovese, *The World the Slaveholders Made* (London, 1969).
- 60 Rowley, *Destruction of Aboriginal Society*, p.16.
- 61 See, e.g., E.L. Wheelwright & K. Buckley (edd.), *Essays in the Political Economy of Australian Capitalism* (Sydney, 1975), vol. 1.
- 62 Rapid conquest and depopulation also inhibited Aboriginal employment in the southern areas.
- 63 See especially Sylvia J. Hallam, *Fire and Hearth: A Study of Aboriginal Usage and European Usurpation in South-Western Australia* (Canberra, 1975), Preamble and *passim*.
- 64 See especially Rowley, *The Destruction of Aboriginal Society*, and Ann Curthoys, *Race and Ethnicity: A Study of the Response of British Colonists to Aborigines, Chinese and non-British Europeans in New South Wales, 1856-1881* (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1973), chapter 1.
- 65 K. Marx, *Capital* (Moscow, 1959), vol. I, p.734.
- 66 Evidence from the Americas in particular suggests that (a) hunter/gatherers adapted less readily to wage-labour or to any kind of regular work than agriculturalists, and (b) the agents of pre-capitalist modes of production were more readily incorporated into feudal than into capitalist social structures.
- 67 See, e.g., M.C. Hartwig, 'Aborigines and Racism: An Historical Perspective', in F.S. Stevens (ed.), *Racism: The Australian Experience*, Vol. 2 *Black versus White* (Sydney, 1972), pp.15-18.
- 68 See especially Ann Curthoys, *Race and Ethnicity*, chapters 1 & 2. Liberal democracy in Australia, as in most other 'new' capitalist societies, was *Herrenvolk* democracy at its inception. Cf. Louis Hartz (ed.), *The Founding of New Societies* (New York, 1964); Pierre L. van den Berghe, *Race and Racism*; George M. Fredrickson, *The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate on Afro-American Character and Destiny, 1817-1914* (New York, 1971).
- 69 On this, see especially Rowley, *op. cit.*
- 70 Rowley, *Outcasts in White Australia*, pp.65-6.
- 71 Hartwig, *loc. cit.*, p.13.
- 72 For elaboration of the concepts involved here, see K. Marx, *op. cit.*, Part III; C. Meillassoux, 'From Reproduction to Production', *Economy and Society* 1, 1 (1972); H. Wolpe, 'Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power', *loc. cit.*
- 73 No cash wage was stipulated at all until the twentieth century when small minimum wages were fixed in Queensland and the Northern Territory. No minimum wage was stipulated in South Australia and Western Australia.
- 74 Rowley, *Outcasts in White Australia*, p.115.
- 75 For a good account of protection/segregation policies, see e.g. C.M. Tatz, 'Commonwealth Aboriginal Policy', *Australian Quarterly* 36, 4 (1964); and 'Queensland's Aborigines; Natural Justice and the Rule of Law', *Australian Quarterly* 35, 3 (1963).
- 76 *The Remote Aborigines*, p.218.
- 77 See e.g. R.M. & C.H. Berndt, *A Northern Territory Problem: Aboriginal Labour in a Pastoral Area* (unpublished manuscript).
- 78 See e.g. A.P. Elkin, 'Aboriginal Policy 1930-1950; Some Personal Associations', *Quadrant* 1, 4 (1957); Rowley, *Destruction of Aboriginal Society*, pp.328-32, *Outcasts in White Australia*, pp.31, 84, *Remote Aborigines*, p.204.
- 79 My own previous work in the field—Hartwig, *loc. cit.*, and especially *The Progress of White Settlement in the Alice Springs District and its Effects upon the Aboriginal Inhabitants, 1860-1894* (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Adelaide, 1965)—suffers from the same limitations.
- 80 This seems to be common to most racial and ethnic minorities in capitalist societies. For a brilliant exposition of the duality involved, see Eugene D. Genovese, *In Red and Black* (London, 1971), chapter 3, 'Class and Nationality in Black America'.

6

UNEQUAL EXCHANGE AND AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN EXPLORATORY INVESTIGATION

DAVID CLARK

There is no branch of economics in which there is a wider gap between orthodox doctrine and actual problems than in the theory of international trade.

Joan Robinson

IN HIS INTRODUCTION to Volume One of these essays, E.L. Wheelwright pointedly remarked on the 'almost total lack of any Marxist based attempts to analyse the development of Australian capitalism', and warned that conventional economics as taught in most Australian universities provided little help towards such a task.¹ Similarly, the efforts of Australian economic historians, despite an upsurge in activity amongst them, are also of limited utility.² Yet although it is relatively easy to deplore the limited use of Marxian analysis and insights by Australian researchers, it is considerably more difficult to offer constructive, viable research programmes, without which no effective challenge to orthodox interpretations of our past can emerge. Historians working in the tradition of Anglo-Saxon empiricism become very restless with any serious discussion of epistemological questions; they demand application of theories, they demand results.³ These demands tend to intimidate potential critics, Marxist or otherwise, to the detriment of a more critical historiography. In the Marxian toolbox there rests a variety of useful aids, but the first task must be to understand these aids and their possible limitations in certain historical projects. An overview and assessment of received notions about our general pattern of development was provided in Volume One of these essays.⁴ In the

present contribution the usefulness of the concept of 'Unequal Exchange'—its origins, its various interpretations, its limitations—will be critically assessed. In doing so, the work of Arghiri Emmanuel will be given special attention in an effort to make his fundamental theses easier to comprehend and to test. No prior apologies are offered for the theoretical emphasis of this essay; it is necessary and unavoidable. Nevertheless, a preliminary attempt is made to relate Emmanuel's work to the economic relationships between Australian and British development over the last century, in the hope of prompting further work in this area.

Too much recent Marxist writing, especially that inspired by the French linguistics *savant* Louis Althusser, tends to obscure its message by limiting the appeal of Marxism to those with a philosophical bent, to those with a penchant for metaphysical jousting.⁵ Most importantly, such writing serves as a poor means of directly confronting received historical research, for the orthodox researcher soon tires of the obsessive use of jargon which the Althusserians hide behind. 'Authorities of the social formation', 'diachronies', and 'synchronics' will not be employed in what follows. Deliberate obfuscation will be avoided and it is hoped that the reader will be assisted by the notes and bibliographical guidance provided. The most enlightening analysis is not always the simplest; if the problem at hand is multi-faceted and involved, its understanding necessitates patience and rigour. Those readers with some background in Marxian economics and in orthodox international trade theory will find the going easier; those without such an advantage will hopefully not be deterred. It is too often forgotten that Marx's interest in political economy was something that developed after his undergraduate days, and that he spent the rest of his life trying to compensate for his earlier ignorance of the discipline.⁶

Ricardo, Marx and Emmanuel

Arghiri Emmanuel's *Unequal Exchange* first appeared in French in 1969, although there had been explicit discussion of its major themes amongst French-speaking Marxists for some years before.⁷ It was not until 1972, when an English translation appeared, that these debates attracted attention amongst Anglo-Saxon scholars. But even since then, only limited attention has been paid by such scholars to his challenge compared with the interest shown by their French and Italian counterparts.⁸ Particularly interesting is the fact that the doyen of neo-classical economics, P.A. Samuelson, Nobel Prize winner and textbook entrepreneur *extraordinaire*, has recently given serious attention to the book in his postgraduate seminars. This should in itself arouse the curiosity of all types of economist; Samuelson's *imprimatur*, reactionary as it may be, is rarely given to writers outside the neo-classical camp. The effect of Samuelson's interest has been to encourage orthodox international trade theorists to try to grapple with known alternatives to Ricardo's theories of comparative advantage. One internationally recognised trade theorist has even written a paper which appears to be an attempt

to prove that the existence of imperialism is logically impossible! It is thus important to explain why the orthodox theorists have shown such interest in Emmanuel's work and to show how his work constitutes a challenge to orthodox international trade theory.

The clearest and most concise statement of Emmanuel's target is contained in the opening paragraph of *Unequal Exchange*:

When we look back over the history of economic doctrines during the last 150 years or so, we are struck by the brilliant race that has been run by the theory of comparative costs. In a branch of learning in which hardly anyone agrees with anyone else, either in space or in time; in which practically nothing is generally accepted and each generation of scholars changes academic truths into paradoxes and paradoxes into classical rules; in which everything is various and contradictory, up to and including the categories and concepts employed, so that even discussion itself becomes impossible for lack of a common language—David Ricardo's famous proposition emerges from the fray as a truth that is unshakable, if not in its applicability and scope, then at least in its foundations.⁹

To appreciate Emmanuel's message requires at least a cursory understanding of the history of the theory of international trade. In *Unequal Exchange*, he provides a useful and enlightening discussion of this history which serves as a most essential prologue to his own work. In fact the concept of 'unequal exchange' is meaningless taken out of the context of this historical setting; just as one cannot study Marx without studying Ricardo, so one cannot begin to appreciate Emmanuel without such a background. It was correct and inevitable that Marx's followers would try to widen his model of capital accumulation so as to include foreign trade; to try to show the economic importance of colonial involvements. Rosa Luxemburg in her debate with Lenin on imperialism stressed the importance of colonies in providing new markets for the ever increasing output of the more industrialized powers, thereby enabling the capitalist to 'realize' his return from his exploitation of wage labour. In her work, and in the work of Nikolai Bukharin, is the concept of an 'unequal exchange' between the capitalist, industrialized economy and the colony or dominion.¹⁰ The concept was further developed, and in a most challenging way, by E.A. Preobrazhensky in his contributions to the 'Soviet Industrialization Debates of the 1920s', where he suggests that the only way the infant Soviet could accumulate the capital needed for rapid industrialization was *via* an 'unequal exchange' between the 'socialist' State sector and the 'capitalist' peasant economy. But this is not the place to pursue this interesting digression.¹¹ In the simplest terms, Emmanuel's case against orthodox predecessors rests on their failure to make international trade theory more in accordance with reality, their failure to acknowledge the *mobility* of both capital and labour. The result is the orthodox view that it is the prices of commodities entering into foreign trade which determine the return to their producers and not *vice versa*; that it is the yield of man's economic activity which determines his earnings, it is not his earnings which determine the yield of

his activity. This view rests on foundations provided by David Ricardo which must be briefly sketched here, to permit further elaboration of Emmanuel's critique of Ricardian comparative advantage.

Ricardo's famous example in terms of two countries, England and Portugal, each producing both wine and cloth, is to be found in almost every economics textbook. It rests on certain key assumptions, the most important being that there is a constant amount of labour in each country which can be transferred from one type of production to the other without difficulty or loss, and that constant returns prevail for both commodities right up to full employment of the whole labour force. Because output per head of wine in Portugal relative to output per head of cloth is greater than in England, then total output is increased when trade permits labour to be moved into production of wine in Portugal and cloth in England. Of special importance to Emmanuel is the fact that this model does not weigh one against the other, the costs of production of a commodity in two different places, but the differences between the costs of production of two commodities in each of the countries concerned.¹² Even more important is that Ricardo's model merely demonstrates that irrespective of what actual prices may be, the international division of labour will be advantageous to the exchanging parties in general and to each other separately. The question which is of vital concern to Marxist scholars and to most underdeveloped countries today, namely the proportion in which the trading nations will share the advantage gained by their exchange, did not concern Ricardo. To him and his disciples, this distribution, as with price itself, is determined by subjective forces which are outside the powers and assumptions of his analysis. This point deserves further elaboration if Emmanuel's model is to be properly understood.

Emmanuel acknowledges that there has been considerable development of Ricardo's model, that many of its key assumptions have come under close scrutiny and some even modified. But to him the most important question is whether it is costs that determine value or whether value determines cost. With the 'Marginal Revolution' of the 1870s, and with Walra's contribution in particular, came a reverse approach to the determination of costs and prices. Prices were not considered to be determined by costs; costs were determined by price. This allowed neo-classical theorists to reject the general conclusion of the classical theory of value, that commodities are exchanged in terms of the quantities of the factors of production incorporated in them, while still retaining the law of comparative costs. In other words, in neo-classical international trade theory, costs no longer coincide with the quantities of the factors used up in their production, because the factors are no longer competitive between countries (assuming benefits of trade have been maximized). Ricardian and Marxian theories of distribution can therefore be avoided. Prices are the product of supply and demand forces, with the theory of comparative costs merely setting limits on price fluctuations. The upper limit is the price beyond which it is preferable for a country to produce

the would-be imported commodity itself, and this limit corresponds to the lower limit of the exported article (and *vice versa*), since it is assumed that imports are paid for by exports. Within these limits the precise rate of exchange is fixed by the respective intensities of consumer needs for each commodity. In contradistinction to this approach, Emmanuel sets out to demonstrate that once we leave a two commodity world analysis, or we vary the size of the trading partners, prices are then completely predetermined by the relations between costs, and not by demand forces. The manner in which the distribution aspect of Ricardian comparative advantage was excised from the original model by neo-classical theorists—by replacing a labour theory of value with a neo-classical one—helps to explain why Ricardo's contribution to trade theory has outlived in general acceptance most other aspects of his analytical contribution to economics.

A major inadequacy of Emmanuel's potted history of the theory of international trade is his failure to outline clearly the mechanism by which Ricardo argued trade would be balanced in the long run. Of great importance to Ricardo's case against the Corn Laws which inspired his work, Ricardo's theory of profit argues that the rate of profit on capital is dependent upon the labour cost of producing the necessary real wage. Thus if the imported commodity is a wage good, trade will have the effect of increasing the rate of profit. Trade is balanced under the assumption of a different rate of profit in the two trading countries, whereas within each country the rate of profit would tend to equalize between regions as supply and demand pressures come into play. In Ricardo's own words:

Experience, however, shews that the fancied or real insecurity of capital, when not under the immediate control of its owner, together with the natural disinclination which every man has to quit the country of his birth and connexions, and intrust himself with all his habits fixed, to a strange government and new laws, check the emigration of capital. These feelings, which I should be sorry to see weakened, induce most men of property to be satisfied with a low rate of profits in their own country, rather than seek a more advantageous employment for their wealth in foreign countries.¹³

More recent developments of the law of comparative advantage have not provided a very satisfactory explanation of why trade between countries should balance. As Joan Robinson put it, the most famous English neo-classical, Alfred Marshall, 'only succeeded in producing a degenerate version of Ricardo's model' and he had little excuse for not discussing the possible effects of different rates of profit in the separate trading countries, writing as he did when the sentiments so well expressed above by Ricardo, were certainly not those of British capitalists of Marshall's day, in the era of the golden age of British overseas investment. Robinson is even more scathing in her criticism of post-Marshallian developments—'Samuelson's version of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory is still more degenerate'¹⁴—and like Emmanuel, she deplores the failure

of theorists to adjust their theories adequately to changes in capitalism since 1817, when Ricardo's *Principles* appeared. Robinson's own work has qualified her as a most constructive critic, but her theoretical thrust against orthodox trade theorists is different from that of Emmanuel; and lest it be thought that Emmanuel's work is the only substantive critique available of orthodox trade theory, some brief comments are necessary here on the 'Cambridge' or neo-Ricardian challenge to such theory. By refuting neo-classical claims that 'rewards to the factors of production' (in other words the distribution of income) are purely the product of market forces, and by demonstrating that there is no such thing as 'capital' which can be quantified without a prior knowledge of prices (and hence of income distribution), the neo-Ricardians led by Piero Sraffa¹⁵ have reminded economists of the need to consider the political element in the distribution of income between classes and nations. The full implications of this challenge remain to be fully enunciated, but promise to challenge seriously the way in which orthodox economists and economic historians look at development.¹⁶ Thus Emmanuel's work and the neo-Ricardian contribution constitute a potential double-handed assault on the theoretical foundations of much orthodox scholarship.

The most glaring contrast between the supporters of the law of comparative advantage and the reality of world trading developments since the law was first enunciated by Ricardo, has been the failure of the terms of trade (the prices at which goods are bought and sold) to follow the course usually predicted for them. Central to Ricardo's prediction of a falling rate of profit and hence the likelihood of a 'stationary state', was his belief that the price of primary products would rise steadily, making wages high and thus depressing profit levels. He was joined by J.S. Mill and most other classical economists; as Emmanuel puts it, they all 'arrived at forecasts that were absolutely contrary to what happened—unreservedly pessimistic as regards the prices of manufactured goods and unhesitatingly optimistic as regards the prices of primary products'.¹⁷ His complete list, and one well documented, includes Marx, Marshall, Bukharin and even Keynes. More recent predictions by Colin Clark in 1942 suggested that, by 1960, the terms of trade for primary products would improve by 90 per cent when compared with 1925-1934 levels.¹⁸ Such a prediction, like so many others, was cruelly refuted by fact.¹⁹ Attempts made by modern theorists to explain these trends, with much discussion of demand elasticities, are, according to Emmanuel, 'merely so many rationalizations constructed for the needs of the cause by writers who are in confusion before a phenomenon that they had not foreseen and that is inconvenient for them'.²⁰ The main defect of these demand studies is that they mistakenly identify the exports of the wealthy country with the export of manufactured goods, and the exports of the poor countries with the export of primary products. To cite an example, Emmanuel notes how textiles, once the backbone of British export trade, have now become a speciality of poor countries,

and he asks whether at the moment when the change of location of this industry took place there occurred a reversal in the elasticities of demand. This point leads Emmanuel to state what is in his opinion the most fundamental question of his work:

Are there really certain products that are under a curse, so to speak; or is there, for certain reasons that the dogma of immobility of factors prevents us from seeing, a certain category of countries that, whatever they undertake and whatever they produce, always exchange a large amount of their national labour for a smaller amount of foreign labour?²¹

Emmanuel's theoretical attempt to answer this question is a rejection of the view that international trade is the Achilles heel of the labour theory of value; instead he argues that only by utilizing Marx's value theory can we explain trends in international trade that have been unsatisfactorily explained by work based on the law of comparative advantage. He has taken up the challenge, thrown down by the prominent orthodox theorist Bertil Ohlin, to develop Marx's theory towards this end, and this helps make the book of special interest.

Emmanuel chastises not only orthodox economists for not successfully challenging Ricardo's hegemony, but Marx and his followers as well. It is well known that Marx fully intended to include in *Capital* a comprehensive discussion of international trade theory but this intention was frustrated by illness, and finally by death. One of the ironies of the history of Marxian scholarship is that in an area where Marxists were later to have much to say, Marx himself provided limited direct guidance. Emmanuel sees this long-standing hiatus and valiantly tries to remove it. Yet unlike most other Marxists as will be explained below, he does not use capital migration as his starting point. Instead he commences with the theory of surplus value in a search for the determinants of international values, and in doing so he must rely heavily on the complex debates that have been engendered by Marx's development of Ricardian value theory. However, the failure of Marxists to use a similar starting point in discussing imperialism is not his only critique. Marx himself must be criticized for not seeing the importance of capital and labour mobility and their consequent effects on international prices, particularly as it was in the period immediately before the 'imperialist epoch' that such mobility was greatest. Marx's followers, as well as the orthodox economists, deserve condemnation for not recognizing the growing contradictions between the assumptions of Ricardian comparative advantage and reality:

From Quesnay onwards economists have worked on models constructed according to a noble logic and carried on as though the real world did not exist. They have reasoned as much as the mind could possibly wish, but they can no longer claim to *know*, in the sense that the veterinary or the electronics expert knows. From this time onward the laity have no longer been obliged to stay quiet and listen in the way they do with those who *know*. Political economy has ceased to be a respectable science.²²

Yet *Unequal Exchange* is much more than just a critique of orthodox theory. It is a particularly interesting and challenging book because its critique rests on radically different theoretical foundations, which automatically raise a number of important questions crying out for empirical testimony. Before this is possible, though, a serious effort must be made to understand his alternative theoretical foundations, and the criticisms that have been made of them by his fellow Marxist scholars. Having discussed Emmanuel's position *vis-à-vis* his predecessors, we are now in a position to delineate his alternative model.

The Unequal Exchange Process

To those familiar with orthodox international trade theory, a simple way of categorizing the most distinctive feature of Emmanuel's alternative model, would be to see it as resting on the assumption of capital mobility. This does a disservice to the model, though, as one can speculate on the effects of capital mobility, without adopting Emmanuel's attempt to extend the labour theory of value to the international plane. To reiterate the basic themes of the previous section, the two main hypotheses of the law of comparative advantage which Emmanuel specifically sets out to replace are first, the immobility of labour and capital, and second, the idea that prices are determined by market forces. Ricardo believed that wage levels (the price of labour) are determined by a level of minimum subsistence for workers, which could differ from country to country according to climatic differences, but such wage disparities were not a product of foreign trade or of prices of traded goods. To him the only factor whose price could vary from country to country in accordance with the return from foreign trade, was capital. Thus any consideration of the advantages or disadvantages of foreign trade would be reflected in the rate of profit on capital. The price of labour to Ricardo was an exogenous price. Marx on the other hand replaced Ricardo's theory of wages with one that placed class struggle at the centre of wage determination and income distribution. But, as explained above, most modern trade theorists since the 'Marginal Revolution' have rejected both these theories of the determination of the price of labour. 'Modern' reasoning in simple terms goes something like this: the state of international demand determines the prices of export products, the prices of these products determine the level of national revenue; the level of the national revenue (the total of factor earnings), together with the relative scarcities of these factors, determine the distribution of revenue, and therefore, finally wages and profit. Prices are the given variable, factor earnings are merely the effect. Emmanuel turns this causality upside down: the price is no longer the given variable and the wage unknown; he makes the wage given and the price the unknown. The result is a maxim that illustrates the implications of this reversed causality: '*One is not poor because one sells cheaply, one sells cheaply because one is poor*'.²³

To justify this position, Emmanuel stresses two important historical developments which have had the effect of making wage levels in all

countries more rigid. One is the development of trade unionism in the developed countries, which reduced the responsiveness of wage levels to market forces, especially when it came to downwards pressure on wages; the other is the increased mobility of capital, which has tended to equalize the rate of profit on the international plane. But by equalization Emmanuel does not mean that the rate of profit is the same everywhere.²⁴ This equalization has prevented wage disparities from being passed on to profits; it prevented low-wage countries from counterbalancing low wages by high profits, in order to retain within the country the extra surplus value extracted from the workers. Instead, this surplus has been increasingly 'removed' to the benefit of consumers in the more developed countries. As the terms of trade continue to worsen (ignoring short-run fluctuations like the recent oil price rise) against the less developed countries, the transfer of surplus will also increase, *via* the widening gap between wage levels in the centre and the periphery countries. The internationalization of the rate of profit prevents the differences in wage levels being passed on to national profits, forcing only one conclusion: that the centre countries exploit the periphery countries not primarily through investment and profit repatriation, but through the mechanism of trade:

Once triggered, this process becomes cumulative. Low wages give rise to a transfer of value from backward countries to the advanced countries and this loss reduces, in its turn, the material potential of a future improvement in their wages. It provides, on the contrary, recipient countries with the necessary potentiality for employers' concessions which further widen the gap between national wages. This widening of the gap worsens the inequality of exchange, and eventually the resulting value transfers. The poorer one is, the more exploited one is, and the more exploited one is the more impoverished one becomes: as in the relations between proletarians and capitalists within a nation, likewise between countries; poverty conditions exploitation and exploitation reproduces through its effects its own condition.²⁵

For those readers familiar with Marxian economics the process described above can be illustrated by the use of the accompanying table.

Branch or country	C	V	S	Value	Rate of profit	Price of production
A	240	60	60	360		375
B	120	60	60	240	25%	225
	360	120	120	600		600

If the wages(v) rise by one third in A, all other things remaining equal, the scheme becomes:

A	240	80	40	360		384
B	120	60	60	240	20%	216
	360	140	100	600		600

The inequality of exchange can then be expressed by:

$$\frac{384}{216} > \frac{375}{225}$$

The use of Marx's prices-of-production schema puts Emmanuel on rather unstable ground, for he is forced to enter into the famous 'Transformation Problem' debate begun by E. Boehm-Bawerk and developed by L. von Bortkiewicz at the turn of the century.²⁶ Space limitations prevent a detailed discussion of the implications of this particular debate for his model, but suffice it to point out that Emmanuel's appendix on the problem itself is a valuable discussion of the issue.²⁷ A serious critical examination of Emmanuel's work really requires a concentrated foray into this area, as does any analytical discussion of the labour theory of value. It is hoped that the reader will be encouraged to pursue this matter in response to these comments. For those familiar with the 'Transformation Problem', the basic difference between Marx's analysis and Emmanuel's is as follows. To Marx, the transfer of values from economies with high rates of exploitation to economies with lower rates was necessitated by differences in the organic composition of capital ($\frac{C}{V}$), by different rates of exploitation, but for the sake of analysis he assumed that wage rates were equal. Emmanuel, on the other hand, is stressing that the different rates of exploitation are the result of differences in respective wage rates. Despite his acknowledgement of the difficulties which the 'Transformation Problem' raises for his model, Emmanuel does not provide a very satisfactory solution; most importantly his approach leads him to ignore the role of capital in unequal exchange and it results in considerable confusion. This limitation is especially important when it comes to empirical application of his model. He fails to distinguish adequately between real wages, the value of wages and the rate of surplus value²⁸; and his model assumes technological equality between trading partners, which clearly conflicts with past and present realities. Ricardo's famous search for an absolute, invariable standard of measurement of value, which began the 'Transformation Problem', raises a fundamental problem for Emmanuel. Namely, what units of measurement can one use in tracing trading flows? Emmanuel, in holding tightly to 'labour power' measures, makes such measurement a difficult process. Piero Sraffa's 'Standard Commodity' solution to Ricardo's unsuccessful search would be more useful here, and offers greater hope for precise empirical application of the Emmanuel model. Most interestingly, Emmanuel in his latest paper has provided a version of his model in Sraffian terms, which helps him circumvent the 'transformation' hurdle,²⁹ and some readers may react sympathetically to the following comments of Thorstein Veblen, the arch iconoclast and critic of orthodox economics:

The feint which occupies the opening paragraphs of the *Kapital* and the corresponding passages of *Zur Kritik*, etc., is not to be taken seriously as an attempt to prove his (Marx's) position on this head (the labour theory

of value) by the ordinary recourse to argument. It is rather a self-satisfied superior's playful mystification of those (critics) whose limited powers do not enable them to see that his position is self-evident.³⁰

As has been shown above, Emmanuel's model has Marx's theory of value as its main inspiration but it is rather surprising to find him giving only passing attention to Arthur Lewis,³¹ whose ideas bear considerable resemblance to those expounded by Emmanuel. In his famous 1954 *Manchester School* article, 'Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour', Lewis drew attention to two phenomena that are central to Emmanuel's work. The first concerned the existence of capital movement from countries with labour surplus and subsistence-level wages, to countries with higher wages: 'Many capitalists residing in surplus labour countries invest their capital in England or the United States'.³² This is important to Emmanuel's claims about the mobility of capital and the tendency for rates of profit to equalize, for it shows a two-way process of capital movement, which serves as some embarrassment to adherents to a simple Leninist model of imperialism based on investment. Emmanuel should be respected for accepting the reality and for trying to fit it into a Marxian framework. Of even more importance is Lewis's questioning of the traditional view that wages in the export sector follow the fluctuations in world prices. He asks how much wages can rise, in the face of increased demand, if the country possesses an almost unlimited reserve of surplus labour power in the self-subsistence sector. For once industrial wages reach a level where the peasant can purchase with them more goods than he can purchase from his land in his village, then he will become a factory worker. In these circumstances, Lewis argues, the wage paid in the export sector, irrespective of worker demand and the productivity of the sector, will in fact be governed by the amount of produce that a man can extract from the soil under the conditions of low productivity that typify subsistence agriculture. Emmanuel rightly points out the long history of this approach, used by Malthus in discussing the comparative wage levels and soil fertilities of Europe and America, and later by the heretic Silvio Gesell.³³

Emmanuel's differences with Lewis rest on the specificity of the latter's model; it is limited to cases where a low-yield self-subsistence sector is present—'dualistic economies'. Differentiation in wages to Emmanuel is not simply a product of the forces Lewis describes; and more important, Emmanuel is especially concerned with the question of who gets the benefit of the wage differences between countries. To him, 'unequal exchange' occurs only when the foreign consumer receives the benefit, when he receives goods with a higher labour content than the goods he has helped to produce and export. Emmanuel has undoubtedly received inspiration from Lewis; but in developing the phenomenon described and relating it to the labour theory of value and the possibility of profit equalization, Emmanuel's work can and should be differentiated from Lewis's.

As he is describing a process, Emmanuel has apparently been reluctant

to offer a 'simple' definition of 'unequal exchange'. The first attempt he provides is unnecessarily confusing and difficult:

Regardless of any alteration in prices resulting from imperfect competition on the commodity market, unequal exchange is the proportion between equilibrium prices that is established through the equalization of profits between regions in which the rate of surplus value is 'institutionally' different—the term institutionally meaning that these rates are, for whatever reason, safeguarded from competitive equalization on the factors market and are independent of relative prices.³⁴

A superior definition appears in his confrontation with Charles Bettelheim, a confrontation which takes up almost the second half of *Unequal Exchange*:

My entire study of unequal exchange is based on the premise that in exchange it is not the incomes of the producers that depend on the relative prices, but the relative prices that depend on the incomes of the producers, that is, on the predetermined 'income' of the labour factor, since the income of the capital factor is only a residue, and whatever incomes of other factors there may be result merely from the redistribution of this residue.³⁵

Far superior to both these is one he refined for a critical Anglo-Saxon audience during a visit to the University of Sussex; at last we are given something to hang our analytical hats on:

If the wage is exogenous (an institutional, independent variable), and if a tendency exists for the formation of a general international rate of profit, then any autonomous variation in the wage rate in one branch or in one country will entail a variation in the same direction of the respective price of production and a variation in the opposite direction of the general rate of profit.³⁶

This passage can be expressed in a slightly different manner, but one which further clarifies the issue. At any point in time the sum of wages and profit in the international sphere is a particular magnitude; a change in wages in a particular country will in turn affect in an opposite direction the world total of profit, and also therefore the profit in the country in which the wage variation took place. However, the variation in total profits is distributed amongst all countries and only part of it may affect the products of the country in which the wage variation occurred. At the same time an equivalent but opposite variation of wages is passed on in its entirety to these products alone. As a result, the relative prices of these products will vary in the same direction as that of the supposed variation of wages, with the general rate of profit varying in the opposite direction. (Reference to the numerical example provided above of the Marxian scheme of prices of production may make this process clearer.)

Finally, before turning to the question of the applicability of the Emmanuel model to the Australian development experience, some recognition of the polemical heat the book has generated within the Marxist camp is in order. The point as to whether the worker in the more advanced country exploits his counterpart in the less developed country is the most controversial political implication of *Unequal Ex-*

change; it is over this that the most polemical debate has occurred. More orthodox Marxists such as Charles Bettelheim and Michael Kidron categorically reject such a conclusion for its divisiveness to the notion of international class struggle, and for its implicit policy suggestion that all that is needed to eliminate imperialism is a readjustment of prices and wages. Readers are urged to consult the Emmanuel-Bettelheim debate in *Unequal Exchange*, but Bettelheim's general position is best summarized in the following passage:

... his book offers what seems to me the most radical 'criticism' that can be made of the conclusions of political economy regarding the effects of international trade between countries that are at unequal levels of development, as long as one limits oneself to theoretical positions that are still 'precritical'—which does indeed ensure that one is 'listened to' by all economists. Thus this book seems to me to set out, within the 'precritical' domain, the most advanced conclusions on international trade that can be arrived at while keeping within this domain.³⁷

This kind of attack has been further developed by other commentators, especially in French journals. It raises interesting epistemological questions which cannot be ignored but deserve much deeper discussion than is possible here. Essentially the main thrust against Emmanuel is that he is guilty of not *explicitly* utilizing historical materialism in his analysis. To quote his most vituperative critic, S. Amin: 'Economistic Marxist economics has led to dealing with the trends of the system in mechanistic, unilateral terms ... These are false debates which come to an end once they are placed in their proper content: defined not by economics but by historical materialism'.³⁸ To Amin the 'unequal exchange' debate is 'closed', as is the much older 'Transformation Problem' debate, once 'economistic Marxism' is seen to be 'Ricardian' and 'vulgar'. Such a position appears to be aimed at destroying any possibility of direct confrontation with orthodox theory. It is much easier for Samuelson and the like to ignore Amin's discussions of historical materialism than Emmanuel's more direct assault on a crucial tool in the orthodox economist's toolbox. These teleological purists conveniently overlook the fact that Marx himself realized the need to fashion his material for a wider audience, and the pamphlets he produced with Engels's help became invaluable introductions to Marx's political economy. One gets the very strong feeling that those who hide behind slogans of 'social relations of production' and other fashionable jargon are either incapable, or afraid, of confronting the orthodox economists on their own ground. Instead they stand aloof and say, 'we will only debate if you come into our battle-field'—a safer and intellectually easier position, but one Marx never believed in. His 2,000 or more pages on Ricardo illustrates this only too clearly. In this atmosphere, Emmanuel deserves special praise for attempting to fashion his argument in a way that enables confrontation; in a way that has at least forced acknowledgement of his challenge.

Nevertheless, for those unfamiliar with Marxian economics and the history of economic thought, *Unequal Exchange* is a miasma; it is hoped

that the lengthy discussion of the Emmanuel thesis provided in this essay has provided some pathways into this complex world for the interested reader. To summarize Emmanuel's theoretical contribution: 'Unequal Exchange' is implicit in the famous 'Transformation Problem' of *Capital*; it is implicit in the possible stable coexistence of different branches of production, with different internal structures (or organic compositions of capital) but with similar rates of profit. Its relevance to the analysis of relations between developed and backward regions has been seen by numerous Marxists before Emmanuel. What is new about Emmanuel's use of the concept is the mechanism he uses to illustrate the phenomena, the quality and clarity of his discussion of the mechanism, and the controversial political conclusions that follow from his work.

The Emmanuel Model and Australian Experience

The utility of the Emmanuel model for explaining Australian development experience should be examined on two separate levels: the first involves general questions which his distinctive approach to trade analysis raises, the second involves an attempt to verify empirically his more precisely posited relationships between key variables. Application of his model to Australian experience, even on the most superficial level, appears to offer useful insights for a country whose development by any criterion has been heavily influenced by foreign trade. One of the few extensive debates amongst Australian economic historians in recent years revolved around the applicability of a particular theory of international trade to the Australian development case. 'Staple theory' emphasizes the vital role that the successful development of viable export commodities plays in the growth process; it attempts to show how the choice of a particular staple or staples can exert wide influence on the general course of development. Begun by J.W. McCarty,³⁹ the staple theory debate raised a number of interesting questions, but a general consensus of opinion emerged that by itself staple theory does not provide a complete theoretical explanation of why Australia developed when and how it did. Most importantly for our purposes, staple theory rests on the kind of assumptions which, Emmanuel argues, poorly reflect reality and on which the Cambridge debates in capital theory have cast very serious analytical doubts.

Emmanuel's special emphasis on capital mobility and the consequential equalization of profit process does find some reflection in Australian historical experience. For example by the late 1880s, after a period of heavy capital inflow, the confidence of British investors in Australian colonial loans was so high that interest rates were almost as low as those on the safest domestic loans, British government consols. This occurred at the height of the Long Boom but it nevertheless illustrates a phenomenon that Emmanuel rightly argues is not adequately represented in most orthodox trade theory. Similarly, Emmanuel's opposition to neo-classical trade theory can be supplemented by pointing out that such tools as staple theory utilize the aggregate production function, a con-

cept that a growing number of neo-classical economists are refusing to continue to use and which the Cambridge School jettisoned over twenty years ago.⁴⁰ Given this situation of challenge, of theoretical ferment, Emmanuel's work can serve to clarify which tools are the best to be applied to Australian experience.

In support of his general thesis, Emmanuel briefly discusses the comparative development experience of the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa and asks why the last of these has only achieved a national income per capita well below that of the others, despite her more than comparable natural resources. All were tied to the same mercantile and financial networks, all were connected with the same source of capital; and 'All five were colonized by men of the same northern stock, tough and fearless'.⁴¹ The only difference he sees is the treatment of the indigenous population. Because the South African indigenes could not be 'eliminated' as easily as their brothers in the other four countries, average wages have remained low despite the affluence of the small minority white population. It would thus be to the whites' advantage, to take a purely hypothetical case, to exterminate the Bantus and replace them with white, high wage labour. Gold production (and presumably also diamonds) would be hit severely, but Emmanuel argues that the drastic cut in world supply would force an increase in the world price of gold more than enough to cover the increased cost of production brought about by the increased wages paid to the substitute white workers.

To give another example, why did North America achieve so quick and great a dominance over Latin America, when the climatic conditions and natural resources are not so different? Emmanuel argues that the answer basically lies in the fact that the persons who settled North America came from parts of Europe with a higher living standard than those who settled south of the American border, and it was natural for them to seek even higher incomes. Thus, in the last analysis, it is the uneven development of the world that produces marked wage differentials, which in turn have greatly influenced the development pattern of the newly settled regions. Starting with the handicap of low wages it is no wonder that the majority of underdeveloped countries fall further and further behind their developed counterparts. The long term deterioration in the terms of trade is a product of these wage differentials and it is through trade, not investment or profit repatriation, that exploitation of these less underdeveloped countries occurs. These examples are clear illustrations of Emmanuel's insistence that wages are the 'independent variable'.

Behind this assertion lies the argument that high wages encourage the application of more capital intensive techniques (in Marxist terms a rise in the organic composition of capital) and hence productivity growth and, by their impact on 'effective demand', would encourage investment so that the expanded market demand could be fulfilled. This kind of analysis can leave the Emmanuel thesis open to a particularly dangerous and erroneous interpretation which must be carefully guarded

against. Like Malthus and Sismondi, who argued early last century that consumption demand creates its own production, Emmanuel does tend to imply that countries are developed because of their high levels of consumption, facilitated by their high wage levels.⁴² But this is merely begging a further question: Are countries developed simply because of their high levels of consumption or is it more fruitful to argue that they consume so much because they are developed? In other words, instead of studying export-led growth and the development of Australia's export staples, should Australian economic historians instead emphasize our particular pattern of imports, which in turn were influenced by our high wage levels, especially in the 1870s and 1880s? Attempts have been made at comparative study of import patterns of countries such as Australia, Canada, and the United States, perhaps inspired by Emmanuel's work, but such exercises in themselves are rather futile if one is interested in *explaining* the growth of such economies. Surely a developing country's ability to import deserves first consideration. Without either export income or capital inflow (and the latter in the Australian case usually went to assist directly or indirectly the development of our export industries), imports of any real magnitude are impossible. By placing emphasis on import patterns, one is merely dealing with the *effects* of a particular development course and not its cause. This raises perhaps the most fundamental question about the Emmanuel thesis. Are high wages the cause of a particular development pattern, such as that experienced by Australia, or are they merely a product of other forces? Certainly high wages may reinforce existing trends of development but can they be considered an 'independent' variable in the manner Emmanuel suggests? It is a fair and serious criticism of Emmanuel to point out that his failure to utilize the Marxian reproduction models of Volume II of *Capital*, and their later application to development problems by Rosa Luxemburg in her *Accumulation of Capital*, and by others, is primarily responsible for the dangerous 'consumption determined' growth approach that Emmanuel's work can encourage. Any attempt to apply his thesis to Australian experience must be especially careful on this point; a good dose of Luxemburg and the Marxian reproduction models would be a useful antidote here for Marxist scholars.⁴³

Certainly Emmanuel's model offers guidance on Australia's relative development success of a kind quite different from, and in fact superior to, that offered by André Gunder Frank. It is fashionable amongst many Marxists and their fellow travellers, and particularly amongst liberal scholars, to take up Frank's 'development of underdevelopment' thesis and attempt to apply it to historical experiences outside those of Chile and Brazil from which it was originally deduced.⁴⁴ Showing keen insight, Emmanuel rejects such an exercise, and criticizes the simplistic view that 'development' is a synonym for 'non-dependence': 'So what is the good of wasting time looking for causal relations between dependence and underdevelopment when *by definition* the latter is nothing but another word for the former'.⁴⁵ Emmanuel thus rejects the explana-

nation of Australia's ability to develop offered by Frank, namely: 'The development of the British ex-colonies in North America and Oceania was rendered possible because the ties between them and the European metropolis at no time matched the dependency of the now underdeveloped countries of Latin America, Africa and Asia'.⁴⁶ Certainly it is difficult to measure degrees of 'dependency', but Frank does seem to have forgotten the 'blocking' and 'dependency' that existed in North America and in the Australian colonies. Were not the Navigation Acts greatly restrictive to both areas? Did not Australian development rest heavily on the dependent inflows of capital and labour and on the British market for our key exports, on the international division of labour of which we were part? Emmanuel is correct to draw our attention, as did Brian Fitzpatrick, to the importance of our trading arrangements with Britain.

The 'unequal exchange' model also suggests that penetration of foreign capital *per se* cannot be used as the single cause of underdevelopment.⁴⁷ Australia at key periods, notably in the 'Long Boom', 1920s, and since World War II, has received substantial inflows of foreign capital. The fact that the first two of these flows were tightly bunched, which made Australia more vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the London capital market and hence to international crises, cannot be overlooked in any discussion of the positive and negative features of our dependence. Nevertheless Australia has developed and emerged as a 'small industrial state'. This should be qualified by pointing out that foreign capital up to World War II was not primarily directed into industrial enterprises, but was largely raised by Australian governments to allow construction of the social overhead capital, so necessary if the private sector was to industrialize. There can be no general, simple relationship between capital inflow and the level of development. Australian and Canadian experience illustrates that there can be heavy capital inflow *and* industrialization *and* development. On the other hand, Indian industrialization has largely been promoted by the local bourgeoisie, little reliant on foreign investment.⁴⁸ It too does not support the simple capital inflow-level of development thesis.

What Emmanuel provides is an analytical framework that does permit, admittedly with some difficulty, more concise study of the Britain-Australia links than the Frank or capital-inflow hypotheses. But as with all models it is the attempt to apply them in a consistent and thorough manner to real-world situations that is most difficult. Part of the appeal of the Frank type approaches is that they permit analysis to remain at the level of very broad generalization. Emmanuel's model in contrast opens up a number of interesting relationships which can and should be explored, avenues which force one back to primary sources and to statistics. His model reminds us just how much work there remains to be done in applying Marxian insights to the Australian development experience. To support this contention some attention will now be given to more specific applications of his model.

Any discussion of the possible application of the Emmanuel thesis to

Australian experience must be closely tied to the problems involved in the use of available statistics. '*La statistique est une maîtresse perfide qui égare ses adorateurs*' (Statistics is a mistress who makes fools of her admirers) is a maxim well worth repeating in this context. Even a simple outline of all the major dangers and problems in relating 'unequal exchange' to the Britain-Australia relationship is beyond the scope of this essay, for it would necessitate a lengthy and critical commentary on the relevant statistics that are available and on the gaps that need to be filled. Nevertheless, some important questions arise from even the crudest attempt at statistical testing. One possible starting point could be the controversial work of the Marxist statistician, Jurgen Kuczynski, and in particular his *A Short History of Labour Conditions under Industrial Capitalism in Great Britain and the Empire*. In the light of more recent studies, it would be difficult today to accept uncritically all the conclusions of this work, but he did look at the available statistics through Marxist eyes, even if his vision was clouded by the dogmatism of the Stalin era. Unlike most others who utilize statistics, he was remarkably frank in reply to accusations that his work was biased:

I shall always make use of my statistical knowledge in the interest of the people. I shall always endeavour to do it in such a way that the technique is faultless, that the training I have got has not been misspent. I hope that I shall succeed more and more in presenting just those statistics which the working class and the people need in their fight for freedom and democracy. If that is bias then I hope I shall get more and more 'biased'. (pp.35-6)⁴⁹

Kuczynski, unlike Emmanuel, was determined to play down the relatively high wages in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand at key stages over the last century, so as to add support to his general thesis that Western workers' living standards were on a continual downwards spiral from the Industrial Revolution onwards. It is highly doubtful whether Marx would have accepted Kuczynski's rather simplistic thesis, and his vulgar Marxism today looks rather quaint. Despite his stated aims, his compilations of official statistical series and of work done by non-Marxist scholars can be used to help test Emmanuel's thesis, at least as a preliminary to the more sophisticated statistical examination it deserves.

From the accompanying table we can at least see the relative changes in real wages in the two economies over the time period in question, but we should be very careful in trying to deduce much else. Especially noteworthy is the fact that these are two separate indexes, compiled from data collected according to different criteria and selection procedures. The numbers shown are not *absolute* figures, or actual wages paid, and Kuczynski's conversion of money wages into real wages is only as reliable as the price indexes and other information he was forced to rely upon. With all such series there is always considerable scope for refinement and improvement. For the purpose of international comparison, Kuczynski estimated that in 1900 the ratio of real wages between Britain, Aus-

BRITAIN AND AUSTRALIA CHANGES IN NET REAL WAGES, 1850-1939 (1900=100)								
Year	Britain	Australia		Britain	Australia		Britain	Australia
1850	59	58	1880	75	93	1910	95	97
1	60	58	1	78	91	1	95	100
2	59	61	2	78	82	2	93	95
3	63	78	3	81	83	3	95	97
4	57	77	4	78	88	4	97	91
5	55	65	5	87	87	5	83	80
6	56	68	6	79	82	6	78	86
7	55	68	7	84	92	7	74	85
8	55	64	8	88	91	8	84	83
9	61	65	9	91	86	9	98	79
1860	62	69	1890	95	85	1920	100	82
1	58	78	1	93	89	1	101	101
2	58	77	2	90	89	2	90	106
3	62	73	3	90	86	3	90	106
4	69	71	4	92	98	4	91	108
5	69	61	5	95	90	5	94	108
6	68	69	6	99	85	6	93	111
7	61	85	7	98	81	7	97	114
8	61	76	8	98	88	8	96	110
9	64	84	9	102	93	9	96	107
1870	68	95	1900	100	100	1930	103	101
1	72	90	1	107	94	1	104	92
2	73	101	2	98	89	2	106	88
3	76	95	3	97	91	3	105	93
4	78	81	4	96	97	4	105	98
5	79	87	5	96	93	5	103	102
6	79	73	6	98	94	6	105	108
7	76	78	7	99	97	7	104	112
8	73	79	8	97	93	8	107	116
9	72	89	9	96	96	9	98	115

Source: Adapted from tables in J. Kuczynski, *op. cit.*, pp.89-90, 105, 107, 131.

tralia, Canada and India was 30:35:40:4½,⁵⁰ and using this information we can draw some general conclusions about the relative changes in real wages in Britain and Australia. For the period 1850 to 1890, Australian real wages were usually higher than those in Britain; but over the period 1900-1939 there is greater instability in relative changes. Kuczynski's indexes need much development before it would be possible to use them with any more precision to test Emmanuel's model. They do remind us however that for most of the period under review, both money and real wages were higher in Australia than in Britain and this fact was of course very important as a 'pull' force behind heavy British emigration to Australia, especially in the Long Boom, the few years before the Great War and in the first half of the 1920s.

As it is a central political ramification of 'unequal exchange' that the workers in the higher wage countries exploit their counterparts in the lower wage countries, can we conclude from the fact that Australian wages have generally been higher than British ones that the Australian

worker, through 'unequal exchange', has exploited his British brethren? Assuming for the sake of argument that Australia was the less developed country of the partnership for most of the past century—and Emmanuel believes that productivity of labour is the only meaningful measure of development—what kinds of influence did changes in British wages have on the pattern of Australian development? To Emmanuel all wages are supposed to be the 'independent variable'. However, he believes that the real wages of workers in the less developed economy are significantly influenced by changes in the money wages paid to workers in the developed economy, *via* increases in the price of products imported from the developed economy. Thus any discussion of empirical validation of 'unequal exchange' must also examine changes in the terms of trade between the trading partners. In the Britain-Australia case we need to examine not only the changing prices of key British imports into Australia, but also the forces behind the prices received for our major exports; and the latter can only be discussed in terms of world supply and demand for such products.

Once we turn to the question of our terms of trade with Britain we are again reminded that the difficulties associated with applying the Emmanuel thesis to Australian experience are not just related to the impressive manner in which he has presented his model, but are also very much a product of the research gaps in Australian economic history generally. We know that there have been wide fluctuations in the terms of trade between us and our trading partners over the last century, but if we ask whether there has been a secular deterioration in our terms of trade, either in the relative short-run or over longer-run periods, then definitive answers are difficult to provide. What is first required are indices of export and import prices which take into account 'invisible' trade and changes in the quality of traded goods, and the provision of such indices is not a minor task. As one authority has noted: 'It is surprising that in an economy as open as the Australian, the government statistician has yet to produce—even for relatively short periods—national income series adjusted for the terms of trade'.⁵¹ Until serious efforts are made to provide historical series of this kind, discussion of the Emmanuel thesis in the Australian content can only be restricted to broad generalization.

Testing of the Emmanuel thesis requires consideration of further statistical problems. He talks about a 'general international rate of profit' and argues as to how a change in wages in one country will affect this profit rate in an opposite direction, assuming that the economy in question is large enough to influence the general profit rate. This is easy to theorize about but very difficult to test empirically. No tables of actual profit rates are provided which would be of use to a Britain-Australia study, and much work remains to be done on historical aspects of Australian income distribution before the relationships between changes in relative wage levels and changes in the 'general international rate of profit', and between wage changes and changes in Australian profit

levels, can be closely analyzed. (J.H. Dunning's *Studies in International Investment* would provide considerable guidance for the analysis of profit relationships.)⁵²

On a more general level, it is hard to find in the historical relationship between Britain and Australia the precise kind Emmanuel postulates as existing between the third world and the centre economies today. An attempt to measure the precise extent of exploitation *via* our trade with Britain is, as has been suggested above, a worthwhile if difficult task. But it would be foolhardy for radical historians to confine their analysis of our economic ties with Britain to possible exploitation *via* trade, to the exclusion of consideration of the effects of British investment and profit repatriation (or ploughing back of profit which was the more frequent phenomenon). Nevertheless, Emmanuel's thesis does open up the whole question of possible exploitation through the trading mechanism and does offer a research challenge to radical historians. It stimulates thought about the possible ways in which Marxian analysis could be applied to understanding our past; it illustrates the need for radical scholars to think very carefully about the theoretical tools they need; it suggests that the unrealistic foundations of orthodox trade theory make it unsuitable for analyzing Australian development and it offers a different set of questions for investigation. What this discussion of the applicability of the Emmanuel thesis to Australian development illustrates is the urgent need for a thorough, comparative testing of orthodox theories of international trade and the Emmanuel thesis against our historical experience.

Proceeding beyond our starting point of relative wage levels between Britain and Australia over the last century, we can look at 'unequal exchange' from a slightly different angle. As noted in the discussion of similarities between the Lewis model and Emmanuel's thesis above, Emmanuel believes 'unequal exchange' only takes place when the foreign consumer (for our purposes the British) receives goods with a higher labour content than the goods he has helped to produce and export (to Australia). Wage levels are only a partial guide to this transfer process; for Emmanuel, 'labour content' is equal to labour power, using traditional Marxian terminology; and this concept is not simple to quantify as mentioned earlier. This problem highlights a more general one facing all radical scholars of Australian history. In some ways we are fortunate to have at our disposal a substantial mine of quantitative material concerning our development, thanks especially to the work of T.A. Coghlan at the turn of the century and more recently to N.G. Butlin. However, care should be exercised in use of this material; a thorough and conclusive test of the Emmanuel thesis firstly requires the reconstruction of Australian national accounts according to the analytical framework Emmanuel uses. This is far from being a minor task and is certainly far beyond the scope of this essay. Discussion of the Emmanuel thesis helps to remind us once again of the lacunae that exist in Australian historical research.

Even if we accept Emmanuel's emphasis on wages as the 'independent variable', we are still left with the task of explaining the reasons behind the relative wage levels that have existed between Australia and Britain, and to do so necessitates an overview of the international division of labour of which we were and still are only a small part. Clearly, then, the Emmanuel thesis in itself is inadequate as a complete theoretical guide as to how we developed when we did and how we did; but, although he does briefly discuss the Australian case in support of his thesis, his work is primarily aimed at elucidating the surplus transfer process between rich and poor economies. Nevertheless it still raises a number of interesting questions, and questions are what the economic historian hopes to get from a study of economic theory. Insufficient work has been done on the relationships between British and Australian wage levels and the effects of these on changes in the terms of trade between the two countries. The Emmanuel thesis highlights these research gaps and provides yet another example of the value of serious study of development theory in explaining actual development experiences.

Finally, and most important, the above discussion of Emmanuel's work serves as a clear reminder of the variety of tools in the Marxian tool-box; tools which offer constructive alternative guidance to that proffered by orthodox, neo-classical economists. It is hoped that this essay, exploratory as it is, will encourage more examination of Marxian concepts and more sophisticated attempts at the application of such concepts to Australian economic history. Only after this has been done on an extended scale will comprehensive histories of the political economy of Australian capitalism be possible.⁵³

NOTES

- 1 E.L. Wheelwright, 'Introduction' in E.L. Wheelwright & K.D. Buckley (edd.), *Essays in the Political Economy of Australian Capitalism, Volume One* (Sydney, 1975), pp.1-2.
- 2 For guidance on this question, see the debate between G. Snooks and T. Rowse in *Labour History* 28 (May 1975) and my 'Marx versus Butlin: Some Comments on the Snooks-Rowse Debate', *Labour History* 30 (May 1976).
- 3 A useful critique of much Anglo-Saxon historical scholarship is provided in G. Stedman-Jones, 'History: the Poverty of Empiricism', in R. Blackburn (ed.), *Ideology in Social Science* (London, 1972).
- 4 D.L. Clark, 'Australia: Victim or Partner of British Imperialism?', in Wheelwright & Buckley, *op. cit.*
- 5 It is tempting to pursue and develop these rather inflammatory asides about the Althusserians, but in this context it could only be a digression. The theological nature of Althusserian work perhaps helps to explain its appeal to 'Catholic Marxists', especially in French-speaking universities and in Latin America. But critical Marxists should not just read the Gospel according to St. Louis. See the essay by H. McQueen in Volume Two of these essays for a very rare example of Althusserian methodology applied to concrete reality.
- 6 Engels, in discussing Marx's undergraduate years, noted: 'He knew nothing whatever about political economy ...' Cited in E. Mandel, *The Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx* (London, 1971), p.11.
- 7 Emmanuel's major works include: 'Les salariés des pays développés sont-ils plus exploités que ceux des pays sous-développés' and 'Les effets des variations des salaires dans une système économique ouvert' (Mimeographed papers, University of Grenoble, June 1969); *L'échange inégal* (Paris, 1969) — the first English edition, *Unequal Exchange*, appeared in 1972; 'Le colonialisme des "poor whites" et le mythe de l'impérialisme d'in-

vestissements', *l'Homme et la Société* 22 (see *New Left Review* 73, for an English version); 'Myths of Development versus Myths of Underdevelopment, *New Left Review* 85; *Le profit et les crises: Une approche nouvelle des contradictions du capitalisme* (Paris, 1974)—this book, by utilizing the Marxian reproduction models, provides a more general view of capitalist development.

By far the best presentation of his case is contained in a paper written for a critical Anglo-Saxon audience: 'Unequal Exchange Revisited', *University of Sussex, Institute of Development Studies Discussion Paper No. 77* (Mimeographed) 1975. (My thanks to Melanie Beresford and Bruce McFarlane of the University of Adelaide for acquiring a copy of this paper for me during a visit to the University of Cambridge). The recent appearance of a paperback edition of *Unequal Exchange* will hopefully generate more interest in Emmanuel's work.

- 8 Important discussions of Emmanuel's thesis in French include C. Palloix, 'L'impérialisme et l'échange inégal', in *l'Homme et la Société* 12 (1969), and his 'La question de l'échange inégal' in no. 18 of that journal. (Palloix's views are summarized in 'The Question of Unequal Exchange: A Critique of Political Economy', *Bulletin of the Conference of Socialist Economists* vol. II [1] Spring 1972). Samir Amin's *L'échange inégal et la loi de la valeur* (Paris, 1973) and his 'Unequal Exchange and the Law of Value: The End of a Debate', *United Nations African Institute for Economic Development and Planning, Dakar* (1973), constitute a rather precocious assessment of Emmanuel and should be read critically. A more useful discussion is found in A. Emmanuel, E. Somaini, L. Boggio & M. Salvati, *Salaires, sous-développement, impérialisme: Un débat sur L'Échange inégal* (Paris, 1973), originally published in Italian. See also G. Pilling 'Political Economy and Imperialism: the Work of Arghiri Emmanuel', *Economy and Society* II (May, 1973), and M. Kidron, 'Black Reformism: the Theory of Unequal Exchange' in his *Capitalism and Theory* (London, 1974). To my knowledge (stated at the risk of offending other Australian colleagues), the only serious discussion of Emmanuel in an Australian journal is A. Giles-Peters, 'Unequal Exchange', *Arena* 32-3 pp.103-10.
- 9 A. Emmanuel, *Unequal Exchange*, p.vii.
- 10 T. Kemp, *Theories of Imperialism* (London, 1967), provides a useful starting point for an understanding of these questions.
- 11 For Preobrazhensky's 'model', see his *The New Economics* (Oxford, 1965), first published in Russian in 1926. My 'The Marxian Reproduction Models as a Theory of Growth: the Soviet Industrialization Debate Revisited', *Working Paper* no. 4 (Department of Economic History, University of New South Wales, 1975), and *Studies in the Origins and Development of Growth Theory, 1925-1950* (Ph.D. thesis, University of Sydney, 1974), discuss these debates in some detail.
- 12 A. Emmanuel *Unequal Exchange*, p.viii. See pp.40-2 for a fuller statement.
- 13 D. Ricardo, *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* (Cambridge, 1951 Sraffa edition), pp.136-7. Ricardo's 'discovery' of the doctrine of comparative advantage is usually used as the yardstick by which other Classical economists are judged regarding their contributions to the theory of international trade. H. Myint has recently argued that Adam Smith's failure to 'discover' comparative advantage meant that 'instead of ruling out international mobility of capital by assumption, Smith analyzed how the allocation of capital funds between domestic investment ("the near employment") and foreign investment ("the distant employment") would be adjusted until the natural rate of profits in the two were equalized'. (H. Myint, 'Adam Smith's Theory of International Trade in the Perspective of Economic Development', *Paper presented to the History of Economic Thought Conference*, University of Glasgow, September 1976, p.7). In sum, all the 'sins' of Ricardo should not be placed on the shoulders of all the Classical economists, and Emmanuel's extensive discussion of the development of trade theory would have been greatly improved if Smith's more catholic approach had been acknowledged, especially given the weight Emmanuel places on capital mobility in his assault on Ricardian comparative advantage.
- 14 J. Robinson, 'The Need for a Reconsideration of the Theory of International Trade', *Collected Economic Papers*, vol. IV (Oxford, 1973), p.18.
- 15 P. Sraffa, *Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities* (Cambridge, 1960).
- 16 Some details of the 'Cambridge' challenge are enunciated in my 'The Cambridge Controversies in the Theory of Capital: Their Significance to Economic Historians' (Paper presented to an Inter-University Seminar at the University of New South Wales, November 1974). A substantially revised and improved version of this paper is also available.
- 17 A. Emmanuel, *op. cit.*, p.xxviii.

- 18 C. Clark, *The Economics of 1960* (London, 1942), pp.52-4. Clark's work illustrates the pitfalls in crystal-ball gazing, by conservatives or by Marxists. Those who have read in *Nation Review* his vituperative reviews of anything he suspects to be 'pink' (including his review of Volume One of these essays) should consult this interesting book. Like some Marxists, Clark is also fallible. Yet he does his other earlier work a disservice with his current *enfant terrible*, *bête noir* rôle on behalf of Australian reactionary forces. (David Clark, author of this essay, is not related, by either heredity or ideological inclination, to his famous namesake).
- 19 See F.F. Clairmonte, 'A Note on the Terms of Trade of Primary Producing Countries, 1952-1972', *Journal of Contemporary Asia* V, 4.
- 20 A. Emmanuel, *op. cit.*, pp.xxix-xxx.
- 21 *ibid.*, p.xxxi.
- 22 *ibid.*, p.xiv.
- 23 A. Emmanuel, 'Unequal Exchange Revisited', *loc. cit.*, p.37.
- 24 He approvingly uses A.R.J. Turgot's description of 'equalization', viz. 'The different uses to which capital may be put thus bring in very unequal returns; but this inequality does not prevent them from having a reciprocal influence upon each other, and a sort of balance being established between them, as between two liquids of unequal weight and communicating with each other through the base of an upturned siphon, the two branches of which they occupy; they would not be at the same level, but one would not be able to rise higher without the other one also rising, in the opposite branch of the siphon'. (*Reflections on the Formation and Distribution of Wealth*, London, 1794. Cited in Emmanuel, *Unequal Exchange*, p.71).
- 25 A. Emmanuel *Unequal Exchange*, p.38.
- 26 The literature on the 'Transformation Problem' is voluminous and ever expanding. Useful starting points include: E. von Boehm-Bawerk, *Karl Marx and the Close of his System* (see the 1949 reprint with an introduction by P.M. Sweezy, which has recently been reprinted in paperback); R.L. Meek, 'Some Notes on the Transformation Problem', *Economic Journal* 66; M. Dobb, 'A Note on the Transformation Problem', in his *On Economic Theory and Socialism* (London, 1955); P. Mattick, 'Value and Price', *Science and Society* 23; and A. Medio, 'Profits and Surplus Value: Appearance and Reality in Capitalist Production', in E.K. Hunt & J.G. Schwartz (edd.), *A Critique of Economic Theory* (Penguin, 1972). My 'Contradiction, Confusion, and Calumny: the Continuing Significance of the Transformation Problem', Paper presented at *Marxist Scholars Conference, University of Adelaide September 1974*, surveys and assesses the major aspects of the controversy.
- 27 A. Emmanuel, *op. cit.*, Appendix V. See also note 33, p.99.
- 28 For an excellent discussion of this point see Giles-Peters, 'Unequal Exchange', *Arena* 32-33, pp.106-7.
- 29 A. Emmanuel, 'Unequal Exchange Revisited' *loc. cit.*, pp.39-43.
- 30 Quoted in D. Seckler, *Thorstein Veblen and the Institutionalists* (London, 1975), p.48.
- 31 A. Emmanuel, *Unequal Exchange*, pp.87-9. There is also a brief discussion of the Lewis-Emmanuel similarities in A. Emmanuel *et. al.*, *Salaries, Sous-développement, impérialisme*, pp.27-8.
- 32 The 'Lewis model' first appeared in *Manchester School* 1954 and is reprinted in A.N. Agarwala & S.P. Singh (edd.), *The Economics of Underdevelopment* (New York., 1963). The sentence cited is on page 440 of the reprint.
- 33 A. Emmanuel, *Unequal Exchange*, p.88.
- 34 *ibid.* pp.61-4.
- 35 *ibid.* p.368.
- 36 A. Emmanuel, 'Unequal Exchange Revisited' *loc. cit.* p.38.
- 37 A. Emmanuel, *Unequal Exchange*, p.351.
- 38 S. Amin, 'Unequal Exchange and the Law of Value', *loc. cit.* p.65.
- 39 J.W. McCarty, 'The Staple Approach in Australian History', *Business Archives and History* IV, 1.
- 40 This question is discussed at length in my 'The Cambridge Controversies in the Theory of Capital: Their Significance to Economic History', *loc. cit.*
- 41 A. Emmanuel, *Unequal Exchange*, p.124.
- 42 In his 'Unequal Exchange Revisited', p.71, Emmanuel does stress that this is a peculiar feature of contemporary advanced economies rather than a general rule of development for all economies at all times.
- 43 As well as Luxemburg, the growth theory of Michal Kalecki would also be useful for guidance purposes.
- 44 Some comments were made on this question in my 'Australia: Victim or Partner of

- British Imperialism' *loc. cit.* pp.50-1, 70.
- 45 A. Emmanuel, 'Unequal Exchange Revisited', *loc. cit.*, p.83.
- 46 A.G. Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (New York, 1967), p.12.
- 47 Emmanuel's position on this question is best outlined in his 'White-Settler Colonialism and the Myth of Investment Imperialism' (referred to in footnote 7).
- 48 See M. Kidron, *Foreign Investments in India* (Oxford, 1965).
- 49 J. Kuczynski, *A Short History of Labour Conditions under Industrial Capitalism in Great Britain and the Empire* (London, 1972 reprint), pp.35-6.
- 50 *ibid.*, p.181.
- 51 N. Cain, 'Trade and Economic Structure at the Periphery: The Australian Balance of Payments, 1890-1965', C. Forster (ed.), *Australian Economic Development in the Twentieth Century* (London and Sydney, 1970), p.96, n. 16.
- 52 J.H. Dunning, *Studies in International Investment* (London, 1970).
- 53 The recent publication of W.A. Sinclair's *The Process of Economic Development in Australia* (Melbourne, 1976), the first survey economic history of Australia to appear for many years, has not changed the conclusions of this paper. Sinclair's work deserves serious and close scrutiny, of a kind not feasible here.

7

THE BASTARDS FROM THE BUSH: SOME COMMENTS ON CLASS AND CULTURE

IAN TURNER

Popular culture was not identified by the people, but by others, and it still carries two older senses: inferior kinds of work (cf. popular literature, popular press as distinguished from quality press); and work deliberately setting out to win favour (popular journalism as distinguished from democratic journalism, or popular entertainment); as well as the more modern sense of well-liked by many people, with which, of course, in many cases, the earlier senses overlap. The recent sense of popular culture as the culture actually made by people for themselves is different from all these; it is often displaced to the past as folk culture but it is also an important modern emphasis.... In the [mid-20th century] popular song and popular art were characteristically shortened to pop, and the familiar range of senses, from favourable to unfavourable, gathered again around this. The shortening gave the word a lively informality but opened it, more easily, to a sense of the trivial. It is hard to say whether older senses of pop have become fused with this use; the common sense of a lively movement, in many familiar and pleasing contexts, is certainly appropriate.

Raymond Williams: *Keywords* (1976)

DEFINITIONS ARE ALWAYS a useful starting point, and this definition (or discussion?) by Raymond Williams is particularly useful—for what it conceals as well as for what it reveals. A minor question may open the way to a deeper investigation.

Williams assimilates both 'popular music' and 'popular art' to the summary 'pop'. But there is a world of difference between pop music

Much of this paper was presented to a seminar on various aspects of Australian culture, held at the University of Exeter in May, 1976. I am grateful to Dr. Peter Quartermaine, organiser of the seminar, and to the participants, for various comments. The paper was written in London, without access to certain Australian material; it is consequently more impressionistic than I would like it to be.

and pop art. In either of its meanings, pop music derived from 'popular' sources and was directed to a 'popular' audience. The 'tops of the pops', from the first Hit Parades of the 1930s, were an amalgam of the descendants of sentimental 19th century drawing-room ballads and of watered-down jazz modes. (There was no distinctively Australian pop music of this period—except perhaps for such songs as 'I want to linger longer in Wodonga', which may be due for revival.) The pop music of the 1960s, that typified by the Beatles and the Rolling Stones, sprang from American Negro rhythm and blues rather than (despite the tag of 'rock') the rock'n'roll of Bill Haley and the Comets; though Haley—and Elvis Presley—were in their time important symbols of dissent for young urban Australians as William Dick suggests in his novel, *A Bunch of Rabbits*. At its worst, pop music was trite, mindless and endlessly repetitive; but there have been at all times composers and lyric-writers, arrangers and performers working within the genre who have brought an individual, interesting, and sometime challenging quality to the music. 'Pop' is a music which, however much it may have been trivialised and over-promoted by commercial interests, has a popular origin and is directed towards a popular ('mass') audience. It has always attracted imitation and invited participation (by way of dancing, whose changing styles, from the graceful glissandos of the modern waltz and the vigorous acrobatics of the charleston or the twist to the self-absorbed solo sway-and-shuffle which goes with modern rock, deserve detailed study); that has strengthened its popular base.

'Pop art' is something else. As Mario Amaya writes:

... when a group of artists actually *use* popular culture itself as straight source material, and thus directly accept its visual existence, ... the old division between 'popular' and 'fine' art must be questioned ... Because of the cross-reference between the new art's subjects and objects, taken from 'popular culture', it has been called Pop Art, but no term could be more misleading. ... Although it began as a highly sophisticated art comment on some visual facts in the world of mass-media, it was never intended for the masses themselves or made specifically to be understood by the many rather than the few.¹

It is true, as Amaya says, that the 'pop' artists achieved some notoriety through the mass media and that some of them adapted the icons of their genre to mass production. But their art was called 'pop' because they had taken over a visual language from popular or mass culture as a basis for comment on that culture, and not because of the audience to which they addressed themselves. 'Pop art' is thus a part of the 'high culture'.

I should perhaps explain how I am using that slippery word, 'culture'. Leo Tolstoy, who was deeply suspicious, even contemptuous, of the refined elite art of his day, and who had a warm sympathy for the artistic expressions of peasant life, made an important point:

We are accustomed to understand art to be only what we hear and see in theatres, concerts, and exhibitions; together with buildings, statues, poems,

novels..... But all this is but the smallest part of the art by which we communicate with each other in life. All human life is filled with works of art of every kind—from cradle-song, jest, mimicry, the ornamentation of houses, dresses and utensils, up to church services, buildings, monuments and triumphal processions. It is all artistic activity.²

Tolstoy was thinking of a pre-industrial society. My present use of the word 'culture' is not as all-embracing as that of the anthropologists (who use it to distinguish the entire man-created world from the natural environment). It corresponds rather to that of modern sociologists of culture; it incorporates all that Tolstoy thought of as 'art' and goes beyond that to take in entertainments and recreations, including sport; modes of communication, including the demotic language; appeals to taste, such as advertising, as well as expressions of taste; ideologies and *mores*. That is, something close to 'life style'; not the process of production of the necessities of life, the 'work' process, but those creations of the human imagination which may derive ultimately from necessary production but which, more immediately, embellish and define the style of that process, validate or challenge it, and inform patterns of behaviour outside it.

Amaya distinguishes between 'popular' and 'fine' art. With Raymond Williams, I prefer to distinguish between 'popular culture' and 'high culture'. The latter usage suggests a sociological rather than an aesthetic distinction, though it begs an important question. The 'popular/high' dichotomy implies a social hierarchy; the use of 'high' suggests that there is one culture which belongs to a social elite (which may or may not be identified with a ruling class—that is another question) and another culture which belongs to the 'people', or the 'masses'. Setting aside for the moment the matter of a social hierarchy, it is nevertheless possible to distinguish empirically between cultural products or expressions which reach, or are intended to reach, a 'mass' audience, and those which involve a minority audience, and it is reasonable to describe the former as 'popular culture'.

Whatever kind of culture (in my use of the word) we are talking about, this is an area of life in which the element of choice operates more freely—or seems so to operate—than it does for most people in the work situation. It is true, of course, that the apparent freedom of choice is limited by acculturation, which seeks to establish from the earliest years the permissible range of alternatives, and by persuasion through the media, which seeks to manipulate choice for profit, prestige or power. But even when they are aware of these limitations, people experience the cultural process as offering more freedom: it is possible to choose which football team one will support (or even to refuse to support any team); it is commonly not possible to choose which nut one will tighten or which key one will punch. That is why many historians, seeking to define that elusive quality, the 'character' of a nation or a class, have found it more useful to investigate culture than the process of production. As Joseph Strutt, the first historian of British recreation, wrote:

In order to form a just estimation of the character of any particular people, it is absolutely necessary to investigate the Sports and Pastimes most generally prevalent among them. War, policy, and other contingent circumstances, may effectually place men, at different times, in different points of view; but, when we follow them into their retirements, where no disguise is necessary, we are most likely to see them in their true state, and may best judge of their natural disposition.³

Modern social historians, particularly those of the Marxian tradition, will want to relate cultural inquiry to class structure; to investigate what cultural expressions are common to the whole community, and what are the property of a particular class (constituting perhaps a 'sub-culture'); to assess whether particular cultural expressions reinforce or undermine the class structure. But most will allow that the cultural process has a life of its own; that, while it relates finally to the process of necessary production, it mediates and exerts its own influence upon the man/production relationship. They will probably also allow that, for most purposes, most people define themselves in terms of culture rather than of work.

Accepting that the popular/high culture dichotomy involves at least a concept of minorities and majorities, how does this relate to class structure? That is a question which can only be answered in historical terms. Let us set aside the 'primitive' culture of tribal society ('primitive' not because the culture lacks complexity and sophistication but because the technological base is undeveloped) as a special case, and consider rather the cultures of 'pre-capitalist economic formations'—the 'Asiatic, ancient, and feudal' modes of production. In these societies, the 'high culture' was the property of the court and the aristocracy, the church, the slave-owners and the landed gentry; the 'popular culture' was the property of the slaves, the serfs, the peasants, the craftsmen and apprentices, the unlettered 'folk'. The creators of the high arts were often specialists who owed their livelihood to the patronage of wealthy individuals and institutions; they met their obligations by giving form in music, painting, saga, sculpture to the aspirations of their masters, or simply by giving them pleasure. Often—particularly when patrons and artists shared a common belief in the transcendental, as did, for example, Fra Angelico and the Dominican fathers—artistic creation seems to have proceeded with little conflict. Occasionally the vision of a supreme individual such as Michelangelo conflicted with the desires of his papal patrons. But the context within which the artist worked was known; he shared a common language with his fellows and his patrons. The life style of the high culture was differentiated sharply from that of the 'folk', though it interlocked at some points—notably in public ceremonies and religious worship.

The products of the high arts (though not, of course, other aspects of the high culture—language, *mores*) were identified as the work of known individual artists; even when the artist's name is not known, works are attributed on stylistic grounds to, for example, the 'Master

of the Magdalene'. The unique work is witness to the experience and understanding of the unique personality. Insofar as the artist succeeds in communicating his understanding, in illuminating or enriching the experience of his audience, he may be taken as speaking for his social milieu and his times; but he remains an individual. (This dodges the question of the 'universal' in art, the concern of artists of all times with such universal human phenomena as love and the mystery of death. I do not have space here for an extended discussion, nor is it strictly relevant; so I will just say that I believe that, while a continuing concern with such questions is a necessary part of the condition of being human, the form of expression of that concern is always historically specific.)

Not so the products of the popular arts in pre-industrial times, the 'folk arts'. Folk culture focuses on the creations (which are themselves in a continual process of re-creation) rather than on the individual creators. Folk artists take a song, a story, a style of decoration from the common currency and make it their own. They receive a work from their forbears, modify it to suit their own taste and talent, and hand it on to their successors. Folklorists know this process as 'oral transmission', though the term is not really appropriate for the decorative and visual arts and for music and dance. The essence is that the work is not ossified in print or other permanent form; the folk artist may have more or less facility, but his creative activity is one in which the whole community shares. The difference between a traditional singer singing 'Sir Patrick Spens' and an actor playing Hamlet is that the latter is bound by Shakespeare's text, no matter what interpretive gloss he puts on it, while the former may (indeed is expected to) modify the song he has inherited to suit his audience and himself. The folk arts have a recognisable style (one can thus distinguish traditional singers from the many 'folk-revival' singers who apply modern rhythms and harmonies to traditional songs), but there is, and can be, no final and correct version of any piece of folk art. Each rendition is the work of an individual artist, but the art-work itself is the sum of its variants, and is, in that sense, the creation of the community to which it belongs rather than of any one individual. For this reason—as well as the fact that pre-literate communities, while they may be written about by men of the high culture, leave no written records of their own—many social historians have found it interesting and useful to use the materials of the folk culture to illuminate the way of life of the common people.

Thus it is possible to distinguish two cultures in pre-industrial societies, a distinction which relates to class structure: the 'high' culture, created by individuals but becoming the property of the elites of wealth and power, of church and state; and the 'popular' culture, communally created and the property of the folk. Not that there were impenetrable walls between the two cultures. Artists of the high culture took what they needed from the popular culture of their day: Falstaff and his cronies spoke the language of the common people; in her madness, Ophelia sang the songs of the folk. And sometimes, as with many of the poems

of Robert Burns, works created by artists of the high culture achieved a wide currency among the folk. And it may also be true, though it would be difficult to prove, that there were times (perhaps Elizabethan England?) when the clamour of class conflict was muted by the supra-class clarion of national pride. But the generalisation stands: there were two cultures, and they represented different and often incompatible life-styles.

(That broad generalisation glosses over many important detailed qualifications. There were great differences of style between the cultures of London craftsmen, Northumbrian miners and Cornish peasants. In areas of strong regional identification, for example the British Midlands, as represented in the novels and television dramas of the family textile industries, or of strong nationalist aspiration, as in Scotland and Ireland, class feelings were often submerged. The broad generalisation may stand as an analytic device, but woe betide the would-be politician who bases his appeal solely on his perception of class, and who ignores regional and national sentiment!)

It is only in comparatively recent times—say, over the last two hundred years—that social and cultural historians and critics have recognised the existence of the two cultures, and even then the recognition has often been grudging. To many early commentators, it seemed that only the elite could create and appreciate the arts, that insofar as works of art circulated among the common people, these must have been degenerate echoes of the creations of the elite. The sophistications of an Earl of Rochester:

When wearied with a world of Woe
To thy safe Bosom I retire,
Where Love, and Peace, and Truth does flow,
May I contented there expire

were preferred to the direct passion of the folk rhymes:

O western wind, when wilt thou blow
That the small rain down may rain?
Christ that my love were in my arms
And I in my bed again.

Even those who recognised that the folk arts had a life of their own were somewhat patronising, or apologetic, in their regard, praising, for example, the 'pleasing simplicity and many artless graces, which ... have been thought to compensate for the want of higher graces'.⁴ It was left to critics, performers and political activists of our own times to make the now-obvious connections between the traditional popular cultures and class struggle and national liberation.

The coming of modern industrial society transformed the pre-industrial patterns of culture, for three reasons. The emergence of a bourgeoisie and a proletariat meant a new class structure and new class relationships. New technologies—and particularly the development of the mass media—created new kinds of communication. And all kinds of

production and exchange, including cultural exchange, became part of the commodity market (a market which, partly because of the growing division of labour, now included labour power).

It is still possible to distinguish, in the context of modern industrial society, between a high culture and a popular culture; but each has changed considerably in character; and it can be argued that the distinction between the two cultures can no longer be drawn as precisely and as sharply as it was in pre-industrial society.

The works of the high arts are still produced by specialist artists for an elite, minority audience, but under quite different conditions from those which previously prevailed. Private patronage has virtually disappeared. A dramatist may be commissioned by a theatre to write a play; a painter may receive a retainer from a gallery proprietor in return for an option on his output; a writer or a composer may be awarded a fellowship by a government agency or some other institution; but, in general terms, the creative artist produces for the market. (I am speaking, of course, of the situation of artists in the free-enterprise economies, and not of the communist world, in which the artist produces not for the market, or for himself, but for the party and the state.) Within the limits set by political and moral censorship, he is free to produce what he will; but his livelihood depends on his ability to satisfy the tastes of those with money to buy, or on his success (or that of his entrepreneur) in convincing potential buyers that the artist's taste is worthy of respect—or that his works are a reasonable investment risk.

No longer enjoying a secure position in an ordered, hierarchic society, no longer communicating directly with his audience and speaking a common language with them, the artist depends on the market but finds himself in conflict with its demands. He no longer knows his potential audience; indeed, given the rapidly changing distribution of wealth in industrial society, as new fortunes are made and change hands, he can no longer be sure of the sentiments or tastes to which he is appealing—his potential buyers may be swayed by fashion or by the desire for conspicuous consumption or future profit rather than by the desire for enriched experience and understanding. He has three alternatives: to produce works which exist in their own right, for himself, his fellow artists, and a close circle of cognoscenti who probably lack significant purchasing power; or to produce enough marketable works to buy time for the work which satisfy himself; or to devote himself to producing what he thinks will sell. At the far edges of alienation, any art-work which is unique or durable comes to seem an unacceptable compromise with the imperatives of the market: the artist produces works in multiple, or works which are deliberately ephemeral, or 'happenings' rather than material objects. (Such is the desire of modern society for novelty, which itself reflects the pace of technological innovation and the idea of progress, that even an artist who repudiates permanence may find himself the centre of fashionable interest, and well compensated for his troubles; the analogy with Marcuse's 'repressive tolerance' seems clear.)

The high artist of modern industrial society is neither bourgeois nor proletarian; he is classic petit-bourgeois—the individual producer and entrepreneur who is at the mercy of the vagaries of a market which he may try to manipulate but cannot control. (Marx to the contrary: I do not accept the comment in the *Communist Manifesto* that ‘the bourgeoisie ... has converted the physician, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage labourers’.)

Meanwhile, the artist is subject to a new range of pressures from the mass communications media. Machine printing, photographic reproduction, electronic reproduction of sight and sound create both opportunities and difficulties for artists. The arts are labour-intensive industries: the gap between the production costs of a live performance of a play, an opera, a symphony and the mechanical reproduction of the work grows inexorably wider; the economies of scale are not available to the poet or painter or film-maker whose appeal is to a minority, high culture audience. But the possibility—and the temptation—of mass reproduction is always there. Shakespeare and Spillane, Beethoven and the Beatles can and do appear side by side on the book and record stands of the chain stores. The equation is evident: a 10 per cent royalty on a book or record selling one thousand copies at \$10 comes to \$1000; the same royalty on one hundred thousand copies of a book or record selling at \$2.50 comes to \$25,000. And since both the products of the high culture and those designed for mass distribution are subject to the laws of the market, the one category tends to assimilate to the other.

At the same time, the two audiences which could be reasonably clearly distinguished in pre-industrial society tend to merge. On the one hand, universal literacy and the long-term rise in educational standards make the high arts generally accessible; on the other, the mass media are all-pervasive. It is true that the high arts are not accepted by the majority of those to whom they are now accessible: the common people feel that the high arts stand outside their experience, belong not to them but to an alien elite; the democracy of sharing culture, like the democracy of sharing power, is more apparent than real. And it is true that not all the owners of television sets watch quiz shows, crime dramas and soap operas. But it is also true that, where many languages used to exist, we tend more and more to recognise only one—and that the language of the mass media of communication.

The phenomenon of mass communication through mechanical reproduction and the electronic media has also transformed the nature of popular culture. The direct relationship which existed between the folk artist and his audience, a known and localised social stratum, has given way to a communication by way of machines between the popular artist and an anonymous and indefinable mass (‘indefinable’ except that market surveys show a negative correlation between higher educational levels and the most popular products). It is this universal distribution of cultural products through mechanical media and an impersonal market which has led many recent critics to prefer the term ‘mass culture’ to

'popular culture'. It is true, as Raymond Williams says, that 'mass communication and the mass media are by comparison with all previous systems not directed at masses (persons assembled) but at numerically very large yet in individual homes relatively isolated members of audiences'.⁵ It is also true that the individual members of mass audiences receive what is presented to them in individual ways. But the scale is different: over two thousand years, the largest conceivable audience of 'persons assembled' has grown only by a factor of three or four (the Roman Colosseum held 50,000 people; V.F.L. Park, the headquarters of Melbourne football, will hold 150,000), but a 'best-selling' book or record means sales of a million copies, while films and radio and television programmes may communicate to multiple millions. And the entire mass audience receives the same mass-produced product. (Without considering in detail Marshall McLuhan's argument, which often lacks a sound historical and sociological base, it seems probable that he is right in suggesting that the electronic media are inherently more involving, and so more persuasive, than earlier forms of communication; though, in making such a judgment, we run the risk of ignoring the sacred and the magical).

Artists who produce for the market must take account of market preferences; if they market their works through entrepreneurs (media-owners, producers, publishers, gallery proprietors) the market pressures are multiplied by the desire of the entrepreneurs to maximise their profits. Classical political economy describes the entrepreneurial function as risk-taking, but most entrepreneurs of the arts don't want to take risks—they prefer to repeat their successes. High artists who produce unique works or works requiring little capital investment (painters, sculptors, individual composer-performers, poets with access to a duplicating machine) may escape the worst of the market pressures by communicating directly with their audiences; but, as a general rule, the greater the investment required in producing the work (publishing a book or record, staging a play or an opera, making a film), the more the artist is subject to market imperatives. In the high-risk, high-investment arts, innovation increasingly depends on public patronage; but public patronage is restricted to the high arts—the popular arts, which are thought of as entertainment rather than as enrichment or enlightenment, receive little support from government or other institutions. It is only the rare artist of any kind (say, Picasso or the Pink Floyd) who can survive on his name alone; and even he is subject to a different kind of pressure—the danger of losing his audience if his creativity flags and he becomes repetitive and boring. (There seems to be a contradiction here between the demands for repetition and innovation, but it is more apparent than real: different audiences, and the same audiences at different times, require the reassurance of familiarity and the stimulation of the novel, and novelty is more acceptable from an artist whose reputation is familiar).

It is stating the obvious to say that nowhere are market pressures more evident than in those of the popular arts which are mass-produced,

disseminated through the mass media, and directed towards a mass audience—pop music, television, film. Mass production in the arts, as elsewhere, requires large investments, and capital is invested to make a profit. Rare artists, like the Beatles, can, if they combine unusual success and shrewd business judgment, become self-capitalising; but most are at the mercy of entrepreneurs. Not only is their talent exploited, in the sense that they are required to produce what the entrepreneur believes will sell, but they are exploited in the economic sense, in that the entrepreneur seeks to minimise the return to the artist in order to maximise his own return. In the early days of modern pop music, Peter Sellers created the character of a retired colonel who ran a ‘stable’ of pop singers—a stable in the literal sense, complete with regimented diet and riding whip. Trade union organisation has enabled actors and technicians in film and television to establish minimum standards (although it has given them no control over the product itself); but the thousands of eager aspirants who hang around the fringes of the pop music world have proved impossible to organise.

So far, I have been discussing the social base of the high and popular cultures in pre-industrial and industrial society. I would like now to turn to some of the value judgements which underlie the ‘high/popular’ dichotomy.

I started by accepting that the concepts of ‘high’ and ‘popular’ involve empirically minorities and majorities; but the terms imply more than that—they also suggest a range between superior and inferior, a distinction between elites and masses, that is to say, a value judgement about the quality of the two cultures, the audiences to whom they appeal, and the nature of the responses they elicit. That is apparent in the way in which critics approach the two cultures. Commonly, critics discuss the high culture in terms of the qualities inherent in the products of that culture—that is, in terms of the intentions of the artists, of their success in communicating their insights into the nature of human experience. Contrariwise, critics commonly discuss popular culture in terms of its effect on the audience which consumes it.

Even such a sophisticated and sympathetic observer as Antonio Gramsci showed a curious ambivalence in this matter. He recorded that he read with sorrow of ‘the death of Serafino Renzi, leading actor in a company of barnstormers’, and remembered ‘the pleasure I had every time I went to hear him. For in fact the performance was a combined effort: the anxiety of the public, the emotions let loose, the intervention in the play of the working class audience, was certainly not the least interesting performance of the two’. (The same point might perhaps be made about the popular music hall, vaudeville and melodrama of pre-electronic times).

But he could also say, of some of his prison reading:

I have the capacity ... of seeing the interesting side even of the lowest products of the intellect—such as serial stories for example. If I had the opportunity I would accumulate hundreds of thousands of notes on certain

aspects of mass psychology ... Why is this reading matter the most read and the most published? What needs does it satisfy? To what aspirations does it respond? What sentiments and points of view are represented in this tripe to make it so popular with the wide masses of the people? ... Every book, especially if it has a bearing on history, can be of interest. In every trashy little book you can find something which will serve its turn.⁶

In the first case, Gramsci was entering imaginatively into the relation between popular culture and popular audience; in the second, he was objectifying it, looking at it from the outside. Critics of the high culture generally talk in philosophical and aesthetic terms. Like most critics of popular culture, Gramsci was talking in political and sociological terms.

Behind the use of philosophical/aesthetic or political/sociological terms there lies a range of value judgments. The two central, and closely connected, judgements relate to the true nature of culture and to the proper use of time. As Raymond Williams points out,⁷ the original meaning of the word 'culture' was cultivation, improvement—of the natural environment. From there, the word extended to self-cultivation, the improvement of the mind. But to improve means to go from worse to better, to aspire to the good life; and the good life is defined in terms of the Judeo-Christian ideology. Among the concerns of that ideology are salvation, which requires both faith and work, and adherence to a strict code of conduct which proscribes the pleasures of the flesh as inhibiting faith and distracting from work. Judeo-Christian thought postulates both spiritual improvement and material progress as goods; the one is to be achieved by contemplation and worship, the other by that labour which God imposed on Man after the Fall. (The Judeo-Christian tradition weighs heavily on the thinking of the non-Christian philosophers of the 19th and 20th centuries: spiritual improvement is translated into the triumph of reason—and reason, like prayer, is put to the service of material progress. And that transcends what is usually thought of as a central argument of the 19th century: progress is as central to the thought of Marx as it is to that of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill).

Within that tradition, culture remains an extension of cultivation. What time man has available to him outside his hours of work should also serve the cause of improvement. Four hundred years ago, Montaigne, who lived within the Christian culture but had a sceptical turn of mind, wrote: 'A painful fancy takes possession of me ... If I cannot combat it, I run away from it ... By changing place, occupation, company, I escape'. But escape was not a word which commended itself to the Judeo-Christian culture: it was better to confront and conquer one's temptations. Sixty years later, Pascal, who was a great admirer of Montaigne, but perhaps more devout, said: 'All the unhappiness of men arises from one single fact, that they cannot stay quietly in their own chamber, [reflecting] on what they are, whence they came, and whither they go ... All great

diversions are a threat to the Christian life'. Our contemporary use of language supports Pascal rather than Montaigne: words such as play, game, sport, pastime, diversion suggest an improper frivolity—or at least a lack of concern for the serious affairs of life which may be allowed to children but is frowned on among adults. 'Escape' is seen not as a necessary preliminary to renewed involvement but as a failure to confront the realities of life—whether because of wilful default or because one is deliberately diverted by interested parties for their own ends. The word recreation has lost the hyphen which gave it the sense of a time of 're-creation' of energy for more serious purposes. An adult may be permitted to play something—golf, or chess—provided that this can be glossed as improving the body or the mind, but he may not just play, which is an end in itself. (It is this aspect of play which has led many critics to assimilate the arts to play, as another form of behaviour which is undertaken without ulterior purpose, for its own sake). 'Culture' remains cultivation, improvement, rather than idle amusement or the mode of satisfaction of sensual appetites. Freud's concept of sublimation fits cultivation, improvement, rather than idle amusement or the mode of satisfaction of sensual appetites. Freud's concept of sublimation fits they do not invoke Freud—also speak of the desirability of restricting sexual activity so that the energy so conserved may be devoted to more socially useful purposes).

I do not want to suggest that the whole of the high culture was or is devoted to the ideals of culture and improvement. The Earl of Rochester and his circle were not primarily concerned with the Judeo-Christian idea of the good life, except to deny it; nor were de Sade or Baudelaire or Jean Genet. But most high culture critics would argue that the possibility of cultivation and improvement exists only within the high culture, that the popular culture is set apart from such concerns. And beyond this moral judgment, there is a concern for technical skill and sophistication: the high culture aspires to the refinement and improvement of expression; the popular culture vulgarises. Putting it crudely, high culture critics see their culture as encompassing the great moral issues which confront mankind (even when conventional morality is denied), and as aspiring, through experiment and innovation, to an ever greater subtlety of style. Popular culture wants only to have a good time.

This often leads to the further assumption that only a small minority of people, an elite, is capable of creating and appreciating the works of the high culture; that the masses lack the self-awareness and the emotional and intellectual depth to comprehend the best of culture. And to its obverse: works (and modes of behaviour) which belong to the minority are *ipso facto* good and desirable; acceptance of them becomes a way of identifying with the minority, the elite, and may become an important expression of upward social mobility (or, in prestige terms, 'social climbing'). Whereas cultural products which reach a mass audience are *ipso facto* of low quality—'vulgar' or 'common' in the derogatory

sense of those words. Cultural distribution is thus taken to reflect and reinforce class distinctions: that is not to say that the bourgeoisie and the cultural elite are the same thing, but that the one is taken to include the other.

(Two qualifications should be made to that generalisation. Some artists use the forms of the high arts to attack bourgeois society, or simply '*épater les bourgeois*'; bourgeois society, however, shows a considerable capacity to accommodate them—the Dadaists and Bertolt Brecht are good examples. And the technology of modern industrial society makes possible, and its ideology encourages, the mass production and distribution of products of the high culture: van Gogh's chair and his sunflowers must be almost as widely distributed as the tawny 'straw-hat shiela' who graces the walls of so many suburban pubs; mass distribution certainly alters the ambience of a work, but does it transform its quality)?

The elite/mass assumption also leads to a line of argument which runs from Alexis de Toqueville through Ortega y Gasset to T.S. Eliot and F.R. Leavis and which asserts a kind of Gresham's Law of culture: that, in a democracy, the standards of the masses will prevail over those of the elite; that bad culture will drive out good. For those who think in this way, the mass production and dissemination of cultural products at the same time threatens the continued existence of the high culture (along with the elite which sustains it) and creates a new mass culture which operates as an ideological cement for the dehumanised mass society.

This conservative critique of popular culture finds an interesting parallel in the Marxist critique. Writing of the 'decline of art due to the decay of bourgeois economy', an English critic of the 1930s, Christopher Caudwell, said:

Just as the novel breeds a characteristic escape from proletarian misery—'escape' literature, the religion of capitalism—so music produces the affective massage of jazz, which gratifies the instincts without proposing or solving the tragic conflicts in which freedom is won. Both think to escape necessity by turning their backs on it and so create yet another version of the bourgeois revolt against a consciousness of social relations.⁹

Answering questions of the kind raised by Gramsci: 'What needs does it satisfy? To what aspirations does it respond?' Caudwell suggests that the literature and music of the popular culture divert the attention of the masses (here, the proletariat) from social reality by providing sensual stimulation, and offer an escape from the impoverishment and injustice of everyday life by enabling the consumers of such a culture to fulfil their wishes—but in the imagination. Popular culture, in the modern secularised society, replaces religion as the opium of the people, the flowers which bedeck their chains.

Most Marxist critics would go further than this, and suggest that popular culture is not only diversionary and escapist, but also operates to create a false consciousness in the proletariat by means of the values

it disseminates—that happiness can be achieved by individual success within a competitive, class-divided society, and measured in terms of the material rewards of the consumer culture. (Thus does utilitarianism assimilate individual to social progress). To Gramsci, popular culture is both a means to secure, and an expression of, bourgeois hegemony, which he defines as ‘the “spontaneous” consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life’ by the ruling class, a process which ‘operates without “sanctions” or compulsory “obligations” but nevertheless exerts a collective pressure and obtains objective results in the form of an evolution of customs, ways of thinking and acting, morality, etc.’, so ‘turning necessity and coercion into “freedom”’.¹⁰

European Marxists, from Marx on, have thought of the Marxian philosophy as at the same time encompassing and transcending the whole humanist tradition of European culture—both the high and the popular streams. They have consequently asserted a cultural continuity from the revolutionary expressions of slaves and peasants and the individualist humanism of the pre-capitalist high arts to the potential for a new culture which is created by the proletarian revolution and the construction of socialism. In opposition to elitist critics, Marxists have claimed that the great cultural creations of past ages were unjustly monopolised by social elites in consequence of their wealth and power, and that, in a just society, the products of the high culture would belong to all—not formally, as in a bourgeois democracy, but in living reality. They have accepted the valuation placed on the high culture, but have denied that its continuance depends on the continued existence of an elite. At the same time they have counterposed the possibility of a continuing popular culture (in the sense of popularly created, and expressing the life and aspirations of the common people) to the mass culture imposed on the common people in modern industrial society. In contrast, Chinese Marxists, at least since the Cultural Revolution, have seen virtually the whole of the past culture as being impregnated with ideas which threaten the new, and have denied cultural continuity: ‘The proletariat ... must meet head-on every challenge of the bourgeoisie in the ideological field and use the new ideas, culture, customs and habits of the proletariat to change the mental outlook of the whole of society’.¹¹

In programmatic terms, the European communist countries have sought to make the high culture of the past universally accessible. But they have been ideologically selective about what is to be made available: in the U.S.S.R., Tolstoy and Pushkin are more widely published than is Dostoyevsky, and this seems a matter of policy rather than consumer preference. And the style of presentation of the performing arts (opera, ballet) is frozen at pre-revolutionary standards, while such popular entertainments as the circus and ice-skating have been given a high-art gloss. Their left-wing critics condemn this as a betrayal of proletarian and socialist values: the austere Chinese communists see the popularisation of the pre-revolutionary high arts as involving the perpetuation of

bougeois values and material incentives, while the libertarian Yugoslav film-maker, Dusan Makaveyev (who is now living in the United States), in his deadly satire, *W.R.: The Mysteries of the Organism*, suggests that what is happening is the creation of a new elite and a new authoritarianism. At the same time, the communist regimes (Chinese as well as European) seek to contain and control cultural innovation: the search for new modes of expression is inhibited—because, it is claimed, new modes are inaccessible to the masses ('bourgeois formalism'); contemporary creation is channelled into accepted forms and ideologically accepted content. Communist theory denies in populist terms the high culture/popular culture dichotomy, in its minority/majority as well as its elite/mass aspect; communist practice reduces contemporary creativity to the imperatives of the economic and political base.

(I have here lumped together the Chinese and the European communist regimes. I should say that I do not believe that they are really alike. The cultural policies of the European regimes seem to me to confirm the existence of a new elite, while the policies of Communist China seem to me to be based on egalitarian values. The Chinese rejection of the artistic past (though not of the crafts tradition, which is closely followed), and the infusion of 'proletarian' values into the popular culture, seem to me to mean an impoverishment of the imagination in contemporary Chinese culture. The questions whether this is merely a projection of my own bourgeois-individualist ideology, and whether restriction of the imagination is necessary to the extraordinary material and human advances made by Communist China, present an intellectual and moral dilemma which I have been unable to resolve.)

I moved from discussing the social base of the high and popular cultures to considering the value judgements which are involved in cultural criticism. In fact, I do not share any of the values which I have been describing. I would argue rather for a libertarian Marxist position (I do not regard this as a contradiction in terms, as do many authoritarian Marxists). I do not have space to argue the case in detail, so I will simply assert it. I do not believe that cultural creation, the work of the imagination outside the 'work' process, should be concerned only with enrichment or enlightenment—still less with production or any existing power structures. On the contrary, I believe that both the insights and the 'escapes' that are to be derived from what are called the arts and the entertainments are necessary to living, and that both are subject to aesthetic and moral judgements (by which I mean judgements about what they are doing, and how well they are doing it). I do not find it possible to draw a line between a creative and aware elite and the non-creative and unaware masses; I agree with Gramsci's comment:

There is no human activity from which every form of intellectual participation can be excluded: *homo faber* cannot be separated from *homo sapiens*. Each man ... carries on some form of intellectual activity, that is, he is a 'philosopher', an artist, a man of taste, he participates in a particular conception of the world, has a conscious line of moral conduct, and there-

fore contributes to sustain a conception of the world or to modify it, that is, to bring into being new modes of thought.¹²

What is at issue is how best to extend human understanding of both the existential realities and the inherent possibilities. I do not believe that the use of modern technology and the mass media to communicate works of the imagination is necessarily inconsistent with the creation of works of value, or necessarily depreciates the currency of the imagination. And, speaking from the vantage-point of one who lives within an advanced industrial society, I do not believe that the imagination is narrowly conditioned by, or should serve, the mode of production, or immediate power interests; on the contrary, I believe that the imagination should stand in an alternative and critical relationship to the production process and to all existing power structures.

Given that starting point, I have more to hope for from at least one aspect of popular culture than do most contemporary cultural critics; that is, the counter culture. The counter culture is a 'popular' culture not because it is a majority culture, although some of the values it expresses are widely spread: it is 'popular' because it is outside and in opposition to the norms of the high cultures of both the capitalist and the communist worlds. The counter culture is against the work ethic and for the right to play. It is against the 'reality principle' and for the 'pleasure principle'. It is for the individual's right to be himself, but against any claim to dominate others. It is pluralistic and not monolithic. It does not confront existing power structures; rather, it subverts them by denying the value systems which sustain them. Seeing where science and technology have led us, it denies the moral supremacy of reason; observing the imperatives of consumerism, it denies progress: or at least it seeks to redefine those concepts. The values expressed by the counter culture are not new; they were prefigured by organicists and aesthetes, privileged minorities who had sufficient resources to live according to their lights. What is new is that technology has caught up with the alternative values: the counter culture has become, in the advanced industrial societies, a general possibility. If I am right, its present manifestations anticipate, in crude and exploratory ways, a transformation of values akin to that of the Renaissance and Reformation.

A Marxian social analysis suggests not that culture, in the way I have used the word, is immediately and directly determined by the mode of production, but rather that *the mode of production sets the limits within which the imagination can operate*. Past analyses have, quite rightly, assumed that the possibilities were limited by an economy of scarcity; the uneven distribution of scarce resources created the conditions for a divided culture. Modern technology gives rise, for the first time, to the possibility of a society of plenty (though what constitutes 'plenty' still has to be defined by the argument between the 'progressivists' and the conservationists); the possibility of plenty calls into question the division of society into a privileged elite and an underprivileged mass (and there-

fore the existence of a self-perpetuating ruling class); the cultural dichotomy gives way to a plurality of cultures. A modern Marxian analysis suggests that socialism, having been postulated as a science (necessity), will once again become a utopia (free will).

I began this essay intending to write a brief theoretical introduction to a discussion of Australian popular culture; I now find myself with a rather lengthy opening, and little space left for what happens in Australia. This has its compensations, however: there has been very little discussion in Australia of the problems involved in investigating popular culture, and hopefully the above comments may lead to some discussion; while there has been almost no investigation of Australian popular culture, so there is little to write about, except in an impressionistic and superficial way.

It is possible to look at popular culture in at least four ways:

1. Through content analysis—what are the ideas, values, symbolic meanings which are embodied in or conveyed by the cultural products?
2. Through audience or consumer survey—how many and what kind of people do the products reach? what effects, social and psychological, do they have on the recipients?
3. Through moral and aesthetic judgements—where do the products stand in relation to a given set of values? how is the communication achieved, and how successfully does it operate?
4. Through structural analysis—what position does the popular culture occupy in relation to the economic, political and ideological structures of the society?

It is clearly possible to look at the high culture in just the same ways. It is, however, true that most Australian critics have ignored the popular culture and have confined their discussion of the high culture within the third of these approaches. It is nevertheless possible to offer a sketchy account of the development of Australian popular culture and to suggest further lines of investigation.

The first European settlers in Australia (the willing and the unwilling), leaving England on the eve of the Industrial Revolution, brought two cultures with them—the high culture of the educated and the gentry, in which at least the senior officers of the Establishment had been raised; and at the bottom end of the System—the convicts and rank-and-file soldiers—a rural folk culture, along with the street ballads and the thieves' argot which was the beginning of an urban popular culture. The recreations of the common people were those of the English villages and towns. Their literary expression was based on old world models, although their songs and stories came to express colonial attitudes and experiences. The self-image created by the convicts and bush-workers of this early ballad community has been analysed by Russel Ward in *The Australian Legend* (1958); its elements, Ward says, were an irreverent or hostile attitude towards authority and social pretension; a solidarity in the face of natural difficulty or social injustice; a capacity for initiative

and improvisation in an unfamiliar and often unfriendly environment; a stoic response to discomfort and danger and a concern for present realities rather than the hope of a transcendental future. It can hardly be denied that these elements are central to so much of this popular culture as has survived; social historians, however, continue to debate hotly the extent to which this complex of attitudes was representative of colonial society as a whole and whether it adds up to something that can be called a 'national character'.

Australian society developed in the 19th century within the parameters of industrialisation, urbanisation, universal literacy, and the market economy. This development sounded the death-knell of the orally transmitted culture of early colonial Australia. The bush ballads survived in isolated pockets just long enough for 20th century collectors to save them from oblivion. The village recreations gave way to the codified sports of the cities and to commercialised popular entertainment. The styles and values of the ballad-singers and yarn-spinners achieved formal literary expression in the work of such writers as Henry Lawson, A.B. ('Banjo') Paterson and Joseph Furphy.

The rapid spread of the print medium and of commercial theatre and music-hall swamped the communal creativity of the early ballad community. The post-1945 'folk revival'—springing in Australia as in England and the United States at least partly from a political motive, the desire to keep alive a popular, working-class culture (and in Australia to hold the line against the octopus of the coca-cola culture)—preserved the songs and provided models for 'revival' singers to create new songs, but this was a fringe activity rather than one which grew out of the everyday life of the community. A few sub-cultures continued to create oral cultures of their own—the radical movement, the armed services, the fringe-dwelling Aborigines, the students—but these expressions reached only a limited audience and made little impact on the community at large. Virtually the only continuing general expressions of a popular culture in the old, orally transmitted sense were in the fields of adult bawdry, children's games and rhymes, and graffiti.

To many critics, these cultural expressions seem unworthy of serious attention; yet they reveal significant patterns of behaviour and attitudes to life. A lively exchange continues in these fields: an interesting feature of this is the extent to which it is international, the Australian products replicating those of other English-speaking countries. There is no collection of Australian bawdy stories, but most of those that I have heard appear in Gershon Legman's *Rationale of the Dirty Joke*. Most of the songs in *Snatches and Lays* (edited by 'Sebastian Hockbottle' and 'Simon ffoulkes') and other Australian collections are also to be found in the British and American collections, though there are some notable Australian creations—'The Bastard from the Bush' (attributed to Henry Lawson, as 'Eskimo Nell' is attributed to Robert Service and 'The Ball of Kirriemuir' to Robert Burns); a World War I ballad which contains the memorable lines:

... I'm just back from the shambles in France
 Where whizz-bangs are many and comforts are few
 And brave men are dying for bastards like you;

the World War II 'Ballad of King Farouk'; and a recent parody of a Rolf Harris pop song, 'Pull Me Dungarees Down, Blue'. Even the most ephemeral of all ephemera, graffiti, are part of the international exchange process, as a comparison of *Australian Graffiti* (Rennie Ellis & Ian Turner) with British and American collections, demonstrates.

Bawdry of this kind has traditionally been a male preserve (though Rennie Ellis collected some fascinating example of women's graffiti); an analysis of this material provides significant evidence of popular attitudes towards sexuality. As might be expected, what it reveals is dehumanisation, aggression, guilt, the hostility of men towards women. But what is important is that this is inside evidence, a spontaneous expression, rather than an impressionistic account based on outside observation.

The same point may be made about the folk culture of children—their lore and language, their rhymes and games. My own research in this field (see my collection of children's rhymes, *Cinderella Dressed in Yella*) confirms the existence of an extensive international exchange, though I was unable to discover how this exchange took place. It also confirms the observations of Iona and Peter Opie and other collectors and researchers—that here is a world which has its own rules and *mores*, its own modes of communication, which exist independent of the adult world. One can learn much from this about childhood's awakening perception of sexuality, competition and co-operation, race and class. A study of children's culture offers valuable insights into the processes of learning and socialisation, and the extent to which the children's processes reflect or stand outside the adult processes.

These are all interesting, but not the most significant, aspects of Australian popular culture. Popular recreations and entertainments, habits and standards of behaviour, manners and customs, beliefs and superstitions, language, popular taste—these are perhaps more important, but all await detailed investigation and analysis.

I suspect that irreverence and irony are widely shared Australian attitudes—if you like, aspects of the 'national character'. (The pattern of post-war immigration has made it more difficult than ever to speak in such nebulous terms; I am thinking of attitudes which seem to be widely held by native-born Australians). The demotic language seems to suggest this, though the thirty-year-old pioneering studies of S.J. Baker await further development. And these attitudes seem to me to be central to what can still be called 'Australian humour' (even when other cultural expressions are internationally homogenised, humour clings obstinately to national styles). One of the few graffiti collected by Rennie Ellis which I would regard as being distinctively local (I could be wrong) is the exchange 'I fuck cunts—Bloody snob'. That has the flavour of the authentic Australian put-down. There seems to me to

be a continuity of irreverence and irony running from the bush ballads and the writings of Lawson, Paterson and Furphy, through Lennie Lower's neglected classic, *Here's Luck*, and the vaudeville artists Roy Rene and George Wallace, to contemporary film and television comedians—a humour which cuts pretension down to size and confronts disaster with ironic laughter. The folklorist W.F. Wannan has made a start on Australian humour, but much more extended analysis is needed.

Some work has been done on popular literature and other popular entertainments, but virtually nothing is known about individual leisure pursuits and recreations. Roger Covell and, following him, Humphrey McQueen, have written about music in the home (McQueen commenting, I think wrongly, that piano ownership was evidence of the bourgeoisification of the Australian working class); but little is known about what music was played. (I was brought up on a curious collection called *The Scottish Students' Songbook*—'De Camptown Races' and 'Excelsior'). And what, for example, of the decorative arts (furnishing, clothing), food and drink, card-playing (euchre for the workers, bridge or solo for the middle class, I guess), gardening, motoring, picnics and barbecues? The list is never-ending.

Understandably, analysis of popular literature has been undertaken largely by women investigators seeking to test the proposition (and succeeding in establishing) that the popular fiction of women's magazines presents a set of male-oriented stereotypes of the role of women in domestic and social life. But no one has yet investigated sales of books, or borrowings from the corner libraries, which have now disappeared—or, for that matter, why the corner libraries disappeared. (My own early—1930s—favourites included Dornford Yates, Leslie Charteris, and Clarence E. Mulford; that is, after I had matured beyond *The Magnet* and *The Gem*, *Triumph* and *Champion*. Perhaps that selection reflected my middle-class origins; what did working-class families read)? And, so far as I know, no-one has analysed the writing of what may well be Australia's all-time best-selling author, Frederick J. Thwaites.

The whole area of popular entertainment—theatre, film, radio, television, sports—offers a fascinating insight into the development of modern industrial urban society. A start has been made on the institutional history of theatre, film, radio and television. We know that theatre was the most important public entertainment (except for sports) until about World War I, when film began to replace it. We know that Australia made an early start on film production, and had some early successes, but that the local industry was slowly destroyed by the competition of American imports, especially after sound was added to sight in the 'talkies'. We know that the Australian radio and television industries were an uneasy compromise between the British (national) and American (private enterprise) system. But we know little about the nature of the programmes which were presented, and (except for the market surveys of recent times) what audiences they reached.

It is possible to make some guesses—for example, about television.

In the early days, Australian TV screens were dominated by the Western, which was exclusively an American import. Market research demonstrated the popularity of such programmes; yet, oddly, a Western could not be made in Australia. Superficially, the Australian outback had much in common with the American West. Over many decades, pioneers moved into new territory. The horse figured largely in popular culture. The Australian Aborigines could be compared with the American Indians (although they had a quite different technology and economy). Pastoralists competed with agriculturists for the land. Fire, flood and drought were common hazards. The coming of the railroad transformed the life of the outback, as it did that of the West. But there have been no Australian 'Westerns'. An observant Irishman, Charles Gavin Duffy, suggested the reason in recording his memories of Melbourne when he reached there in 1856, in the middle of the years of gold:

It resembled a settlement in the American Far West in its external aspect, but with the external aspect the resemblance ceased. There was no violence or disorder, no roughs or rowdies. No man carried arms.¹³

There could be no Australian Western because at no time and nowhere in Australia did justice grow out of the barrel of a gun.

The Western gave way to the crime drama on Australian screens; this was a genre which made more sense in a country which had known more crime and punishment than most. No-one has yet made a comparative study of English-language crime dramas; I can only offer some sketchy comments, based on regular viewing over several years. Why do people watch crime dramas? Because, I suspect, it enables them to identify simultaneously with two contradictory impulses—law and disorder. But not all crime dramas express the same attitudes. The archetypal American crime drama, *The F.B.I.*, is not about real live people—does Ephraim Zimbalist Jnr. have a wife? or an ulcer?—but about a universal struggle between personified Right and Wrong. The archetypal British crime drama—*Z Cars* and its many descendants—is only marginally about right and wrong; it is much more about British class structures and patterns of authority; the relationship between Barlow and Watt and their superiors and subordinates is much more important than the relationship between the cops and the crims. The Australian crime dramas—*Homicide*, *Matlock*, *Division Four*—are also only marginally about right and wrong; they are rather about Australian mateship and the ambivalent Australian attitudes towards criminality and law enforcement. I am not suggesting that the writers and producers of these television dramas set out consciously to make these points (though there is some grounds for suspicion in regard to *The F.B.I.*), but that they reflect, and therefore provide an important insight into, the preoccupations and attitudes of the communities in which they live and work.

But the longest lasting, and perhaps the central, Australian concern in popular entertainment has been with spectator sport. A British historian of sport, Dr Percy F. Young, has suggested that he who writes

a history of football also writes a history of the nation, and the claim is not altogether facetious. A favourable climate, the highest degree of urbanisation in the world, and a high level of prosperity have all contributed to the outdoor orientation of Australian popular culture, expressed in travel (Australians live easily with space and distance—an observation which is confirmed by a comparison of the work of Australian and European landscape painters), individual sports such as surfing and skiing, sun-worship, and the mass spectator sports. I have been particularly interested in the history of Australian Rules football (partly because it is an important social phenomenon, and partly because I like the game); and it is not difficult to trace that history from the beginnings of the game as a leisure activity for gentlemen, through the years when it became a leisure pursuit of workers (at about the same time, and for the same reasons, as football became a leisure activity for British urban workers), to the public spectacle which it is today. I have space only for a few quick generalisations about the game as it now is. For the spectators who flock to Australian football, the game provides a ready means of self-identification—with the team which one supports, and with the charismatic players. It is a great leveller; it cuts through class barriers and provides an opportunity for instant communication. For many of the players, it is an important means of social mobility. For many of the administrators, it offers prestige and political advantage. For the media, it is a money-spinner. In a generally uptight community, it provides an outlet for the public expression of emotion. It is cathartic in its effect, a socially-approved means of releasing aggression, and may therefore channel aggression away from more sensitive areas of social life. At the same time as it engages and entertains the spectators, it involves them in a continuing process of aesthetic judgement.

These are only a few examples of the many areas of Australian popular culture which seem to me to justify the serious attention of historians and critics. I would not pretend that my comments are anything more than hasty generalisations based on superficial observation; but it seems to me that this is an area of investigation which should be central for those who wish to develop a serious social critique. I have tried in this essay to do two things: to suggest some of the theoretical problems involved in a study of the sociology of culture, and particularly of popular culture, which deserve far wider discussion in Australia than they have yet had; and to indicate some of the lines along which an investigation of Australian popular culture might proceed. Those who seek to understand society from a broadly Marxian perspective have always confronted the gap which exists between the 'class in itself' and the 'class for itself'—between objective situation and subjective perception, which is defined by the *mores* and values which are embodied in (often assumed by, rather than overtly articulated by) culture. It seems to me important—and it may well also prove to be useful—for critics of the Marxian persuasion to balance against their analyses of social structure an analysis of the culture through which people experience and define their existence

within that structure.

NOTES

- 1 M. Amaya, *Pop as Art* (London, 1972), pp.16-18.
- 2 L. Tolstoy, *What Is Art?* (London, 1898), p.51.
- 3 J. Strutt, *Sports and Pastimes of the People of England* (London, 1801), 1831 edn, pp. xvii-xviii.
- 4 Bishop Thomas Percy, *Reliques of Ancient English Poetry* (1765), preface.
- 5 R. Williams, *Keywords* (London, 1976), p.162.
- 6 A. Gramsci, 'Letters from Prison', *New Edinburgh Review* (tr. Hamish Henderson, no date), pp.9, 14, 25. (These letters were written in the years 1927-29).
- 7 R. Williams, *Keywords*, pp.76 ff. For a more extended discussion, see Williams, *Culture and Society* (1958).
- 8 For these quotations, and a discussion, see Leo Lowenthal, *Literature, Popular Culture, and Society* (Englewood Cliffs, 1961), pp.15 ff.
- 9 C. Caudwell, *Illusion and Reality* (London, 1937), 1947 edn, p.245.
- 10 A. Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks* (London, 1971), pp.12, 242. (The notebooks were written in 1929-35; the individual items are not dated).
- 11 Resolution of the Eleventh Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 8 August 1966. J. Chen (ed.), *Mao Papers* (London, 1970), p.118.
- 12 A. Gramsci, *op. cit.* p.9.
- 13 In *Contemporary Review*, 1888, quoted in K.S. Inglis, *The Australian Colonists* (Melbourne, 1974), p.206.

8

ELITISM IN EDUCATION AND THE RADICAL INITIATIVE

HELEN G. PALMER

There is no necessary connection between socialism and permissiveness.

John P. White¹

I

'The child of poorest parents', said W.J. Stephen, Victorian Attorney General in 1872, 'who is sent without payment to be educated by a master appointed by the State does not receive his education in the way in which a child received education at a charity school in England; but he gets it as one of the advantages derived from living in a free country where all co-operate in supplying the common necessities'.²

Amid the rhetoric with which during the nineteenth century the capitalist countries launched their national systems of education, there were few who put the primary aim of public education more directly than this liberal. Industrial capitalism needed a literate, numerate, working population if management functions were to be put into operation, if instructions were to be followed and skills acquired by its operatives; and with its rise, universal basic education became essential. This was brought about by the only means possible, the creation of national systems of public³ schools, which quickly swept out of existence the patchwork of small private schools, leaving the larger, more powerful ones to consolidate and concentrate on their special function of training a governing elite. The Australian colonies reached this point in the 1860s and 1870s, when the states passed Acts establishing national systems of public elementary education. The fact that much of the debate appeared to be about the role of denominational education should not obscure the point that what was really at issue was the need of industry and commerce for a literate and numerate population.

There is however a second voice always to be heard—a voice of warning. The national systems are to provide for the ruled, not the rulers. This division had been made earlier. While the squattocracy sent their sons to England to be educated as gentlemen and masters, Macquarie,

in 1810, was instructing the Sydney Charity Schools to make their pupils 'dutiful and obedient to their Parents and Superiors, honest, faithful and useful members of Society, and good Christians'. Good operatives had to be able to read, write and figure, but give too much of it and where would we get our hewers of wood and drawers of water? What was envisaged by the fathers of the Education Acts was similarly limited. On the one hand, national education was necessary to prevent the spread of discontent and radical ideas among the masses. It was true that if you taught the masses to read they might read Tom Payne; but they were more likely to be domesticated. On the other hand, education was to be thought of, as even a campaigner for the 8-hour day and the early trade unions, J.J. Casey, said in debate, as a measure that fell within the realm of the state only in relation to 'those children whose education their parents are unable or unwilling to undertake; and those children ought only to be taught the rudiments of primary education'.

For the ruled, the three Rs were enough. But not forever. The third question, late in being posed, concerned the nature of the educational meal provided. Both its quantity and its quality were involved. There was a tendency on the part of the labour movement to ignore this question, as though education were merely another form of welfare service, uncoloured by class values. Those in the movement who were concerned did not attribute class content to education, but limited themselves in the main to criticism of its jingoism and to cultivation of Australian national sentiment. Thus the Victorian ALP Conference of 1929 included two clauses in its programme:

That peace and internationalism be inculcated in the minds of all children attending state schools.

That no articles relating to or extolling wars, battles, or heroes of past wars be printed in state school papers and books.

In 1905, the Federal Labor Party Conference adopted in its platform the aim of 'the cultivation of an Australian sentiment based upon the maintenance of racial purity and the development in Australia of an enlightened and self-reliant community'. The 'racial purity' phrase referred, of course, to the determination of the party to prevent the 'infiltration of cheap labour', but the effect of the whole statement was to make clear the labour movement's independence of cultural as well as economic and political ties with the older countries, notably Great Britain. There was, however, no notion that education itself was a function of the establishment. It is not difficult to find parallels to these concerns in the last quarter of the twentieth century. For instance:

Mr C. C. Brain, the managing director of Australia's biggest employment agency . . . , said this week that job opportunities were very limited for people who could not read or write. They might become factory workers, but they could not become supervisors; they might become labourers, but, without the ability to read and write reports and other relevant material, they would not be appointed foremen. They are condemned to the lower

echelons of industry for life.⁴

In 1977, unemployment has highlighted a fear expressed by Conant:

May not advanced specialised education which leads nowhere make a man a desperately unhappy citizen, and hence an unstable member of the body politic? . . . from frustrated individuals with long education and considerable intelligence society has much to fear.⁵

II

The task facing the public education systems in Australia in the closing years of the twentieth century is difficult enough. According to the Karmel Report,⁶ there are now up to three million children in all schools; in 1974, one million eight hundred thousand were in secondary schools. Population mobility has been marked, particularly from inner to outer suburbs, to the new 'instant' mining towns, from country centres to the city and in the development of new growth centres. In 1973, nearly 1.6 million people notified a change of address. There was a general drift from non-government to government schools, particularly from Catholic primary, parochial schools. The percentage of pupils aged fifteen and over remaining at school rose between 1966 and 1973 from 24 per cent to 34 per cent. In secondary government schools, about one third of the teaching staff was twenty-five years of age or younger in 1974, and one third of the teachers had been teaching for three years or less.

The trends in the Australian economy in the third quarter of the twentieth century were such as to apply the same kinds of pressures to raising educational standards as had the earlier swing from the three Rs to secondary education for all. They were characterised by a number of factors. First, the shrinkage of those employed in primary production. Second, the state's assumption of more and more responsibility for directing the economy. Third, an increase in specialisation (making it less and less likely that the son could 'follow in his father's footsteps'). Fourth, the administration of industry and the economy by immense urban complexes requiring government and private bureaucracies. Fifth, a growth in the tertiary sector of the economy (the professions, the service industries). Sixth, an increase in the mobility of labour. Seventh, an increase in the influence of communications and the mass media.

All these tended to raise the level of education and this, together with the computer revolution, in its turn created huge educational bureaucracies. An additional factor was the raising of the aspirations of the young and of their parents, the second of 'two great elemental sources of education expansion'. The establishment could no longer cling to the concept that there was a 'limited pool of ability' for higher education. In Britain, the Crowther Report of 1959 and the Plowden Report of 1967 rejected this. More were to be educated further.

The technological revolution, as Wyn Williams points out, is different in character from the industrial revolution. The latter

encouraged men to think by breaking down processes (as in the division of labour in industry) into suitably simple mechanical stages. The new revolution does exactly the opposite. It requires that we recognise that new machinery, such as the computer, is based on a cybernetic system of communication; 'feed back' has to be built in so that errors can be corrected. This means that today people are required who are educated in seeing problems *in toto*, rather than specialists trained in the modes of thought of a particular discipline.

Growth of educational bureaucracies made the 'knowledge industry' a prime target for the merchandisers of educational hardware and software. Education is big business, and many big businesses have been quick to buy into the distribution of educational equipment made possible by increased funding of schools and learning institutions such as libraries.⁸ A side effect of this process, and of the teacher shortage, is the development of the pre-packaged teaching programme. Ostensibly a contribution to individualised learning—the pupil pursuing his individual programme at his own rate within an open interactive classroom—it may, as Gwyneth Dow points out, have the opposite effect:

The open classroom that I visited in Sweden was as real as you like. In it two traditional classes had joined together, and one maths teacher and a teacher's aide had replaced the two previous class teachers, although the *real* teacher had become the book, the tape-recorder and the graph in which the child plotted his own progress against the chart that represented the norm expected of him. No need for carpets on the floor: the work demanded the hush of individual busywork—there was little to talk to the teacher about and nothing to say to the chap in the next seat. Occasionally there was movement when the child reported his latest progress score to the aide, who of course had comprehensive records for the whole group.⁹

Moreover, the claim that pre-packaged multi-media kits allow the pupil to range freely among a number of resources is largely specious. The materials selected 'are structured so as to lead to the conclusions implicit in them' (Dow). 'You discover what you are intended to find out'. Books are signed by authors; buying them means selecting according to the author, whose credentials are given, and the publisher. Packaged instant education kits are frequently anonymous; but the impact of the medium gives them authority over the book, and is as prescriptive as the note-giving and note-taking now in disrepute.¹⁰

There is a regular process by which any society transmits its culture. There is a balance to be developed between the provision for training in those minimum skills and attitudes which the economic and social framework requires of the whole population, and those the dominant group considers appropriate for its future governing elite. The more stable the society, the more explicit this distinction, since it can rely on fairly general acceptance. In periods of increased social change,

however, the balance becomes precarious. The kinds of skills demanded by the economy must be redefined, and with them the social relationships and attitudes needed to support the new patterns. Yet this quickly brings under challenge the question of control, for if more is to be required of the ruled, they may become unwilling to leave all the definitions of roles to the rulers. The existence of two forms of education is no longer taken for granted as part of the immutable order of things; the old upstairs-downstairs justifications are no longer universally accepted. As new grounds are constantly sought to justify the retention of power by an elite, so must new ways of guaranteeing their educational advantage be found. But it ceases to be possible to ensure this by educating rulers and ruled entirely separately, as an administrative act. For the concept of an educational elite to be separated from class, it must be justified on educational rather than political grounds. This justification must permeate the whole school system and be propounded by educationists rather than rulers. More than that, it must be such as to be credible to and believed by the ruled. It is with this process that radicals must be concerned.

III

Any class society produces a class education. Australia grew up when money had replaced social rank as a measure of the elite. The twentieth century saw the rise of higher demands for education. Basic literacy and the three Rs were no longer sufficient for the operatives. With more sophisticated form of production, universal elementary education proved inadequate. In the first decades of the century, primary schools added 'primary tops' or became higher elementary schools. The first high schools were established. The bar-line had been raised a notch. Which pupils were to rise above it? The labour movement was insistent that the barrier should not be a financial one; that the public schools should be the base for a system of 'free education, from the primary school to the university'. But there was still need for selection for scarce secondary places among those pupils whose parents could afford to let them stay at school for post-primary education; and this was in the main done by competition for bursaries or scholarships.

Methods of selection for secondary education, and then for the various 'sides' within secondary education—general, technical, commercial and home science—became the concern of educational administrators between the two World Wars. From this flowed an interest in improving methods of selection. And if selection, why not prediction? If pupils could be directed into courses for which they were best suited, much wastage could be avoided. It is from this point that educational psychology, and in particular psychometrics, established itself as a key part of educational administration and ideology. Hence it is relevant to examine the English experience, from which so much of the thinking in Australia derived.

Concern that Britain was falling behind in the race for industrial development, and a rising dissatisfaction with an educational structure that was proving inadequate even for its limited aims, led in the twenties and thirties to demand for the replacement of the hierarchical ladder by 'secondary education for all'—the title of an important statement by R. H. Tawney.¹¹ The Hadow Report of 1926 made some attempt to shift policy towards making secondary education a stage in its own right for all children, not merely an afterthought at the top of the elementary school; and it foreshadowed the raising of the school leaving age to fifteen.¹² The Report was soon under frontal attack. To provide a framework of secondary education for *all* adolescents would mean lowering the quality of existing secondary schools—'sacrificing' the 'academic 10 per cent' to 'the great majority of the child population [who] must leave school to take up wage earning occupations . . .' However, as the wider ambitions of the Report were whittled away by the economies of the late twenties and the depression years, it became clear that it had already sold the pass by confining its formulations too closely within the educational assumptions of the existing hierarchical order. During the thirties it was this emphasis on the differing 'needs' of children that enabled the opponents of secondary education for all to open the flood gates to an era of elitism with a new theoretical base.

The history of the rise of the cult of 'intelligence testing' has been amply documented.¹³ It is perhaps sufficient here to quote the form in which it appeared as the theoretical underpinning of the Spens Report of 1938, which set the pattern for English education for decades to follow:

Intellectual development during childhood appears to progress as if it were governed by a single central factor, usually known as 'general intelligence', which may broadly be described as innate all-round intellectual ability. It appears to enter into everything which the child attempts to think, to say, or do, and seems on the whole to be the most important factor in determining his work in the classroom.

The Board, adds the Report, had been assured by its 'psychological witnesses' that this factor of general intelligence could be approximately measured by intelligence tests, and hence that it was possible at a very early age 'to predict with some degree of accuracy the ultimate level of a child's intellectual powers'. It followed from this that 'Different children from the age of eleven, if justice is to be done to their varying capacities, require types of education varying in certain important respects'. The definition of 'types of abilities' became, in the Norwood Report of 1939,¹⁴ different 'types of mind'. These were basically three: the pupil who 'is interested in learning for its own sake, who can grasp an argument or follow a piece of connected reasoning'; second, the pupil 'whose interests lie markedly in the field of applied science or applied art'; and third, the pupil who 'deals more easily with concrete things than with ideas . . . abstractions mean little to him . . . His horizon is near, and within a

limited area his movement is generally slow'. For these, the Report recommended essentially the tripartite division of schools that already existed—grammar, technical and 'modern'. As an educational historian remarked, the suggestion seemed to be 'that the Almighty has benevolently created three types of child in just the proportions which would gratify educational administrators'.

Every word of such definitions was to carry its full weight in decades to come. The 'general intelligence' factor was essentially *innate*; education and opportunity would not affect it. It did not vary; so it could not only be used to predict, but set a limit to intellectual development. Its existence justified streaming within the school as well as a tripartite division between schools. As the 'g' factor was innate it was also culture-free, provided tests were skilfully designed to isolate it from its culture. Being innate, it was distributed throughout the community according to the normal curve; and if results showed that the top end tended to contain a higher proportion of the children of bank managers and doctors and the bottom end the children of miners and process workers, then this was further evidence that it was the level of innate general intelligence that had placed them in these social categories in the first place. The concept of the different 'needs' of children became transmuted into the concept of differing and immutable abilities, or degrees of educability. It provided the perfect justification for differentiation of schools and within schools, with an aura of scientific objectivity (the tests were often called 'objective tests'). It also provided an administrative formula upon which educational decisions could be taken out of the hands of educators and placed in those of experts. As the leading theorist, Cyril Burt, put it in a broadcast talk as late as 1950:

Obviously, in an ideal community, our aim should be to discover what ration of intelligence nature has given to each individual child at birth, then to provide him with the appropriate education, and finally to guide him into the career for which he seems to have been marked out.

Although this view of intelligence in children blossomed into a full-grown, comprehensive view of human intelligence, it is important to remember the context. This was quite specific. It coincided with the need of the ruling class in mid-century Britain to find justification, within a framework that could still operate under the banner of 'secondary education for all', for keeping entry to what was regarded as 'real' secondary education—embodied in the grammar school—selective. Quite simply, there were few places and many applicants. A method more acceptable than financial limitations was needed. The concept of selection by IQ was scientific, respectable, self-fulfilling. The theory led to the retention of the grammar school for the elite, the spread of the secondary modern schools for those who failed to gain entry. The critical view led to the demand for comprehensive secondary schools.

It is significant that, while the theory of the IQ was well known in Australia (successive generations of teacher trainees studied Hadow,

Spens, Norwood and the work of Burt), the critique was not. Partly, no doubt, because its strongest spokesmen were Marxist; partly—and this is related—because it took some time to become consolidated into a comprehensive form which could get beyond isolated dissatisfactions with the hierarchical system and tackle IQ theory at the roots; partly because Australian administrators also felt no need to look for a critique of the selection and streaming to which Australian school systems were committed. The critique gathered strength in the late forties, and became part of the campaign for comprehensive schools in which the labour movement was increasingly involved. It claimed that the theory rested on ‘circular arguments and unproven assumptions’. Although the theory’s supporters claimed that they could provide an objective criterion of ‘intelligence’, the psychometrists were acting without any scientific frame of reference, for there could be none. Consequently all that they were measuring was the performance by pupils at a set of tasks, formulated in a specific educational context—the need to separate the few from the many—and a particular social context—the existence of class society, and of an educational system that reflected it. This measurement they then assumed to represent a factor to be called ‘general intelligence’. It was also assumed to be innate and, like height and eye colour, distributed in the community according to the normal curve. Given this assumption, as Simon points out, ‘All tests are so constructed that the results *must* fall into this pattern; indeed, a test which does not produce this pattern is considered to be a “bad” test of “intelligence” and so never put into use’.

In a restatement of their position, the psychometrists¹⁵ modified some of their original claims. Thus, it was admitted that education received could have some effect on ‘intelligence’; that ‘most of the abilities we wish the tests to measure are also affected by social class’; and on the question of the distribution of ‘intelligence’ according to the normal curve, ‘It is true that no conclusive proof that intelligence is so distributed can be adduced, and that the distribution of the scores of IQ’s we actually obtain from most tests approximate to the normal type simply because of the manner in which the tests are constructed’. What was *not* admitted was that if these admissions were necessary, the claim of the psychometrists to a general theory of innate intelligence was destroyed. If the ‘intelligence’ factor could be influenced by education—that is, could no longer be considered innate—then it could no longer be used to measure ‘educability’ or set limits to ‘educational potential’; and the quality of the education children received became crucial. If it could no longer be claimed that testing could be ‘culture-free’, then it was saying nothing new, but merely confirming an advantage or disadvantage that the social system already created. If the application of the normal curve distribution to ‘intelligence’ was merely a useful statistical hypothesis, then to base tests upon it was merely to make them an instrument in a self-fulfilling prophecy. And if all of these things were true, no universal educational theory had been enunciated, and what

was left was merely a device for selecting the few most likely to fit into the English grammar school.

IV

If dependence on IQ theory was never as complete in Australia as in England, the assumptions upon which it rests remain as pervasive as ever. While it is no longer acceptable to make selection for various forms of secondary school, or various 'streams' within the secondary school, dependent upon the IQ alone, the IQ mixed in various formulae with tests of performance—for example, in the form of the 'composite mark' in NSW—travels with the pupil through his school career in some states. Such a mark is frequently consulted at the end of the pupil's schooling when examination marks in various subjects are 'weighted' as part of the procedure for tertiary selection. The Karmel Commission worked on the assumption that disadvantaged children are to be found in disadvantaged areas—'Australia's most underprivileged neighbourhoods'—and found 1023 schools with about 13 per cent of the country's pupils in that category.

The Karmel Report has aroused the special ire of the elitists because of its concern for educational 'outcomes', not merely equality of educational opportunity. *Equality of opportunity, offered to competitors who have unequal starts, merely perpetuates inequalities that already exist.* For the elitist, however, equality of outcomes is a heresy, as James McAuley, a leading spokesman for the intellectual Right, said in an address to the New South Wales Liberal Party soon after the publication of the Karmel Report:¹⁶

In pursuance of its egalitarian 'philosophy' the Schools Commission proclaims 'an emphasis on more equal outcomes from schooling'. Not more equal opportunities merely, but more equal outcomes. Schools are inhabited by middle and upper-level students with ability and drive and by low-level students with poor aptitudes and motivation. If you give equal opportunities to the able students to realise their potential on high-culture material suited to their needs, it is pretty certain that the gap will widen between what they achieve and what the unwilling student will achieve. The only way in practice to produce 'more equal outcomes' is to flatten down the top . . . [The more able] are entitled to matriculate into the high culture and not be held down to populist mediocrity.

In reply, Dr K. R. McKinnon, Chairman of the Schools Commission, denied that giving extra assistance to disadvantaged children would result in 'conformity or levelling down'.

Of course, this will result in diversity of individual achievement, but not, one hopes, differences between boys and girls, rich and poor, town and country, migrants and native-born, or black and white.¹⁷

There are other Australian critics who challenge more directly the elitists' 'high culture' approach. For example, the views of Stephen

Knight, Associate Professor of English at Sydney University, are reported as follows:

Professor Knight, on the other hand, argues that 'high' culture may have little relevance to today's students. The principle behind the 'high' culture, as defined by Matthew Arnold and propagated by Dr F. R. Leavis, is that there is a type of approach which trains you for life, he said. 'Nobody denies that fine literature and fine music is a grand thing. But is this the only type of culture? And is it necessarily the type of culture which should be forced on students?' He said he was in agreement with the Schools Commission that culture is more broadly based.¹⁸

The charge that education is middle class and that it teaches working-class children to despise and reject their own culture hangs heavily on arguments about language. Bernstein¹⁹ described the language of the working class (though there is much argument about the term) as being of a 'restricted' character, in the sense that it could not reach out to certain kinds of meanings, and limited the power of the speakers to understand their environment. It was 'context-bound', not suited to universal or generalised statement, and restricted working-class children educationally. Standard speech, more the currency of the middle class and certainly the language of education, was capable of 'context free' use and operated an 'elaborated' as opposed to a restricted code. Bernstein's views, his critics claim, are based on insufficient study of the actual speech of children. In particular Labov,²⁰ in analysing the speech of Negro children in America, points to its richness and immediacy and suggests that standard English as used by the middle class is 'middle class verbosity'. 'We know that people who use these stylistic devices are educated people, and we are inclined to credit them with saying something intelligent.' Rosen²¹ attacks Bernstein's work as a dogma that has had a dangerous effect on the education of working class children: 'Whereas in the fifties (they) had their IQs branded on their forehead, in the sixties more and more of them had the brand changed to "restricted" or "elaborated"'. He sums up:

In all that I have said I may possibly have given the impression that I believe that working-class speech is as fine an instrument as could be devised for communication and thinking, and that middle-class speech is pretentious verbiage. That would be absurd romanticism. I *am* saying that the relationship between class and speech cannot be described or understood by the usual sociological methods. Working-class speech has its own strength which the normal linguistic terminology has not been able to catch. There is no sharp dividing line between it and any other kind of speech, but infinite variations in the deployment of the resources of language. I do not think there are aspects of language usually acquired through education which, given favourable circumstances, give access to more powerful ways of thinking; but given the conditions of life of many strata of the middle class, the language acquired through education can conceal deserts of ignorance. Moreover, the middle class have often to pay the price for the acquisition of certain kinds of transactional

language, and that is loss of vitality and expressiveness, and obsession with proprieties.

The Karmel Report is unequivocal in its attitude to this controversy:

It is, in the Commission's view, romantic nonsense to maintain that the development of effective English usage, intellectual competency or opportunities to discover enthusiasms not available through the child's home are simply attempts by one group to impose its culture on others. Non-standard forms of English usage, for example, are equally valid with standard ones as a means of social exchange within a limited group of people. Their range, however, does not encompass the more sophisticated and generalised language usage required for everyday life in a society whose business is conducted in standard language forms; nor do they give access to the ideas or forms and higher and further study with which power, incomes and status are closely allied in industrial societies. It is true that the forms of knowledge valued in schools and associated with power in the society largely represent the accumulated culture of ascendant social groups. It is therefore important that valued knowledge should be approached from other social perspectives and the achievements of other groups appreciated. But, despite their historical associations, there is nothing necessarily middle class about logic, mathematics, science, art or any of the other ways through which the human race has reflected upon or sought to order understanding.

V

Radical teachers, students and parents are confronted in Australia today with a number of questions in the field of education on which it is not easy to determine a radical position. Is illiteracy widespread, and growing? Or is what appears to be illiteracy merely a reflection of the increased area of knowledge a pupil has to be familiar with? Has the knowledge explosion changed the whole pattern of education, making it more important for the pupil to know how to find his way among sources of information than to learn and remember information? Or are the schools simply failing to give a grounding in the three Rs? Have audio and visual methods of communication replaced reading and writing in the modern world, and the computer transformed the concept of numeracy? Or are these skills still the basis of the transmission of culture?

Does the fact that the schools are now educating for the year 2000 mean that current knowledge will then be out of date, and that schools should therefore be training in methods of acquiring knowledge rather than supplying knowledge itself? Or will there always be a corpus of knowledge that can be defined within each subject area, and without which it is impossible for the citizen to speak as an educated man? Should courses of study be designed by the participants to suit the needs of a particular locality or skilled population? Or centrally designed to reflect such a common body of knowledge? Is the study of mankind best pursued by a broad topic or thematic approach, overlapping and

drawing on all the disciplines? Or do the disciplines provide a framework within which the systematic study can best be pursued? Should Social Studies replace History and Geography? If the child learns by proceeding from the known to the unknown, the nearer to the further, should the study of mankind begin with the family at home, the neighbourhood and the local government and proceed outwards? Or with simpler forms of society and proceed chronologically towards the more complex?

Are courses of study made more relevant to alienated youth by centring on current topics, contemporary literature and art? Or is relevance ageless? Should students have a greater say in the content and method of their studies? Or is this an area whose nature is predetermined by society's needs? Should parents take a greater part in the shaping of the school's educational programme? Or is this a field in which the educationist must have professional decision? Are school patterns too rigid and rigorous to fit today's lifestyles? Or too permissive? Should there be less schooling? Or more?

On such questions it is not possible for the radical to take a position on the basis of whether the point of view is generally called 'progressive' or 'traditional'. In the first place, 'progressive' trends are often found on further scrutiny to be rather the result of a bureaucracy handing over the reins of a steed which it can no longer control. With the explosion in school numbers and educational expectation, the centralised authority can no longer prescribe with the certainty and assurance which it could exercise when educational provision was smaller and circumscribed; it therefore hands to the schools and to educators the appearance of an autonomy they are insufficiently staffed and provided to exercise. Of the size of the task of the school systems there can be no doubt. Simultaneously students of the knowledge explosion have pointed to the fact that henceforth the sheer volume of knowledge means that nobody can expect to remain a specialist for a lifetime in even a tiny corner of it. There will be no more Renaissance Man. With the explosion in the volume of knowledge went the certainty of what was essential and permanent in any part of it. Given such a flux, educational bureaucracies abandoned any hope of directing a process they could no longer control, and flung the reins to the participants.

There is a second reason why radicals cannot be satisfied to take an educational stance according to the progressive/traditional dichotomy. This is, that far from representing capitalist and anti-capitalist trends, both fulfil in different ways the demands that capitalism makes on its educational systems in differing phases. The nature of these demands will be dealt with later. *It is the main argument of this essay that the fundamental cleft in educational thinking is not between progressive and traditional, but between those who believe that there should be one form of education for rulers and one for the ruled, and those seeking a more egalitarian approach.*

Progressive education was brought to public attention in Australia

by the visit in 1937, organised by an English body called the New Education Fellowship (NEF), of a group of speakers from ten countries. Progressive education, pioneered by people like Montessori and Homer Lane, had taken form in England as a reaction to the rigours and patriotic direction of education during World War I. On the individual level, progressives tended to follow philosophies such as that enunciated by Homer Lane:

Human nature is innately good; the unconscious processes are in no way immoral. Faults are not corrected by, but brought about by, suppression in childhood . . . The freer a child is, the more it will be considerate and social, and more its chief interests will be progressive and the more its fundamental instinct, always to find new difficulties to conquer, will have valuable outlets. It is the attempt to create a conscience in children which leads in adults to unconscious conflict and neurotic inefficiency. A 'conscience' cannot be imposed.²²

The pioneer progressives saw the child in terms of a metaphor:

. . . people have not realised that development can only come from within and cannot come from without. The living plant must develop its own cells; the most skilful gardener is incapable of producing in the plant even the most imperfect and rudimentary growth of cells. The best he can do is to provide conditions which will favour development—nourishment, air, space.²³

Specifically, as Montessori told an NEP conference in 1929, the essential thing was not to think of how to teach the child, or how to influence him for his own intellectual good, but of how to construct about him an environment adapted to his development, and then to leave him to develop freely. At this fundamental level, the progressives accepted a view that was consistent with belief in the innate capacities of the child. They were in fact not much concerned with his intellectual development, or with the relatively disadvantaged position of the children of the working class (in the main school systems)—an ignoring assisted by the fact that most of their models were small private schools outside the mainstream. Some, it is true, recognised rather cursorily the need for what Dr Harold Rugg called the 'social heritage' factor in training—'that part of the social heritage that must definitely be accepted by all, e.g. the multiplication table, the principles of mechanics, the decencies of life'. But in general their insistence that growth must come 'from within the child himself', with the function of the educator being that of providing 'an environment perfectly adapted to his life' (Montessori), assumed that all the elements of growth were within the child at birth, and that the process of unfolding from within would, given the absence of restraints, take place automatically. This placed them in an idealist position.

The NEF visit provided a rare outside view of Australian education and found it over-centralised and under-funded. (Professor F. Hart, visiting the school at Kalgoorlie, found it 'the world's poorest school

in the world's richest mile'.) The publication in Australia of the report of the 1937 NEF conference, 'Education for Complete Living', and further visits by speaking teams in 1946 and 1949, gave an impetus to progressive thinking in the state systems. The progressives 'believed in the value of composite subjects, such as social studies rather than history and geography, child centred schools rather than teacher dominated ones, co-operation rather than competition, and internationalism rather than nationalism'.²⁴

For practical purposes, this reinforced the elitist position that children have innate capacities that provide a limit to their intellectual growth. The progressives with their emphasis on child-centred schools and the many-sided development of the child tended to give support to the 'types of children' theory. A favourite example of the project approach current during the thirties and forties was that of a social studies project. The class was following an air race from London to Sydney, and each day noted the progress of the aviators and the countries over which they were flying. The pupils shared the work, each contributing his part. Pupil A was good at research; his role was to read about the countries covered in the encyclopaedia and report to the class. Pupil Z was good at handwork; his role was to cut out and place in position the flags for each team of aviators. The point of the example was to demonstrate that there should be parity of esteem between the contributions made by the two children, since each was contributing according to his ability. Such instances, implicit in the project approach, are an example of the essentially idealist position of progressive education. Moreover

Many of the progressivist ideas are a form of paternalist social control, developed precisely out of the selective ethos as realised in colleges of education—i.e. embodying the Black Paper assumption that working-class children must be entertained or kept busy rather than taught, because they are incapable of intellectual achievement. This element in progressivism is indeed an impediment to developing the qualities of citizenship that are necessitated as a common bond by the present predicament of society: a broad knowledge of the state of the world and how it got to be so; an understanding of the limitations and provisional nature of any view of the world, i.e. an understanding of the forms of knowledge; the skills and confidence to be active in public affairs; environmental alertness and technological inventiveness; an understanding of the means of communication to which we are all subject; an imaginative interest in unfamiliar cultures; and so on.²⁵

Public education today comes under criticism from a new direction. The elements of this criticism have been building up for a long time; but it has emerged as a coherent theory only in the last ten or fifteen years. The in-words are an index of the period: escalation, pollution, rat race, racism, ZPG, multiversity, establishment. And the words marking the response: drop-out, student revolt, black power. It is no accident that many of the gurus whose paperbacks flood the bookstalls drew their insights or their experience from the Third World—that source of much

of the vital energy that has led young people all over the world to take heart about the future of *homo sapiens* and vote against the established order with their feet. More, they say, is not only not better; more is probably worse. Our sacred cow—the minimum school leaving age that prevented society from exploiting little children—emerges in Paul Goodman's title as 'Compulsory MIS-Education'. But let us be clear what they are talking about. It is, in Illyich's word, *schooling*—the whole structure, from primary to tertiary, of subject divisions, prerequisites, selection, grading, certificates, passes and failures, that traps children into a compulsory lock-step and makes the years from five to six onwards until they fall by the wayside, a series of competitive obstacle events.

'School is dead', says Erich Reimer. For one thing, it is too expensive. No country in the world can afford to give the quantity of modern schooling people expect to *all* young people; even in the few rich nations, the money spent on the schooling of an elite consumes such a proportion of the resources that the less privileged are condemned to exclusion. Schooling is the great monolithic secular orthodoxy of our time; it must be disestablished. It is schooling, says Goodman, that confines a generation of young people within a sterile framework at the very time when they are crying out for experiences giving scope for their spontaneity, creativity, sexuality. Paul Friere is concerned with the processes by which the people of the Third World—doubly oppressed by the metropolitan culture and the local and usually imitative power elites—can break through their double alienation. Genuine education, he says, cannot be neutral; it is either for domestication or for freedom. Friere sees the de-mystification of language, 'showing what words really stand for' in terms of social reality, as an instrument of liberation. Illyich too, attacks the monopolistic grip of schooling. Both in the richer industrialised countries and the others, he says, 'the mere existence of school discourages and disables the poor from taking control of their own learning. All over the world the school has an anti-educational effect on society; school is recognised as the institution which specialises in education. The failures of school are taken by most people as a proof that education is a very costly, very complex, always arcane and frequently almost impossible task'. So we must develop alternatives to schooling, in other words, if we are to have education. Alternatives that are not institutionalised, but form from 'networks of people' of all ages and skills and interests, learning those things they wish to, when they wish to, in ways they wish to.

If the summary above gives the impression that the gurus of de-schooling are cloudy visionaries out of touch with the world, it needs correction. In their critique of the role of schooling in contemporary society they are dealing substantially with what *is*. For many students, schooling is sterile, unrelated to life, a necessary evil because it is their only path to a meal-ticket. My argument is not so much with the gurus as with their followers—those, at least, who have not thought their position through beyond the slogans. We *do* need to develop every possible kind

of alternative to lock-step schooling. We *do* need to break the monopoly that schooling has over the process of learning, because it is a monopoly that excludes. But the young radical who votes against the system with his feet—who, like Stork, is ready at any moment to get hold of a bike and a few beads and set off for the Ganges—comes from a social group that has the initial advantages. He has had his educational ‘good start’; with that under his belt, he can opt out, and, at any time he chooses, opt in again. The affluent society offers this freedom only to a few. For the majority of Australian children, all choices are not open. Their environment is not rich in any values that can be of use to children. It is merely glossy. The reverse side of glossy is shoddy—and children are a prime target for exploitation in the consumer society. Their environment does not open windows to stimulating experiences or beckon them forward with an invitation to explore a wider world. They must find their sense of their own worth, their place in the scheme of things, their satisfactions and their budding interests where they are, or not at all. And for better or worse, they are in the schools.²⁶

Apart from a ritual gesture towards the needs of ‘children with special learning difficulties’, the manifesto for the Australian Council for Educational Standards, another attack on the Australian public schools, reads as if the only children in the educational system were in its ‘A’ stream, destined for the tertiary level. The statement is open to criticism not so much because it is a prescription for non-change, or because it warns against the spread of ‘an anti-intellectual approach in the name of “progressive education”’ (a genuine criticism, as indicated earlier in this essay), or because it could be written about a no-man’s land independent of time or space so completely does it disregard the special problems of our time. It is open to criticism because it is so patently concerned with an elite reproducing itself. It provides, as it were, a closed room, with the great majority of children with their concerns and problems left outside.

VI

Several years ago Doug White identified three models of curriculum that could be abstracted from Australian education:

The first is that of top-down instructions, prescribed course of study and textbooks, external examinations, fully-occupied student time, rigid rules of conduct for teachers and students, inspection and checking from above. In this kind of system, students learn that it is necessary to abide by the rules, that coercion is a fact of life and that knowledge is something objective and in the possession of the authorities. This is the kind of school education which is everywhere passing away, though not without its death spasms, as the frequent battles in high schools over such issues as hair length and uniforms indicate. The kind of theory and research which accords with this makes assumptions, for example, about fixed abilities and is concerned with the best methods of getting knowledge across.

A second model can be built around the idea of the professional teacher,

a more independent, flexible and widely knowledgeable person. There is more doubt now about certainties in knowledge, and prescribed syllabuses and external examinations are regarded as of doubtful validity. The social and education systems are still accepted as given, but students must be prepared for a variety of roles within them—even ones which do not yet exist. Social consensus is still taken to be both valid and 'right', but conflict and change are important in establishing it. The emphasis changes from agreed 'content' in knowledge and courses of study, to agreed skills and methods which are supposed to equip students to operate in a variety of institutionalized roles. Some study of society is introduced into the curriculum. Old-style examinations become replaced by tests of developed ability, still externally set, with those developed by the ACER for the Commonwealth Secondary Scholarship Examinations as a prototype. Selection of students is based upon their skills, and also upon the willingness of students to participate within the framework laid down for them. As in many other ways, the Australian National University leads here, and has already begun its selection of students based partly on the opinion of secondary schools on the 'suitability' of their students . . . This kind of education is emerging throughout Australia.

A third model lurks within the second and to a certain extent has always been present in education even if only in the outlying areas of the honours section of some university departments, in 'progressive' private schools and in kindergartens. Knowledge, and social organization in general, is regarded as a social product. The essential characteristics of the development of abstract, general understanding are that those involved in their production are working on problems that concern them, that in this they make contact with others who have something to offer in the solution of them, and that this is not hampered by authority or the definition of the area of work by experts. In such an education the separation of teacher and student roles becomes blurred, for all are learning, although they will bring different experience and abstractions from that experience to the situation. Social arrangements are made, in principle, by the participants—they do not fit into previously-defined role patterns. Such an approach to education leads into irreconcilable conflict with imposed authority patterns.²⁷

For such a model as the third to operate there would have to be the abandonment of the concept that the development of human powers depends on the interaction of heredity and environment. As Brian Simon says:

Perhaps the most important lesson learned from Soviet psychologists in relation to the problem of 'intelligence' testing, is that its very point of departure—which determines the whole direction and nature of investigations and the interpretation of findings—is very much open to question; that is, the concept that human mental powers depend on the interaction of heredity and environment. This assumption, dating back to the biological origins of psychometry at the close of the nineteenth century, necessarily delimits findings for it can only be postulated either that heredity is the chief factor at work (which in the present state of knowledge is speculation, however thick the cloud of statistics) or that 'environment' (the vaguest of general categories confusing together influences of

a qualitatively different order, natural and social) is the major influence. The only other way out of an arid controversy is to suggest, as has recently been common form, that more allowance ought to be made for continued interaction between these two 'factors'. The point to be made here is that the initial assumption rules out an understanding of the specific role of education in the social environment and activity of human beings. Only by eliminating preconceived ideas about the nature of human development, which equate this with animal development, and by taking integral account of the social context can there be an objective approach to study of the specific qualities of human learning and the role of education in the formation of social man . . .²⁸

Moreover such a model must be based on an entirely new learning theory such as that enunciated by Soviet educational psychologist, A.R. Luria:

It is now generally accepted that in the process of mental development there takes place a profound qualitative reorganisation of human mental activity, and that the basic characteristic of this reorganisation is that elementary, direct, activity is replaced by complex functional systems, formed on the basis of the child's communication with adults in the process of learning. These functional systems are of complex construction and are developed with the close participation of language, which as the basic means of communication with people is simultaneously one of the basic tools in the formation of human mental activity and in the regulation of behaviour. It is through these complex forms of mental activity . . . that new features are acquired and begin to develop according to new laws which displace many of the laws which govern the formation of elementary conditioned reflexes in animals.²⁹

It is only on such a basis that the left can make decisions about immediate educational problems. For instance, on the Tyndale School crisis, John P. White comments:

There is no necessary connection between socialism and permissiveness. The democratic left has excellent reasons for taking a strong stand on the content of education. Despite its differences, it has long been animated by a picture of a better society than our own—one where people fraternally co-operate in the promotion of their own and others' well-being, are impatient with privilege and injustice and allow full weight to individuals' demands for spheres of privacy and non-interference. A condition of such a society is that its members are *conscious* of what it is to be a citizen of such a polity. This demands knowledge of the moral principles underlying a social democracy, the broad understanding of science, literature, art, history and other things necessary to understand what one's own or others' well-being may consist in and to make informed political decisions.³⁰

The kinds of skills that radicals would like to see the schools develop in young people are not so different from those that are generated during any popular action—such as a community action group. There, the original impulse of protest is added to by the calling in of citizens with varying contributions to make—expertise, know-how, confidence and, not the least, the mixture of militancy and absence of subservience to the Establishment that in the end is the only amalgam that will bring

about social change.

It is to questions such as these that radicals must now address themselves.

NOTES

- 1 'Tyndale and the Left', in *Forum* (Spring 1977).
- 2 *Hansard*, Victoria, 8 May 1872.
- 3 In this essay, the term 'public' is used to describe government-provided schools. Although it has its relevance to élitism, the system of Public Schools—that is non-government schools—is not dealt with here.
- 4 *Sydney Morning Herald*, 4 June 1975.
- 5 J. B. Conant, *Education in a Divided World* (1949).
- 6 Schools Commission, *Report for the Triennium, 1976/78* (June 1975).
- 7 Wyn Williams, in *Democracy and Education* (1970).
- 8 For instance, 3M Australia Pty Ltd, which supplies a large proportion of the electronic hardware to Australian schools, grew from the Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing (Aust.) Pty Ltd. Bell and Howell has passed largely into American hands.
- 9 Gwyneth M. Dow, "'Teacher-proof' Resources", in *The Secondary Teacher* (Melbourne, October 1971).
- 10 A lavish multi-media kit—strip films, tapes and a brochure—put out by the Encyclopedia Britannica on South East Asia contains a segment on China. It contains the throwaway phrase, 'Although the Great Leap Forward failed . . . '.
- 11 R. H. Tawney, *Equality for All* (London, 1920).
- 12 However, care must be taken to see that the secondary stage is 'sufficiently elastic, and contains schools of sufficient variety of type, to meet the needs of all children . . . Thus all go forward, though along different paths. Selection by differentiation takes the place of selection by elimination'.
- 13 In this section the author is indebted to the work of Professor Brian Simon in particular, *Intelligence, Psychology and Education—a Marxist Critique* (Lawrence and Wishart, London 1971), and *The Politics of Educational Reform, 1920-1940* (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1974).
- 14 *Report of Consultative Committee on Secondary Education* (HMSO, 1938).
- 15 Notably in P. E. Vernon (ed.), *Secondary School Selection: A British Psychological Society Enquiry* (1957).
- 16 *Sydney Morning Herald*, 18 August 1975.
- 17 *Sydney Morning Herald*, 21 August 1975.
- 18 From a report in *University of Sydney News*.
- 19 Basil Bernstein, 'A Critique of the Concept of "Compensatory Education"', in Rubenstein & Stoneman (edd.), *Education for Democracy* (Penguin, 1970).
- 20 William Labov, 'The Logic of Nonstandard English', in Williams & Markham (edd.), *Language and Poverty: Perspectives on a Theme* (Chicago, 1970).
- 21 Harold Rosen, *Language and Class—A Critical Look at the Theories of Basil Bernstein* (Folding Wall Press, Bristol, 1972).
- 22 Homer Lane, *Talks to Parents and Teachers*.
- 23 Craddock, 'Self-government and the growth of character', in *The Creative Self-Expression of the Children*.
- 24 Alan Barcan, 'The Transition in Australian Education', in Cleverley & Lawry (edd.), *Australian Education in the Twentieth Century* (Longman, 1972).
- 25 Gabriel Chanan, 'Levels of debate and levels of control: research and the Black Papers', in *Forum* (Autumn 1976).
- 26 Here, I have drawn upon Helen Palmer, 'Education is good, so more education is better', *Heresies* (Australian Broadcasting Commission, 1974).
- 27 Doug White, 'Education and Capitalism', in J. Playford & D. Kirsner (edd.), *Australian Capitalism* (Penguin Political Science series, 1972).
- 28 Brian Simon, introduction to *Intelligence, Psychology and Education* (Lawrence and Wishart, 1971).
- 29 A. R. Luria, quoted in Brian Simon, 'Contributions of Soviet Psychology', *ibid*.
- 30 John P. White, 'Tyndale and the Left', in *Forum* (Spring 1977).

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